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Summary 
 
This thesis, which addresses an innovation studies audience, deals with a neglected 
topic in the study of socio-technical transitions: the destabilisation and decline of 
established industries. While most of the transitions literature focuses on the emergence 
of novelty, this thesis investigates the productive role of destabilisation and processes of 
unlocking of existing regimes. 
The research question is: 
How can we understand the unfolding of industry destabilisation processes? 
To answer this question, this thesis aims to make theoretical contributions by 
developing an integrative framework that overcomes shortcomings in existing views of 
destabilisation. Insights from a number of different approaches are mobilised as 
‘building blocks’ for theoretical elaboration. Destabilisation is understood as a process 
involving: 1) multiple interacting pressures, 2) industry strategies and responses to 
(economic and legitimacy) challenges, and 3) decreasing commitment to industry 
regime rules. The theoretical perspective addresses: a) destabilisation as a long-term 
unfolding process, b) the multi-dimensional and co-evolutionary nature of 
destabilisation, and c) the role of normative problems in destabilisation. 
To assess the robustness of the conceptual perspective, the thesis studies three cases of 
destabilisation: 
- The destabilisation of the British coal industry in the transition from the 
omnipresence of coal to a four-fuel economy (1880-1967) 
- The destabilisation and decline of British deep coal mining in the electricity sector 
(1967-1997) 
- The destabilisation of coal use in the transition towards low-carbon electricity 
(1990-2011). Possible revival? 
The case studies show the usefulness of the conceptual framework. The analysis of 
patterns and causal mechanisms further identifies similarities and differences of 
destabilisation pathways in the cases. Specificities in the kinds, rates, interaction and 
timing of these dynamics produce different destabilisation patterns.
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1 Introduction: the destabilisation of socio-technical 
systems 
This thesis is about the destabilisation of established industries. Industry destabilisation 
is related to technological transitions and often parallels the emergence of novel 
technological systems. As such, destabilisation can be seen as the ‘flipside’ of the 
emergence of novelty in transitions.  
This topic is relevant to the societal debate on transitions to sustainability. Focussing on 
destabilisation may lead to new insights on how to accelerate and provide direction to 
transition processes.  
Furthermore, this topic is relevant to academic debates in the transitions literature. 
Destabilisation remains a neglected topic in transitions research. Addressing it thus 
promises to open up a new research agenda. 
1.1 Background motivations 
Contemporary societies face unprecedented environmental and sustainability challenges. 
Environmental problems have been worsening in the past decades, with issues such as 
climate change, resource depletion, biodiversity loss, etc. coming to the fore of public 
and political debates. Avoiding dangerous climate change has emerged as a substantial 
challenge of the 21st century (UNFCCC 2011). With continued global energy demand 
growth, global CO2 concentrations are still rising (IPCC 2007) and are expected to keep 
on rising in the coming decades under current assumptions, business practices and 
policies (IEA 2011). Stabilising CO2 and other GHG concentration to 450ppm in order 
to increase our chances of limiting global temperature increase to 2ºC “is likely to be 
very difficult and costly” (Stern 2007:338) and unlikely to be achieved without strong 
policy commitments and a “far-reaching transformation of the global energy system” 
(IEA 2010). 
The scale and importance of the climate problem have been increasingly recognised by 
governments, organisations and individuals throughout the world, leading to calls for 
rapid transitions to low-carbon economies (Stern 2007, DTI 2007, DECC 2011b, IEA 
2011). Addressing such societal challenges calls for the deep structural transformation 
of socio-economic systems in more sustainable directions (Unruh 2002). This means 
fundamentally changing the structure of existing societal domains such as energy, 
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transport, agri-food, housing, and water supply. However, because environmental 
problems in general, and climate change in particular, relate to public goods (Stern 
2007), there are no clear short-term economic incentives to address them: 
“The climate is a public good: those who fail to pay for it cannot be excluded from enjoying its 
benefits and one person’s enjoyment of the climate does not diminish the capacity of others to enjoy 
it too. Markets do not automatically provide the right type and quantity of public goods, because in 
the absence of public policy there are limited or no returns to private investors for doing so: in this 
case, markets for relevant goods and services (energy, land use, innovation, etc.) do not reflect the 
consequences of different consumption and investment choices for the climate. Thus, climate 
change is an example of market failure involving externalities and public goods.” (Stern 2007:25) 
Solving the climate problem is thus likely to require public intervention, as industry 
alone will not enact the required structural transformation. This means that transitions to 
sustainability and low-carbon societies require the public expression of normative goals, 
societal aspirations, and political determination if substantial change is to be delivered: 
“Climate Change is an issue requiring urgent and extensive action on the part of governments, 
business and citizens if the risk of serious damage to global prosperity, sustainable development and 
security is to be avoided.” (UN Global Compact 2010) 
Two broad views can be distinguished in the policy discussions on transitions to low-
carbon societies. The first view emphasises the need to stimulate the emergence of new, 
low-carbon alternatives to current systems. The second view emphasises our reliance on 
high-carbon, unsustainable technologies, and seeks ways to reduce our dependence on 
fossil fuels and avoid lock-in to a high-carbon energy trajectory. 
So far, policy and entrepreneurial efforts have primarily focussed on the first view: 
fostering innovation and investment in more sustainable alternatives such as wind 
turbines and solar PV (Scrase and MacKerron 2009), often with very limited success 
(Mitchell and Connor 2004). Within this approach, new technological systems are 
expected to replace existing ones. For instance, low-carbon energy technologies are 
nurtured in protective technological niches (in specialised and/or subsidised small-scale 
applications) until they are able to scale up and compete with existing technologies 
(Kemp et al. 1998, Kemp and Soete 1992, Schot et al. 1994, Sandén and Jonasson 
2005). 
However, this approach is unlikely to be sufficient, as the strong resistance and inertia 
of established systems make it very difficult for alternative technologies to displace 
them: 
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“Historically driven by economies of scale, the electricity system becomes easily locked into a 
technological trajectory that demonstrates momentum and is thereby resistant to the technical 
change that will be necessary in a shift to a low-carbon economy” (Stern 2007:355) 
Heavy reliance on fossil fuels is showing no strong signs of change, but rather 
persistence, as fossil fuels use continues to increase at greater rates than renewable 
energy worldwide (Fisher et al. 2007). The urgency and scale of the challenges faced 
means that the prospective transition away from fossil fuels needs not only to be 
directed, but also to be accelerated (Jefferson 2008).  
The limited deployment of renewable energy so far, and the stable patterns of fossil fuel 
use, suggest the usefulness of the second view. Proponents of transitions to 
sustainability, or to low-carbon energy systems should not only focus on the nurturing 
and diffusion of more environmentally benign technologies, but also on the 
displacement or restructuring of established industries and energy systems. 
“Some of the reasons cleaner technology is not diffusing rapidly through firms, for example, relate 
to overarching structures of markets, patterns of final consumer demand, institutional and regulatory 
systems and inadequate infrastructures for change.” (Smith et al. 2005:1491) 
It is thus highly relevant to the debate on sustainability transitions to focus on the 
productive role of the destabilisation of established systems. By focussing on the 
destabilisation of established industries in relation to pressing environmental problems, 
this thesis thus contributes to the exploration of pathways to sustainability, a topic 
directly relevant to contemporary societal and policy challenges. 
1.2 Academic relevance and audience 
The destabilisation of socio-technical systems is also an important academic topic, 
which relates to several academic debates. This thesis engages primarily with the 
growing research community of transitions scholars interested in long-term structural 
change in socio-technical systems. In this section, I relate my research topic to debates 
within this academic community, and highlight my contributions to these debates. 
The literature on socio-technical transitions has attracted the interest of a growing 
community of researchers. So far, contributions have mainly focussed on: 
- the successful deployment and development of new technological systems (Kemp 
et al. 1998, Sandén and Jonasson 2005), 
- understanding transition patterns and dynamics of sociotechnical systems and 
regimes (Elzen et al. 2004, Rip and Kemp 1998, Geels 2005a, Geels 2005b, Smith 
et al. 2005), and 
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- developing policy-relevant strategies to nurture the emergence of innovations, e.g. 
via visions, learning, networks, etc. (Loorbach 2007, Rotmans et al. 2001). 
Such contributions have deepened our understanding of the emergence of new systems, 
themes that generally bear a positive connotation.1 Comparatively, only little has yet 
been done in exploring the flipside of transitions: the destabilisation and decline of 
incumbent systems. I aim to avoid what might be called the ‘winner bias’ by shifting the 
analytical focus to the erosion/loss of stability of established systems.  
This thesis contributes to the transition debate, and the debate on path dependence and 
lock-in. 
Relevance to the transitions debate 
The debate on socio-technical transitions, and innovation studies more broadly, have so 
far had a tendency to focus on the emergence of novelty – often assuming the 
destabilisation of incumbents along the way. More than thirty years ago, Rosenberg 
already warned that the focus on 'new' rather than 'old' technologies may lead to 
incorrect conclusions: 
“It is a general practice among historians to fix their attention upon the story of the new technology 
and to terminate all interest in the old. The result, again, is to sharpen the belief in abrupt and 
dramatic discontinuities in the historical record” (1976:203) 
Shove and Walker’s criticism of transition management is therefore pertinent, and 
suggests that destabilisation and emergence are two parallel processes: 
“A more comprehensively systemic approach (...) would also offer an equally detailed analysis of 
processes that parallel those of innovation, these being trajectories of erosion, decay, and 
fossilisation. (…) transitions of any description routinely involve and require the loss or 
abandonment of previously important sociotechnical systems. (…) the transitions management 
literature says little about how the ‘death’ of undesirable systems might be engineered” (2007:767). 
Within the neo-Schumpeterian literature on ‘technological discontinuities’, the 
breakthrough of novelty is assumed to precede or cause the decline of old industries 
(Tushman and Anderson 1986, Christensen 1997), as radical competence-destroying 
innovations make previous technologies obsolete. This focus on the emergence of 
novelty is dominant in transitions studies. It has been translated in its theoretical 
                                                
1 New technologies inherently relate to birth, expansion, growth, and other positive connotations. 
Successful innovations entail consequences that are perceived as benefiting the society as a whole: new 
jobs, new research, growth, and progress in general. 
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developments, in the choice of empirical focus, and in the types of policy and 
governance implications that have been devised. 
This relative neglect does not mean that the productive role of destabilisation in 
transitions has not been acknowledged. The multi-level perspective (MLP), for instance, 
emphasises the nesting of processes at various levels (Geels 2002a, Geels 2004, Geels 
and Schot 2007). It provides a widely used model for transitions where broad societal 
transformations (new problems, socio-cultural change, political cultures and ideologies, 
etc.) and emerging technological alternatives (‘niche-innovations’) exert pressure on 
incumbents. Problems originating in the wider landscape of socio-technical regimes are 
a source of unlocking, which can put established configurations in flux and thus 
increase their vulnerability to technological challenges. Alternative technologies may 
take advantage of periods of flux in which broad societal change and the emergence of 
problems cast opportunities for change. 
So, while transition scholars have devoted most of their attention to the process of 
technological breakthrough, they have so far provided mere hints about the ‘downward’ 
process of destabilisation. Destabilisation remains an under-investigated topic. This 
thesis is motivated by an attempt to address this neglect. 
Relevance to the debate on path dependence and lock-in 
The debate on path dependence in innovation studies and evolutionary economics has 
emphasised the stability of existing technologies and industries. Technological systems 
get locked in (sub-optimal) configurations (David 1985, Arthur 1989, Nelson and 
Winter 1982). Authors interested in these questions have investigated the influence of 
processes of selection, path creation, and historical contingencies in the trajectories 
leading to lock-in. This literature suggests that socio-technical configurations, once 
established, are highly persistent through time. This thesis, instead, is concerned with 
understanding the reverse mechanisms of ‘unlocking’ of deeply embedded industry 
activities. I suggest that such mechanisms may open up windows of opportunity and 
eventually lead to the decline or re-configuration of industries entailing important 
negative externalities. 
So, established socio-technical systems have an in-built tendency to resist change, 
which makes the breakthrough of new technologies difficult. Socio-technical systems 
are dynamically stable, evolving along established socio-technical trajectories (Geels 
2002a). The co-evolution of technology, industries, markets and institutions in socio-
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technical systems can lead to various forms of lock-in (David 1985, Arthur 1989, Unruh 
2000, Walker 2000, Kemp et al. 2012) that decrease the likelihood of introducing 
substantial change. For instance, the present structure of electricity supply (large-scale 
supply, highly centralised distribution, dominance of fossil fuels and imported fuel 
sources, lasting commitments to nuclear, few powerful suppliers in liberalised markets, 
remoteness from user concerns) is a typical lock-in situation – related to constraints at 
play during its build-up and consolidation –from which it is proving difficult to depart 
today (Unruh 2000, Nye 1999).  
The destabilisation of established industries is thus a difficult process because of 
inherent mechanisms of inertia. A variety of forms of industry lock-in has been 
identified in the literature, including: 
a) in technology and infrastructure: existing technical capacity, infrastructure and 
related competences prevent adaptation to disruptive innovations (Tushman and 
Anderson 1986); 
b) routines (skills, knowhow and tacit knowledge) which prevent industry actors 
from initiating radical new search processes (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi and 
Nelson 1994); 
c) market-related: commitment to specific trade partners, customers, and supply 
chains through established resource flows (Christensen 1997) that result from 
the search for increasing returns (Arthur 1989); 
d) institutional lock-in: prevailing rules and norms in industries (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996), further amplified by widespread adoption by industry actors 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983); 
e) cognitive lock-in: deeply engrained cognitive beliefs and which prevent industry 
actors from interpreting environmental signals clearly (Barr et al. 1992) and 
recognising disruptive change (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). 
Such lock-in mechanisms thus raise barriers to unlocking. Destabilisation is unlikely to 
be driven solely by endogenous dynamics, and external pressures for change can be 
expected to be important for unlocking. The build-up of pressure in destabilisation is 
likely to involve processes of accumulation, articulation and alignment across multiple 
dimensions. 
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Furthermore, lock-in is not solely a structural mechanism, but is also enacted. This 
means that various forms of lock-in are actively reproduced by actors defending 
established regimes2 through resistive strategies. 
1.3 Specific goals and contributions 
Destabilisation has attracted academic interest in various disciplines. In this thesis, I 
will argue that existing views on destabilisation are insufficient to address my research 
questions and related research criteria. In chapter 2, I will distinguish five existing 
views on destabilisation and will suggest three aspects that I wish to address jointly. 
Rather than making specific contributions to these existing views, the conceptual 
elaboration in chapter 3 will build on and combine them in order to address my research 
goals. 
Aspects of destabilisation have attracted the attention of researchers in a broad range of 
disciplinary traditions, including economic and political history, studies of industrial 
change, corporate change and organisation studies, innovation studies, and business and 
management communities. There has been interest in decline at the level of nations and 
national economies (Thompson 1998, Elbaum and Lazonick 1986, Wiener 1982, 
Edgerton 1996), industries (Dintenfass 1992, Lorenz 1991, Lazonick 1983, Zammuto 
1985) and organisations (Mone et al. 1998, Nystrom and Starbuck 1984, Huff et al. 
1992, Weitzel and Jonnson 1989). Such contributions tend to focus on the adverse 
contextual conditions and factors that may lead to decline (Porter 1980, Ansoff 1987, 
McCarthy et al. 2010) and on the types of response strategies devised to cope with such 
conditions (Pettigrew 1987, Barr 1998, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, Kaplan et al. 2003, 
Miles and Cameron 1982, Meyer 1982, Weitzel and Jonnson 1989). 
In chapter 2, I review the existing theoretical contributions of relevance to industry 
destabilisation. Five non-exclusive views can be analytically distinguished and related 
to specific disciplinary backgrounds: 
1. The literature on technological change and the role of technological 
discontinuities 
2. The literature on economic change and the role of wider market dynamics 
3. The literature on industry legitimacy and the role of socio-political challenges 
                                                
2 In this thesis, I will adopt the notion of ‘industry regime’ as a set of field-specific institutions enabling 
and constraining the behaviour and action of industry actors (see 3.2.3 and 3.3.1.3). 
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4. The literature on organisational change and managerial responses to challenges 
5. The literature on institutional change and the role of changing rules 
Some authors combine elements from these views – which I distinguish analytically. I 
will suggest a specific way to combine them that is tailored to addressing my research 
questions. 
Indeed, I aim to put particular emphasis on three aspects of industry destabilisation: 
1. My interest in processes of long-term unfolding leads me to put a particular 
emphasis on the temporal articulation of change at multiple levels. 
2. My interest in multi-dimensional co-evolution leads me to consider multiple 
interacting sources of change in destabilisation processes. 
3. My interest in current sustainability challenges leads me to consider the role of a 
particular kind of societal challenges in destabilisation processes: environmental 
issues.  
These three aspects of destabilisation processes provide the location for specific 
theoretical contributions developed in this thesis. The following sub-sections give an 
overview of the related challenges and introduce the scope of contributions to be 
elaborated in chapter 3. 
1.3.1 Destabilisation as long-term unfolding process 
Although concerned with change, most authors addressing industry destabilisation and 
decline tend to look for (sets of) dependent variables influencing the performance of a 
given industry, instead of considering destabilisation as an unfolding process. 
Destabilisation has been related to external sources of change that are detrimental to 
industries (Abernathy and Clark 1985, McCarthy et al. 2010, Porter 1980), the degree 
of fit between organisations and their environments (McCarthy et al. 2010, Zammuto 
1985), or the influence of firm characteristics on the type of decline experienced 
(D’Aveni 1989, Hambrick and D’Aveni 1988, McKinley 1993, Mone et al. 1998). In 
exploring destabilisation, these authors tend to take a ‘variance approach’, in which 
change in the value of an independent variable is described as the result of fixed 
relationships to its dependent variables (Poole et al. 2000) that often takes the form of 
universal and testable laws. These authors investigate the whys of change, with little 
consideration for crucial characteristics of long-term change: changing entities and 
contexts, temporal contingency, multiple and mutable causalities, changing meanings 
and attributes, etc. (Haydu 2010). There has been relatively little conceptualisation of 
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the actual process of change, and the underlying generative mechanisms that explain the 
hows of change. This observation – related to different epistemological choices – 
appears to have more general relevance for the study of organisational change:  
“much research on organization change is ahistorical, aprocessual, and acontextual in character (...) 
There are remarkably few studies of change that actually allow the change process to reveal itself in 
any kind of substantially temporal or contextual manner.” (Pettigrew 1987:655). 
This thesis, by taking a process approach to destabilisation (Poole et al. 2000, Van de 
Ven and Poole 2005), sets particular emphasis on unfolding over long periods of time.3 
In this way, sequences of action and events can thus be seen as located within enabling 
and constraining structures and contexts (that themselves undergo change), rather than 
the outcome of ‘atemporal’ laws and variables (Abbott 1992). Furthermore, I will 
mobilise insights from historical approaches to develop the notion of multiple levels of 
unfolding in destabilisation processes as a core organising principle for theoretical 
elaboration and analysis that will allow me to distinguish different mechanisms playing 
on and across different levels: industry, environments, and landscape. 
1.3.2 Destabilisation as multi-dimensional co-evolutionary process 
Within the literature on destabilisation and decline, most scholars tend to restrict their 
analysis to a narrow set of sources of change likely to disrupt industry stability. Among 
the kinds of pressures considered, they have emphasised the role of technological 
change (Tushman and Anderson 1986, Christensen 1997), competitive and market 
pressures (Porter 1980, Ansoff 1987), sometimes adding a regulatory dimensions 
(McCarthy et al. 2010, Abernathy and Clark 1985). Other scholars have been attentive 
to the role of institutional change and legitimacy (Leblebici et al. 1991, Lounsbury 2001, 
Scott 2001), and social movements in destabilisation (Den Hond and De Bakker 2007, 
Davis et al. 1994). The problem is that few contributions have explicitly focussed on the 
co-evolutionary nature of changes on multiple dimensions in destabilisation processes, 
and thereby they may understate the role of the interplay between economic, political, 
socio-cultural, technological and institutional change.4 My contribution therefore is to 
                                                
3 The epistemological assumptions of this thesis are further elaborated in chapter 4. 
4 Economic historians (Freeman and Louça 2001, Lazonick 1983, etc.) and socio-technical scholars 
(Geels 2004, Geels and Schot 2007, Smith et al. 2005, etc.) provide illustrations of how such a task may 
be addressed. 
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elaborate a conceptual perspective that attends to the interaction of pressures for change 
between multiple dimensions. 
Some authors have recognised the co-evolutionary nature of destabilisation (Oliver 
1992, Tushman and Romanelli 1985, Scott 2000, Meyer et al. 1990). However, their 
analyses are oriented towards the search for fixed causal relationships and factors 
affecting destabilisation, 
“The purpose of this paper is to identify the factors that are likely to predict deinstitutionalization” 
(Oliver 1992:564, my emphasis) 
or forces for fundamental change (Tushman and Romanelli 1985) that can explain 
‘mode shifts’ between continuous and discontinuous change (Meyer et al. 1990, 
Tushman and Romanelli 1985), rather than towards uncovering the unfolding of co-
evolutionary processes in destabilisation, which I intend to address. 
This thesis makes the case for a co-evolutionary approach to destabilisation that 
addresses the multi-dimensional nature of the challenges faced by industry actors in 
socio-technical configurations across economic, technological, regulatory and socio-
cultural domains. 
1.3.3 The role of societal challenges in destabilisation 
The bulk of the literature on decline focuses on economic factors, and tends to 
downplay socio-political pressures and particular normativities involved in addressing 
societal challenges. However, such pressures are crucial for a better understanding of 
transitions to sustainability, because of the public goods characteristics discussed in 
section 1.1. I am interested in understanding the emergence and articulation of societal 
problems, insofar as they influence the destabilisation of existing regimes. 
Within the debate on socio-technical transitions, Smith et al. (2005:1502) have referred 
to ‘purposive transitions’ as those “which have been deliberately intended and pursued 
from the outset to reflect an explicit set of societal expectations or interests”. Most 
transitions analysed in the literature have however followed more decentered and 
emergent patterns (Smith et al. 2005). So far, only a limited number of historical 
transitions cases where societal issues and central coordination have been important 
have been analysed. Such cases can however provide valuable insights to the real world 
challenges of sustainability and transitions to low-carbon societies, and promise to 
allow for valuable theoretical contributions (Fouquet 2010, Smith et al. 2005). 
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Societal problems and related normative contests are not only important for transition 
studies, but also growing concerns in the innovation literature at large, particularly 
through its engagement with policy communities. However, societal problems remain 
an underdeveloped topic in innovation studies. In a critical assessment of the field of 
science, technology and innovation policy research, Morlacchi and Martin (2009:575) 
conclude that: 
“we still don’t have a very satisfactory theory of social change. Our ability to improve social 
problems remains rather limited, and we do not know why we appear to have only modest gains in 
relation to many societal problems” 
This thesis contributes to these debates by investigating the role of societal challenges in 
destabilisation processes, focussing on environmental problems.5 This interest further 
highlights the importance of taking a co-evolutionary view on long-term processes, as 
environmental problems emerge in socio-political spheres (normative contestation, 
policy, etc.) but may penetrate economic and market spheres and significantly affect the 
trajectories of socio-technical regimes. 
1.4 Focus and research questions 
Within the general topic of the destabilisation of socio-technical regimes, this thesis 
adopts a specific focus on industries.6 Industry actors in a particular technological 
system do not operate autonomously, but in the context of socio-technical regimes (Rip 
and Kemp 1998). I will thus take industry actors as the main focal group in socio-
technical configurations, and consider their embeddedness in multi-dimensional co-
evolving environments. 
The main research question of this thesis is oriented towards a better understanding of 
the process of destabilisation. The thesis aims at answering the following question: 
 
                                                
5 I take environmental problems as a particular kind of societal challenge. Throughout the thesis, I refer to 
‘environmental problems’ as societal problems related to the natural environment. However, because I 
conceptualise industries as facing pressure in their environments (economic and socio-political), I have 
strived to avoid confusion throughout the text by distinguishing ‘environmental problems’ from ‘pressure 
in industry environments’ or ‘environmental change’ (also referred to as ‘external problems’ – not to be 
confused with ‘externalities’). 
6 Industries are understood as populations of industry actors (firms) producing similar products or 
services. Industry boundaries are defined for each case study according to geographical scope, products, 
markets and main technologies. 
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1. How can we understand the unfolding of industry destabilisation processes? 
 
Taking into account my aforementioned interests and research goals, this question can 
be further declined in three sub-questions: 
 
a. How can we attend to destabilisation as a (long-term) unfolding process? 
b. How can we attend to multi-dimensional co-evolutionary nature of 
destabilisation? 
c. How can we attend to the role of societal challenges in destabilisation? 
 
Considering the substantial amount of relevant literature contributing to address one or 
more aspects of destabilisation (see chapter 2) and my crosscutting research goals, a 
related challenge concerns combinatorial forms of theoretical elaboration. 
 
In order to address my background motivations, and delve into policy-relevant 
elaborations, a further question is oriented towards the application of research findings 
to current challenges: 
 
2. What lessons for current sustainability transition challenges can be derived 
from a theory of destabilisation elaborated and refined on the basis of historical 
cases? 
1.5 Research criteria 
A number of epistemological assumptions underpin the understanding of destabilisation 
put forward in this thesis. I seek to explain destabilisation as an unfolding process – that 
is, by explaining how things change over time (Van de Ven 1992, Pettigrew 1997) and 
appreciating the effect of time and timing (Van de Ven and Poole 2005). Adopting this 
standpoint, my research is inscribed within a process research tradition (see chapter 4), 
in which explanation relies on the identification of developmental event sequences, 
rather than the influence of a set of dependent variables (Van de Ven and Poole 2005, 
Van de Ven 2007, Langley 1999, Sminia 2009). This epistemological positioning is 
particularly suited for the study of substantial change unfolding over extended periods 
of time.  
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Studying long-term change processes (e.g. transitions and industry destabilisation) can 
be done by mobilising forms of explanation attentive to history (Geels and Schot 2010). 
A number of authors have highlighted the mutual benefits of a dialogue between 
historians and social scientists in this respect (Burke 2005, Sewell 2005, Braudel 1958, 
Van de Ven and Poole 2005). 
This thesis is receptive to such historical approaches. Historically-minded social 
scientists have highlighted a number of characteristics of unfolding processes. These are 
here mobilised as search heuristics that will guide theoretical elaboration and empirical 
research.  
These heuristics are: 
1. the unfolding of change processes 
“To understand a change process, it is critical to understand how it unfolds over time and how time 
and timing affects it.” (Van de Ven and Poole 2005:1394) 
One way of dealing with unfolding is to mobilise ideal-typical developmental sequences. 
Interest in the longitudinal unfolding of change has led some scholars to develop 
models that outline an ideal progression pattern: 
"the central focus of developmental process models is on progressions (i.e. the nature, sequence, 
and order) of activities or events that an (…) entity undergoes as it changes over time. (...) a linear 
sequence of stages or phases of development is a common form of progression in these process 
models” (Van de Ven 2007:199) 
I suggest using such stylised models as a general frame of reference from which to 
elaborate refined interpretations to take account of more nuances: 
2. the co-evolution of multiple sequences of events within multiple temporalities and 
multiple patterns of causality 
“One significant characteristic of historical events, is that they always combine social processes 
with very different temporalities – relatively gradual or long-run social trends, more volatile swings 
of public opinion, punctual accidental happenings, medium-run political strategies, sudden 
individual decisions, oscillating economic or climate rhythms – which are brought together in 
specific ways, at specific places and times, in a particular sequence.” (Sewell 2005:9) 
 “Most historical sociologists reject the notion of a single master process, acknowledging multiple 
processes that overlap and intersect one another. Explaining a particular outcome or pattern of 
development thus involves a particular logic of explanation: situating events or outcomes in terms 
of their location in intersecting trajectories with independent temporalities” (Aminzade 1992:466) 
3. changing patterns of causality 
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“A fully eventful conception of temporality must also deny the assumption that causal structures are 
uniform through time. Events must be assumed to be capable of changing not only the balance of 
causal forces operating but the very logic by which consequences follow from occurrences or 
circumstances.” (Sewell 1996:263) 
4. unpredictable and contingent patterns of change 
“As against the implicit assumption of most social scientists, that social change takes place 
according to smooth, gradual, predictable, and linear processes, historians assume that historical 
temporality is lumpy, uneven, unpredictable, and discontinuous.” (Sewell 2005:9) 
5. durable path dependence and sudden shifts 
“Contingent, unexpected, and inherently unpredictable events (…) can undo or alter the most 
apparently durable trends of history (…) History displays both stubborn durabilities and sudden 
breaks, and even the most radical historical ruptures are interlaced with remarkable continuities.” 
(Sewell 1996:264) 
Further considerations on process and historical approaches will be developed in 
chapter 4, when presenting the epistemological assumptions underlying this thesis in 
detail: process theory and the search for patterns. 
1.6 Research strategy 
1.6.1 Case studies 
In order to assess the plausibility, the usefulness and further explore the explanatory 
power of the conceptual perspective, I mobilise two historical cases of fully realised 
destabilisation processes. The resulting theory of destabilisation is then applied to a 
contemporary challenge of societal relevance (forming a third case).  
Case studies are suitable methods for the tracing of destabilisation patterns and 
mechanisms. Indeed, case studies are regarded as a suitable strategy for research 
attentive to rich context and complex developmental processes (Yin 1994). 
Because destabilisation is a long-term co-evolutionary process, its investigation justifies 
the mobilisation of longitudinal case studies (Siggelkow 2007), and a research design 
that is attentive to the unfolding of processes (Van de Ven and Poole 2005, Langley 
1999, Sminia 2009). Indeed, case studies are rich in context, and allow for the tracing of 
unfolding processes in search for generative mechanisms (Ragin 1997, George and 
Bennett 2004, Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Methodological choices are further 
elaborated in chapter 3. 
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1.6.2 Empirical focus: destabilisation in the British coal industry 
Case study design. 
The cases chosen for the empirical investigation of destabilisation patterns cover three 
periods of the British coal industry, ranging from 1880 to the present. I have chosen the 
coal industry for its historical relevance as an energy source, its deep societal 
embedding, and multiple decline paths throughout the twentieth century.  
While most comparative studies tend to cover a single period in multiple geographic 
settings, I have taken a different approach. I cover multiple periods in the same context. 
The UK context has been chosen for its historical importance in developing and 
maintaining coal as a fuel source, but also for pragmatic reasons such as the 
accessibility of data sources. Furthermore, comparing juxtaposed cases presents 
difficulties but also opportunities for the investigation of destabilisation processes. 
Indeed, specific causal relations are unlikely to hold from one period to another (Haydu 
2010). However, by comparing cases across time periods, the researcher can gain to 
access a deeper understanding of causal mechanisms to generate generalisable findings 
that transcend specific historical contexts. This kind of explanation is especially 
relevant when one goal is to generate findings from historical cases and to apply them to 
contemporary challenges. 
Methodological choices related to case study design are further developed in chapter 3. 
Case selection. 
Within the period covered (1880-present), three case studies are developed: 
- Case 1: The destabilisation of the British coal industry (1880-1967) 
- Case 2: The destabilisation and decline of the British deep coal mining (1967-1997) 
- Case 3: Climate change and the destabilisation of coal-fired generation in the UK 
(1990-2011). Possible revival? 
The selection and temporal bounding of cases is based on theoretical criteria.  
The historical cases display a high degree of phenomenon: a destabilisation process can 
be clearly identified. In each case, the focal industry actors have experienced serious 
pressures across multiple dimensions. In the two historical cases, this has led to major 
decrease in industry size, and fundamental change in structure and the scope of 
activities. The first case ends in 1967 with the transition to the four-fuel economy, while 
the second case ends with the completion of the dash for gas in 1997. Figure 1.1 
provides an overview of the two historical cases, reflecting various stages of economic 
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decline. The cases selected here fall into the extreme and paradigmatic types (Flyvbjerg 
2006). They are extreme because they are particularly rich and complex, involving 
many different sources of change, with strong degrees of interaction. They are 
paradigmatic because of the central role of coal in economic, political and social 
considerations in Britain, which put the industry in the frontline of the radical changes 
affecting British society throughout the period of study.  
All three cases have also been selected in relation to environmental problems, as the 
industry was confronted with different problems with the natural environment: coal 
smoke, acid rain and climate change, respectively. The third case is of a more 
prospective kind: coal-fired electricity generation, under substantial pressure, still faces 
an uncertain future, which can however be understood with the conceptual approach 
developed. 
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Figure 1.1: Coal consumption in Britain (1880-2000), outline of destabilisation pattern for historical 
cases. 
1.7 Thesis overview 
Chapter 2 looks at existing contributions to destabilisation, analytically identifying five 
views in various literatures. It then introduces contributions that provide insights related 
to the three research challenges. The last section of the chapter collects ‘building 
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blocks’ from the theoretical perspectives covered, and suggests guidelines for 
theoretical elaboration. 
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual perspective developed to investigate industry 
destabilisation. Building on the existing literature on destabilisation, this chapter 
formulates the conceptual perspective mobilised for the study of industry destabilisation. 
Taking a ‘building blocks’ approach to conceptual elaboration, it mobilise insights from 
the different views on destabilisation covered in chapter 2 to formulate a synthetic 
perspective tailored to address my three research aims. It addresses 1) dynamic 
unfolding at multiple levels, 2) multi-dimensional co-evolution, and 3) the role of 
environmental problems. 
Chapter 4 spells out the methodology used in this thesis. It discusses epistemological 
assumptions, explains the research design, the rationale for choosing a case study 
approach, justifies the choice of case, and outlines the analytical strategy. 
Chapters 5 to 7 make up the empirical sections. They each contain an analytical 
narrative and an analysis of the destabilisation pattern. 
Chapter 8 compares the cases in search of generalisable findings in order to answer the 
research questions. It formulates conclusions concerning the three research challenges 
and generates lessons for sustainability challenges. The chapter ends with a discussion 
of the contributions, the nature of the research, the qualification of the conclusion and 
outlines potential avenues for further research. 
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2 Theoretical review of destabilisation  
This chapter discusses existing perspectives on destabilisation in various academic 
literatures. It is argued that most existing views have some blind spots in relation to the 
research criteria elaborated in the introduction. The different views introduced here will 
be mobilised selectively as ‘building blocks’ from which to elaborate the conceptual 
perspective in the next chapter. 
2.1 Destabilisation in the literature: five views 
A number of explanations for destabilisation can be found in the literature. I organise 
the existing literature in five broad views, according to their privileged focus and 
explanation for the phenomenon. This partitioning results from analytical choices and is 
somewhat artificial. Some authors do not fall clearly into one view. Because I am 
interested in building a synthetic understanding of destabilisation, I will first focus on 
their distinctive features, before discussing complementarities (theoretical and 
practised) in order to integrate elements from each view in chapter 3. 
In each view specific mechanisms are seen to affect stability and change in established 
systems, linking industry destabilisation and decline to: 
1) the breakthrough of radical technological innovations which overthrow 
established industries,  
2) selection pressures on economic dimensions (markets, technology, competition, 
etc.), 
3) selection pressures on socio-political dimensions affecting political and cultural 
legitimacy, 
4) the development of managerial responses to challenges, and  
5) patterns of institutional change. 
I discuss these views with the aim of generating building blocks for further integration 
in my conceptual perspective. 
2.1.1 The role of technological discontinuities in destabilisation (view 1) 
The literature on technological discontinuities explains destabilisation by focussing on 
the role of competence destruction arising from innovation. Competence-destroying 
innovations are radical innovations that disrupt established technological trajectories, 
overthrowing existing technological systems and the industries supporting them 
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(Tushman and Anderson 1986, Christensen 1997). In this view, influenced by 
Schumpeter’s (1939) metaphor of creative destruction, the introduction of novelty is 
seen as the cause of industry destabilisation, as “radical technological innovations 
create new market opportunities while simultaneously damaging, destroying, or 
transforming demand in many existing product markets” (Hill and Rothaermel 
2003:259). 
Such innovations introduce a new type of technology, leading to greatly improved 
price/performance, or new or fundamentally improved specifications to markets. 
Competence-destroying innovations are: 
“so fundamentally different from previously dominant technologies that the skills and knowledge 
base required to operate the core technology shift. Such major changes in skills, distinctive 
competence, and production processes are associated with major changes in the distribution of 
power and control within firms and industries”. (Tushman and Anderson 1986:442) 
Often emerging outside industries (Cooper and Schendel 1976), competence-destroying 
innovations are disruptive for established firms and lower barriers to entry for new 
firms (Tushman and Anderson 1986). They imply substantial challenges to established 
industries, and may eventually lead to their downfall: 
“The effect [of radical innovations] is thus to reduce the value of existing competence, and in the 
extreme case, to render it obsolete.” (Abernathy and Clark 1985:6) 
The successful introduction of radical innovations can thus have serious destabilisation 
consequences on established industries (Freeman and Soete 1997), because they rely on 
resources and infrastructure that incumbents do not possess or master. In most cases, 
strong inertia in established routines and technological trajectories increase incumbent 
vulnerability to such challenges. 
Thus, technological change may be an important source of industry destabilisation.  
2.1.2 The role of market forces in destabilisation (view 2) 
A broad corpus of literature, including economic history, industrial economics, business 
and management studies, relates industry destabilisation to a range of market selection 
pressures. Industry actors are seen to evolve in market environments in which they face 
competitive pressures (Porter 1980). These pressures affect the performance and 
survival of individual firms (Hannan and Freeman 1977), as well as entire industries 
(Lorenz 1994). Increasing pressure in economic environments creates economic and 
competitive problems for industry actors. Long periods of low economic performance 
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may lead industry actors to question established practices and prevailing regime rules 
(Tushman and Romanelli 1985, Geels 2011, Turnheim and Geels 2011). 
Economic approaches to industry environments consider the influence of markets, 
products and technologies, and governments on the evolution of industries (Ansoff 1987, 
Porter 1980, Abernathy and Clark 1985, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988, McCarthy et 
al. 2010). These elements affect stability and change in organisational environments. 
Porter (1980, 1991) sees industries as embedded in an economic environment where 
competitive forces are at play (see Figure 2.1). According to this view, industry actors 
thus face 1) the intensity of rivalry between existing firms, 2) the bargaining power of 
suppliers, 3) the bargaining power of buyers, 4) the threat of new entrants, and 5) the 
threat of technological substitutes (see view 1). Organisations are seen as seeking 
competitive advantage by adapting to these forces. Other sets of factors affecting 
competition in industries include new technology, changing customer demands, 
government policy and regulation (Abernathy and Clark 1985), technological, products, 
demand, regulatory, and competitive change (McCarthy et al. 2010). 
So, this view explains both stability and change in relation to industry embeddedness in 
market environments, and exposure to multiple forces of changes therein. While this 
type of research tends to focus on the individuation of exogenous factors, and often 
takes a variance approach to the industry-environment relationship, the sources of 
change identified provide a useful starting point for the identification of dimensions of 
change likely to co-evolve in the destabilisation of industries.  
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Figure 2.1: Porter's five forces, summary of key drivers (based on Porter 1980) 
 
Economic historians have also contributed to the understanding of decline, related to 
market forces, but tend to take a more process-oriented approach. The theme of 
destabilisation and decline is not new to students of economic history, who have made a 
genre of histories of ‘the rise and fall of…’ in which an entire developmental process, 
from emergence through golden age and decline, are captured. Historians have covered 
the decline of different forms of social organisations: the decline of civilisations, the 
decline of empires and nations (Edgerton 1996, Elbaum and Lazonick 1986, Wiener 
1982), and the decline of industries (Dintenfass 1992, Church 1995, Lorenz 1991, 
Lazonick 1983, etc.). 
The long-term analysis of decline in political and economic entities points to three main 
factors (Thompson 1998): 1) the inflexibility of institutionalised practices (Elbaum and 
Lazonick 1986, Kirby 1992), 2) the search for continuity in the face of external threats 
of various kinds (economic, political, military, etc.), and 3) the inability to innovate and 
exploit the opportunities arising from changing. Such historical approaches thus provide 
the additional benefit – in line with my epistemological choices (see chapter 4) – of 
attending to long-term processes, explicitly articulating exogenous factors and 
endogenous enactment, and also capturing institutional dynamics. 
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2.1.3 The role of socio-political challenges to legitimacy in destabilisation 
(view 3) 
Contributions labelled under this view share a focus on non-economic forces of change 
in industry environments, which may challenge industry legitimacy. Indeed, industry 
actors can be seen as also embedded in socio-political environments in which non-
economic forces and actors interact and may exert pressures on the legitimacy of 
industries: 
 “The success or failure of a new industry and firms within [the political context] depends on their 
abilities to achieve institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). To achieve this, firms 
may either adapt to institutional requirements or attempt to build their goals and procedures directly 
into society as institutional rules (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Thus, firms compete not only in the 
marketplace, but also in this political institutional context. Rival firms often cooperate by 
collectively manipulating their institutional environment to legitimize and gain access to resources 
necessary for collective survival” (Van de Ven 1993:30, my emphasis) 
The nature of change in industries is thus not only influenced by economic and 
technological determinants, but also by socio-political forces. With respect to 
destabilisation, forces in the socio-political environment of industries can exert 
substantial legitimacy pressure on existing regimes (Pettigrew 1987). According to 
Suchman (1995:574), legitimacy can be defined as: 
“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” 
Industry actors thus also compete for the legitimacy of their activities (Leblebici et al. 
1991). The socio-political legitimation process can be defined as follows: 
“Sociopolitical legitimation refers to the process by which key stakeholders, the general public, key 
opinion leaders, or government officials accept a venture as appropriate and right, given existing 
norms and laws. One can measure sociopolitical legitimation by assessing public acceptance of an 
industry, government subsidies to the industry, or the public prestige of its leaders.” (Aldrich and 
Fiol 1994:648) 
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) have been primarily concerned with the central role of 
legitimacy for the stabilisation of new industries. But legitimacy also has to be 
maintained throughout industry evolution (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy is thus equally 
important for established industry actors. 
Because industry actors are embedded in socio-political environments, non-economic 
actors bear influence on industry patterns and strategies. Destabilisation can be 
conceived as a de-legitimation process, involving normative contestation, changing 
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regulations, political ideologies, and changing public beliefs affecting industry 
legitimacy. In 2.2.3, I will further expand on the role of environmental problems (as a 
specific kind of socio-political challenge), by mobilising the issue lifecycle and social 
movement literatures. 
2.1.4 Organisational change and managerial responses to destabilisation 
(view 4) 
I now turn to an approach to industry destabilisation that focuses on processes of 
organisational change. Organisational theory and managerial studies provide insights on 
industry responses to adverse conditions and challenges. I here review such 
contributions that are relevant to destabilisation processes. Starting from an overview of 
the organisational decline literature (Weitzel and Jonsson 1989, Zammuto and Cameron 
1985, Whetten 1987, Grinyer and Spender 1979, Mintzberg et al. 1998) as a dynamic 
process, I then focus in on three sub-processes influencing organisational change in 
challenging environments. 
Organisational decline as a dynamic process 
Increasing pressure in industry environments does not always lead to immediate action 
and change by industry actors committed to deep-seated regimes. The enactment of 
destabilisation implies matching industry strategies with changes in industry 
environments, and may thus lead to various outcomes ranging from smooth adaptation 
to radical transformation or organisational collapse. 
The organisational decline literature has developed various typologies and stage models 
receptive to the dynamic interplay between external challenges and endogenous 
enactment of change (Weitzel and Jonsson 1989, Zammuto and Cameron 1985). 
Keeping in mind their ideal-typical nature, such models can be used as initial guides to 
endogenous enactment in destabilisation processes.7 
Ideally, organisations have the ability to avoid decline. But when responses are delayed, 
strategic changes tend to require deeper transformations. Avoiding decline thus involves 
the implementation of increasingly radical organisational change as problems increase 
                                                
7 Indeed, these stage models tend to simplify the decline process by assuming a linear sequence of stages. 
We will see that such a progression may be challenged in practice (interruption, overlaps, skipping stages, 
etc.), as acknowledged by the authors. Nevertheless, such analytical simplifications are useful to 
distinguish ideal patterns and deviations therefrom. 
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and performance gaps deepen (Weitzel and Jonsson 1989), and may eventually lead to a 
point of no return (see Figure 2.2). The decline of organisations is not inevitable, but 
seen as the result of inappropriate actions in various stages (Table 2.1). Each decline 
stage comes with opportunities for corrective action. Organisational inaction (arising 
from a failure to perceive, interpret or act upon pressures) increases the likelihood of 
progress through later stages, eventually leading to terminal decline in the absence of 
timely action and adaptive strategy. 
 
Decline Begins Dissolution
Adequate organizational equilibrium
Organizational performance
Rgura 1. Widwiing performance gap as dadine daapans.
the necessity for change and the nature of the changes
needed, the process of decision making itself, and the imple-
mentation of decisions (Kaufman, 1985), all of which can con-
tribute to change actions that do little or nothing to correct
the problems.
At this stage, organizationai failure may not be immediate, but
it becomes more likely if the right changes are not made.
Tensions present in stage 3 increase as the dominant coali-
tion begins to fractionate, with subgroups positioning them-
selves to compete for declining resources. Employees
experience great uncertainty as rumors multiply and morale
deteriorates (Greenhaigh, 1982). Some of the more talented
may leave as they see opportunities for advancement and
personal growth disappear. Members in boundary-spanning
positions who believe that their calls for change have been
ignored begin to consider other job possibilities. Leadership is
questioned, and individual leaders are subjected to increasing
stress.
Organizational leaders are forced by circumstances to con-
sider substantive changes. They can no longer defend "busi-
ness-as-usual" goals and methods (Starbuck, Greve, and
Hedberg, 1978). However, the organization's responses to
decline may negatively affect its ability to arrive at quality de-
cisions just when this ability is most needed. Vulnerability to
cognitive biases increases in periods of decline because of
102/ASQ, March 1989
 
Figure 2.2: Widening performance gap as decline deepens (source: Weitzel and Jonsson 1989) 
 
Table 2.1: Stages of organizational decline and orresponding organizational action (Weitzel and 
Jonsson, 1989:97) 
Stages Organizational action
1. Blinded Failure to anticipate or detect pressure toward entropy; decline begins
2. Inaction Failure to decide on corrective action; decline becomes noticeable
3. Faulty action Faulty decisions; faulty implementation of decision
4. Crisis Given faulty-action stage and unforgivi  environment, last chance for survival. Given forgiving environment, slow erosion.
5. Dissolution Given crisis stage and unforgiving environment, rapid demise. Given forgiving environment, slow demise.  
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As destabilisation progresses, and industries are threatened, it becomes increasingly 
difficult for industry actors to get away with minor changes to their activities and 
strategies. Accordingly, they must operate changes of a more transformative kind 
(Tushman and Romanelli 1985). Grinyer and Spender (1979) have focussed on nested 
levels of structure guiding organisation strategy (see Figure 2.3), and how industry 
responses move from incremental to more radical kinds of questioning: 1) tighter 
controls, 2) new strategy, and 3) new ‘industry recipe’. According to Grinyer and 
Spender (1979), problems need to worsen before regime rules are questioned. However, 
when corrective action and learning are delayed, there is a risk for industry strategy to 
be ‘too little, too late’. Indeed, delayed response to destabilisation pressures can lead to 
deteriorating performance, and an acceleration of destabilisation pressures (Hambrick 
and d’Aveni 1988).  
 
Adoption of
recipe
Development of
strategy
Implementation Corporate
performance
Stage 2:
Reconstruct or 
develop new 
strategy
Stage 1:
Tighten controls
If satisfactory
If unsatisfactory
Reinforcement and
elaboration of recipe
Stage 3:
Adopt new recipe,
maybe with new
senior management  
Figure 2.3: Dynamics of reorientation (Grinyer and Spender, 1979:122) 
 
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) provide a similar formulation of destabilisation stages, 
when problems become more pressing. In these stages, the ability of organisations to 
survive without introducing major change is increasingly reduced. Three main 
trajectories may then be pursued: 1) organisational re-orientation, 2) organisational re-
creation, and 3) organisational dissolution. Organisational re-orientation implies 
significant changes to the main activities and strategies, without questioning core 
assumptions such as mission, identity, norms and beliefs. Organisational re-creation 
implies fundamental changes in core values and beliefs within organisations (Tushman 
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and Romanelli 1985). Decline implies the inability of an organisation to survive in any 
form. According to Weitzel and Jonsson (1989:94): 
“Organizations enter the state of decline when they fail to anticipate, recognize, avoid, neutralize, or 
adapt to external or internal pressures that threaten the organization's long-term survival.” 
So, industry actors have the ability to develop strategies and implement radical 
transformations to avoid destabilisation conditions at various points in the unfolding of 
the process. With respect to internal capacity to respond, the literature suggests that: 
- in early stages, good information about problems is crucial (Weitzel and Jonsson 
1989, Pettigrew 1987), 
- as problems become serious, effective strategies are required (Weitzel and Jonsson 
1989, Grinyer and Spender 1979, Pettigrew 1987), and 
- when problems become crises, only substantial transformative change may avoid 
decline (Tushman and Romanelli 1985, Wetizel and Jonsson 1989). 
I now turn to these three sub-processes influencing organisational change in challenging 
environments. 
1) Perceiving and interpreting problems 
Destabilisation involves the emergence of new problems or the worsening of existing 
problems, which have to be addressed by appropriate strategies. However, industry 
actors do not always adequately perceive problems, especially when these involve new 
situations. 
Strategic choices and action thus require industry actors to interpret new situations as 
challenging (Daft and Weick 1984), recognising the types and rates of change they are 
facing (Judge and Miller 1991), adjusting the sense of urgency respectively, and 
avoiding denial. Sense-making and interpretation of industry environments are essential. 
However, prevailing cognitive structures may blind actors from understanding novel 
situations. Industry actors tend to simplify their environments, mobilising mental maps 
in order to better navigate them (Mintzberg et al. 1998:159). 
Information and signals that are not consistent with prevailing schemas tend to be left 
out (Mintzberg et al. 1998:161). The resulting myopia or blindness means that external 
signals are not always seen with clarity (Barr et al. 1992). Blindness to challenges 
delays response strategies and contributes to inertial response patterns (Barr 1998, 
Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, Kaplan et al. 2003). 
“Organizations (…) might not be able to respond adequately to a change in the environment 
because an outmoded but institutionalized frame continues to predominate.” (Kaplan 2008:747) 
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So, while industry actors need to recognise problems with existing strategies and 
activities (Barr 1998), this might require changes to prevailing rules and interpretive 
frames. The ability to change industry-specific rules is referred to as second-order 
learning (Argyris 1976, Mintzberg et al. 1998, Nystrom and Starbuck 1984), a crucial 
skill of adaptive organisations in adverse environments. The early questioning of 
dominant positions and ideology is particularly important to deflect destabilisation 
processes in pre-crisis periods (Pettigrew 1987). 
2) Formulating and implementing response strategies 
In stable environments, industry actors tend to follow well-established strategies and 
ways of doing things that have proved successful in the past: 
“organizations spend most of their time pursuing given strategic orientations” (Mintzberg et al. 
1998:313) 
Furthermore, established routines and capabilities are highly valuable as they facilitate 
basic organisational search processes in conditions of regular and predictable change 
(Robertson and Langlois 1994, Dosi and Nelson 1994). Overall strategic orientation 
provides a coherent frame for action in stable times, which can be differentiated into 
more specific strategies linked to various dimensions of industry environments (Geels 
2011). Typical strategic changes include new marketing strategies, R&D, product 
development, lobbying, public relations and information campaigns. However, because 
industry actors are involved in multiple games in their environments (Porter 1980), 
there are cognitive limitations as to how many problems can be perceived and addressed 
simultaneously without stretching the coherence of industry positioning and prevailing 
strategies. 
Thus, early responses to problems tend to remain within the boundaries of established 
strategic regimes and may be successful at alleviating moderate degrees of pressure 
(Ansoff 1987). Most response strategies remain incremental or related to a given 
dimension of industry environments, and thus don’t require the fundamental 
questioning of the industry’s identity, core values and beliefs, but rather doing things 
differently. 
3) Implementing transformative change 
Incremental change to established strategies, supported by prevailing routines, may be 
ineffective in the face of novel situations: 
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“Then [when situations change] all that is constructive and effective about an established strategy 
becomes a liability.” (Mintzberg et al. 1998:18). 
Formulating and implementing transformational change can be problematic, as it 
requires breaking out of the existing strategic mould. Existing strategies draw on 
substantial material resources, skills and capabilities, and routines. Such commitments 
hinder swift adaptation to external change (Child 1997, Leonard-Barton 1992, Miller 
1990, Robertson and Langlois 1994).  
Organisational inertia and resistance to all but incremental change impede on “a firm’s 
ability: (1) to reassess environmental opportunities and constraints, and thus to initiate a 
strategic reorientation; and (2) even given such reassessment, to substantially disrupt the 
networks of interdependent resource relationships and value commitments toward 
implementation of a new strategic orientation.” (Tushman and Romanelli 1985).  
Thus, in addition to cognitive and interpretive problems discussed above, various forms 
of lock-in limit industry responses to destabilisation conditions: 
- commitment to existing material stocks and resources flows, which limit the 
availability of resources for forward-looking or responsive initiatives (Judge and 
Miller 1991), 
- commitment to established routines (established ways of doing things that guide 
strategic action), which may become core rigidities that prevent adaptation in 
changing environments characteristic of destabilisation contexts (Leonard-Barton 
1992, Miller 1990) 
- commitment to prevailing beliefs and values that constrain what is seen as 
acceptable and feasible: 
 “the basic beliefs, or mindset, of the strategic actor tend towards stability, and this inhibits the 
making of strategic choices which are adaptive to new circumstances.” (Child 1997:50). 
So, while industry actors have the ability to develop creative response strategies, they 
often find it difficult to abandon existing templates or archetypes, because mechanisms 
of inertia create resistance to major change (Huff et al. 1992).  
However, in destabilisation processes, when industry actors experience a widening 
performance gap with external conditions, overcoming organisational lock-in and 
inertia requires deep transformations in the ways things are done. Strategic renewal and 
organisational reorientation call for the ability to learn to change rules (second-order 
learning) (Barr 1998, Argyris 1976, Nystrom and Starbuck 1984). 
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However difficult they are, organisational reorientations happen. They are seen to 
punctuate longer convergent periods of incremental change (Abernathy and Utterback 
1978, Tushman and Anderson 1986). They imply a radical reformulation of 
organisational strategies and processes, involving changes in products, markets, and 
normative positioning (Tushman and Romanelli 1985). 
2.1.5 Institutional change and destabilisation (view 5) 
Institutional theory provides another kind of explanation of stability and change, as 
related to rule structures. While the organisational processes discussed under view 4 are 
closely tied to industry activities and strategies in dynamics of economic decline, 
institutional theory and sociology provide valuable complementary insights into the 
non-material aspects of change. In such views, industry actors can be seen as 
structurated by institutional rule-sets, commonly referred to as industry mindsets or 
cultures (Phillips 1994), recipes (Grinyer and Spender 1979), templates (Huff et al. 
1992), regimes (Geels 2011), within organisational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Institutional theorists attend to the non-material structuring elements of social life. They 
have dedicated their attention to the relationships between institutions and action, 
conceived of as a dynamic process. Institutions are a key sociological concept to explain 
the non-material structure of social action at multiple levels of organisation. Institutions 
are the set of formal and informal rules (norms, values, and beliefs) that guide (enable 
and constrain) social action (Giddens 1984). Within organisational sociology, 
organisations are seen as embedded in co-constructed institutional structures: 
“organizations, and the individuals who populate them, are suspended in a web of values, norms, 
rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions, that are at least partially of their own making” 
(Barley and Tolbert 1997:93) 
The growing body of literature on institutional change has so far mainly addressed the 
emergence of institutions; research on what might be labelled ‘de-institutionalisation’ is 
comparatively scarce: 
“Empirical studies of deinstitutionalization are relatively rare” (Scott 2001:183) 
Prevailing institutions within organisational fields can be challenged, as some industry 
actors within them abandon them (Davis et al. 1994, Lounsbury 2001). Institutional 
structures lead to strong inertia and institutional lock-in, which means that de-
institutionalisation is difficult. Institutions are powerful frames for action. However, 
these frames are not static; they are regularly changed and modified: 
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“The concept of institution clearly connotes stability and order, but that does not mean that 
institutions do not undergo change. Institutional systems undergo change for both external and 
internal reasons. Exogenous change may be occasioned by disruptions occurring in wider or 
neighboring systems—whether for political, economic, or social reasons—that destabilize existing 
rules and understandings.” (Scott 2008:437) 
Lounsbury et al. (2003) suggest that the establishment of new strategies and practices 
within industries requires the previous de-institutionalisation of existing industry frames. 
It is, however, difficult to question taken-for-granted rules and routines. This is 
especially true for core regime rules (mission, identity, core beliefs) in highly 
institutionalised settings: 
“the lack of flexibility that comes with increasing institutionalization of an organization's mission 
will inhibit the organization's ability to innovate in response to organizational decline.” (Mone et al. 
1998: 121) 
A few studies of de-institutionalisation (Oliver 1992, Scott 2000) provide essential 
background to the understanding of destabilisation. De-institutionalisation can be 
defined as: 
“the de-legitimation of an established organizational practice or procedure as a result of 
organizational challenges to or the failure of organizations to reproduce previously legitimated or 
taken-for-granted organizational actions” (Oliver 1992:565) 
Mahoney (2000) suggests four different kinds of explanations for the reversal of self-
reinforcing institutional processes in various strands of economic history. De-
institutionalisation has thus been explained as a process arising 1) “when it is no longer 
in the self-interest of actors to reproduce a given institution”, 2) when “an exogenous 
shock (…) puts pressure on the overall system, making a given institution's function 
obsolete and demanding its transformation to preserve the system in the new 
environmental setting”, 3) through conflict, when subordinate groups “successfully 
challenge the prevailing arrangements”, or 4) “when events bring about its forceful 
juxtaposition with an alternative, mutually incompatible conceptualization” leading to 
the “breakdown in consensual beliefs regarding the reproduction of an institution” 
(Mahoney 2000). 
Having noted that institutions change over time, involving institutional decline and 
institutional emergence, my interest in process leads me to question how the 
relationship between actors and institutions play out over time. Structuration theory 
provides an entry point to a more processual approach to de-institutionalisation. Within 
structuration theory, institutional structures are portrayed as constraining and enabling 
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the behaviour of actors (Giddens 1984). Actors actively draw on such existing structures 
to guide their action, interpreting them in new contexts. Through their agency, actors 
are seen to produce and reproduce structures – structures are constantly enacted. These 
structures make action possible but also limit future possibilities. The notion of 
structuration provides a useful way to consider the duality of structural regularities and 
individual action; structures are both the medium and outcome of social interaction 
(Giddens 1984).  
With respect to destabilisation, structuration theory suggests that structural regularities 
(e.g. patterns of change and stability) must be conceived of with attention to the actions 
of individual agents: destabilisation patterns are visible at the macro-level and enacted 
at the micro-level. This recursive relationship is schematised in Figure 2.4: actors draw 
on existing structures for action, and structures are (re)produced in local practices, in 
ongoing processes (thus the time axis). It follows that destabilisation must be analysed 
with attention to structural patterns and enactment by industry actors. This can be done 
sequentially, by ‘analytical bracketing’ (Giddens 1984, Archer 1982) – that is, by 
analysing structure and agency separately. 
time
structure
agency
st
ru
ct
ur
es
  a
re
(r
e)
pr
od
uc
ed
in
  lo
ca
l  p
ra
ct
ic
esactors  draw
on  structures
 
Figure 2.4: Ongoing recursive relationship between structure and agency in structuration 
 
However, de-institutionalisation processes are “likely to be associated with the arrival 
of new beliefs and practices” (Scott 2001:184). Scott (2001) stressed the need for 
‘destructuration and restructuration’ processes to be investigated. Figure 2.5 
schematically represents how, in destabilisation processes, institutional re-production 
processes are interrupted as industry actors ‘break away’ from established structural 
patterns by questioning inherited institutional frames (de-institutionalisation) at the 
same time as producing new ones (re-institutionalisation). According to this view, 
destabilisation involves the erosion and breakdown of existing institutional structures as 
they lose their meaning and relevance and are abandoned by actors mobilising new 
frames to make sense of the world. 
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institutional  frame  1  (IF1) institutional  frame  2  (IF2)
 
Figure 2.5: De-institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation in destabilisation processes, dotted 
line represents expansion of time (drawing on and combining Den Hond and De Bakker 2007, 
Giddens, 1984, Archer 1982) 
2.2 Underdeveloped aspects and relevant insights from different 
literatures: three aspects 
The first part of this theoretical review was organised around the analytical – and 
arguably artificial – partitioning of five views, which provide a variety of explanations 
for destabilisation processes that can be mobilised and combined for theoretical 
elaboration to address my research questions. 
I now turn to three emerging aspects of destabilisation to which this thesis seeks to 
contribute: 
- destabilisation as multi-level unfolding process 
- destabilisation as multi-dimensional co-evolutionary process 
- the role of societal problems in destabilisation processes 
I argue that these aspects have not been the main focus within the existing literature on 
destabilisation, although some authors have provided useful contributions in these 
directions. In order to complement and connect the explanations provided by the views 
covered so far, I mobilise insights from different literatures. This discussion allows me 
to suggest additional insights that cut across the building blocks in view of theoretical 
elaboration in chapter 3. 
2.2.1 Destabilisation as long-term unfolding process 
When approaching destabilisation or long-term structural change, the approaches 
reviewed in 2.1 have tended to take a variance approach to multi-dimensional contexts 
(McCarthy et al. 2010, D’Aunno et al. 2000), with little attention to processes of 
unfolding. The destabilisation of industries is a long-term process. I have suggested in 
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the introduction that a process epistemology can enhance our understanding of 
destabilisation. Taking the longitudinal aspect of destabilisation as a central objective of 
explanation calls for a processual view of change that accommodates the unfolding over 
time of mechanisms across multiple levels. 
I here examine the contributions of authors that investigate temporal dimensions of 
destabilisation and provide potential bridges towards an understanding of the unfolding 
of destabilisation dynamics across different levels. 
2.2.1.1 Historical views and multiple temporalities 
Historians have provided fruitful approaches to the study of long-term processes. A 
fundamental assumption is the existence of multiple time scales and temporalities 
(Braudel 1958, Sewell 2005, Burke 2005 Geels and Schot 2010). Gaddis (2002) 
suggests that historians provide a meaningful way of linking together multiple levels of 
change across different temporal dimensions. They mobilise layered explanations that 
incorporate immediate causes (e.g. actions, decisions, trigger events), intermediate 
causes (e.g. social contexts, specific discourses, actors dependencies) and distant causes 
(broader contexts such as macro-ideologies, wars, economic cycles) (Figure 2.6). Exploration of the Research Topic 15
T&F Proofs: Not For Distribution
We believe any theory of transition should incorporate Braudel’s ideas 
of multiple time scales, while acknowledging that his perspective was top-
down and structuralist by conceptualizing agency (events) as superfi cial 
disturbance of structural changes. Furthermore, Braudel never explicitly 
theorized the relationships between his levels.
In sum, theories of history offer the following useful general heuristics 
for studying long-term processes: multi-causality, co-evolution, lateral 
thinking, anti-reductionism, patterns, context and the use of different time 
scales. In the following chapters, these heuristics inform our conceptual 
work on long-term socio-technical transitions.
History is also important for transitions research in another way, 
however. We will not only develop a socio-technical perspective on tran-
sitions, but also test the plausibility of the proposed perspective with his-
torical case studies. In our argument we rely on historical case studies for 
three reasons. First, studies of future transitions cannot be tested as of yet 
(because the future still lies ahead), while studies of present or ongoing 
transitions are also limited, because they cannot cover entire transitions 
from beginning to end. Second, as we will argue in Chapter I.6, test-
ing requires the tracing and analysis of processes, event sequences, and 
agency; the historical case-study method is well suited for this. Third, his-
tory is important as a treasure trove of empirical case studies that enable 
what Yin (1994) has called analytical generalization towards conceptual 
perspectives and theories. This is exactly how we will use our case stud-
ies, especially in Chapter I.4 where multiple cases are used to replicate 
Figure I.1.1 Different historical time-developments (Bertels, 1973: 123).
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Figure 2.6: Different levels of unfolding (Bertels 1973:123) 
 
Interaction between multiple levels of change i likely to be imp rtant in destabilisation 
processes. This means that destabilisation involves the conjunction of processes at 
different structural levels, with different temporal characteristics and causal 
mechanisms. Analysing such kind of change is challenging. 
Multi-level approaches allow for the nesting of various levels of causalities and related 
temporal patterns, but require the ability to define relations between different units of 
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analysis. Industry actors can be seen as being inscribed in industries, themselves 
inscribed in industry environments, themselves inscribed in their broader societal 
context. Agents interact within and across these levels. Similarly, institutional structures 
can be seen as operating at these multiple levels (individuals, organisations, industries, 
organisational fields, etc.).  
I thus distinguish three levels of unfolding that I will further unpack in chapter 3: 1) 
industry moves and games towards its environments, 2) pressures and interaction in 
environments, and 3) broader landscape changes. Changes on these different levels have 
to be linked to each other. Specific dynamics are at play at each one of these levels. In 
specific instances, which need to be better understood, these different dynamics may be 
coupled together, providing momentum to emerging patterns of change. I here review 
contributions that attend to the mechanisms of unfolding across different levels of 
organisation. 
2.2.1.2 Characterising the types of environments faced by industries 
Within the management and organisational change literatures, authors concerned with 
the types of environments facing industries (Ansoff 1987, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 
1988, McCarthy et al. 2010, Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan 1998) have focused on the 
types of change in industry environments. While these contributions do not really attend 
to the processual nature of change, they do provide insights for the study of patterns and 
regularity at the interface between industry actors and their environments. 
These authors consider timing, rates, direction and predictability of change across 
multiple dimensions. Ansoff (1987) characterises organisational environments in terms 
of their rate and predictability, yielding 5 types of environmental conditions: 1) placid 
and non-turbulent, 2) expanding environment, 3) changing environment, 4) 
discontinuous change (change in multiple dimensions), and 5) highly turbulent change. 
Destabilisation is more likely under the two latter types of environments, in which 
surprises are more frequent, inherited strengths can become weaknesses, and past 
strategies are unlikely to remain relevant. Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan (1998), 
drawing on Mintzberg (1979), suggest that in unstable and unpredictable environments, 
organisations are substantially threatened and “must innovate consistently to compete, 
or even survive” (1998:15). 
In a similar vein, McCarthy et al. (2010) have built on the notion of high velocity 
environments (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988), as those presenting “rapid and 
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discontinuous change in demand, competitors, technology and/or regulation” 
(1988:816), and destabilising existing knowledge. They provide a useful 
conceptualisation of environmental change, and dynamic relationships between various 
dimensions of change. Industry destabilisation is more likely in conditions where 
degrees of change are experienced across multiple dimensions which are tightly coupled 
– i.e. “the degree to which the velocities of different dimensions in an organizational 
environment are causally connected – the degree to which a change in the velocity of 
one dimension causes a change in the velocity of another” (McCarthy et al. 2010:612-4). 
Under such conditions, anticipating causal connections between different forms of 
change in industry environments may crucially determine the success of individual 
firms within industries under adverse conditions. McCarthy et al. (2010) recognise the 
role of timing and sequencing of change across environmental dimensions: 
“The impacts of changes in the velocity of one dimension on the velocities of other dimensions are 
unlikely to occur instantaneously but, rather, over time, as the social and technological mechanisms 
that connect the dimensions are sequentially triggered and exert their impact.” (McCarthy 
2010:620)  
This focus on characterising particular industry environments leads to the identification 
of regularities, predictability and cyclical nature of environmental variables (velocity), 
issues of synchronism, dynamic fit between organisations and the pace of change in 
their environments. Such a broad view on change has to be enhanced by an approach 
receptive to the unfolding of processes. 
2.2.1.3 Macro-patterns of environmental unfolding 
Taking the path-dependent nature of change (and destabilisation in particular) seriously 
stresses the importance of developing a long-term view of change that is receptive to the 
unfolding of processes and patterns over time. Suarez and Oliva (2005) have made an 
important step in this direction. They characterise what they refer to as ‘environmental 
change’ across four basic attributes: frequency, amplitude, speed and scope (Table 2.2), 
and are thus mainly interested in meso- and macro-level process, i.e. environmental 
change and broader landscape transformations. They then suggest a typology based on 
combination of these attributes, selecting five ‘interesting’ types of environmental 
change: 1) regular change, 2) hyperturbulence, 3) specific shock, 4) disruptive change, 
and 5) avalanche change (Figure 2.7). 
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Table 2.2: Attributes of environmental change and resulting typology (Suarez and Oliva 2005) 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Types of environmental change (Geels and Schot 2007, adapted from Suarez and Oliva 
2005) 
 
While an understanding of the three first types of environmental change has been 
discussed in the literature (see discussion on environmental velocity above, and the role 
of shocks below), disruptive and avalanche change remain underdeveloped in studies of 
destabilisation. 
Geels and Schot (2007) have further demonstrated the usefulness of such a typology. 
Building on Suarez and Oliva (2005), they combine the types of change with multi-level 
mechanisms in order to develop a typology of transition pathways. In this way, they 
effectively link environmental change to multi-level system dynamics and provide a 
generalisable account of unfolding processes within socio-technical transitions. The 
formulation of different ideal transition pathways as “combinations of dynamic 
mechanisms” (Geels and Schot 2007:416) allows for an analysis of individual cases in 
search for patterns in sequences of events. 
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The approach to destabilisation put forward in this thesis aims at formulating ideal 
patterns in order to make sense of a variety of possible event-sequences that might be 
observable in real-world cases. 
2.2.1.4 The role of shocks and extreme events 
So, destabilisation can be seen as resulting from long-term unfolding processes at 
multiple levels, which may play out to form specific patterns. However, substantial 
change is often associated to significant events, which are seen as critical turning points. 
Historically-minded social scientists have been attentive to developmental trajectories, 
and the role of turning points in re-directing established trajectories. 
“In studying the temporal intersection of different trajectories, sociologists have often emphasized 
the way in which this intersection produces key moments, or conjunctures that mark the coming 
together of relatively autonomous processes. At these points, the choices and intentions of actors 
become highly consequential and the possibility of substantial change arises. Thus the future-
oriented subjectivities of social actors in a crisis situation, produced by the temporal intersection of 
political and socioeconomic trajectories, may lead to institutional restructuring by revolutionaries 
who ‘seize the time’” (Aminzade:1992:467) 
Tensions between interlinked processes of change are thus likely to arise at critical 
points in time in which event-sequences are brought together in path-dependent 
processes (Mahoney 2000, Sewell 2005). At such turning points, the synchronicity and 
timing of change in co-evolving processes appear to be critical. 
Shocks and extreme events are significant discrete occurrences with important 
contingent consequences (Suarez and Oliva 2005). They can trigger disruptive event 
sequences (Meyer et al. 1990, Frantzeskaki et al. 2008, Sewell 2005), and thus disturb 
existing contexts in favour of change in new directions. They “are likely to shake the 
system, thereby causing the organization to break away from the path” (Sydow et al. 
2009:701). Shocks may also open up windows of opportunity for the coupling of new 
ideas, agendas and solutions (Kingdon 1984, True et al. 1999).  
Shocks may play a substantial role in relation to the salience societal problems: 
“Highly publicized events are critical triggers of institutional transformation (…). Such public 
occurrences, here called critical events, are contextually dramatic happenings that focus sustained 
public attention and invite the collective definition or redefinition of social problems” (Hoffman and 
Ocasio 2001:414) 
 “Major shocks or accidents, for instance, can push an issue higher on the agenda and strengthen the 
empirical credibility of particular discourses” (Elzen et al. 2011:265) 
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However, unless they are actively mobilised, the influence of shocks remains limited. 
Indeed, “[a] specific shock may dissipate and disappear after a while, returning to base 
line, or it may lead to a structural stepwise change” (Schot and Geels 2007:404). This 
means that in order for an extreme event to influence destabilisation processes, it must 
be interpreted in relation to problems with existing systems. 
2.2.2 Destabilisation as multi-dimensional and co-evolutionary process 
When considering industry-environment relationships, most scholars tend to focus on a 
specific aspect of environments (e.g. economic change, or socio-political change), or 
specific sources of change within them (e.g. technology, demand, regulation, etc.). 
Various dimensions of environmental change are usually considered separately, with 
little interest in interactions. Destabilisation has thus mostly been conceived of as 
resulting from technological competition, adverse market conditions, or socio-political 
change – as represented in Figure 2.8. 
industry
 
Figure 2.8: Bidirectional relationships between industry and external actors (hexagons) in various 
environmental dimensions (dotted zones) 
 
Even when taking into account a wide array of potential sources of radical change 
(D’Aunno et al. 2000, McCarthy et al. 2010, Oliver 1992, Meyer et al. 1990, Scott 
2000), scholars tend to give only limited attention to processes of interaction between 
interdependent elements of industry environments. The interaction between 
environmental dimensions is particularly relevant when studying industrial change as a 
process involving change along multiple dimensions. Indeed, changes in markets, 
technology, policies, and socio-cultural dimensions – although they come with their 
own features and relative autonomy – are likely to influence each other (Freeman and 
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Louça 2001), thus increasing their respective destabilisation potential. Thus, not only do 
industries co-evolve with actors and dimensions in their environments, but 
environmental dimensions also co-evolve with each other in destabilisation processes 
(bold arrows in Figure 2.9).  
industry
 
Figure 2.9: The co-evolution of environmental dimensions in socio-technical configurations 
 
So, established regimes face multiple pressures that can display varying degrees of 
alignment over time: 
“There is typically no shortage of pressures acting on any given regime, often pushing in opposing 
directions. In practice, it is therefore not simply the existence of such pressures that is decisive. 
Instead, it is what we term the articulation of pressures for any given regime transformation.” 
(Smith et al. 2005:1495) 
Furthermore, because of the multi-dimensionality of industry environments, industry 
actors can be seen as constantly engaged in multiple changing games: 
The choice of strategy [in rapidly changing or heterogeneous contexts] is a series of ever-changing 
games in which the position in one game can influence but does not determine the position in the 
next one. (Porter 1991:110) 
Industry actors thus face the challenge of balancing coherent action and strategy with 
divergent environmental conditions (McCarthy et al. 2010). Industrial change is thus 
likely to reflect the complexity and degree of alignment between pressures in 
environments. 
Building on the socio-technical literature (Geels 2002a, Geels and Schot 2007, Smith et 
al. 2005), and other contributions that consider the multi-dimensionality of industry 
environments (e.g. McCarthy 2010, D’Aunno et al. 2000), this thesis aims to develop a 
conceptual framework that allows understanding how pressures in industry 
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environments co-evolve to form destabilisation contexts, as well as how industry actors 
enact destabilisation. Such an approach requires attention to mechanisms of change, and 
a conceptualisation that is receptive to changing patterns of interaction across multiple 
forms of ‘embeddedness’ (Dacin et al. 1999). Furthermore, such an approach should be 
compatible with an understanding of industry actors as engaged in multiple games, 
which themselves interact with and influence each other (Porter 1980). The conceptual 
perspective will thus formalise such interaction processes, notably through the notions 
of ‘pressure interaction’ and ‘enactment patterns’. 
2.2.3 Societal problems in destabilisation 
Because of my interest in sustainability and low-carbon transitions, I here pay extra 
attention to the role of societal issues in destabilisation processes. This interest has been 
motivated in the introduction in relation to contemporary challenges facing energy 
systems, such as aspirations to direct change towards low-carbon energy systems. While 
such issues may reach the status of ‘societal challenges’ when they achieve high levels 
of attention and mobilisation, they tend to originate outside of prevailing societal 
regimes. I am thus interested in the evolution of societal challenges – defined as 
problems that come to the attention of industry actors not through their own 
normativities as constituted by industry regimes, but through contrasting normativities 
of non-regime actors as constituted by wider social movements and civil society – and 
their influence on established industries.  
The role of societal problems in destabilisation processes and in theories of social 
change in general remains an underinvestigated topic: 
“we still don’t have a very satisfactory theory of social change. Our ability to improve social 
problems remains rather limited, and we do not know why we appear to have only modest gains in 
relation to many societal problems” (Morlacchi and Martin, 2009:575) 
In destabilisation processes, challenges to the image, reputation and identity of industry 
actors may be substantial sources of external pressure (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001), 
especially with the increase of public attention to specific problems associated with 
industry practices (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). 
I mobilise two literatures that address the role of societal problems in destabilisation 
processes: 1) the issue lifecycle literature and 2) the literature on social movements. 
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2.2.3.1 Issue lifecycles 
The issue lifecycle literature seeks to identify the determinants of issue evolution in 
society, as they rise to public attention, and eventually lead to policy or industry 
response. Such contributions are relevant to an understanding of destabilisation 
processes insofar as they attend to the gradual build-up of momentum around new 
societal concerns, and relate this emergence process to challenges to existing industry 
practices and strategies.  
The literature on issue lifecycles suggests that public awareness and concern about new 
issues varies through time (Rivoli and Waddock 2011). New issues may rise to (and fall 
from) public and political attention, resulting in varying degrees of pressure on 
businesses and governments to address these problems. Furthermore, the temporal 
evolution of specific issues can be analysed as sequences of ideal stages, from the 
emergence to a resolution of problems (Downs 1972, Mahon and Waddock 1992, 
Bigelow et al. 1993, Lamertz et al. 2003, Rivoli and Waddock 2011). Crucial 
determinants of issue evolution include refinements in the framing of problems and 
controversies (Wartick and Mahon 1994, Lamertz et al. 2003), the involvement of 
multiple environmental actors, media attention and public concern (Hilgartner and Bosk 
1988, Newig 2004), and industry and policy responses to new societal claims (Mahon 
and Waddock 1992, Rivoli and Waddock 2011).  
In early stages of issue emergence, framing and the diffusion of a shared understanding 
of the problem at stake are important. When societal issues reach mass public attention, 
they increase the sense of urgency that drives perceived responsible actors 
(policymakers and/or industry actors) to search for adequate solutions (Mahon and 
Waddock 1992). Public opinion and its attention to specific problems is however 
difficult to measure. Common proxies include media coverage (Carvalho and Burgess 
2005) – a common shorthand indicator for managers (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001) – and 
opinion polls (Newig 2004). Issue lifecycle theorists also highlight that public attention 
is limited, which means that societal problems “must compete both to enter and to 
remain on the public agenda” (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988:58). Issues may thus remain 
unaddressed if attention is not sustained (Bigelow et al. 1993).  
Policy formulation and intervention is often portrayed as the resolution stage of societal 
issues (Bigelow et al. 1993, Newig 2004) – that is, new issues emerge in the public 
sphere, may acquire salience through public attention, leading to political activity and 
eventual policy outcome with the intention of positively addressing the issue. Such 
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approaches thus emphasise regulatory pressure as the process by which externalities can 
be ‘internalised’ by industry actors. New government regulations are crucial for the de-
institutionalisation of social practices: 
“Among the external pressures identified, changing government regulations are most likely to 
deinstitutionalize past practices, given the strength of coercion that underpins the legal enforcement 
of government mandates.” (Oliver 1992:584). 
This means that the translation of societal problems into a policy concern with 
substantial traction marks a turning point in the articulation of socio-political pressure 
on industries. For instance, strong environmental regulation is seen as a driver of 
environmental innovation (Porter and von der Linde 1995). 
But issues may gain societal salience and still not move towards resolution or 
responsive industry action. The literature on stakeholder and issue management has 
been more concerned with understanding what kind of, and whose claims really matter 
from the perspective of corporate actors (Mitchell et al. 1997, Wartick and Heugens 
2003). The ability of external actors and their claims to affect industry legitimacy and 
reputation raises an issue’s salience and its likelihood to be addressed (Zyglidopoulos 
2003, Mahon 2002). 
2.2.3.2 Social movements 
The literature on social movements provides keys about the societal mechanisms by 
which new issues such as sustainability may gain momentum in society (Dryzek et al. 
2003). It is interested in the mobilisation of public support around new (often far-
ranging) societal problems. These typically concern side effects, externalities or 
recurring problems related to public goods associated with technological systems. 
Societal issues may include health and safety concerns, social and labour problems and 
environmental problems (Mahon and Waddock 1992). Via the expression of such 
problems, new values, normative positioning and cultural preferences and ideologies 
may challenge established practices. As mainstream beliefs and normative orientations 
change within society, conventional assumptions, such as the legitimacy of 
technological and industrial systems can be questioned and challenged. Such 
mechanisms can play a significant role in industry destabilisation. 
Different relevant social agents and stakeholders “may become involved with an issue 
at different times” (Mahon and Waddock 1992:19). These different actors or groups are 
central to the framing (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, Benford and Snow 2000) and 
evolution of issues (Wartick and Heugens 2003), thus affecting the kind of pressure they 
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exert on industries. Social movement theory suggests that activists actively seek to 
increase momentum and mobilisation around new issues. Social movements are built 
around the motivation of diffusing new field frames (Benford and Snow 2000) and 
exposing public opinion, policymakers, economic entities and/or industry actors to 
societal issues. 
Social movements interact with the general public and public opinion in two significant 
ways: a) through education and awareness raising on new or underrepresented issues 
that contribute to the framing of problems (Mahon and Waddock 1992, Rivoli and 
Waddock 2011), and b) through the mobilisation of public support for policy change via 
democratic processes (protest, vote, etc.). 
Societal issues and problems tend to be initially raised and formulated by activists, as 
they call for change in prevailing practices and raise controversies. An important 
activity concerns the framing of problems and potential solutions: 
“Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared 
understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make 
attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and 
urge others to act in concert to affect change” (Benford and Snow 2000:615) 
Social movements actively participate in cultural framing via the articulation and 
diffusion of knowledge around societal issues (Rivoli and Waddock 2011), e.g. through 
scientific research and awareness raising campaigns.  
Social movements and activists are thus crucial for new issues to be raised in public and 
political arenas – they act as agenda builders (Wartick and Heugens 2003). They are the 
driving force behind societal pressures. They use “extra-institutional tactics, or tactics 
not commonly embraced by institutional elites and that, in some way, are subversive to 
the target institution” (King 2008:396). Social movements seek policy change and 
reform by mobilising and sustaining public attention to specific issues. They try to 
influence policy formation processes by raising new issues, framing them as substantial 
problems, and eventually offering potential solutions. The literature suggests that three 
main strategies are available to overcome the difficulties of access to policy formation: 
1) to capitalise on public mobilisation (Giugni and Passy 1998), 2) to form strategic 
political alliances (Tarrow 1994, Dryzek et al. 2003), and 3) to develop uncontested 
expertise. These processes are interlinked: 
“When they benefit from the support of public opinion, social movements increase their legitimacy 
as political actors in front of the political authorities.” (Giugni and Passy 1998:3). 
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Activists can also exert highly localised contestation pressure on a given public or 
private organisation (Den Hond and De Bakker 2007). Indeed, “effective NGOs engage 
not only the corporations that they target but also attempt to influence government and 
public opinion” (Etzion 2007:653). Activists and contestation groups can also lead, 
foster or associate themselves with niche-level initiatives (technological alternatives, 
policy proposals, alternative cultural preferences, etc.) (Smith 2005, Hess 2005). 
Because of their simultaneous involvement on multiple fronts, social movements and 
normative contestation groups are thus crucial for problem interaction in socio-political 
and economic environments. 
2.3 Taking stock of the literatures and the way forward 
In this chapter, I have introduced a number of literatures relevant to destabilisation. I 
have highlighted a number of blind spots with these existing views, focussing on three 
‘transverse’ challenges that this thesis seeks to address. I provided complementary 
insights from a range of literatures that can inform a more integrative approach around 
these ‘transverse’ challenges. These challenges will structure theoretical elaboration in 
chapter 3. I now take stock of the literatures introduced, focussing on ‘building blocks’ 
and their further combination. 
2.3.1 Building blocks  
For each view, I list a number of insights that will be mobilised as ‘building blocks’ in 
chapter 3: 
 
View 1: 
1. Technological competition is an important source of industry destabilisation. 
2. Technological alternatives can exert substantial destabilisation pressure, through 
the introduction of market opportunities based on new functionalities, improved 
performance, and the integration of problems with existing technologies. 
3. ‘Disruptive’ technologies pose challenges to existing industries that are unlikely to 
be addressed within established regimes. 
 
View 2: 
4. Economic problems are important sources of destabilisation. A multiplicity of 
economic pressures can be identified, including: 1) the intensity of rivalry between 
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existing firms, 2) the bargaining power of suppliers, 3) the bargaining power of 
buyers, 4) the threat of new entrants, and 5) the threat of technological substitutes. 
5. Economics pressures affect the financial and economic performance of established 
industry actors. 
6. Long periods of low economic performance may lead industry actors to question 
established practices and prevailing regime rules. 
 
View 3: 
7. Industry actors are also exposed to non-economic pressures. 
8. Socio-political pressures on established industries challenge their legitimacy. 
9. Closely-knit organisational fields contribute to the resistance to change at a 
collective level. 
10. Firms are expected to comply with changing norms and rules in order to survive 
within an organisational field. 
11. The institutional rule-sets structurating industry activities are stable over long 
periods of time, but also regularly undergo substantial change (see view 5). 
 
View 4: 
12. Organisational decline can be seen as a dynamic process, involving numerous 
stages from blindness to dissolution, through crisis. 
13. Each stage of decline comes with opportunities to avoid progression in the later 
stages. 
14. As performance gaps widen, reverting decline requires increasingly radical 
transformation. 
15. When destabilisation contexts become more pressing, three main trajectories are 
possible: 1) organisational reorientation, 2) organisational re-creation, and 3) 
organisational dissolution. 
16. Avoiding organisational decline is related to a sequential set of challenges: 1) the 
perception and interpretation of problems, 2) the formulation of response strategies 
within existing regimes, and 3) the implementation of transformative change 
outside the boundaries of existing regimes. 
17. In pre-crisis stages, good information about problems, sense-making and 
interpretation are crucial to deflect destabilisation processes  
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18. While early responses to problems tend to remain within the boundaries of 
established strategic regimes, as problems become serious, more daring strategies 
are required. 
19. When problems become crises, only substantial transformative change (that 
question established routines) may avoid decline. 
20. The implementation of transformational change is risky as it requires breaking out 
of the strategic mould and abandoning commitment to valuable skills and resources. 
21. Various forms of lock-in (commitment to existing material resource flows, 
established routines, prevailing beliefs and values) limit industry responses to 
destabilisation conditions. 
 
View 5: 
22. The actions and strategies of industry actors are structurated (enabled and 
constrained) by non-material, institutional, rule-sets (i.e. industry regimes). 
23. Industry regime rules are relatively stable over time, but can also be challenged in 
de-institutionalisation processes. 
24. In destabilisation processes, institutional re-production processes are interrupted as 
industry actors ‘break away’ from established structural patterns by questioning 
inherited institutional frames (de-institutionalisation) and the same time as 
producing new ones (re-institutionalisation). 
2.3.2 Mobilising research challenges as guidelines for theoretical 
elaboration 
Based on blind spots identified in the literatures discussed, I derive a set of guidelines 
that will allow me to address three main ‘transverse’ theoretical challenges: 
- Unfolding process 
o Destabilisation is a long-term process, in which the sequencing and timing 
of events and processes is crucial. 
o Destabilisation involves the conjunction of processes at different structural 
levels, involving different temporalities and causal mechanisms. 
o Three levels of unfolding can be proposed: 1) industry moves and games 
towards its environments, 2) environmental pressures and interaction, and 3) 
broader landscape changes. 
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o The intensity, frequency, amplitude and scope of external change are likely 
to influence the unfolding of destabilisation processes. 
o The interaction, alignment and coupling of change at multiple levels are 
likely to accelerate and intensify destabilisation processes. 
o A theory of destabilisation should address the role of external shocks as 
triggers of far-ranging change processes (in conjunction with other 
dynamics). 
- Multi-dimensional co-evolution 
o Destabilisation involves external pressures in multiple domains in the 
economic and socio-political environments of industries. 
o Consequently, industry actors can be seen as involved in multiple games 
towards various dimensions in their environments. 
o In terms of process, destabilisation results from economic decline and de-
institutionalisation processes. 
o Destabilisation theory must address 1) the breakthrough of radical 
technological innovations which overthrow established industries, 2) 
selection pressures on economic dimensions, and 3) selection pressures on 
socio-political and institutional dimensions. 
o Destabilisation involves the interaction and mutual influences between 
pressures across environments. 
o The interaction of multiple sources of change is likely to determine the play-
out of destabilisation trajectories. 
- Societal problems 
o Societal problems are an underdeveloped topic in theories of social change 
that should be attended to in destabilisation processes. 
o New issues may rise and fall on the agenda of public, political and 
economic entities. 
o The emergence of new societal issues is a dynamic process of gradual build-
up involving a variety of actors in industry environments (normative 
contestation groups, policymakers, public opinion, industry actors). 
o Societal issues may become serious challenges for industry actors who 
develop strategies to deal with threats to their legitimacy. 
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o Because of their simultaneous involvement on multiple fronts, social 
movements and normative contestation groups are crucial for problem 
interaction in socio-political and economic environments. 
o Social movements are built around the motivation of diffusing new field 
frames (Benford and Snow 2000) and bringing societal issues to the 
attention of the public, policymakers, economic entities and/or industry 
actors. 
o The translation of societal problems into a policy concern with substantial 
traction marks a turning point in the articulation of socio-political pressure. 
o A theory of destabilisation should be receptive to the role of societal 
problems in conjunction with other determinants of socio-economic change. 
 
These guidelines for theoretical elaboration, related to broad ‘transverse’ research 
challenges, will provide the epistemological ‘glue’ to mobilise and combine the 
identified ‘building blocks’. 
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3 Conceptual perspective 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the conceptual perspective mobilised to investigate destabilisation 
processes. Building on the various views on destabilisation discussed in the previous 
chapter, theoretical elaborations are guided by three research challenges. The aim is to 
develop an understanding of destabilisation that attends to multi-level unfolding, multi-
dimensional co-evolution, and environmental problems. 
3.1.1 Contributions and positioning 
This chapter formulates the conceptual perspective mobilised for the study of industry 
destabilisation. Taking a ‘building blocks’ approach to conceptual elaboration, I 
mobilise insights from the different views on destabilisation covered in chapter 2 to 
formulate a integrative perspective tailored to address my three research challenges. It 
addresses 1) dynamic unfolding at multiple levels, 2) multi-dimensional co-evolution, 
and 3) the role of environmental problems (as a particular kind of societal problem). 
The contributions of my conceptual perspective combine and complement existing 
perspectives reviewed in chapter 2 by attending to the long-term unfolding of 
destabilisation processes at multiple levels (from industry actors to broader landscapes) 
and to the co-evolutionary nature of change on multiple dimensions in industry 
environments. My interest in environmental problems provides a further justification for 
a multi-dimensional perspective that attends not only to developments in the economic 
environment, but also in the socio-political environment of industries. 
3.1.2 Structure of the conceptual perspective 
The conceptual perspective builds on the Triple Embeddedness Framework (TEF) of 
industrial change (Geels 2011), which provides a synthetic conceptualisation of industry 
as embedded in multiple environments and institutional structures. Furthermore, the 
TEF, drawing on notions of industry embeddedness (Geels 2011, Granovetter 1985, 
Dacin et al. 1999, Krippner 2001), accommodates a multi-dimensional understanding of 
industry stability, and is thus a useful starting point for conceptual elaboration on 
destabilisation processes. 
Using this framework as a ‘stepping stone’, I can then formulate an original synthetic 
perspective on destabilisation, consisting of three interrelated processes: 1) the 
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evolution of external pressures, 2) industry responses to perceived challenges, and 3) 
mediation by industry regimes (inertia and change). I address the three ‘transverse’ 
research challenges to elaborate an integrative perspective on destabilisation that 
satisfies my research criteria. 
3.2 Triple Embeddedness Framework (TEF) 
The TEF (Geels 2011) provides a synthetic and useful (Turnheim and Geels 2011) 
conceptualisation of industry actors as embedded in two selection environments 
(economic and socio-political), and structurated by field-specific (enabling and 
constraining) institutions: industry regimes (see Figure 3.1). This framework is here 
mobilised as a ‘stepping stone’ to provide an initial conceptualisation of industry 
embeddedness that allows for the investigation of destabilisation processes. 
Destabilisation results from challenges to prevailing forms of stability. It is thus 
relevant to explore the elements that contribute to industry stability. The TEF suggests 
two broad forms of explanation for the long-term stability of industries: 1) stable 
relationships with external environments (external fit), and 2) inertia provided by 
industry-specific institutions (regime commitment). 
3.2.1 Multi-dimensional external pressures 
I have already pointed to my (theoretical) motivations for dealing with multi-
dimensional industry environments that include both economic and socio-political 
elements. While some efforts towards integration have been noted in the literature 
(d’Aunno et al. 2000, Mone et al. 1998, McCarthy et al. 2010, Oliver 1992, Meyer et al. 
1990, Scott 2000, etc.), they have tended to neglect dynamic interactions between 
environmental dimensions. The TEF conceptualisation of industry environments is 
compatible with my coevolutionary motivation, and thus provides a useful starting point 
for theoretical elaboration. I first discuss two broad environments (economic and socio-
political), and then address their interactions. 
The economic environment encompasses supply-chains and markets. Relevant social 
groups include suppliers, customers, new entrants and competitors, and technological 
alternatives (Porter 1980). The main resource flow concerns goods and services, which 
are exchanged in transactions assessed principally according to economic and material 
criteria: price, cost, technical performance, efficiency, etc.  
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The socio-political environment contains non-commercial relationships between 
industry and non-market actors. Relevant social groups include policy makers, civil 
society, and social movements. The main selection criteria are social fitness and 
legitimacy, which determine industry actors’ ‘license to operate’. Legitimacy has been 
defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995:574). Firms in industries are expected 
to adhere to institutions expressed formally, such as in policies and regulations, or more 
tacitly, such as in normative prescriptions, public values and expectations (Fligstein 
1996, Leblebici et al. 1991, D’Aunno et al. 2000). 
Environmental boundaries and their respective institutional singularities are not 
hermetic; they interpenetrate each other through two main processes: 1) mutual shaping, 
and 2) the active engagement of actors across environmental dimensions.  
1) The economic and socio-political dimensions overlap. Economic sociologists have 
argued that economic activities are partly determined by prevailing institutional rule-
sets and policies (Barber 1995, Davis et al. 1994, Dacin et al. 1999), e.g. economic 
policies set framework conditions for market transactions. Similarly, the criteria at play 
on markets exert their influence beyond market transactions, such as when policies are 
evaluated on the basis of their cost-effectiveness for instance. 
2) Furthermore, social actors engage with each other between environments. Socio-
political actors actively engage in activities with an aim to alter the conditions of 
economic transactions. Economic actors also engage in activities with the intention to 
shape norms, regulations and legitimacy criteria. 
In stable conditions, environmental dimensions and actors follow relatively predictable 
interaction patterns that contribute to the stability of established trajectories through 
alignment. But when environments are in flux, interactions between forces and actors 
across environmental dimensions are crucial to the build up of dynamics of change that 
guide the direction of industry trajectories. Environmental interactions are further 
considered below in the context of multi-level unfolding (3.3.2) and multi-dimensional 
interactions at environmental level (3.3.3). 
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3.2.2 Industry strategies 
Building on insights from evolutionary economics and institutionalist perspectives, the 
TEF suggests that industry actors develop bi-directional relationships with their 
environments, which are mediated by institutional structures. 
Industry actors actively engage with their environments (Child 1997, Miles and 
Cameron 1982, Geels 2011, Mintzberg, et al. 1998). Oliver (1991), for instance, 
suggests that organisations may adopt ‘defiant’ or ‘manipulative’ strategies towards 
change in external institutions, while Miles and Cameron (1982) see firms as capable of 
a variety of positioning strategies on markets, including domain defence, domain 
offence and domain creation. Child (1997:45) considers firms as actively selecting the 
kind of environment in which they operate. 
The relationships between industries and their environments are also enacted. The 
literature on corporate strategy offers clues as to various strategies available to 
organisations to respond to or shape pressures in their environments. Geels (2011) 
provides a summary of the strategies employed by industry actors towards their 
environments. 
“The main strategies towards various environments are the following: 
a) Economic positioning strategies focus on the position of industries in the (economic) task 
environment. They include supply chain management, operations management, marketing 
and sales.  
b) Innovation/technology strategies include R&D, knowledge management, and product 
development alliances. 
c) Political strategies relate to government policies, and include lobbying, financial 
contributions to political parties, litigation, organized pressure strategies, and information 
strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999); 
d) Socio-cultural strategies relate to social debates and public opinion, and include framing 
strategies, public relations, advertising and information campaigns (Lounsbury and Glynn, 
2001).” 
(Turnheim and Geels 2011:6) 
3.2.3 Mediation by industry regimes 
Building on institutional theories (Giddens 1984, Scott 2001, Haveman and Rao 1997), 
the TEF supplements the embeddedness of industry actors in environments by a 
structuration process (see view 5). The ‘industry regime’ (Geels 2011, Turnheim and 
Geels 2011) is a set of industry-specific institutions (Haveman and Rao 1997) that 
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enable and constrain the behaviour and action of industry actors. Industry regimes differ 
from broader institutions, at play in industry environments (such as societal discourse 
and beliefs, economy-wide regulations, customer prescriptive values, etc.), which 
structure whole economies, societies, etc. Regime commitment and capacity for action 
are tightly linked (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
Building on Scott’s (2001) conceptualisation of institutions, and adding a technical 
dimension, industry regimes include: 
1) cultural-cognitive elements (beliefs and cognitive frames), 
2) normative elements (mission, identity and values),  
3) technical elements (competences, knowledge, capabilities), and 
4) regulatory elements (specific regulations). 
These institutional structures of industries provide a frame for action. They are 
mobilised on a routine basis to make sense of external reality. They provide the rule-set 
for firms in industries to formulate strategies, but also set limits to the creativity of 
responses to environmental conditions. Indeed, as frames for action, institutions provide 
limits to what is seen as possible, and are powerful sources of conformity and lock-in. 
The different elements of industry regimes have here been ordered according to their 
structural importance, cognitive elements having precedence over action elements in a 
continuum between abstraction and physicality (Gavetti and Rivkin 2007). Cultural-
cognitive and normative elements constitute the core rules as they relate to ‘ways of 
being and interpreting’. They are thus more fundamental than technical and regulatory 
elements, which relate to ‘ways of doing’ or the ‘world of action’ (Gavetti and Rivkin 
2007). Consequentially, when core rules are changed, they are likely to lead to changes 
throughout established sets of rules. The contrary is not necessarily true. 
Commitment to industry regimes may lead to various forms of lock-in, which provide 
industry inertia and raise barriers for change. At industry levels, four broad types of 
lock-in can be specified in relation to regime elements: 
1) Commitment to cultural-cognitive institutions (routine rigidity) narrows down 
the scope and focus of industry search and sense-making (Gilbert 2005). 
Managers and engineers become blind to developments outside their search area 
(Nelson and Winter 1982), underestimating threats and opportunities. Cognitive 
inertia leads to difficulties in processing external change and may delay the 
matching perceived problems with solutions or strategies (Barr 1998, Tripsas 
and Gavetti 2000, Kaplan et al. 2003). 
  
54 
2) Commitment to predefined mission and identity refrain industry actors from 
changing their normative positioning in society (Dutton and Dukerich 1991).  
3) Commitment to the existing technological and competence base creates 
resistance against technological discontinuities (Tushman and Anderson 1986), 
which by definition tend to disrupt past investments in skills and technologies. 
New capabilities are difficult to develop in exploitation phases (March 1991). 
4) Industry actors are committed to industry-specific regulatory institutions through 
compliance mechanisms (Scott 2001). These institutions constrain the behavior 
of industries with incentives and disincentives. 
Institutional logics are relatively stable, but can change and be disrupted. Institutional 
change has been receiving increasing attention from scholars (Scott 2008, Dacin et al. 
2002, Oliver 1992, Mahoney 2000, Den Hond and De Bakker 2007). Drawing on such 
contributions, industry regimes are not seen as permanent structures. Instead, they are 
stable over extended periods of time, as long as industry actors are willing to reproduce 
them. They are generated by the cumulative action of organisations during industry 
formation (emergent enactment), are actively reproduced by on-going mobilisation of 
its categories by organisations (routine enactment), and may be modified through 
second-order learning processes (enactment of change).  
3.2.4 A synthetic understanding of industry stability 
Industry actors are thus embedded in environments and in sets of rules. The former type 
of embeddedness in environments relates to interaction between mutually dependent 
actors), while the latter type is oriented towards rules and structures. The related forms 
of explanation are thus complementary. 
Industry actors are subject to external selection pressures in their environments, and 
tend to conform to prevailing institutions (see Figure 3.1). The TEF discussed above 
suggests essential sources of industry stability (Geels 2011).  
1) Industry actors seek fit with their environments: a) stable or growing resource 
flows in the economic environment, and b) acceptable levels of legitimacy in the 
socio-political environment. 
2) Internal industry stability is maintained by the reproduction of industry-specific 
institutions. Industry actors are committed to regime rules and tend to reproduce 
them as long as they are perceived as viable.  
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The external and internal dimensions of stability are interlinked, such that stable 
industries ascribe to strongly institutionalised rule-sets and strategies, and benefit from a 
stable relationship with external conditions. The resulting stability is enacted on an on-
going basis. In conditions of regular change, rules and resource flows are reproduced by 
actors. Destabilisation thus requires actors to question the regime rules when 
experiencing problems with resources and legitimacy. 
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Figure 3.1: Triple embeddedness representation of industries (adapted from Geels 2011) 
3.3 Industry destabilisation 
I now mobilise the TEF to integrate the ‘building blocks’ covered in the literature 
review, and position my conceptual contributions in relation to the research challenges 
introduced in chapter 2. 
3.3.1 Towards a synthetic understanding of industry destabilisation 
Building on the TEF (see 3.2), which formalises bi-directional relationships between 
industry actors and external actors in industry environments, and institutional rules 
structures enabling and constraining the agency of industry actors, I can now elaborate a 
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perspective that attends to destabilisation in relation to these forms of industry 
embeddedness. 
Destabilisation can be understood as resulting from the weakening of external sources 
of stability and actor commitment to established regime rules. These processes are 
interlinked and mutually influence each other. I first conceptualise external pressures 
and industry responses separately, before specifying their dynamic interaction. 
3.3.1.1 External sources of change 
I here integrate insights on forms of change in industry environments presented in 
chapter 2 (views 1 to 3). Various scholars have considered different sets of sources of 
change in industry environments (Porter 1980, Ansoff 1987, Abernathy and Clark 1985, 
McCarthy et al. 2010). Building on such insights and on the TEF, I identify ten distinct 
types of forces in industry environments from which substantial pressure can originate 
(see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Sources of change in industry environments 
 
In the economic environment, industry actors face pressures on markets and on the 
supply side. These pressures overlap partly with Porter’s 5 competitive forces (1980). 
The market position of industry actors is affected by changes in:  
1. the size of demand (market size),  
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2. the kinds of demand (qualitative attributes) 
3. the degree of technological competition in products.  
These sources of change are mainly enacted by customers and competing industries. On 
the supply side, industry actors face: 
4. on-going challenges concerning the availability of essential resources (financial 
capital, raw materials, equipment and machinery, labour and capabilities, etc.)8,  
5. the introduction of substantial process innovation, and 
6. competition from new entrants.  
These pressures are enacted by suppliers and industrial competitors. 
In the socio-political environment, industry actors face  
7. changes in societal beliefs and discourse expressed by the general public,  
8. normative protests expressed by specialised activist organisations concerned 
with undesirable industry practices in relation to societal challenges (Den Hond 
and De Bakker 2007),  
9. changes in policies that regulate, and  
10. changes in policies that provide support to industry activities.  
These latter types of selection pressures are articulated by actors that fall beyond the 
realm of the market, but nevertheless exert significant influence on regimes. 
3.3.1.2 Industry responses 
Thus, industry actors simultaneously face multiple pressures in their environments, 
which affect their market position, financial performance, and political and cultural 
legitimacy. They develop specific response strategies to attend to pressures in multiple 
domains. These responses have to be balanced with each other for overall strategic 
consistency, and are enabled and constrained by regime rules. 
In chapter 2, I have highlighted three processes relevant to industry enactment of 
pressures and destabilisation contexts (view 4), namely 1) the perception and 
interpretation of problems, 2) the formulation of response strategies, and 3) the 
implementation of transformative change. I here integrate these insights to the TEF and 
the notion of regime rules. 
                                                
8 See for instance, discussion of munificence in the organisational literature, as the availability of 
organisational environments to provide sufficient resources for the population they host. Such 
conceptions are different from resource-based views, which emphasise that firms and organisations 
actively develop resources for themselves (e.g. capabilities and core competences). 
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The three processes are sequentially linked, and each involves a particular kind of 
relationship with environmental signals that is mediated by internal structures: 
1) the perception and interpretation of problems is the first mode of interaction 
between industry actors and their environments in destabilisation processes. 
Internal controls and sense-making devices assess the existence of gaps between 
external expectations and actual performance. Problems and performance gaps 
may be missed, downplayed, or denied, in which case they can get worse. 
However, if recognised, problems are met by adjustments to existing strategies, 
or the development of new strategies. 
2) According to the TEF, four types of industry strategies can be distinguished: a) 
economic positioning strategies, b) innovation/technology strategies, c) political 
strategies, and d) socio-cultural strategies. Each type of strategy addresses 
specific environmental dimensions. The strategic response process involves the 
initial search for and selection of new strategies, followed by increasing resource 
dedication, and later the abandonment of previous strategies. The successful 
implementation of response strategies can alleviate problems altogether. 
However, because industry strategies are constrained by prevailing industry 
regime rules that limit the field of possible action, they might not be enough to 
cope with serious threats, or multi-dimensional combinations of pressures. 
3) When pressures are intense, multiple, and/or highly aligned, environments might 
become so challenging to industry actors that they can no longer be addressed 
without reformulating existing regimes rules. Implementing transformative 
change to industry rules is a difficult task that requires the ability to question 
taken-for-granted assumptions, the ability to substantially re-direct committed 
resources, and the creativity to define a new fruitful trajectory to guide future 
strategies. Depending on the depth and scope of regime rule change, industry 
transformation can be a re-orientation or a re-creation trajectory (see below). 
3.3.1.3 The articulation of external problems and endogenous responses 
Increasing pressures in the environment of industries (changing external rules and 
resource flows) can lead to weakening economic performance and/or decreased levels 
of legitimacy. Sustained weak performance may lead to doubts in the adaptive potential 
of existing regimes, and may trigger the initial search for solutions outside the bounds 
of the existing regime (early diversification). If problems continue unresolved and turn 
  
59 
into serious challenges, industry actors may have to implement major regime change in 
order to survive. This implies the re-evaluation of peripheral regime rules (re-
orientation), or the fundamental re-evaluation of core beliefs (re-creation) (Tushman 
and Romanelli 1985).  
However, radical changes to strategies and regime rules (i.e. changes in mission, 
identity, and industry structure) are risky for industry actors, because they involve the 
development of new activities in unchartered and uncertain territory. In destabilisation 
contexts, undertaking such risky renewal activities may, however, be the only way to 
alleviate external pressures. Because destabilisation involves the temporal articulation 
of external and internal dimensions, the timing of responses strategies and structural 
transformation is crucial. Navigating destabilisation contexts involves the risks of 
adapting too soon, or too late. 
The understanding of destabilisation processes could thus be improved by attending to 
their unfolding, including variations in the nature, timing and interaction of sources of 
change at multiple levels. In the next section, I further conceptualise these aspects of 
destabilisation processes. 
3.3.2 Destabilisation as a multi-level unfolding process 
In this section, I attend to destabilisation as a multi-level unfolding process. Building on 
historical approaches to long-term change, I first distinguish three levels of unfolding, 
cover mechanisms at play in each of them, and suggest their articulation in 
destabilisation processes. 
I have already distinguished several organisational levels in which industry actors are 
inscribed. These organisational levels are implicit in the TEF, but are worthwhile 
rendering explicit and developing further. The TEF maps industry actors within 
industries, and within environments. Figure 3.3 represents industry actors as inscribed 
in multiple organisational levels: 1) industries, 2) industry environments (organisational 
fields), and 3) broader environments (landscape). 
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Figure 3.3: Industry actors inscribed in multiple organisational levels 
 
This conceptualisation of multi-level embeddedness remains fairly static. Building on 
multi-level perspectives inspired by historical approaches (2.2.1.1), when considering 
destabilisation as an unfolding process, specific dynamics and temporalities can be seen 
as operating at each level. The unfolding of processes at each level is further specified 
below. Because of my focus on industries and industry actors, I first conceptualise the 
unfolding of destabilisation processes at this level, before conceptualising ‘higher-
order’ dynamics. Furthermore, these levels are interrelated, and thus require the 
specification of multi-level interaction mechanisms. 
3.3.2.1 Industry enactment of destabilisation 
Here I build mostly on managerial and institutional approaches (views 4 and 5), which 
link destabilisation to decreasing regime commitment and processes of strategic change. 
Understanding destabilisation as an unfolding process requires a conceptualisation of 
the process of change at organisational and industry levels as it is implemented in the 
face of serious external challenges. Destabilisation involves increasing external 
challenges and decreasing commitment to established strategies and regime rules.  
The destabilisation of industries can be represented as progressing through a number of 
phases. Such phase models are ideal-types that can be mobilised as search heuristics to 
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guide empirical analysis (O’Rand and Krecker 1990). They are necessary 
simplifications of real-world processes. 
Isolating industry response requires to ‘analytically freeze’ other dimensions and 
organisational levels, in order to take an ‘inward’ look. Therefore, I for now assume that 
problems increase gradually, and focus solely on industry responses and enactment of 
transformational regime change. Building on existing conceptualisations of 
organisational decline (Collins 2009, Weitzel and Jonsson 1989, Tushman and 
Romanelli 1985) and issue evolution (Bigelow et al. 1993, Rivoli and Waddock 2011), 
the internal enactment of destabilisation by industry actors can be conceptualised as 
following five phases, from denial to dissolution (see Table 3.1):9 
1) Blindness and denial. In the early stages of destabilisation, when pressures have 
emerged but remain weakly articulated, industry actors tend to pay very little 
                                                
9 This kind of developmental model is shares some attributes with of life-cycle theories of organisational 
change. In such models, “the typical progression of change events (…) is a unitary sequence, [for which 
the progression] to the final end state is prefigured and requires a specific sequence of events” (Van de 
Ven and Poole 1995:515). Ideal progression sequences are conceptualised as linear, although some 
departures can be considered as deviations. Such models tend to view the influence of environmental 
forces of change (e.g. selection pressures at environmental level) as limited. Here, for instance, problems 
are assumed to increase gradually in the ideal enactment model. However, the stage model is not here 
taken as a determined programme following an endogenous logic towards an end state, but rather as an 
ideal pattern against which to compare more sophisticated real-world developments. The inherent logic is 
evolutionary, as the focal entity (industry) is conceptualized as adjusting to changes in a selection 
environment. 
Evolutionary theories of change base their explanation on “a continuous cycle of variation, selection, and 
retention” (Van de Ven and Poole 1995:518), operating at a higher organisational level – that of 
populations. The notion of ‘fitness’ can be mobilised to appreciate the relationship between industry 
strategies and environmental selection pressures (see 0). 
What is the relationship between the five-stage enactment model of destabilisation enactment and the 
overall evolutionary perspective suggested by the TEF? The overall evolutionary logic provides the 
backdrop of the conceptual perspective, allowing for the consideration of multiple environmental 
selection pressures, and variational changes (incremental and more radical) in industry action and 
strategies. This multi-faceted explanation of change is located at the boundary between industries and 
their environments. The stage model provides a nested form of explanation (at the level of industry 
actors) that is here used as a heuristic device against which to evaluate industry development trajectories, 
and variations thereof. The two forms of explanation are thus complementary and operate at different 
levels. Working out the relationship between these two models of change thus “requires specifying 
macro-micro links” (Van de Ven and Poole 1995:534), which is done throughout this section. 
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attention to problems, downplaying them or even denying them. Industry 
strategies follow a ‘business as usual’ mode, with strong regime commitment. 
2) Early small changes. As problems are better articulated, they can no longer be 
denied and are increasingly recognized by industry actors (Rivoli and Waddock 
2011). Industry strategies remain defensive, with the implementation of tighter 
controls, but also some early diversification and incremental innovation 
strategies. Regime commitment is still strong in this phase. 
3) Doubts and diversification. When problems increase, they create substantial 
pressure for change. The widening of performance gaps and the accumulation of 
negative feedback point to the ineffectiveness of old strategies. Industry actors 
thus devote an increasing amount of resources into diversification and 
exploration activities (Miles and Cameron 1982), as increasing doubts about 
regime viability lead to weakening commitment. 
4) Full destabilisation and decline. As problems become more pressing, the level of 
urgency is raised, so that industry actors face serious threats to their activity and 
a possible crisis. Industry actors lose faith in the existing regime. In such cases, 
depending on the severity of the problems in relation to the industry’s core 
competence and the ability of industry actors to enact radical change, industry 
actors will develop drastic turn around strategies in order to have a chance to 
survive. Two main options then become available to industry actors (Tushman 
and Romanelli 1985, Geels 2011, Turnheim and Geels 2011): 
a) Re-orientation: substantial change in peripheral rules (technical and 
knowledge base, regulations) with core principles untouched. Loss of faith 
thus leads to the development of new means for survival. 
b) Re-creation: deeper changes to core regime rules (mission, identity, core 
beliefs). Loss of faith thus leads to the development of a new hope for 
survival around a fundamentally changed industry. 
5) Dissolution: failure or inability to address mounting problems. Loss of faith 
leads to the abandonment of prospects for survival. Industry strategies focus on 
making the most of decline, or avoiding the eventuality of collapse, by 
downsizing and ‘milking’ assets. 
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Table 3.1: A stage-model of industry destabilisation 
Problem recognition Regime commitment Industry strategies
1. Blindness or 
denial Denied and downplayed Strong Business as usual
2. Early small 
changes Recognised Strong
Tighter controls, domain defence, 
incremental innovations and 
early diversification
3. Doubts and 
diversification Increasing problems
Early doubts in regime viability, 
weakening commitment Exploration and diversification
4a. Re-orientation Urgent, threatening, crisis Loss of faith – new means Substantial change of peripheral rules (ways of doing)
4b. Re-creation Urgent, threatening, crisis Loss of faith – new hope Radical change of core rules (ways of being)
5. Dissolution Urgent, threatening, crisis Loss of faith – no prospects Downsizing, ‘milking’, collapse, etc.  
This form of stage model is a useful simplification that can be mobilised as a heuristic 
device against which to evaluate more complex cases, for which developments as 
specified in each column (Table 3.1) may be less linear. The resulting understanding of 
industry destabilisation enactment thus goes beyond life-cycle models, as it is based on 
a process of industry adjustment (rather than development toward an end state), and 
includes a dynamic understanding of industry-environment interactions. In evolutionary 
terms, industry destabilisation may be linked to increasing selection pressure, the 
questioning of regime rules issued from previous retention phases, and strong variation 
in the search for new adaptive industry forms and attributes. 
3.3.2.2 Unfolding at environmental level: alignment and spillovers 
Building on approaches attending to sources of change in industry environments (views 
1 to 3), and other multi-dimensional perspectives, I now unpack processes of unfolding 
at the level of industry environments, in which pressures are articulated.  
I here build on Freeman and Louça’s (2001) approach to the explanation of historical 
economic change. They suggest that the co-evolution of five semi-autonomous 
subsystems (science, technology, economics, politics and culture) provides insights to 
historical developments. They justify the mobilisation of different subsystems for 
conceptual and analytical reasons: 
“[the subsystems] are proposed because each one has been shown to have some semi-autonomous, 
and certainly not insignificant, influence on the process of economic growth (…), and most 
important of all, it is precisely the relative autonomy of each of these five processes that can give 
rise to problems of lack of synchronicity and harmony or, alternatively, of harmonious integration 
and virtuous circle effects on economic growth. It is thus essential to study both the relatively 
independent development of each stream of history and their interdependencies, their loss of 
integration, and their reintegration.” (Freeman and Louça 2001:126-7, original emphasis) 
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In a similar vein, but with a different object of study, I suggest that destabilisation 
pressures in industry environments should be studied in their ‘relatively independent 
development’ as well as in their interaction. I thus here discuss two main processes: 
a) conjunctures of individual pressures, and 
b) interaction and alignment between multiple pressures  
Conjunctures of individual pressures 
With respect to changes in the economic, technological, political, and socio-cultural 
dimensions of industry environments, a number of insights can be mobilised from the 
building blocks of the various literatures covered in chapter 2. These rely mostly on 
views 1 to 3. However, as noted by McCarthy et al. (2010), it is a tricky exercise to 
generalise about the rate, intensity and scope of different types of pressures, as they are 
inherently dependent on the industry type and context, and are likely to vary over time. I 
here nevertheless try to provide some informed keys to the temporal unfolding 
characteristics of different types of pressures. 
Changes in market size can be expected to be fairly frequent. The price of the 
goods in question, or re-adjustments of consumption patterns, can lead to minor demand 
fluctuations, depending on factors such as the elasticity of demand and the availability 
of substitutes for these goods. Certain fluctuations have a cyclical nature and are thus 
fairly predictable (e.g. seasonal and hourly variations for energy demand, or planned 
capital renewal schemes). Major demand fluctuations can be related to disruptive events 
affecting the supply and distribution of goods and their prices (e.g. oil shock, supply 
disruption related to strikes, etc.). Forward industry linkages with different markets 
mean that major changes affecting downstream industries can significantly affect 
overall demand patterns. More gradual and/or predictable demand changes arise with 
deeper changes in customer preferences (kinds of demand), technological substitutes, 
the renewal of the capital stock or infrastructure supporting the market.  
 Changes in technological competition are related to the introduction of 
innovative alternatives, often by new entrants. The rate of technological innovations is 
tied to their scope: small and incremental innovations tend to occur more frequently 
than more far-ranging innovations. Punctuated equilibrium theory also suggests that 
long periods of incremental change are punctuated by shorter upswings of radical 
innovation (Abernathy and Utterback 1978). Radical innovation can be disruptive and 
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thus lead to substantial destabilisation pressure. Incremental innovation often has the 
opposite effect of strengthening established technical trajectories. 
 The availability of essential resources tends to wither when it is not maintained 
– that is, it has an inherent tendency for slow erosion. Thus, essential resources have to 
be regularly renewed. In the case of natural resources, gradual exhaustion can be offset 
by exploration or technological improvement, implying substantial costs. Similarly, 
financial or political support is acquired on the basis of periodic agreements or contracts, 
at the termination of which new negotiations are due. Therefore, the erosion of essential 
resources is a fairly predictable, routinised external constraint in most cases, and the 
frequency of change depends on the kind of resource. However, the availability of 
valuable resources is also exposed to less predictable downward trends and crises. For 
instance, political commitment to a given industry is a less formalised and palpable 
asset – yet, it is no less valuable – and is sometimes reversed on very short time scales 
(e.g. dissolution of established political ties following a general election). 
 Processes on socio-political dimensions tend to follow comparatively more 
gradual dynamics than market changes, but can exert significant and far-ranging 
pressure on industries. Societal values, norms and institutions are so persistent that they 
have traditionally been studied as fixed in the mainstream economics literature (which 
is less interested in long-term change). The notion of (policy) paradigm has been 
developed to explain how such deep-seated structures may change only slowly (Hall 
1993). However, socio-political dimensions are also prone to more rapid forms of 
change such as in political crises, sudden public upheavals, etc. when large societal 
shifts may disrupt institutional logics (Pierson 2004). I would argue, however, that such 
rapid shifts result from the punctual opening of windows of opportunities in slow 
moving structures (Kingdon 1984). 
Changes on cultural dimensions often follow gradual patterns that play out over 
many decades. This does not preclude from the possibility of major upheavals and rapid 
cultural change, but they are likely to be related to some form of external shock, and the 
availability of new discourses. Indeed, new discourses and cultural repertoires have to 
be elaborated before they can be widely adopted throughout society. The difficulty of 
such a process, involving cultural contests, resistance, and framing struggles, explains 
the relatively low frequency and rate of significant socio-cultural change. However, 
such changes can have profound implications, namely in allowing the alignment of 
multiple pressures. 
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 Regulatory pressure for change typically builds up slowly, with numerous 
lengthy debates leading up to policy formulation. Many opportunities exist for actors to 
slow down the process. Implementation is usually comparatively diligent, and can thus 
lead to abrupt patterns of environmental change. Policy change is related to opportunity 
structures that may arise with regular frequency (e.g. related to electoral cycles), or less 
predictable changes in the salience of specific issues (e.g. issue lifecycle), which are 
sensitive to extreme events. 
 
Although strong external pressures in one dimension may be sufficient for 
destabilisation, it is likely that industries face even bigger problems when multiple 
pressures interact to create a ‘perfect storm’. While firms tend to be skillful in 
responding to single pressures, unexpected alignments may overwhelm and destabilise 
them. This also means that destabilisation can follow different patterns, depending on 
the strength and speed of, and interactions between, pressures. 
Interaction and alignment 
I now turn to the interaction of multiple pressures, which I have suggested is likely to 
lead to more pressing destabilisation conditions. As changes in multiple interrelated 
subsystems become aligned, they are likely to lead to greater overall pressure for 
change. I formulate mechanisms within and across environmental domains by which 
various types of pressure interact. 
It has been noted in the literature review that existing research on destabilisation tends 
to focus on the influence of isolated factors. Furthermore, whenever multiple sources of 
change are considered, one-dimensional explanations tend to prevail: destabilisation has 
been explained either as economic decline or as de-legitimation process. D’Aunno et al. 
suggest that crossovers between the influence of economic and socio-political forces 
provide a fruitful area for research:  
“Both institutional and market forces are likely to affect divergent change [i.e. abandoning 
institutionalized templates] to varying degrees in different organizational fields and, probably, in 
different historical periods. Moreover, institutional and market forces may interact in important 
ways to affect organizational change, and future research should aim to specify their roles more 
precisely” (2000:700-701). 
Investigating pressure interaction between environments is thus relevant to a co-
evolutionary understanding of destabilisation (see Figure 2.9). The literature on 
organisational environments has recognised the need for a better understanding of 
  
67 
relations between environmental variables more generally (Judge and Miller 1991, 
McCarthy et al. 2010). The literature on co-evolution (Freeman and Louça 2001, Geels 
2002a, Geels and Schot 2007, Smith et al. 2005, Volberda and Lewin 2003) further 
suggests that significant change can result from the interaction of dynamics in multiple 
interrelated subsystems. Socio-technical approaches provide a fruitful understanding of 
destabilisation as a process of de-alignment between multiple interlinked dimensions. 
They suggest that tensions in the alignments of markets, technology, industry, users, 
regulations may build up and lead to transformative change (Geels 2002a, Freeman and 
Louça 2001). Thus, structural crises may arise from tensions (i.e. mis-alignment) 
between the co-evolving sub-systems10 that jointly produced stable configurations 
(Freeman and Louça 2001). Long-term structural regularity in socio-economic systems 
is punctuated by periods of de-alignment, which creates the kind of tension that is at the 
source of the destabilisation of socio-technical configurations. Destabilisation can thus 
be viewed as a process of de-alignment of interrelated sub-systems, involving 
decreasing mutual ‘fit’. Destabilisation is likely to involve change across multiple 
dimensions. When taking industry actors as the primary focal group, the destabilisation 
of industries can thus be seen as resulting from decreasing alignment between 
established industry trajectories and (multiple) environmental dimensions. External 
destabilisation contexts become more pressing as multiple forces are aligned and 
coupled (cf. ‘avalanche change’ – Suarez and Oliva 2005, Geels and Schot 2007). The 
study of destabilisation should be attentive to the unfolding of interaction processes at 
environmental level. I further unpack the multi-dimensional interaction of pressures in 
industry environments in 3.3.3. 
3.3.2.3 Landscape trends and shocks 
Building on socio-technical and other approaches receptive to long-term unfolding 
processes, I now discuss the role of deep structural trends and events in destabilisation. I 
first introduce the notion of landscape dynamics, and then explore their interaction with 
destabilisation processes at the level of organisational field.  
Landscape dynamics 
                                                
10 The sub-systems are seen as having distinctive features and relatively autonomous selection 
mechanisms. 
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Because industry destabilisation unfolds over extended periods of time, the process is 
likely to be influenced by deeper structural changes (Braudel 1958), sometimes referred 
to as ‘landscape’ developments (Rip and Kemp 1998, Geels 2002a). 
I here consider the notion of ‘landscape’, as topographical constraining elements 
structuring the unfolding of evolution of societal dynamics (see Figure 3.4). Socio-
technical landscapes are deep structural trends that influence organisational fields 
(Sewell 2005). They are likely to affect the course of development of technological 
change, economic policy, markets, and normative discourses and beliefs in processes of 
historical change,  F.W. Geels, J. Schot / Research Policy 36 (2007) 399–417 403
kinds of rules1: regulative, normative, and cognitive.
Examples of regulative rules are regulations, standards,
laws. Examples of normative rules are role relationships,
values, behavioural norms. Examples of cognitive rules
are belief systems, innovation agendas, problem defini-
tions, guiding principles, search heuristics.
Underlying this conceptualisation is a multi-
dimensional model of agency. We assume that actors
are self-interested, act strategically, and try to calculate
which actions will best achieve their goals. But cognitive
capabilities and time are limited (bounded rationality).
Hence, actors use cognitive rules and schemas, some of
which are shared with others. Formal rules, role rela-
tionships and normative ties also enter in decisions and
actions, because actors are embedded in regulatory struc-
tures and social networks. Here we follow Giddens who
argues that rules are always implicated in action. In struc-
turation theory (Giddens, 1984), rules do not exist ‘out
there’, but only through use and reproduction in prac-
tice. Actors are embedded in rule structures, but at the
same time reproduce them through their actions (‘dual-
ity of structure’). Actors are not passive rule-followers
(‘cultural dopes’), but active rule users and makers.
Actors use rules to interpret the world, make sense, and
come to decisions. Rules are not just constraining (mak-
ing some actions more legitimate than others), but also
enabling (creating convergence of actions, predictabil-
ity, trust, reliability). An important difference between
niches and regimes is that the constraining influence
is much stronger for the latter.2 Niche-innovations can
become regimes, when social networks grow larger and
rules become more stable and constraining, leading to a
reversal in their relation to agency.
The sociotechnical landscape is a different kind of
structure. Rip and Kemp (1998) introduced this concept
in a wide-ranging review of theories of technological
change. History, archaeology, anthropology and philos-
1 We talk about ‘rules’, because the term ‘institutions’ is often mis-
interpreted as public organisations.
2 Niche-innovations experience weak structuration. Social networks
are small and precarious, with actors entering and leaving. Economic
structures and markets are not well developed. Cognitive structures are
not well articulated, indicated by disagreements about design specifi-
cations, user preferences and regulations. In sum, structures require a
lot of ‘work’ from niche-actors to be uphold.
For sociotechnical regimes, structures are more developed and provide
strong structuration, making it difficult to deviate from mainstream
practice. Cognitive rules have stabilised (e.g. dominant designs). The
social network is large and stable, because actors have aligned their
activities. Market structures and exchange relationships have also
stabilised. In sum, structuration is stronger for regimes than for niche-
innovations.
Fig. 3. Topography of development trajectories (Sahal, 1985, p. 79).
ophy view technology as part of the ‘material culture’
of societies. Philosophers see modern man living in a
‘technotope’ rather than a ‘biotope’. Modern society has
characteristics of a ‘mega-machine’ (Mumford, 1967).
Historians showed how road and electricity infrastruc-
tures changed over time from strange and contested
technologies to taken-for-granted backdrop. As sta-
bilised backdrop, they still exerted power and influence.
Rip and Kemp saw sociotechnical landscapes literally
as something around us that we can travel through and
metaphorically as something that we are part of, that
sustains us (Fig. 3).
While niches and regimes work through sociological
structuration, sociotechnical landscapes influence action
differently. Sociotechnical landscapes do not determine,
but provide deep-structural ‘gradients of force’ that make
some actions easier than others.
We support this conceptualisation of sociotechni-
cal landscape (which has similarities to the historian
Braudel’s concept of longue dure´e). It highlights the
technical, physical and material backdrop that sustains
society. However, sociotechnical landscape in this sense
is relatively static, comparable to soil conditions, rivers,
lakes and mountain ranges in biological evolution. But
we also want to include dynamic aspects of the external
environment, i.e. analogies for rainfall patterns, storms,
lightning. Hence, Van Driel and Schot (2005) elaborated
the landscape concept, distinguishing three types: (1)
factors that do not change or that change only slowly,
such as climate; (2) long-term changes, such as German
industrialisation in the late 19th century; (3) rapid exter-
nal shocks, such as wars or fluctuations in the price of
oil. This varied set of factors can be combined in a sin-
gle ‘landscape’ category, because they form an external
context that actors cannot influence in the short run.
In this article, we propose a further differentiation,
using Suarez and Oliva’s (2005) article on environmen-
tal changes. Their interest is different (how firms react
to major changes in business environments), but their
typology is useful. They distinguish four dimensions
 
Figure 3.4: The topography of tech ological evolution (Sahal 1985:79)  
 
Dynamics qualifying as landscape changes include slow trends (cultural changes, 
political cultures and ideologies, etc.), rapid events and shocks (van Driel and Schot 
2005). L ng waves of eco omic and technol gical change, urbanisation patterns, 
industrialisation, globalisation, liberalisation, the rise of social movements, but also oil 
price shocks, wars, etc. are historical examples. As time goes by, landscape changes re-
define the very context of social activities and communities. 
Landscape changes provide strong s ructuration of local activities, forming ‘gradients 
for action’ (Geels 2004). Landscape changes provide relatively stable developmental 
conditions, framing the evolution of change in industry environments. However, this 
context is also subject to change. Landscape structures change as novel deep structuring 
frames emerge. Through this process, landscape changes can favour the alignment of 
pressures in the environme ts of industries, carving out avenues of environmental 
change, and thus increasing the likelihood of concurring societal dynamics by deep 
structural alignment.  
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Shocks and extreme events are particularly disruptive occurrences in the landscape of 
industries: they have the potential to re-define environmental assumptions and lead to 
crises. Significant crises draw attention to particular problems, activate previously 
dormant tensions or difficult relationships: 
“Environmental jolts highlight institutionalized assumptions about the environment, and reveal 
unexpected relationships between institutionalized practices, technologies, organizational forms, 
and outcomes that may not be apparent in times of stasis” (Sine and David 2003:186) 
This can lead previously neglected issues to rise to the highest level of decision-making 
agendas, and problems to gain momentum. 
Landscape-field interaction 
Within the multi-level perspective (MLP) (Rip and Kemp 1998, Geels 2002a), it is 
suggested that landscape processes and trends can create ‘tension’ in existing socio-
technical configurations. I suggest, additionally, that landscape change can mediate 
industry environments by favouring the alignment of destabilisation pressures across 
domains in a given trajectory: 
- newly legitimated ideas and values may change the mandate of government to 
regulate industries, eventually leading to an altered policy framework; 
- newly legitimated ideas and values may lead to changes in societal aspirations and 
visions, which affect beliefs and discourses, the expression of normative problems, 
customer preferences and practices; 
- changing socio-demographic patterns may facilitate the emergence of new 
behaviours, preferences, aspirations and customer demands; 
- wars and economic crises have a disruptive effect on the pace of the economy, and 
thus affect material resource flows within organisational fields. 
 
In destabilisation processes, shocks and extreme events can: 
- dramatically reveal system failures and inability to deal with certain problems (Sine 
and David 2003); 
- lead to sudden (but fragile) rises in attention for specific issues by raising their 
experiential commensurability (Geels and Verhees 2011) and perceived urgency; 
- disrupt institutional logics and structures, motivate search processes, and thereby 
open up space for the breakthrough of alternatives (Sine and David 2003); 
- accelerate and focus destabilisation processes (Sewell 2005); 
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Event-centred historical narratives have a tendency to attribute strong causal links to the 
immediate consequence of shocks (Burke 2005). While such accounts are partly true, a 
more accurate explanation consists in describing shocks as scarce events that provide 
opportunities for the acceleration of causal sequences: 
“crisis shakes the foundations of organizational fields by motivating scrutiny and search processes 
for causes and solutions. Crisis environments prompt powerful actors to engage in search processes 
that can ultimately result in profound institutional change. The resulting loss of taken-for-
grantedness, recoupling of outcomes and behaviors, and redefinition and expansion of alternatives 
renders practices that were once taken for granted as “the way things are done” vulnerable to reform 
or replacement” (Sine and David 2003:188) 
Furthermore, dramatic events do not necessarily lead to change, if they are not 
perceived, not understood, or concealed. This means that for a shock to have a 
significant system-destabilising outcome, it must be preceded by ongoing discussions 
and debates about problems and associated solutions. 
So, landscape changes, and especially shock and extreme events are not only catalysts 
of change in industry environments (Sine and David 2003), they are opportunity 
structures that can be actively mobilised by external actors. 
3.3.2.4 Wrapping up 
So, destabilisation processes include dynamics at multiple levels. How can these be 
combined in an integrative understanding? 
Historians provide fruitful approaches to multiple levels of explanations and related 
temporalities that can here be mobilised to make sense of multi-level dynamics (Gaddis 
2002, Sewell 2005, Geels and Schot 2010). Braudel (1958) suggests that longitudinal 
dynamics can be identified at different time scales and speeds: 1) structural patterns, 2) 
conjunctures, and 3) chains of events. I have already noted in chapter 1 that a multi-
level conceptualisation of destabilisation should attend to these different timescales, but 
also formulate the relationships between different timescales as destabilisation unfolds. 
Destabilisation processes unfold at multiple levels. I distinguish three levels, which are 
related to different organisational levels (see Figure 3.3). The mechanisms involved at 
each level operate according to different temporalities. 
- At (intra-)industry level, events, actions and strategies exert a proximate influence 
on industry trajectories.  
- At the level of organisational fields, domain-specific conjunctures and their 
interactions exert an intermediate influence on industry trajectories. 
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- At a landscape level, secular change and disruptive shocks exert a distal influence 
on industry trajectories. 
Temporal interactions between different forms and levels of unfolding are likely to 
influence how destabilisation patterns play out. Most profound changes can be expected 
when processes between different levels link up (see Geels 2002b:93). 
In the context of my empirical work, I will analyse relationships between dynamics at 
different levels, with a view to specifying mechanisms by which different levels of 
unfolding influence each other. 
3.3.3 Destabilisation as a multi-dimensional and co-evolutionary process 
Because I am interested in the co-evolutionary nature of destabilisation, I here attend to 
the processes by which environmental selection contexts change as an outcome of 
multi-dimensional pressure interactions. Building on contributions focused on change in 
industry environments (views 1, 2 and 3), I here suggest mechanisms and processes that 
participate in the articulation and acceleration of destabilisation contexts. This 
discussion thus provides informed assumptions about pressure interactions, guiding the 
direction of search for the analysis of cases. 
Pressures are initially exerted locally by actors within a specific domain. However, 
under specific conditions, as actors interact with each other, pressures can cross 
environmental domains, be picked up by new social actors, and be expressed through 
multiple channels. Such interactions increase the intensity of pressures, but also alter 
their initial framing to fit the broadening base of relevant actors. 
Building on the theoretical argument set out so far, and taking into account the research 
criteria, the conceptualisation of pressure interaction mechanisms should inform the 
understanding of: 
a) interactions in the economic environment: processes of transmission between 
various economic forces (markets, technology, competition, etc.); this aspect 
allows me to bring together the more common explanations of destabilisation 
(Porter 1980, Ansoff 1987, Tuhsman and Romanelli 1985, McCarthy et al. 
2010); 
b) interactions in the socio-political environment: processes through which 
problems interact between the general public and policymakers, involving actors 
from civil society; this aspect is relevant to address my interest in societal 
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problems (and environmental problems in particular), but remains a neglected 
aspect of destabilisation (Morlacchi and Martin 2009); 
c) interactions between economic and socio-political environments: processes 
through which socio-political concerns are linked to economic problems, and 
processes through which economic problems become socio-political concerns; 
these aspects are relevant to formalise the co-evolutionary nature of 
destabilisation processes. 
 
Because a) and b) are extensively discussed in various literatures, and have already been 
covered in chapter 2,11 I here focus on the third kind of interaction: between economic 
and socio-political dimensions. While these aspects will be further developed on the 
basis of the analysis of cases, I here mobilise relevant insights from various literatures. 
Interactions between economic and socio-political environments: 
Governments and policymakers intervene on markets via economic policies and 
changes in market regulations that frame economic transactions: 
- Technology-oriented policies can stimulate the conditions of technological 
innovation through niche formation, niche protection, R&D support (Kemp et al. 
2001, Garud and Karnøe 2003), or public procurement; 
- Industrial policies provide support to industries (e.g. financial stimulation, subsidies, 
trade restrictions, performance requirements, etc.) in the form of 'buffers' and 
'transformational shields' (Miner et al. 1990) that protect against economic 
pressures and decrease the need for transformational change (d’Aunno et al. 2000). 
Alternatively, weakening policy support can contribute to a negative economic 
climate, as it affects expectations throughout the supply chain, leading to doubts, 
reduced financial support, and the search for alternatives; 
- Consumer-oriented policies stimulate changes in markets by providing incentives 
for new consumer behaviours and demands; 
- Environmental regulations and policies seek to correct market externalities through 
the introduction of (dis)incentives, standards and regulations; 
Social movements and normative contestation groups seek to influence the behaviour of 
economic agents. They develop strategies to stimulate the demands and preferences of 
customers, and the development of alternative technologies: 
                                                
11 See view 2 for a discussion of a), and 2.2.3 for a discussion of b). 
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- Strategies such as boycotts and awareness-raising campaigns can have substantial 
effect in threatening markets and consumer preferences; 
- Technology-oriented movements involve collaborative alliances between normative 
pressure groups and firms in the design and mainstreaming of innovations with 
added societal benefits (Hess 2005); 
- Social movements (typically players outside the firms’ economic environment) may 
be at the root of institutional change and the creation of new industries (Lounsbury 
et al. 2003). 
Economic pressures can also enter the socio-political environment of industries: 
- The development of new technologies may offer policymakers new means to 
address societal problems, and contribute to the formulation of new policies; 
- Economic problems in large industries can lead to demands for policy-support 
programmes (Nuttall et al. 2011). Conversely, sustained low industrial performance 
can lead policy-makers to lose faith in existing industries, decrease enthusiasm and 
support accordingly. 
Numerous forms of pressure interaction can thus occur in industry environments. They 
increase the linkages between different kinds of pressures, and thus contribute to the 
overall alignment of pressures in destabilisation contexts. 
3.3.4 The role of societal problems in destabilisation processes 
Because of my background motivation in transitions to sustainability, I am particularly 
interested in the role of societal problems in destabilisation processes. I have already 
discussed the mechanisms by which societal problems are likely to increase momentum 
(see 2.2.3 and 3.3.3), and thus exert pressure on industry actors (see view 3). I now 
address how societal problems can be analysed in destabilisation processes in relation to 
the framework set out so far. 
Societal pressures and destabilisation 
The framework presented in 3.3 accommodates for the role of societal pressures in 
destabilisation processes.  
Because societal issues may relate to social goods that are usually not valued in markets, 
industry actors and other economic agents in their environment are unlikely to raise or 
address such issues without the perception of a substantial demand for improvement. 
Societal pressures are thus initially raised in the socio-political environmental industries. 
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In 2.2.3, I have introduced literatures on issue lifecycles and social movements that 
provide useful building blocks as to how societal problems may evolve. Societal issues 
need to gather momentum before they can be addressed. Problem framing and 
awareness raising are crucial for an issue to attract public interest and lead to the 
expression of a societal demand. Societal demand for change may lead to the 
formulation of policies to introduce market corrections. So, interactions within the 
socio-political environment are crucial for an issue to become an industry concern. 
However, industry actors are likely to resist the evolution of societal issues that 
challenge their legitimacy. Furthermore, if regulated, societal issues may affect their 
business, incur greater costs and lead to market changes. Because industry actors are 
good at resisting adverse framings and policies, societal issues are unlikely to 
substantially influence industry trajectories unless they are coupled with changes on 
economic dimensions (e.g. changing user preferences, technological competition, etc.), 
and a new credible solution (policy proposal, technological alternative, business model, 
etc.). So, interactions across industry environments are also crucial for societal issues to 
influence industry trajectories. 
Societal problems build up in the socio-political environment of industries (see 2.2.3), 
as socio-political actors challenge established industry practices in relation to specific 
problems. The build-up of normative contestation involves discursive framing processes, 
resource mobilisation, the search for political opportunity structures (Elzen et al. 2011), 
and the build-up of social movements, led by activists and supporting organisations. 
However, in industry destabilisation processes, interactions between these external 
processes and industry strategies, and their mediation by industry regimes are important 
(see 3.3.1). Normative contestation is relevant to destabilisation insofar as it challenges 
the legitimacy of industry actors and prompts responses 1) within regime boundaries, 
and 2) beyond the limits of established regimes.  
1. Industry actors mobilise a variety of strategies in the face of early legitimacy 
challenges. These tend to be within the boundaries of existing regimes, and seek to 
protect it. 
Socio-cultural framing strategies: influencing meanings. It is usually easier to deflect 
nascent legitimacy pressures than to address them with substantial change. For this 
reason, early responses to normative pressure are likely to involve counter-framing 
activities to contest the progression of adverse new meanings to a variety of publics 
(public opinion, decision-makers, customers, etc.), and protect established field frames. 
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Such framing activities are enacted in boundary spaces that span beyond organisational 
fields (e.g. public debate, media, political arenas, etc.). Because societal problems 
related to the natural environment and pollution often involve the elaboration of new 
scientific knowledge (Forsyth 2003, Thorsheim 2006), framing and counter-framing 
strategies are also likely to be targeted at the scientific construction of facts, i.e. industry 
actors may discredit new scientific findings, highlight uncertainties, etc. 
Political and lobbying strategies: influencing policies and regulations. Because societal 
issues gather additional momentum when they are raised in political arenas, industry 
actors engage in those arenas via lobbying and policy framing strategies. When new 
issues are taken up by policymakers, industry actors may devote substantial resources to 
influence policy formulation processes, in an effort to reduce policy stringency. When 
policies and regulations are implemented, industry actors may seek to avoid compliance 
or find regulatory loopholes. 
Innovation strategies: corrections within technological trajectories. Because normative 
activists may contribute to the elaboration of technological visions and expectations 
erected as alternatives to established industrial systems, industry actors also respond to 
societal pressure with corrective innovation strategies. Early innovative activity by 
incumbents tends to remain within established frames as a means to protect it. Such 
incremental innovation can be seen as ‘sustaining’ rather than disruptive innovation 
(Christensen 1997, Bowen 2011), as they seek to demonstrate that solutions can be 
sought within existing regimes. In the case of environmental problems, such early 
innovative activity tends to take the form of ‘add-ons’ or ‘end-of-pipe devices’ (e.g. 
higher smoke stacks, emission control and clean-up devices, etc.) that provide a 
(cheaper) escape route rather than a fundamental re-think of production methods. Such 
strategies might however not be viable in the long-run, if environmental problems are 
associated with successful alternative technologies. 
2. When societal pressures gain momentum and become mainstream public and 
political considerations, defensive strategies that seek regime protection become 
less effective. Industry actors may then develop more long-term strategies that take 
into account the mainstream expression of societal demands as new constraints. 
Industry actors may thus take steps towards shaping alternative regimes with a view 
to abandoning historical commitments. The distinction between external claims and 
internal activities thus becomes increasingly blurred as industry actors envision the 
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possibility of regime change – thus signalling the erosion of regime commitment – 
and seek to establish a middle ground. 
Socio-cultural framing strategies may then shift from contesting societal claims to 
ensuring the compatibility of alternative field frames with future industry activities. 
This may imply participation in the elaboration of visions and expectations as middle-
range compromises towards the mutual adaptation of external claims and the necessity 
of dynamic industry continuity. In the case of environmental problems, established 
industries are likely to favour normative framings that do not rule out their ability to 
develop acceptable solutions in the future (e.g. ‘coal could be clean’, ‘nuclear power 
will become safer’, etc.).  
Political and lobbying strategies may then shift toward gaining conditional support to 
ensure the medium-term viability of current activities, given proactive efforts to develop 
solutions to perceived problems. In the case of environmental policies, this may 
translate into the negotiation of delays in phasing out the most polluting technologies 
until cleaner technologies are available. 
Innovation strategies may then shift towards greater diversification, and the 
simultaneous pursuit of short-term incremental solutions and long-term R&D projects. 
If societal pressure leads to profound transformation in environments, these framings 
and technological developments are likely to become an industry’s last chance of 
survival. Industry survival is thus dependent, amongst other things, on its ability to re-
consider its relationship with emerging field frames, shaping and stepping out of past 
commitments accordingly. 
A main question that also needs to be addressed is whether and how societal issues can 
lead to industry destabilisation. As a preliminary answer, I propose that they are 
unlikely to be the main driving force, and that multi-dimensional and multi-level 
coupling is crucial. 
Addressing the multi-level unfolding and multi-dimensional co-evolution has 
implications for the understanding of the role of societal problems in destabilisation, to 
which I now turn. 
Multi-level unfolding of societal problems 
Societal problems, because they relate to societal aspirations for change, can be 
inscribed in long-term dynamics. Proponents of societal change are aware of their 
inscription in historical processes (in-the-making). 
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With respect to the three levels of unfolding suggested in 3.3.2, it is worth mentioning 
that: 
- The scope of industry responses to societal pressures evolves as the level of threat 
increases (see above). We can expect strategies to shift from defensive counter-
framing to more proactive and exploratory diversifications as societal problems 
gain momentum. 
- Societal pressure does not always increase gradually and linearly; we can expect 
societal issues and related pressure for change to follow ups and downs, in relation 
to swinging public and political attention. Furthermore, interactions with other 
forms of change are crucial for societal issues to gain momentum and thereby 
change environmental constraints on industry trajectories. Normative pressure 
groups actively seek such interactions. The timing of alignments between societal 
problems and other forms of environmental change is an important determinant of 
their influence on industries (Elzen et al. 2011). 
- Societal problems are inscribed in broad transformational change dynamics. 
Aspirations for societal change are often motivated by expectations of a possible 
future where these claims could be addressed. Visions of possible futures allow 
imagining the kind of change that may be introduced, guide efforts towards the 
materialisation of such change, and thereby inform the activities of proponents of 
normative change to reach their goals. Furthermore, societal pressures may gain 
momentum when they are linked with broader change dynamics, such as the 
emergence of new cultural repertoires and the build-up of social movements (e.g. 
environmental modernisation, sustainability, etc.). 
Multi-dimensional and co-evolutionary aspects of societal problems 
The multi-dimensional aspect of societal problems in destabilisation has already been 
discussed in 2.2.3 and 3.3.3. 
Industry actors face multiple pressures in their environments. So, societal pressures 
must be seen as one aspect of industry struggles on multiple fronts. This means that 
societal pressures are likely to compete and be overshadowed by other pressures for 
change. However, other forms of pressures and stress on industries (e.g. changing 
markets, technological competition, user preferences, etc.) can also be seen as 
opportunities for the expression of societal issues. 
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Because normative activists alone bear limited influence on industry trajectories (Elzen 
et al. 2011), they seek to mobilise the interest and support of influential actors 
(policymakers, the general public, customers, technology developers, etc.) to increase 
the momentum of their claims and associate their contestation to credible alternatives. 
Such interactions are more likely in later stages of destabilisation. The association of 
normative contestation with other forms of pressure in industry environments is crucial 
to enhance the inclusion of societal claims in industry destabilisation processes. 
3.4 Wrapping up 
In this section, I have elaborated a conceptual framework that builds on the building 
blocks identified in chapter 2. This framework thus builds on existing perspectives, but 
has been tailored to the specific research challenges that this thesis seeks to address, 
namely: 
- the multi-level unfolding nature of process of long-term change, 
- the multi-dimensional co-evolution of changes in industry environments, 
- the role of societal problems in destabilisation processes. 
 
Destabilisation has been conceptualised as a process involving 1) pressures in industry 
environments, 2) industry responses to such challenges to its economic performance and 
socio-political legitimacy, and 3) changing patterns of commitment to institutional rules 
(industry regimes). 
 
In the next chapter, I clarify the epistemological assumptions underlying the kind of 
explanation sought in this thesis, I develop a research design that accommodates the 
mobilisation of longitudinal case studies for the understanding of destabilisation 
processes, and formulate an analytical strategy. 
 
The plausibility of this framework is assessed against empirical evidence presented in 
chapters 5 to 7. Results are discussed in the concluding chapter, in which I derive more 
general findings and reflect on the theoretical perspective. 
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4 Research design and methodology 
This chapter presents my basic epistemological assumptions, the research design used to 
investigate real-world destabilisation processes, the data sources mobilised to 
substantiate claims with reliable evidence, and the analytical methodology. 
4.1 Epistemological assumptions 
4.1.1 Basic assumptions 
My theoretical perspective seeks not the individuation of factors, or the elaboration of 
general laws, but rather the specification of potential generative mechanisms, and how 
they might play out through time in processes of alignment, coupling, and field 
struggles that can be seen as jointly produce destabilisation patterns. I seek to attend to 
the complexities of the social world by developing a multi-layered form of explanation. 
But how should such complex social realities be understood and investigated? 
“the historical sociologist strives to appreciate all this complexity and yet find patterns by looking 
across cases, down branching paths, or within complex sequences [in search for the interplay of 
causal mechanisms]” (Clemens 2007:528) 
Epistemological assumptions concern the way the social world is understood and 
explained. Poole et al. (2000) distinguish two fundamental research models (see Figure 
4.1), based on different epistemological assumptions, and typically used to address 
different kinds of questions about the social world: 
- Most traditional social science is based on variance approaches that describe 
change in the value of an independent variable as the result of a timeless 
relationship to its dependent variables. Such approaches rest on assumptions of 
deterministic causation (Poole et al. 2000:29) and the continuity of causal 
relationships between variables over time. Variance approaches have been central 
to the development and disciplinary specialisation of modern social sciences. They 
have emphasised the empirical testing of theoretical hypotheses through an 
emphasis on replicability and statistical significance of the whys of change. 
However, they fail to accommodate for attributes crucial to the understanding of the 
hows of change: changing entities and contexts, temporal contingency, multiple and 
mutable causalities, changing meanings and attributes, etc. 
- Process approaches are better suited to the study of change. They provide an 
alternative to variance approaches that is especially attentive to dynamic system 
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properties. In process studies, researchers are concerned with explanations “that 
indicate how the process unfolds over time” (Poole et al., 2000:12). Process is 
conceived of as a developmental event sequence (Langley 1999, Sminia 2009). 
Process researchers mobilise events and chains of events as data. Studying the 
sequencing of events allows for the identification of patterns, and underlying causal 
and generative mechanisms. Outcomes are explained as the result of temporal 
sequences of events and the timing and conjunctures of event-chains. Sequences of 
events can thus be seen as located within enabling and constraining structures, 
rather than the mere outcome of laws and variables (Abbott 1992). This results in 
rich forms of explanation: 
“Process theories may incorporate several different types of effects into their explanations, 
including critical events and turning points, contextual influence, formative patterns that give 
overall direction to the change, and causal factors that influence the sequencing of events.” (Van de 
Ven and Poole 2005:1384) 
Pettigrew (1997:340) suggests five guiding assumptions for processual research: 
“1.    embeddedness, studying processes across a number of levels of analysis; 
  2.    temporal interconnectedness, studying processes in past, present and future time; 
3. a role in explanation for context and action; 
         4.    a search for holistic […] explanations of process; and 
         5.    a need to link process analysis to the location and explanation of outcomes.” 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Two approaches to strategic change (Langley 1999:693) 
 
My approach meets Pettigrew’s criteria for processual research. 
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1. My conceptual framework recognises the role of unfolding at multiple levels in 
destabilisation processes. This means that it allows for the study of processes at 
multiple levels of analysis, as well as interactions between such levels. 
2. My approach to destabilisation recognises the long-term unfolding of 
destabilisation processes, and allows for the study of processes along extended 
periods of time. Attention to historical change processes and deep structural 
transformation in destabilisation allows for explanations that transcend given 
historical contexts. I thus expect the framework to yield insights on past and 
present destabilisation patterns alike. 
3. The conceptual framework combines external and internal views to 
destabilisation processes. By doing so, it gives a place for both changes in 
external context and the internal enactment of change. 
4. While I mobilise a linear model as a heuristic for the study of destabilisation 
enactment, this approach is complemented by a search for deviations, and an 
attention to multiple sources of change. The approach is thus inherently path 
dependent, and accommodates for multiple destabilisation trajectories through 
the search for case-specific patterns. 
5. The conceptual framework seeks the explanation of destabilisation processes. A 
clearly defined outcome of such a process is the implementation of substantial 
regime change or decline following the accumulation of pressure, which both 
lead to a new stable state in transitions terms. This initial diagnosis allows 
circumscribing each destabilisation process with a beginning and an end. In such 
a way, destabilisation processes are linked to destabilisation outcomes. 
My approach thus fits with the processual assumptions set out by Pettigrew (1997). 
4.1.2 A process approach to destabilisation 
This study of destabilisation processes is concerned with understanding how systems 
change over time. My interest in the long-term unfolding of change can best be met 
with a rich longitudinal perspective, which allows getting closer to dynamics as they 
play out: 
“The ability to get closer to theoretical constructs is particularly important in the context of 
longitudinal research that tries to unravel the underlying dynamics of phenomena that play out over 
time. As scholars have increasingly begun to appreciate the role of dynamic processes (e.g., path 
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dependency or evolutionary processes), rich longitudinal research is needed to provide the details of 
how these processes actually play out.” (Siggelkow 2007:22) 
Destabilisation, understood as the interaction of external pressures and endogenous 
enactment, results from an inherently path-dependent process of pressure intensification, 
and wearing down of the sources of stability. A process approach is thus especially 
suited to the understanding of destabilisation and how it unfolds over time. The research 
set-up is centred on the reconstruction of event sequences, ordered through historical 
narratives that allow for process tracing, and the identification of patterns and 
generative mechanisms in various destabilisation trajectories. 
Narratives allow a particular kind of explanation that is attentive to process 
The empirical investigation of destabilisation put forward here relies on narratives to 
make sense of temporal sequences of event, provide insight on how change unfolds 
(Van de Ven and Poole 2005), and identify generative mechanisms. Narratives are a 
useful element of the sociologist’s toolkit: 
“Narratives, the traditional rhetoric of the historian, allow us to capture the unfolding of social 
action over time in a manner sensitive to the order in which events occur. Analytical narratives – 
theoretically structured stories about coherent sequences of motivated actions – can contribute to the 
construction of explanations of why things happened the way they did. Such narratives construct 
causality and meaning in terms of temporal connections among events” (Aminzade 1992:457-8, my 
emphasis) 
Considering external sources of change and internal enactment of change within 
industries, this means relating how sources of change are articulated over time, and 
providing interpretations for the sequences of change as they unfold in industries.  
While process research emphasises the influence of the context, the transient nature of 
entities, their attributes and causal determination, layered causation, and the singularity 
of individual cases, it does so not by shying away from explanation, but rather practices 
a different kind of explanation. Explanation is inherently attentive to real-world 
complexity: 
 “A process study not only supports causal inferences, but also has the additional advantage of 
enabling researchers to trace the mediating steps through which causes act. In principle, researchers 
can track how forces or influences initiated in one event are transmitted or dissipated in subsequent 
events. They can also trace how conjunctions of events produce interactions among causal factors 
that build momentum or lead to decay in the developmental process. These moves can greatly 
enhance the precision of tests of developmental models.” (Poole et al., 2000:13) 
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Explanation is focussed on the underlying logics behind observed temporal sequences, 
with an attention to case-specific contingencies, fundamental generative mechanisms 
and the conditions under which they operate (Van de Ven and Poole 2005).  
Process theory approaches arguably put greater emphasis on accuracy and empirical 
reality, while achieving lower degrees of generalisability and simplicity in explanation 
than variance approaches (Langley 1999, Poole 2000). The search for accuracy is 
relevant for research that is exploratory in the sense that it interested in ‘big’ questions 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003), opens up black boxes and seeks to unveil multi-
dimensional interaction patterns. Indeed, one of the theoretical motivations of this thesis 
is to uncover the interaction dynamics at play in destabilisation processes across societal 
domains, levels of process, and temporality. 
With respect to socio-technical transitions and a co-evolutionary perspective on industry 
evolution, single-lens approaches would miss out on one most salient feature of these 
processes: the ‘re-configurational’ aspects of change. Indeed, transitions imply 
fundamental change in socio-technical configurations, spanning multiple co-evolving 
organisational levels and societal domains, often leaving the systems and sub-units 
barely recognisable. This means that units of analysis and active mechanisms may 
change over time, thus precluding a strict variable-based analytical approach. For this 
reason, process-based and narrative analysis will be preferred in order to convey and 
understand the ‘re-configurational’ aspects of change in destabilisation processes. 
Theorising from longitudinal case studies implies a more open relation to theory and 
social structure, one in which history and interaction mechanisms are taken seriously, in 
line with calls for truly co-evolutionary research:  
“The challenge for [co-evolutionary] research here is to go to a much finer analysis at both 
empirical and theoretical levels, and to move from the statement that everything is coevolving with 
everything else to the identification of what is coevolving with what, how intense is this process and 
whether indeed there is a bi-direction of causality” (Malerba, 2006: 18). 
Process approaches rely on rich longitudinal data in the form of event sequences (Ragin 
1997, George and Bennett 2004, Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), which are mobilised to 
develop historical narratives. Event sequences allow understanding, in each case, how 
events are related to each other, and together make up a particular historical trajectory. 
Event sequences thus enable the researcher to attend to path-dependent and contingent 
change processes (Mahoney 2000). 
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Event-based methodological approaches come in a number of declensions, including the 
analysis of event chains, narratives, analytical chronology, statistical analysis of event 
data, etc. (Pettigrew 1997, Langley 1999, Sminia 2009). The groundwork for this thesis 
has relied on a mixture of such methods. However, I have privileged the use of a 
narrative strategy for the presentation of empirical findings. Indeed, while quantitative 
longitudinal data analysis and event-tracing have provided useful intermediary results 
on specific dimensions of change (e.g. policy change, technological innovation, issue 
attention, etc.), the co-evolutionary objectives and epistemological assumptions of this 
thesis justify a more qualitative approach that reflects the interwoven nature of industry 
destabilisation processes. 
4.2 Research design 
To answer my research question, I have developed a broad understanding of 
destabilisation that draws on and combines multiple layers of explanation according to a 
‘meta’-logic of unfolding. In order to assess the plausibility, the usefulness and further 
explore the explanatory power of the conceptual perspective, I adopt a case study design. 
Indeed, my argument requires rich real-world evidence that reveals the long-term co-
evolutionary nature of destabilisation. 
The reason I choose rich longitudinal case studies, is that such case studies have several 
strengths with regard to the research topic, namely they allow: 
- tracing multiple concomitant processes at multiple levels of analysis over extended 
periods of time (Yin 1994); 
- searching for and discovering patterns (Tsoukas 1989) within and across cases; 
- uncovering underlying generative mechanisms that contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon of interest (Bennett and Elman 2006). 
Furthermore, in order to overcome the conventional criticisms of single case study 
designs, I opt for a multiple case design. This allows increasing the robustness of 
generalisations by comparing and contrasting cases (Hakim 1987:63). Weick’s 
suggestion on comparing events may be extended within and across longitudinal 
narratives: 
“what any event means, what is significant in its unfolding, may become clearer when it is 
compared with another event, and the observer looks for similarities and differences.” (Weick 
2007:17) 
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Comparing multiple cases allows asking under which circumstances specific causal 
mechanisms are activated. A focus on developmental patterns allows for the 
identification of the specific constellation of forces at play in each case (Pettigrew 1990). 
Destabilisation journeys are thus considered in their singularity. Openness to recurrence 
and variety of developmental patterns across cases leads to increasing precision and 
depth in the formulation of generative mechanisms: 
“A versatile process explanation can ‘stretch’ or ‘shrink’ to fit specific cases that may differ in their 
tempo and time span.” (Van de Ven 2005:1384) 
The cross-comparison of multiple cases thus allows for more robust, generalisable and 
testable theory development, often reaching a more appropriate level of abstraction for 
theoretical constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007:27).  
4.2.1 Case selection 
Case selection criteria 
Case selection should be based on theoretical considerations, and the expected potential 
for drawing generalisable insights (Eisenhardt 1989). Within a process approach case 
selection is guided by the degree of phenomenon (Flyvbjerg 2006). I now translate my 
research objectives into criteria to guide the selection of appropriate cases. 
The cases selected for investigation should satisfy the following criteria: 
1) Because of my interest in exploring the co-evolution of industries and economic 
and socio-political environments during destabilisation processes, a relevant 
selection criterion concerns the expected degree of interaction between these 
societal domains. The cases selected should thus not be solely about economic 
decline, but also include changes on cultural, political and technological 
dimensions. This leads me to choose an industry that is politically powerful and 
societally embedded. 
2) Because of my interest in the role of societal problems in destabilisation 
processes, the cases should be selected with regard to the expected influence of 
such problems. 
3) Because of my interest in the lock-in of established industries, the cases selected 
should display strong inertia and resistance to change. This will allow me to 
investigate interactions between external pressures, regime commitment, and 
industry responses in destabilisation processes. 
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4) Because of the exploratory nature of the research, the cases should be selected 
with a view to maximise insights on the phenomenon of destabilisation.  
“When the objective is to achieve the greatest possible amount of information on a given 
problem or phenomenon, a representative case or a random sample may not be the most 
appropriate strategy. This is because the typical or average case is often not the richest in 
information. Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate 
more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied.” (Flyvbjerg 2006:229) 
I thus choose extreme or paradigmatic cases. 
5) Because of the ambitious nature of the research, the complexity of the 
phenomenon under study, and the in-depth nature of the investigation, the cases 
should be selected in accordance to the availability of empirical material in 
secondary literature. 
Overview of cases 
I now provide an overview of the cases, and explain how they meet the above selection 
criteria. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the cases. The cases cover various periods of 
the history of the British coal industry, ranging from 1880 to the present (see Figure 
1.1). The history of the British coal industry in the twentieth century is marked by 
economic turbulence, overall decline, deep structural changes, strong competitive forces, 
societal problems, political conflict and technological innovation. Three distinct 
destabilisation processes can be identified, on the basis of underlying transitions and 
significant breaking points. The first case ends with a new energy policy framework that 
paves the way for the penetration of new sources of energy. The second case ends with 
the privatisation of the coal industry. The third case is ‘in-the-making’ and thus ends at 
a crossway for future developments, at which both decline and renewal are possible. 
The three cases back to back form one long case of the British coal industry from 1880 
to 2011, featuring fundamental changes, decline(s), radical re-orientation(s), and an 
open question about future renewal. 
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Table 4.1: Case summaries 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Period covered 1880-1967 1967-1997 1990-present
Unit of analysis
British coal mining 
industry
British deep-mining for 
power generation
British coal-fired power 
generation
Underlying 
transition
To the four-fuel economy To liberalised energy 
markets
To low-carbon power 
generation?
Destabilisation 
outcome
Decline in multiple 
markets
Near terminal decline Decline or revival?
Important 
dynamics likely to 
affect the 
destabilisation 
trajectory
Shrinking markets, 
nationalisation, 
technological competition, 
the rationalisation of 
production techniques, the 
coal smoke problem.
De-industrialisation, oil 
crises, market reforms and 
industry liberalisation, 
new mining techniques, 
the ‘dash for gas’, acid 
rain.
Energy security concerns, 
planned decommissioning, 
the electricity market 
structure, climate change, 
expectations about CCS 
technology.
 
From one case to another, the unit of analysis is changed, owing to the previous 
destabilisation process that has significantly altered the industry. Because of the long 
time periods involved in each case, and the process approach taken to change, the 
entities observed (e.g. industries) are bound to change throughout cases. The scale, 
importance, activities, meaning, etc. attached to industries are fundamentally altered 
throughout cases as destabilisation unfolds. This also means that the entities change 
between cases, as well as the unit of analysis. 
In the first case, the British coal industry was deeply embedded in many socio-
economic domains, and remained strong and robust, providing energy to virtually every 
activity in the UK until the early 20th century (industry, households, transport, etc.), but 
also moved from many firms to one nationalised organisation. The destabilisation 
process challenged its buoyant position. In the second case, following a first 
destabilisation process, the British coal industry is smaller, consolidated, and 
increasingly specialised in the power generation market, which means that relationships 
are more focussed and its overall societal relevance is weaker. Destabilisation leads to a 
near collapse of deep mining in the UK from the late 1980s. As a result, in the third case, 
a domestic extractive industry is virtually inexistent. However, coal still provides about 
a third of fuel input to power generation despite its significantly degraded symbolic 
importance and the pressure from climate change concerns. British vested interests in 
coal are thus increasingly dematerialised from the actual resource and seem to be 
eroding rapidly; yet new technological and discursive agendas generate enthusiasm 
about a possible renewal. 
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The temporal bounding of cases is related to the phenomenon under study. Cases are 
delimitated with regard to overall transitions and destabilisation outcomes, which are 
arguably historically circumscribed phenomena such as revolutions (Haydu 1998).12 For 
each case, an overall transition process can be observed, or hypothesised for the third 
case. The historical cases end with a significant alteration of the industry's positioning 
on economic, cultural, political and technological dimensions, and relative stability, 
which means that it clearly enters a new era. This observation provides the confidence 
to delimitate the endpoint of cases. The beginning of cases is also determined in relation 
to the emergence of problems that lead to the destabilisation processes observed, so as 
to encompass their development. 
Suitability of cases 
These cases meet the five selection criteria suggested above. 
1) All three destabilisation cases are likely to involve the co-evolution of multiple 
types of pressures. The last row of Table 4.1 suggests that changes in economic, 
socio-political, technological and normative dimensions are likely to affect the 
destabilisation trajectory in each case. For this reason, I can expect the cases not 
to be solely about economic decline, but rather to display interaction between 
multiple pressures. This will allow the investigation of spillovers and alignment 
between multiple sources of change. 
2) For each case, the industry is confronted to a particular societal problem related 
to the natural environment: coal smoke, acid rain, and climate change 
respectively. The case narratives thus also allow for the tracing of the emergence 
of such problems, and their influence on industry destabilisation processes. 
3) For each case, the incumbent industry displays strong inertia and resistance to 
change. This means that the influence of external pressures is likely to be 
mediated by prevailing regimes, the decreasing commitment to which can be 
investigated along the progression of destabilisation. 
4) The historical cases fall into the ‘extreme’ and ‘paradigmatic’ categories defined 
by Flyvbjerg (2006). The cases can be qualified as extreme, because they are 
particularly rich and complex, involving many different sources of change, with 
strong degrees of interaction. 
                                                
12 The temporal delimitation of destabilisation processes however remains subject to the researcher’s 
interpretation, and the convincing argument made to justify such choices. 
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“The extreme case can be well-suited for getting a point across in an especially dramatic 
way, which often occurs for well-known case studies” (Flyvbjerg 2006:229, original 
emphasis) 
The British coal industry, because of its size, strategic importance, long-standing 
and deep embedding in British social life and its economy, is expected to feature 
high degrees of resistance to change.  
The cases can be qualified as paradigmatic, because they “highlight more 
general characteristics of the societies in question” (Flyvbjerg 2006:232). Indeed, 
the coal industry, because of its central role in economic, political and social 
considerations in Britain, has been highly exposed to the radical changes 
affecting British society. The conflictual coal politics of the 1980s, for instance, 
have a paradigmatic character to the types of changes unfolding (de-
industrialisation, market ideology, globalisation, etc.). Actors themselves saw 
coal as paradigmatic: Margaret Thatcher saw the reform of the coal industry as a 
critical test of the market ideology in practice. 
The first case, ending with the institutionalised transition from coal to modern 
fuel alternatives in the 1960s, arguably marks a definitive break from Britain’s 
industrial past associated with the industrial revolution. It is thus likely to be one 
of the most significant destabilisation processes in modern British industry. The 
sharp further decline of the British coal industry in the second case, marked by 
the sensational confrontation between Thatcher’s government and the miners in 
the Great Strike, has become a symbol of the shift to neo-liberal economic 
institutions and away from ‘old’ industrial sectors in industrialised countries. 
The restructuring of the coal industry in the 1980s was one of the first steps in 
this broader transformation. It figures dramatic social consequences, as well as 
the embracing of new modes of resource flows in the emerging age of globalised 
‘free’ markets. 
The potential extreme and paradigmatic nature of the historical cases makes 
them ideal cases for the exploration of destabilisation processes. The third case 
is selected due to its relevance to current policy challenge and debates related to 
current transition debates: will climate change lead to the end of coal, or rather 
provide new opportunities for renewal with technologies such as CCS? 
5) The choice of the British coal industry is also related to more pragmatic reasons. 
Indeed, the history of the British coal industry has been widely covered from a 
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wide range of academic perspectives. This wealth of available secondary sources 
provides a solid base for the investigation of industry change processes with 
respect to multiple dimensions (multiple specialised narrative accounts). Cases 
have thus also been selected  “on the basis of expectations about their 
information content” (Flyvbjerg 2006:230), which could thus be confirmed early 
in the research process. 
Mobilisation of cases 
These cases thus provide a firm basis for the study of destabilisation. They allow for 
comparisons across time, with highly different – yet temporally related – contextual 
conditions. Each case displays a different destabilisation path, with its distinct balance 
of external sources of change and destabilisation enactment. 
The two historical cases are mobilised for theory evaluation and extension, because they 
allow the capturing of fully realised destabilisation processes, with variations in the 
scope, role, interaction and sequencing of pressures. This is crucial to reach sensible 
conclusions about mechanisms and patterns.  
The third case is different in nature, as the possible transition is still ‘in-the-making’ and 
presents high uncertainties as to future directions. Analysis will necessarily be of a more 
prospective kind. It provides the opportunities for the application of insights to an 
important and societally relevant question. It allows the exploration of theoretical 
relevance to a contemporary setting, as well as an opportunity to engage in policy-
relevant arguments. The two historical cases are thus mobilised to generate lessons 
about destabilisation processes in transitions where normative goals are important, and 
are then applied to the third case. 
Further distinctions are fruitful for the developments of insights on the relationships 
between destabilisation and specific processes: 
- The first case, because of the novelty of energy alternatives to coal, allows for an 
improved understanding of the relationships between destabilisation and novelty. 
- The second case, because of the salience of political discourse and policy reform, 
allows for a more detailed discussion of the political mediation of destabilisation. 
- The third case, because of its incomplete nature, and the salience of the climate 
change issue, allows for the discussion of expectations and the role of 
environmental problems in destabilisation processes. 
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4.2.2 Data sources 
Rich case studies rely on multiple types of data sources for their evidence. Combining 
multiple methods and data sources increases the robustness of findings as it opens up 
the opportunity for triangulation: 
“the triangulation made possible by multiple data collection methods provides stronger 
substantiation of constructs and hypotheses” (Eisenhardt 1989:538) 
Variety of data sources and collection techniques is common practice for case studies, 
one that “allows a more rounded, holistic study than with any other design” (Hakim 
1987:61). Types of sources may include histories, archival documents, interviews, 
official documents, etc. (George and Bennett 2005, Yin 1994). 
The case studies draw on both secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources 
provide the basis for the preliminary formulation of case histories, which are contrasted, 
complemented, and critically reassessed using primary data. 
When gathering and organising empirical material, in accordance with the conceptual 
framework, I search for longitudinal data concerning: 
- problems and pressures on multiple dimensions (economic, socio-political, 
technological and normative), and 
- industry response strategies (economic positioning, innovation, political lobbying, 
socio-cultural strategies). 
Secondary sources 
For the historical cases, secondary sources include historical accounts of the coal 
industries, but also detailed analyses of specific events (e.g. the Great London Fog, the 
Great Strike, etc.) or processes (e.g. nationalisation, liberalisation, etc.). Such accounts 
have a tendency to focus on a specific dimension (economic, cultural, technological, 
political, etc.) in great detail. They thus convey a deep analysis (which is their strength) 
but take the risk of bias in conveying causal mechanisms, and their (often unconsidered) 
interplay. The multi-dimensional historical case studies presented here aim to bring 
together, confront, and/or balance such varied explanations. The existence of many 
secondary sources enables me to draw on diverse viewpoints and perspectives: 
- Useful sources for economic data include the Oxford history of the British coal 
industry (Ashworth 1986, Church 1986, Supple 1987) as well as myriad specialised 
publications on the coal industry (Beynon et al. 2000, Burns et al. 1985, Buxton 
1970, Chapman 1999, Dintenfass 1992, Fine 1990, Glyn and Machin 1997, 
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Grainger and Gibson 1981, Hall 1981, Hudson 2002, O’Donnell 1988, Parker 1994, 
Parker 2000, Rutledge and Wright 1985, Supple 1988, etc.). Noteworthy 
quantitative data series are also extracted from e.g. Fouquet and Pearson (1998), 
Ashworth (1986), as well as official statistics, e.g. from DECC and DTI. 
- More generally, publications on British energy history provide relevant context and 
insight into the policy framework (Chesshire and Skea 1989, Helm 2003, Henney 
1994, Newbery and Pollitt 1997, Sadler 2001, Scrase and MacKerron 2009, Watson 
1997, Winskel 2002, etc.). 
- Extensive longitudinal information on cultural, political and social movement 
processes regarding damage to the natural environment is available. For the smoke 
problem, Ashby and Anderson (1981), Brimblecombe (1987), Thorsheim (2002, 
2006) are valuable resources. The acid rain controversy has also been extensively 
covered (Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea 1991, Dudley et al. 1985, Longhurst 
1988, McCormick 1991, McCormick 1997, Rose 1990). Regarding the recent 
history of the climate problem in relation to coal, extant literature and commentary 
are available (Carvalho and Burgess 2005, Helm 2008, Ungar 1992, Lovell et al. 
2009, Jordan and Lorenzoni 2007, etc.). 
- A number of scholars have also provided valuable accounts of the social and 
political dimension of coal (Beynon et al. 1999, Gibbon and Bromley 1990, 
Hudson and Sadler 1990, Leman and Winterton 1991, Parker and Surrey 1993, 
Turner 1989, etc.). 
Primary sources 
Primary sources are mobilised to trace specific processes (qualitatively and 
quantitatively), to critically assess secondary material, and to provide additional original 
detail to deepen understanding of cases. The sources used include: 
- Newspaper articles in the main broadsheets (The Times, The Guardian, The 
Independent) are used to gather information about public opinion and discourse. 
The availability of online databases and search engines for such sources allow for 
longitudinal data collection using keywords and search strings (e.g. ‘coal AND 
smoke’, ‘coal AND electricity’, ‘coal AND (problem OR crisis OR decline)’, etc.), 
which simplify and systematize information gathering. 
- Where relevant, satirical cartoons are mobilised as graphical representations that 
capture collectively shared views, symbols and understandings in an explicit form. 
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- Because of the importance of policy and governmental intervention in the British 
coal industry, I have used government committee reports, parliamentary debates 
and policy documents in order to investigate political and regulatory dimensions. 
- To gather industry-internal information, I have used the memoirs of industry 
chairmen (Robens 1972, MacGregor and Tyler 1986), annual reports from the 
National Coal Board (after 1946), and other publicly available material conveying 
the perspective of industry actors such as opinion articles in the press. Although 
such public statements should not be taken at face value, they do provide interesting 
data for discourse analyses that trace gradual changes in beliefs and orientation. 
The variety of data sources enables triangulation (Yin 1994), and allows for a rich 
analysis of various contexts and response strategies (which does not yet exist in this 
form as far as I am aware of). 
Interviews 
Open-ended interviews were carried out for data collection purposes on the second and 
third cases (for which informants are still alive), after preliminary case histories had 
been elaborated. Industry members and former industry members, and actors in industry 
environments (environmental activists, scientists, etc.) have been interviewed because 
they were identified as relevant participants or observers of the destabilisation process. 
The experiences of such informants provide valuable insights on the timing of events, 
motivations of actors and causal mechanisms at play. However, interviews are 
necessarily selective and biased, and thus require the researcher to create distance with 
the points of view put forward by informants. 
Besides getting answers to specific questions, an open-ended approach to interviews 
allows to gain additional contextual insight by letting informants set the scene, decide 
what elements are important to the story, and infer causal relationships from their 
recollection of events. New points are picked up during these interviews, and lead to 
local refinements in the case narrative, or cast a new interpretation of the case leading to 
more research. The interviewees were: 
- David Brewer, Director General, the Confederation of UK Coal Producers, 
December 2, 2011. 
- Andrew Kerr, former acid rain activist, involved with FoE and Greenpeace UK in 
the 1980s, February 9, 2011. 
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- David Merrick, former scientist at the Coal Research Establishment, February 18, 
2011. 
- Mike Parker, former chief economist at the National Coal Board, February 17, 2011. 
- Jane Paxman, Director of Policy and Communications, 2COEnergy, December 13, 
2011. 
4.3 Analytical strategy: building rich multi-dimensional narratives 
4.3.1 Mixed methods 
The process tradition is methodologically open, valuing any conjunctions of methods 
that are sufficiently coherent with each other and the focal phenomena such as to 
contribute to an improved understanding of change processes. Because of the emphasis 
on richness, historical detail and complexity, qualitative methods are more prominent, 
but quantitative methods are not excluded. I thus use a mixed methods strategy, 
combining qualitative and quantitative data collection and processing methods that 
allow me to convey the richness of event sequences in cases, yet enable synthetic 
analysis of destabilisation patterns. 
A narrative strategy provides the methodological backbone for the development of the 
case studies. It is supplemented by the mobilisation of material elaborated with other 
methods, including: 
- the systematic screening of textual resources with the use of search strings. Material 
screened included industry annual reports, newspapers, and parliamentary 
publications. Search strings (e.g. “coal AND smoke”, “coal AND crisis”, etc.) are a 
necessary step first step to rationalise the wealth of coverage available over such 
long periods of time; 
- the analysis of key public statements (e.g. chairmen’s statements in industry annual 
reports) to industry observe changes in discourse, identity, beliefs and meaning 
systems over time. Such regime elements are hardest to analyse and require 
thorough interpretive analysis; 
- quantitative data are used to identify and illustrate basic trends (production, 
consumption, technology diffusion, financial data, etc.) when appropriate. Such 
historical data series permit the preliminary identification of general patterns. 
Breaking points observed in these trends also provide the starting point for 
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periodisation and in-depth analysis of key events. Financial data has also been 
compiled to provide and indication of industry health. 
4.3.2 From case histories to multi-dimensional case studies 
Specialised historians have covered many aspects of the history of coal in Britain. The 
concern here being to infer insights on a specific process (destabilisation), and 
generalisations relevant to other contexts, the historical cases put forward are balanced 
between historical detail on events and the recognition of developmental patterns (e.g. 
sequences). For this, however, it relies on the vast amount of historical knowledge 
accumulated. These histories provide numerous narratives that usually focus on a 
specific ‘layer’ of the social world (social history, economic history, political history, 
etc.), specific events and episodes (e.g. the miners’ strike or privatisation), all relevant 
to the work at hand. 
The purpose of the narrative strategy is to move from case histories to rich and 
analytically relevant case studies (Pettigrew 1997). In practice, the narrative accounts 
put forward in this thesis include a main plot and sub-plots that reflect:  
a) the multi-dimensionality of developmental patterns,  
b) multiple levels of embeddedness, and  
c) multiple time horizons accommodating processes operating according to 
multiple temporalities. 
The multi-dimensional and multi-temporal coupling of sub-plots into one coherent 
narrative allows the formulation and further qualification of the generative mechanisms 
at play in each case. The main challenge with building co-evolutionary narratives 
resides in making sense of the numerous on-going processes and causal mechanisms 
involved. It requires a broad and open view on possible influences on the main process 
(here, destabilisation). 
The case studies organising the empirical material are thus more than just case histories 
or sequences of events: they have an analytical structure and purpose that is geared 
towards the search for patterns, and generative mechanisms: 
“For the process analyst events and chronologies are crucial building blocks but only building 
blocks. The aim in a processual analyst is not to produce a case history but a case study. The case 
study goes beyond the case history in attempting a range of analytical purposes. Firstly there is a 
search for patterns in the process and presumably some attempt to compare the shape, character and 
incidence of this pattern in case A compared with case B. Secondly, there is a quest to find the 
underlying mechanisms which shape any patterning in the observed processes. The process analyst's 
  
96 
repetitive questioning about how embodies this constant search for underlying mechanisms which 
drive the processes.” (Pettigrew 1997:339) 
The narratives are constructed in relation to categories derived from the analytical 
framework:  
- a diagnosis of an overall transition process provides the basis for the ‘temporal 
bounding’ of cases 
“Judgements have also to be made about when a process begins and ends in any study and again a 
pragmatic mixture of the particular flow of events in any case, the core questions of the study and 
resource constraints all combine to inform the choice of the time series. The time framework in the 
study exposes a chronology which becomes the initial organising mechanism for analysis.” 
(Pettigrew 1997:345) 
- attention to important events, critical junctures, and broad phase changes identified 
in the secondary literature allows for the elaboration of a synthetic multi-domain 
chronology and a ‘working’ periodisation between significant events or conjectural 
shifts; 
- within this temporally structured frame, and on the basis of analytical categories 
(types of environmental pressures, industry response strategies, changes to regime 
rules), a systematic narration is then developed to make sense of the sequencing of 
events and processes, evidence for which is further sought in primary and 
secondary sources; 
- the resulting layered narrative is attentive to environment-specific threads, problem 
careers, multiple levels of strategy, etc.  
- the case narratives are then checked for consistency across multiple organising 
logics: across time, across environmental domains, and between analytical 
categories within domains. 
Case study protocol 
Following these principles, it is possible to elaborate rich, systematic, and analytically 
coherent case studies. These case studies have a beginning and an end. They are 
segmented in periods (1 to n) based on important events and trends identified in the 
secondary literature. For each period, the analytical categories derived from the 
conceptual framework are systematically traced. This systematic structure is represented 
in Table 4.2. Following this systematic process results in rich and comparable case 
studies. 
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Table 4.2: Analytical structure of cases 
P1 P2 ! Pn
Landscape changes
Environmental pressures
Strategies and regime change
Landscape changes
Environmental pressures
Strategies and regime change
Periodisation
Economic 
environment
Socio-political 
environment
 
Case analysis 
For the analysis of each case, an analytical protocol is also followed, in relation to the 
categories developed in the conceptual framework. Case analyses (5.6, 6.5, 7.5) are thus 
structured according to the following sub-sections: 
1. Overall destabilisation context and relative significance of specific pressures 
The most significant pressures are summarized in an analytical table. Relative 
weightings are assigned to pressures, to provide an evaluation of their progression 
through time. The significance of different kinds of pressures to the overall 
destabilisation pattern is then discussed, thus allowing the comparison of a variety of 
destabilisation environments. 
2. Pressure interaction and spillovers 
Because environmental changes are not isolated, I then analyse interactions between 
pressures, and specify underlining mechanisms that can be observed. I also make an 
interpretive summary of the relative size and spillovers of external pressures in a multi-
dimensional space. The schematic figures are based on the TEF (Figure 3.1), with the 
exception that the industry regime has been left out (because the figures focus on 
pressures rather than responses). The grey surface area in these figures represents the 
coal industry (with a rough indication of its size, pressures impinging on its shape, and 
protective measures as a thickening of its boundaries). Pressures are represented by 
arrows directed at the industry (thickness roughly indicating intensity). Spillovers are 
represented by arrows between pressures. Pressure alignment is indicated by their joint 
directionality towards the industry. Broader secular trends are represented outside the 
industry environments. I use these analytical representations as an interpretive heuristic 
in tracing multi-dimensional interactions between pressures in the TEF’s economic and 
socio-political environments. The symbolic representations emanate from my 
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interpretive weighting of pressures and their interactions, and their positioning in the 
multi-dimensional space.  
3. Destabilisation enactment: industry strategies and regime change 
I then delve into the analysis of the main industry strategies, distinguishing a) socio-
cultural framing strategies, b) political strategies, c) economic positioning strategies, 
and d) innovation strategies. Strategic changes are put in the perspective of changes to 
core industry regime rules. 
4. Pattern matching 
The last analytical subsection is dedicated to pattern matching, comparing case 
developments to the ideal-typical enactment model presented in 3.3.2.1. The 
identification of deviations allows further conceptual refinements in chapter 8. 
 
In the next chapters, I present my empirical contribution in the form of three case 
studies. Based on the theoretical elaboration and on this present chapter, I develop 
analytical narratives and discuss aspects relevant to destabilisation and the end of each 
case. 
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5 Case 1: The destabilisation of the British coal 
industry (1880-1967) 
The case covers the period from 1880 to 1967 during which the British economy 
underwent a transition from the virtual omnipresence of coal in energy supply to a four-
fuel13 economy (Error! Reference source not found.). 
Figure 5.1: The British transition in primary energy sources, domestic consumption (Fouquet and 
Pearson 1998:21) 
 
To divide the longitudinal case into several periods, I focused on changes in the external 
environments with lasting effects. I start in 1880, because the rise of a smoke abatement 
movement signalled the early external questioning of the coal industry. Coal output 
continued to grow, however, and peaked in 1913 (Error! Reference source not 
found.), so it is useful to discuss pre-developments as a background to the case. The 
first period (1914-1930) is characterised by disruptions and economic fluctuations, 
starting with the eruption of WWI (Error! Reference source not found.). The second 
period (1930-1946) is characterised by increasing economic problems due to the Great 
Depression and loss of export markets, by increased government influence (to provide 
protection) and by increased cultural sensitivity to the smoke problem. The third period 
                                                
13 It is worth mentioning that the denomination ‘four fuel policy’ (referring to coal, gas, oil and nuclear 
power) is a misnomer. Indeed, electricity is not a fuel, but an energy carrier. Different fuels and/or energy 
carriers entail different qualities and uses, and are not always directly substitutable. 
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(1946-1956) is characterised by nationalisation, by renewed optimism over growing 
coal markets, and by modernisation plans. The industry’s cultural and political 
legitimacy were, however, damaged by the London Smog (1952). The fourth period 
(1956-1967) is characterised by tougher smoke regulations (the 1956 Clean Air Act), 
the gradual removal of policy protection, and increased competition from alternatives 
(oil, gas, nuclear). This led to a loss of faith in the coal industry, and rushed attempts to 
change the industry’s mission, markets and technology. 
The industry itself changed its character throughout the period, moving from a 
fragmented industry in the early 20th century, to a more organised entity in the 1930s 
(via cartels), into a single entity (through nationalisation in 1946).  
5.1 Pre-developments: early pressure regarding the smoke problem 
(1880-1914) 
5.1.1 Pressures in economic environment 
5.1.1.1 Landscape 
The British economy experienced continuous market growth domestically and abroad 
until World War I. However, it was organised around the proliferation of small, 
heterogeneous, local (often family-run) firms with little systematic integration and 
organised control, and thus contrasted with the emergence of more coordinated 
managerial forms: 
“Elsewhere, from the late nineteenth century (notably in Japan, Germany, and the United States) 
corporate capitalism was emerging to become the dominant mode of economic organization. 
Corporate capitalism was characterized by industrial oligopoly, hierarchical managerial bureaucracy, 
vertical integration of production and distribution, managerial control over the labor process, the 
integration of financial and industrial capital, and systematic research and development.” (Elbaum 
and Lazonick 1984:571) 
5.1.1.2 Markets 
Because coal was central to industrial expansion as the principal energy carrier, the coal 
industry enjoyed growing markets, and was profitable. Most economic sectors and 
households relied on coal (Figure 5.2). Between 1850 and 1913, markets grew around 
4% per year (Church 1986). By 1913, exports accounted for 32% of volume sales 
(Court 1945). 
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Figure 5.2: British coal sales by economic sector (Data: Fouquet 2008, DECC Historical data)14 
 
5.1.1.3 Labour relations 
Labour relations were strained, because the mining industry experienced frequent roof 
collapses, underground explosions, fatal accidents, poor working conditions, low wages, 
and limited worker rights. In 1889, workers created the Miners’ Federation of Great 
Britain (MFGB), which strived for higher wages and safety measures (Church 1986). 
Between 1881 and 1913 nominal wages in coal mining increased by 86.8%, while the 
average increase across all sectors was 27.5%, and the cost of living rose by only a few 
percentage points. These wage rises (in nominal and real terms) in the coal industry 
were not only linked to union activism, but also to strong market demand and rising 
coal prices (Boyer 2004). 
5.1.1.4 Technical alternatives 
Coal gas and electricity were two new energy carriers, which on the one hand competed 
with the direct use of coal. On the other hand, they used coal as feedstock and thus 
formed growth markets for the coal industry. When electricity challenged gas in the 
lighting markets, gas industry actors shifted their attention to domestic cooking and 
heating, where it competed with the direct use of coal in stoves and fireplaces. Between 
                                                
14 The absence of noise in the data preceding 1913 is justified by reliance on average estimates before that 
date, while annual data is available from 1913.  
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1882 and 1912, the number of gas consumers increased from 1,972,000 to 6,876,000 
(Barty-King 1984). The pressure of these alternatives on the coal industry was not 
substantial, because gas and electricity both derived from coal, and were thus seen as 
new markets for the industry.15 
5.1.2 Pressures in the socio-political environment 
5.1.2.1 Landscape 
The late nineteenth century saw a relative growth of public health expenditures (Boyer 
2004), and a general interest in issues such as hygiene and the social condition of 
workers (Thorsheim 2006). 
5.1.2.2 Public opinion 
The atmosphere in many industrial cities was filled with smoke, ash, and soot particles 
(Figure 5.3), which caused health problems and deaths, created visibility problems in 
traffic, and dirtied houses, building and laundry. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Smoke problems in 19th century cities (Godwin 1854:60) 
 
Smoke problems were part of daily lives. They were seen as a nuisance, but also the 
price to pay for progress. In the ‘Age of Coal’ most people associated smoking 
chimneys with progress, wealth and employment (Church 1986). People sympathized 
with the industry and believed that coal-burning restrictions would constrain 
manufacturers (Stradling and Thorsheim 1999). People also appreciated the glow of 
                                                
15 Additionally, the efficiency losses from conversion to these different carriers actually implied greater 
primary consumption of coal for these substitutions. 
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coals and the “pokeable, companionable fire” (Ashby and Anderson 1981), which they 
perceived as homely and cosy. 
5.1.2.3 Policy makers 
Although some cities introduced local smoke laws, they contained many loopholes and 
exemptions, were weakly enforced, and prescribed meagre fines (Thorsheim 2006). 
Local politicians were often sympathetic towards owners of smoky factories. 
5.1.2.4 Social movement 
Victorian reformers such as medical doctors, hygienists, and urban planners, were 
concerned about the effects of smoke on health, living conditions, and civilization more 
generally (Thorsheim 2006). In the 1880s, smoke abatement movements emerged, 
which redefined smoke as a dangerous killer, responsible for respiratory diseases, 
deaths and general pollution.16 To educate the public, activists sponsored public lectures 
about smoke, exhibitions about cleaner fuels (the first one in 1881), brochures and 
booklets. The Coal Smoke Abatement Society (CSAS) (1898) focused more on industry 
and greater enforcement of existing smoke laws (Thorsheim 2006). The Smoke 
Abatement League of Great Britain (SALGB), created in 1909, focused on policy, and 
lobbied for greater state involvement and national regulations. The gas industry, which 
marketed itself as clean in comparison to coal, gave financial support to smoke 
abatement groups and collaborated with them by sponsoring exhibitions (Thorsheim 
2002). 
5.1.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
5.1.3.1 Economic positioning strategies 
The coal industry was highly diverse, with thousands of undertakings of varying size 
competing on costs and quality, which varied between regions. In response to labour 
union demands, mine owners increased wages, introduced individual safety lamps, and 
increased ventilation. Additional costs were passed on to consumers (Church 1986). 
5.1.3.2 Innovation strategies 
Technical operations were labour-intensive and relied largely on muscle-power (Court 
1945). Men used picks to cut coal and used shovels to load it into wagons. Ponies and 
                                                
16 Early examples are the Manchester and Salford Noxious Vapour Abatement Association (1876) and the 
National Smoke Abatement Institution (1882). 
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rope-haulage systems transported wagons to vertical shafts, where coal was moved to 
the surface (Figure 5.4). Steam engines were introduced more widely in the late 19th 
century to power ventilation devices, water pumps, shaft haulage, and rope-systems. 
Electricity entered the mines to provide light and to power ventilators. 
Innovation strategies were however not pursued systematically, and great disparity 
prevailed between mines. Already in 1903 a mine inspector complained that: “There is a 
sort of vis inertiae that you have to overcome at a great many collieries before you can 
get any new system introduced” (reported in Pollard 1989:27). 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Drawing of the 19th century Bradley Mine Bilston (Wolverhampton City Council 
Archives) 
5.1.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
5.1.4.1 Political strategies 
The coal mining industry hardly engaged with the smoke problem, because it framed 
smoke as being caused by the users of coal, e.g. factories, gas works, households. 
Factory owners and industrialists used political strategies to defend themselves against 
institutional pressures. They lobbied city councils, officials and judges to weaken 
smoke-regulations and apply these leniently (Stradling and Thorsheim 1999). 
5.1.4.2 Framing strategies 
They also used framing strategies, arguing that jobs and economic welfare were more 
important than smoke problems. This view was regularly displayed in popular media. 
The Daily Mirror, for instance, on March 21st 1912, commented on comparative 
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photographs before and during a potters’ strike and argued: “No smoke means no work, 
and no work no money” (Figure 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.5: Detail from the Daily Mirror, March 21st, 1912, p.9 
5.1.4.3 Innovation strategies 
Coal-using industries also employed innovation strategies, and adopted fuel-efficient 
boilers and furnaces that reduced smoke emissions and fuel costs. They also introduced 
higher chimneys that dispersed and diluted smoke over larger areas. The combined 
effect of these developments was a sensible alleviation of smoke problems since the 
1890s (Ashby and Anderson 1981).  
5.2 Economic fluctuations and ongoing smoke pressure (1914-1930) 
5.2.1 Pressures in economic environment 
5.2.1.1 Economic landscape 
World War I disrupted international trade, but also domestic industry activities (Figure 
5.2). The government took control of strategic industries to support the war effort. This 
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change, although temporary, paved the way for the emergence of new issues to the 
public eye: labour issues, efficiency issues, industrial structure, etc. 
5.2.1.2 Markets 
After the war, export markets recovered in the early 1920s, but were disrupted by the 
1926 strike and then decreased throughout the late 1920s and 1930s (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6: British coal exports (1913-2008), mtons (Data: DECC historical coal data) 
 
Most domestic markets (households, iron/steel industry, other industries, railways) 
fluctuated or stagnated (because of price volatility or industrial fuel efficiency 
improvements).17 Gas and electricity markets grew (Figure 5.2). Collieries and shipping 
decreased, with the gradual introduction of more efficient diesel engines. Aggregate 
domestic demand grew only 0.7% between 1913 and 1929 (Supple 1988). 
5.2.1.3 New entrants 
Because World War I seriously disrupted coal exports (Court 1945), foreign countries 
accelerated the build-up of their own coal industries. They adopted the latest mining 
methods, improving productivity and efficiency levels (Figure 5.7). British mines 
modernized comparatively slowly. By 1913, only 8% of coal was mechanically cut, and 
                                                
17 Between 1920 and 1935, electricity generation and iron production experienced fuel 
efficiency improvements of about 55% and 40% respectively (Buxton, 1979). 
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less was mechanically conveyed (Taylor 1961). After the war, foreign industries 
increasingly competed with British firms in (British) export markets. 
  
 
Figure 5.7: Output per manshift (kg) (Data: Allen 1970, Court 1945) 
5.2.1.4 Labour relations 
Following state control, average wages increased substantially during the war (about 
170% according to Ramsbottom, 1935). State control of the coal industry during WWI 
also led to better working conditions. After the war, labour unions (unsuccessfully) 
lobbied for nationalisation. When the government handed back the mines in 1919, 
owners halved wages in 1920 (Ramsbottom 1935). Labour relations became strained 
and when industrialists again proposed to lower wages and lengthen working days, 
unions responded with major strikes in 1921 and 1924. Unions won the fight and 
actually achieved wage increases of about 8% in that period (Figure 5.11). In 1925 
proposals for wage reduction renewed tensions and culminated in the 1926 General 
Strike, which caused major market disruptions (Figure 5.2). Mine owners defeated the 
unions and subsequently implemented major wage reductions (Court 1945).  
5.2.1.5 Technical alternatives 
After World War I, the production and consumption of coal gas accelerated (Table 5.1), 
because of scale effects, price decreases and the increased use of penny-in-the-slot 
meters. Electricity was increasingly used for lighting and powering machine-tools. Fuel 
efficiency improved as industries shifted from steam towards electric motors (using coal 
more efficiently). 
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Table 5.1: UK Gas production (million cubic feet) (Data: Williams (1981:289)) 
Year UK gas production (Mft3)
1887 56241
1902 91956
1912 126002
1920 295857
1930 313046
1937 341985
1946 446124   
Fuel oil gained some early footholds in shipping and heavy industries. In 1913, for 
instance, the Admiralty shifted towards oil-burning vessels (Church 1986). 
5.2.2 Pressure in the socio-political environment 
5.2.2.1 Landscape 
Temporary government control of strategic industries during the war created a 
precedent, and led to a greater interest in industrial planning from policymakers.  
5.2.2.2 Social movement and activism 
In the 1910s and 1920s, professional groups (doctors, chemists, architects and 
engineers) joined the anti-smoke coalition, changing the emphasis from behavioural 
change to technological solutions. Smoke reduction was reframed in terms of 
economies of fuel and win-win solutions, because industries could simultaneously 
reduce fuel costs and diminish smoke problems (Stradling and Thorsheim 1999). The 
expansion and professionalisation of the anti-smoke movement enhanced its credibility 
with policy makers. In 1921, the CSAS was invited to provide inputs to the Newton 
committee. Disappointed by the weak 1926 Public Health Act (Thorsheim 2006), 
smoke activists reoriented their strategy from regulatory lobbying towards influencing 
public opinion and educating citizens. The newly created National Smoke Abatement 
Society (1929) disseminated information and organized exhibitions. 
The emerging (coal) gas industry also supported smoke abatement groups, and 
contrasted itself with (unprocessed) coal as a clean, convenient, and smokeless 
alternative (Figure 5.8). 
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Figure 5.8: Advert by British Commercial Gas Association (The Times, January 1, 1914) 
5.2.2.3 Public opinion 
Because coal smoke was still generally associated with progress and economic 
prosperity, smoke activists were modestly successful in influencing public opinion. In 
1921 (23 August) an editorial in The Times commented that “We are still far from the 
point at which compulsion [of domestic smoke curbing] is possible. Public opinion has 
to be educated” (cited in Thorsheim 2006:52). 
5.2.2.4 Policy 
The government was concerned about the industry’s economic problems and, in 1925 
and 1926, provided £23 million of direct subsidies and special trade favours (Allen 
1970). Expert committees were formed to investigate the economic problems. The 1921 
Sankey Commission concluded that the coal industry had too many production units, 
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most of them of suboptimal size. The 1926 Samuel Commission reached a similar 
conclusion and promoted the amalgamation of small mines into larger undertakings.  
The industry did not implement these recommendations, which created political 
“disillusionment with the ability of the coal industry to govern itself” (Supple 1988:580). 
In the late 1920s, this frustration led to policy discussions of “compulsory 
amalgamations, cooperative marketing schemes, official subsidies and government-
backed export cartels” (Supple 1988:585). 
Policymakers gradually engaged with the smoke debate. During World War I, it 
sponsored research into coal smoke (Thorsheim 2006) and the efficient use of fuel. 
Smoke regulations for households were not considered, because this conflicted with the 
idea that the home was one’s castle (Ashby and Anderson 1981). The Newton 
Committee Report (1921) concluded that domestic smoke had increased relative to 
industrial smoke, and recommended actions against commercial and domestic chimneys. 
Nevertheless, the subsequent Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Act (1926) was 
relatively weak, applied only to commercial installations and to ‘black smoke’ (which 
created definitional problems and legal loopholes), contained exemptions, and entailed 
insignificant fines (Ashby and Anderson 1981). 
5.2.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
5.2.3.1 Economic positioning strategies 
The industry was squeezed between supply side pressures from foreign industries, high 
labour costs that consumed a large part of net proceeds, and declining and stagnating 
markets that caused over-supply and decreasing prices (Buxton 1979). These economic 
problems, which were exacerbated by miner strikes, led to mine closures, bankruptcies 
(Table 5.2), and a decrease of 30% in the workforce (DECC Historical coal data). 
 
Table 5.2: Number of undertakings and mines (based on Allen 1970, Court 1945, DTI 2002) 
Undertakings/companies Mines
1913 3000
1924 1400 2480
1944 740 1630
1948 National Coal Board 980
1956 National Coal Board 850   
 
The industry’s primary response strategy was the reduction of labour costs (Allen 1970). 
The recommendations from policy committees (to amalgamate the thousands of 
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undertakings into larger ones) did not lead to targeted responses because of limited 
coordination in the industry (Supple 1987). 
5.2.3.2 Innovation strategies 
WWI starved the mines of equipment, lowering production efficiencies and outputs. 
Post-war diffusion of coal-cutting machines and pneumatic picks was slow in Britain 
compared to other countries (Figure 5.9). 
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Figure 5.9: Percentage of coal output mechanically cut in selected countries (Data: Buxton 1979) 
 
The percentage of mines with coal-cutting machines and pneumatic picks increased 
from 8% in 1913, 19% in 1924, to 42% in 1933 (Allen 1970). But the mechanical 
removal of coal (via conveyors) and the mechanical loading of cut coal onto conveyors 
(via power-loaders) diffused more slowly. Technical innovation thus remained sparse 
and partial (Church 1986). This also applied to the processing, washing, and grading of 
coal into different categories: 
“British companies (…) certainly did not set the pace in adopting sophisticated coal-processing 
techniques and marketing practices” (Dintenfass 1992:171).  
Productivity improved only 10% between 1913 and 1936, while the coal industries in 
the Ruhr and Belgium increased their productivity by 80% and 50% respectively over 
the same period (Buxton 1979:61-2). 
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Some coal manufacturers began to diversify into (natural or synthetic) smokeless fuels 
(anthracite, briquettes, etc.), which were more expensive than normal (bituminous) coal 
and harder to ignite (Court 1945). 
5.2.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
5.2.4.1 Political strategies 
After the war, the coal industry and the newly created Mineowners Association of Great 
Britain (MAGB) successfully lobbied against nationalisation proposals. Factory-owners 
lobbied city councils and judges to weaken smoke-regulations and apply these leniently 
(Stradling and Thorsheim 1999). The Federation of British Industries (FBI) influenced 
the Newton Committee Report (1921) and succeeded in watering down the Public 
Health Act (1926), “rendering the bill as innocuous as possible for business generally” 
(Sheail 1997:27-28). 
5.2.4.2 Framing strategies 
The coal industry downplayed the smoke problem, arguing that jobs and economic 
welfare were more important. The FBI also warned that smoke regulations would 
undermine competitiveness and lead to unemployment (Sheail 1997). 
5.3 Increasing pressures and piecemeal responses (1930-1946) 
5.3.1 Pressure in economic environment 
5.3.1.1 Landscape 
The second half of the interwar period was marked by the Great Depression, which led 
to lean economic times and the search for cost reduction throughout the economy. The 
second world war also interrupted economic activities, and led to the mobilisation of 
strategic industries to contribute to the war effort. 
5.3.1.2 Markets 
Household and industrial coal markets contracted during the Great Depression, picked 
up in the second half of the 1930s, and contracted again during World War II (Figure 
5.2). Export markets decreased continuously in the 1930s, and collapsed during WWII 
(Figure 5.6). Collieries and shipping markets also decreased (Figure 5.10), the latter 
because of a shift to liquid fuels. These fluctuations caused bankruptcies and closures in 
the coal industry (Table 5.2), which came to be seen as a ‘sick industry’ (Supple 1988). 
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Figure 5.10: Coal consumption by British ships and collieries (1913-2008), mtons (Data: Fouquet 
2008) 
5.3.1.3 Technical alternatives 
Fuel oil and diesel began to compete in heavy industries and railways, but did not 
diminish coal use, as they did in shipping. Electricity use in industry increased from 
5,000 GWh in 1930 to 19,000 GWh in 1948.18 In households gas and electricity 
increasingly competed with the direct use of coal (for applications such as lighting, 
cooking, heating and powering appliances such as irons, cookers, radios). By 1938, 
60% of the gas industry’s output was for domestic purposes (Ashby and Anderson 
1981). Household grid connections rapidly increased from 32% in 1931, 65% in 1938, 
to 96% in 1961 (Corley, 1966). Electricity prices decreased nearly three-fold between 
1935 and 1945, further encouraging its use in households and industry (Fouquet, 2011). 
But electricity and coal gas exerted limited market pressure since they used coal as 
feedstock and thus formed growth markets for the industry (Figure 5.2). 
5.3.1.4 Labour relations 
Since their defeat in the 1926 strike, unions had lost some bargaining power. Wages 
decreased substantially until the mid-1930s  (Figure 5.11). Despite this reduction, 
relative British wage costs remained high by international standards (Table 5.2). 
Although the proportion of British wage costs to total costs decreased from 70% in 
                                                
18 Data from BEER, Historical electricity data: 1920 to 2007 (file 40583). 
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1927 to 63% in 1936, this ratio was higher than in other countries (44% in Poland, 46% 
in Germany, 49% in the Netherlands, in 1936) (Buxton 1979). Wages increased from 
the mid-1930s when markets grew again. 
 
80 
85 
90 
95 
100 
105 
1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938  
Figure 5.11: Index number of wage rates for UK mining (1924=100) (Data: Ramsbottom 1935, 
1939). 
 
Country Index
Poland 48
USA (bituminous) 61
Germany (West Upper Silesia) 68
Belgium 81
Germany (Ruhr) 96
Great Britain 100
USA (Anthracite) 130
France 145  
Table 5.3: Index of relative labour costs per ton (common currency) of saleable coal, 1935 (British 
costs=100) (Data: Buxton 1979:57) 
 
Decreasing wages and increasing unemployment introduced bitterness in labour 
relations. To protect jobs, miners and unions did not wholeheartedly cooperate in the 
introduction of new innovations (Court 1945). 
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5.3.2 Pressures in the socio-political environment 
5.3.2.1 Landscape 
The difficult economic conditions of the 1930s and the disruption of WWII led to 
greater government involvement in economic affairs. 
5.3.2.2 Policy 
Policymakers stepped in to provide protection against harsh economic conditions.19 The 
Coal Mines Act (1930) allowed the formation of cartels, which restricted output and 
guaranteed minimum prices, and intended to stimulate the consolidation of the industry 
(Allen 1970). The Act was motivated by: a) accumulated frustrations about the inability 
of the coal-industry to put its own house in order (Supple 1988), b) concerns over 
unemployment and social disruption of mining communities c) electoral interests and 
political pressure from labour unions, which had substantial political clout. Policy 
makers paid limited attention to smoke problems, because economic issues had priority. 
5.3.2.3 Social movements 
The smoke abatement movement continued its public information activities (Stradling 
and Thorsheim 1999). A leading activist still saw the lack of public awareness as a 
major barrier: 
“Until every citizen recognizes the fact that he or she is the cause of the dirty fogs nothing really 
adequate and valuable in the progress towards our objective, “clean air”, can come to pass” (Des 
Voeux, 1934, The Times, March 2, 1934). 
5.3.2.4 Public opinion 
New visions of domestic life, which were advocated by the gas and electricity industries, 
began to erode coal’s legitimacy in the 1930s. The electricity industry disseminated 
visions about the all-electric house that was modern, efficient, clean, and hygienic 
(Corley 1966). The Gas Council released movies such as ‘The Smoke Menace’, 
emphasising the dangers of smoke and portraying gas users as progressive citizens 
contributing to reduction of a social nuisance (Taylor 1937). These new visions 
resonated with cultural discourses around ‘modernity’, ‘convenience’, ‘cleanliness’ and 
‘health’. Smoke became part of a larger cultural ‘package’ that framed coal as old-
fashioned, dirty, smoky and unhealthy. 
                                                
19 The British government introduced protective measures (tariffs, tolerance for collusion) in many 
industries in the interwar period (Bowden and Higgins, 2004). 
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5.3.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
5.3.3.1 Economic positioning strategy 
The cartel structure reduced competitive incentives for innovation and efficiency 
improvements (Court 1945), leading coal firms to focus on short-term survival and cost-
reduction. 
5.3.3.2 Innovation strategy 
Since the late 1920s, coal firms also accelerated the diffusion of coal cutters (Figure 
5.9), resulting in productivity improvements from 0.9 tonnes per manshift in 1925 to 1.2 
tonnes per manshift in 1936 (Buxton 1979). But these improvements remained slow 
relative to foreign industries. Mechanisation proceeded in a partial and piecemeal 
fashion, focussing on individual components, but not systemic modernisation:  
“faceworking, roadway development, haulage, winding, ventilation, and lighting all needed to 
improve together, if the technological improvement of one of them was not to have its benefits 
reduced by the stagnant techniques of others” (Ashworth 1986:63). 
Technical inertia in the coal industry had several causes20: a) cartel legislation removed 
selection pressure and led firms to postpone expensive and systemic technical re-
equipment (Court 1945), b) the mindset and identity of managers was characterized by 
rent seeking instead of entrepreneurship and a preference for craft-based styles over 
science and engineering (Buxton 1970, Dintenfass 1992), c) labour unions resisted the 
introduction of new machines to protect jobs, d) firms had limited resources for 
investment because of low profitability in preceding years (Buxton 1979), e) firms 
delayed investment in comprehensive modernization because of uncertainties about the 
recovery of export and domestic markets (Bowden and Higgins 2004).  
In terms of product innovation, the industry developed some new appliances that 
produced less smoke. Diversification into smokeless fuels remained limited. To inform 
consumers about new appliances and more efficient coal use, the Coal Utilisation 
Council (CUC) was created in 1932.  
                                                
20 Many British industries were characterized by ‘defensive and cautious reactions’ and ‘failures to adapt’ 
in the interwar period (Bowden and Higgins 2004). 
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5.3.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
5.3.4.1 Political strategies 
The coal industry accepted the output limitations and price-setting mechanisms but 
lobbied against industry consolidation. Sustained resistance culminated in the 
dissolution of the Coal Mines Reorganisation Commission in 1936 (Ashworth 1986). 
5.3.4.2 Framing strategies 
The industry made some attempts to restore coal’s reputation. The CUC chairman 
suggested that coal was a ‘modern fuel’ that could be burnt in ‘new-fashioned 
appliances’: 
“But why must the word “old-fashioned” and “coal-kitchener” be necessarily coupled together? 
There are many new-fashioned and highly efficient cookers and ranges already on the market which 
consume coal with little if any smoke” (The Times, March 3, 1934). 
5.4 Nationalisation, post-war reconstruction and the Clean Air Act 
(1946-1956) 
5.4.1 Pressures in the economic environment 
5.4.1.1 Landscape 
In the wake of WWII, British industrial efforts were geared towards reconstruction: 
building up capacity to ensure shelter, food, and energy to the masses, as well as putting 
the economy back on its feet. 
5.4.1.2 Markets 
World War II depressed domestic markets and collapsed export markets (Figure 5.6). 
The demand for coal picked up in the post-war reconstruction period, especially in the 
electricity, gas, iron/steel and heavy industries (Figure 5.12, Figure 5.14). Demand from 
railways decreased after the war, because of increasing competition from diesel- and 
electric-powered locomotives. But executive views that steam would remain the 
principal source of power led to a new construction program, resulting in 1518 steam 
locomotives between 1948 and 1956 (Chick 1998). This pushed up railway coal 
consumption in the late 1950s, before contraction in the 1960s. To prioritise industries, 
policy makers rationed growing household demand. The coal industry faced difficulties 
meeting this growing demand, because it “came out of the Second World War a 
vulnerable, smaller, and enfeebled industry” (Supple 1987:10).  
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Figure 5.12: Coal consumption by British households, industries, railways and gasworks (1913-
2008), mtons (Data: Fouquet 2008)21 
5.4.1.3 Technical alternatives 
Coal shortages stimulated the rise of (fuel) oil in iron, steel and heavy industries. 
Nuclear power appeared as an option in electricity generation. 
Households increased their use of gas and electricity, turning into multi-fuel 
environments (Table 5.4). 
 
Cooking Water heating Room heating
Coal 20-25% 60% 75-80%
Coke and anthracite - 20% 15%
Coal gas 70% 15% 5%
Electricity 5-10% 5% 0-5%  
                                                
21 Coal consumption by the electricity sector is not represented on this graph, but is displayed on Figure 
5.14. 
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Table 5.4: Division of domestic heat services among the different fuels (Ministry of Fuel and Power 
1946:38) 
5.4.2 Pressures in the socio-political environment 
5.4.2.1 Landscape 
The reconstruction years marked a change in Government control and ownership of 
industries. A number of strategic industries were nationalised as a result of the newly 
elected Labour government’s promise, and became associated with a ‘social’ function 
(controlled prices, mediation of employment, etc.). 
The Great London Smog (1952) was a profound public shock that the public interpreted 
as an environmental disaster requiring immediate action. 
5.4.2.2 Policy 
The government nationalised the coal industry (1946) for several reasons:22 a) to 
increase control over industries with perceived strategic importance for the economy, b) 
to improve efficiency and productivity (there was accumulated frustration over the 
industry’s inability to consolidate, rationalise and mechanise (Allen 1970)), c) to resolve 
deep-rooted labour problems of the industry (Hannah 2004).  The government initially 
adopted a hands-off approach, leaving day-to-day management to the newly-created 
National Coal Board (Ashworth 1986). The NCB had to rationalise the fragmented 
sector, modernise the mines, invest in R&D and create an efficient national enterprise. 
Financial support underpinned the Plan for Coal (1950), which proposed long-term 
schemes for modernisation, mechanisation and reorganisation. The main immediate 
short-term goal, however, was to increase coal output (Ashworth 1986). The NCB was 
granted the exclusive license to import, which provided protection from foreign 
competition. Other relevant energy policies included coal rationing for households (until 
1958), encouragement of oil use in power stations and industry, and announcements of 
nuclear power ambitions (in 1953 and 1954). 
The 1952 Great London Smog, which caused over 4000 excess deaths, was a major 
shock that created credibility pressures on policymakers (Thorsheim 2006). The 
government reluctantly installed the Beaver Committee (1953). The Beaver report 
(1954, p. 6) defined smoke as “a social and economic evil” and called for an 80% 
                                                
22 Other strategic industries (e.g. steel, railways, electricity, gas) were also nationalised. 
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reduction in coal smoke over 15 years and legislation to achieve this (Ashby and 
Anderson 1981). In 1955, an internal Cabinet memorandum assessed that “public 
opinion is ready for a strong government lead and would support measures on the scale 
proposed. Indeed, we do not think that anything less than positive action on a national 
basis would satisfy public opinion, or prove effective in abating pollution” (cited in 
Thorsheim 2006:181). This assessment led to the 1956 Clean Air Act (CAA), which 
began restricting coal use in people’s homes and enabled cities to create smokeless 
areas. It also provided grants for the conversion of domestic grates to burn smokeless 
fuels (Ashby and Anderson 1981). 
5.4.2.3 Public opinion 
The 1952 smog episode shocked public opinion and placed smoke high on public 
agendas (Sanderson 1961). It reinforced the public perception that coal was old-
fashioned and outdated, and damaged coal’s cultural legitimacy. Public letters and 
newspaper reports also created pressure on policymakers. 
5.4.2.4 Labour relations 
Labour unions emerged from the war with a stronger bargaining position, and 
successfully argued for a substantial role in the newly nationalised industry (Brown 
2004). Low levels of unemployment and the use of strikes led to higher wages in the 
1950s. 
5.4.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
5.4.3.1 Economic positioning strategies 
Expanding markets and government support created new optimism in the industry: “It is 
clear that industry and domestic consumers will continue to burn a very large tonnage of 
solid fuels” (NCB 1953:34). Given the difficulties encountered in scaling up capacity, 
alternative fuels (gas, electricity, oil) were not perceived as threats, but as welcome 
allies in temporarily addressing fuel shortages: 
“maximum use must be made of other fuels to fill the gap” (NCB 1954:27). 
5.4.3.2 Innovation strategies 
The Plan for Coal (1950) assumed that demand would increase to 240 million tons/year 
by 1961-1965, and asked for £635 million of government investments to boost output 
through the introduction of power-loading, locomotive haulage, winding techniques, 
horizontal mining and training schemes for mining engineers (Allen 1970). Subsequent 
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productivity improvements were slow, however, rising from 1.23 tons per manshift in 
1950 to 1.30 in 1958 (Ashworth 1986). An interim evaluation, Investing in Coal (1956), 
increased estimated investments to £1000 million arguing that “the outlay proposed is 
large, but essential for the creation of the efficient and expanding coal industry on 
which the future of the British economy depends”. Slow implementation of 
modernisation plans was due to: a) under-developed managerial and administrative 
skills (Hannah 2004), b) a shortage of engineers, and c) tensions between short-term 
output maximisation and long-term mine reconstruction (Ashworth 1986). 
The industry also diversified into smokeless fuels (such as coke and briquettes), which 
resulted from process treatments of coal (e.g. carbonisation). This required the build-up 
of new capabilities in chemical and thermal engineering and heavy capital expenditures. 
Plans for new coke ovens were implemented slowly, however, because they conflicted 
with output maximisation requirements (and financial resources) for normal mines 
(Ashworth, 1986). The coal industry also engaged in appliance innovation, developing 
adjusted stoves and furnaces that better burnt smokeless fuels. 
The NCB also invested in research, creating the Coal Research Establishment (CRE) in 
1948 and the Mining Research Establishment (MRE) in 1952. The CRE focused on coal 
quality, briquetting, the mine environment and carbonisation, while the MRE applied 
engineering principles to underground mining (Ashworth 1986). 
5.4.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
5.4.4.1 Framing strategies 
While the NCB acknowledged the need to address smoke problems, it defended the 
continuation of coal burn (Sanderson 1961, Scarrow 1972), arguing that the problem 
was the incorrect use of coal in old appliances. The NCB and CUC therefore advocated 
new appliances, smokeless fuels, and consumer education as solutions (Sanderson 
1961). 
5.4.4.2 Political strategies 
The coal industry and FBI successfully lobbied to weaken the Clean Air Act. “It was 
indisputable that a lot of the concessions had been made in order to make the Bill 
palatable” (Ashby and Anderson 1981:114). 
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5.5 Destabilisation: The way to the four-fuel economy (1956-1967) 
5.5.1 Pressures in the economic environment 
5.5.1.1 Landscape 
From the mid-1950s, Britain recovered its industrial capacity, and even produced in 
excess of demand in certain sectors. Post-war economic recovery continued untamed 
until the early 1970s, although growth rates were comparatively lower in Britain than in 
countries like France, Italy and West Germany. 
5.5.1.2 Markets and technical alternatives 
After 1957, overall coal demand declined (Figure 5.2). Alternatives increasingly 
displaced coal in various market segments.  Oil use tripled between 1960 and 1973, to 
nearly 50 million tons of coal equivalent (Fouquet and Pearson 1998), substituting for 
coal in gas works (‘oil gas’), iron/steel and heavy industries and on the railways (Allen 
1970) (Figure 5.12). Coal sales to power stations increased but represented a decreased 
percentage of the power fuel mix. Fuel oil was also used for the heating of commercial 
and industrial premises and (some) domestic heating. Nuclear energy, which came 
online in 1959, competed with coal in power generation. Between 1960 and 1965, about 
20% of the commissioned power station capacity was nuclear (Ashworth 1986). Natural 
gas, discovered in the North Sea in the mid-1960s, began to replace coal gas in the late 
1960s. Household coal use began to decline after the 1956 Clean Air Act, which 
enabled cities to create smokeless areas. By 1970, 5 million premises were covered by 
smoke control orders, leading to a rapid decline of smoke emissions (Figure 5.13). 
Bituminous coal initially lost ground to solid smokeless fuels and (some) fuel oil, and 
then to natural gas (Scarrow 1972). 
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Figure 5.13: Domestic and industrial smoke emissions (1953-1973) (Ashby and Anderson 1981:118) 
 
The primary growth market for coal was electricity generation (Figure 5.14). Coke and 
solid smokeless fuels also formed growth markets until the late 1960s when natural gas 
began to substitute coal gas.23 
 
                                                
23 Coke was a by-product of coal gas production. 
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Figure 5.14: Coal consumption by the power sector, million tonnes (Data: Fouquet 2008) 
5.5.2 Pressures in the socio-political environment 
5.5.2.1 Landscape 
Concerns over British ‘decline’ and competitiveness became more prominent in public 
and political discourse from the mid-1950s, with rising frustration over the poor record 
of restructuring in British industries. 
5.5.2.2 Policy 
In the late 1950s, macro-economic concerns over rising inflation, the international 
balance of payments and Britain’s international competitive position formed the 
background for policy changes that increased pressure on the coal industry. With the 
creation of the Select Committee on the Coal industry (1957) the government increased 
the political scrutiny of the NCB (Ashworth 1986). The government wanted to 
downscale financial support for several reasons: a) macro-economic concerns and a 
desire to decrease government spending (Brown 2004), b) frustrations over escalating 
costs of the industry’s modernisation plans (Ashworth 1986), c) positive expectations 
about nuclear energy. Coal policy subsequently changed from supporting expansion 
towards ‘controlled rundown’. The Revised Plan for Coal (1959) focused investments 
on fewer mines and closed small and inefficient pits. A 1961 White Paper (Cmnd 1337) 
stipulated that nationalised industries should become self-supporting. This policy 
threatened the coal industry, which had experienced losses in the four preceding years 
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(Figure 5.17). The Conservative government therefore made some concessions, 
providing some ongoing protection through cheap loans, contracts for coal use in public 
buildings, contracts for power stations to restrict alternative fuel use, and an excise duty 
on fuel oil (introduced in 1961) (Allen 1970, Ashworth 1986). These protective 
measures were downscaled by the 1967 White Paper on Fuel Policy (Ministry of Power 
1967), thus unleashing market forces on the coal industry. The White Paper 
institutionalized the shift towards a four-fuel economy, with decreasing shares for coal, 
and increasing shares for nuclear power, natural gas, and oil. This policy change was the 
result of increasing political enthusiasm about nuclear power and natural gas, 
accumulated frustration about slow mine modernisation and continued need for 
subsidies, and eroded cultural legitimacy (‘outdated’ and ‘old-fashioned’). The 
reduction in coal production estimates (to 170-180 million tons in 1970) required “the 
most dramatic and ruthless contraction of the industry in post-war history” (Turner 
1989:156, see also Figure 6.2). Although a declining coal industry was now seen as 
inevitable, policy makers were concerned about social and economic costs. To soften 
the impact, the government granted the coal industry long-term supply contracts for the 
electricity industry (NCB 1964), and wrote off almost half of its debts (£415 million). 
5.5.2.3 Labour relations 
Labour relations soured in the late 1950s when the government became concerned about 
inflation, which it perceived to be linked to wage rises (Brown 2004). Throughout the 
1960s, governments tried to persuade or coerce unions to moderate wage claims, 
creating a recurring source of tension. 
5.5.2.4 Public opinion 
The wider public perceived coal as outdated and dirty, despite the reduction of 
smoke problems. The coal industry also lost its ‘special status’ as newer industries 
captured the public imagination. Figure 5.15 illustrates the relative loss of 
enthusiasm for coal in favour of alternatives: ‘King coal’ is pictured as being 
dethroned by ‘King oil’, itself under threat of ‘Prince atom’. 
  
126 
 
Figure 5.15: King coal, King oil and Prince atom, Daily Mail, July 22, 1955. 
5.5.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
5.5.3.1 Economic positioning strategies 
In 1957, coal industry actors still believed in a bright future, expecting coal production 
to increase steadily to 250 million tons by 1970 (Figure 5.16). The easing of fuel 
shortages also contributed to industry confidence: 
 “For the first time perhaps since the 1914 war, British Coal and every man in it can see clearly 
ahead to a future based on a secure and vital place in the national economy” (NCB 1957b:23). 
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Figure 5.16: Actual (until 1955) and estimated coal production and total energy consumption in 
coal equivalent (NCB 1957b:8)24 
 
The 1958 sales decline (of 13 million tons) was not interpreted as a structural 
development: “the period of recession in some British industries was a temporary 
setback in a long-term trend of industrial expansion” (NCB 1958:3). 
But when declining markets accelerated financial losses in 1959 and 1960 (Figure 5.17), 
the industry became more concerned, adopting defensive strategic orientations: 
“The Board’s objective of a market for coal at around 200 million tons a year can be achieved by 
holding those markets where coal can effectively compete and by winning a share of the new 
business arising from future economic growth. Competition in the energy market is expected to 
remain fierce over the next few years” (NCB 1962:14-15). 
 
                                                
24 The left side of the figure (until 1955) represents actual data, while the right side presents a projection 
of current trends. The bottom area (in black) represents British coal production, while the white area 
(white) represents total energy demand in coal equivalent. 
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Figure 5.17: Surplus after interest payment (£m, nominal value) (compiled from NCB annual 
reports) 
 
Concerns evolved into a loss of confidence, because of the 1967 White Paper, which 
projected rapid declines of coal.  
“The Government’s White Paper “Fuel Policy” contained estimates that by 1970 the market for coal 
was unlikely to exceed 170-180 million tons a year. These estimates (…) led to a loss of confidence 
within the industry.” (NCB 1965:xi) 
Accelerated mine closures caused “cynicism and demoralisation in the mining industry” 
(Robens 1972:170). 
5.5.3.2 Innovation strategies 
While the strategic orientation changed from confidence to loss of faith in a few years 
time, the industry transformed itself through various innovation strategies. The Revised 
Plan for Coal (1959) accelerated mine modernisation by improving mine layouts and 
tunnelling methods and enhancing the use of power-loaders. The combination of power-
loaders, coal-cutters and conveyor belts transformed mining into an integrated 
continuous flow industry (Ashworth 1986). Productivity (output per manshift) increased 
substantially, from 1.25 tons in 1957, to 1.56 tons in 1962 and 2.1 tons in 1968 (Allen 
1970, Figure 5.18). This improvement was also due to the closure of inefficient mines 
and focusing investment on fewer, more productive mines. 
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Figure 5.18: Productivity in the British coal industry (Output per manshift in tonnes), dotted lines 
represent data gaps (Data: Buxton 1979, Ashworth 1986) 
 
To support the modernisation program, the industry created an integrated innovation 
system in which the newly-created Central Engineering Establishment  (1956), which 
addressed practical developments and technology testing, interacted with CRE and 
MRE researchers, users, and equipment manufacturers (Ashworth 1986). 
The industry also developed second-generation smokeless fuels, which could be used in 
existing appliances and grates (Ashworth 1986). Despite R&D successes, the coal 
industry failed to rapidly increase its smokeless fuel capacity. The NCB chairman 
blamed the government for not providing sufficient investments: 
“It was clear from our own experience as producers of smokeless fuels that a fantastic amount of 
capital would be needed to build smokeless fuel plants and that this would not be forthcoming” 
(Robens 1972:61).  
The industry also collaborated with appliance manufacturers to improve domestic 
stoves and develop new central heating systems, which enabled it to move into new 
markets (central heating), where coal secured a lead position until the rise of natural gas 
in the late 1960s (Ashworth 1986).  In some instances, the coal industry explored 
service-oriented business models such as “selling heat not fuel” (NCB 1967:23). More 
generally, marketing strategies began to pay more attention to the demand side, which 
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the industry had long taken for granted. Accordingly, the NCB expanded sales services 
and advertising (NCB 1959). 
5.5.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
5.5.4.1 Political strategies 
The coal industry employed political strategies to hinder the implementation of the 
Clean Air Act (Scarrow 1972). The industry also lobbied local councils and planning 
agencies to secure coal markets for individual electricity plants. “We widened our attack 
on other authorities and got the cooperation of people in the industry who served on 
local authorities to press our case, using briefs that we supplied to them” (Robens 
1972:68). The NCB chairman also pushed to acquire planning permissions: 
“the [CEGB] were finding it difficult in the 1960s and onwards to get planning permission for new 
stations, and I weighed in to help them where a coal-fired station was involved. It was a mixture of 
propaganda and politics” (Robens 1972:66). 
5.5.4.2 Framing strategies 
In response to negative public views, the industry tried to restore its reputation by 
engaging in public relations activities, e.g. the 'cosy coal fire' advertising campaign. It 
also framed coal and new appliances as ‘modern’: 
“One of the Board’s tasks is to make clear that coal – as distinct from some of the appliances in 
which it is still being burnt – is not “old-fashioned” (NCB 1960:7). 
In 1960, the NCB launched the ‘progressive industry is going forward on coal’ 
campaign, which linked coal to modern industries (Figure 5.19). 
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Figure 5.19: NCB advertisement in the ‘Progressive industries’ campaign (The Times, April 24, 
1964) 
 
The early 1960s saw the rise of a critical discourse about the coal industry being 
featherbedded and protected, in response to which the industry developed a counter-
discourse (Robens 1972), which argued that: (1) coal was the only indigenous fuel with 
proved long-term reserves; (2) the industry was a major employer, and rapid 
downscaling would have major social costs; (3) investments were beginning to boost 
productivity; and (4) phasing out coal was a waste of past investments.25 This counter-
discourse had little effect on the political debate. Following the 1967 White Paper, the 
industry could do little more than complain about “excessive national commitments to 
the development of natural gas and nuclear power” (NCB 1967:8) and make pleas for 
(some) ongoing support (via obligations and contracts). 
                                                
25 “Since 1947, £1,300 million have been invested in the coal industry (…) There is no national 
advantage to be gained from not using to the full the resources of an industry in which so much 
has been invested.” (NCB 1964:5) 
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5.6 Analysis 
5.6.1 External pressures 
The case study shows that the coal industry experienced multiple pressures in economic 
and socio-political environments. Table 5.5 summarises the main pressures, and 
heuristically indicate how each pressure increased and decreased in strength for the 
various periods.26 
 
Table 5.5: External pressures for change on coal industry in economic and institutional 
environment (0/+ is weak pressure for change; + is moderate pressure; ++ is big pressure; - is 
stabilizing external pressure; -- is major stabilizing pressure) 
 
Shrinking 
markets
Changing markets 
and preferences
Technological 
competition
New entrants Normative 
contestation
Public opinion and 
discourse
Political pressure
++ 0/+ ++ + - 0/+
especially export 
decline
coal gas and 
electricity in upper 
class households
foreign 
competition in 
export markets
growing anti-smoke 
movement, alliance 
with alternatives
public support for 
coal (jobs and 
prosperity)
Govt  investigates 
industry problems; 
weak 1926 smoke 
regulations
+ + 0/+ + + + -
export decline; 
home stagnation
new user 
preferences coupled 
to new cultural 
repertoires
early competition 
from gas and 
electricity in specific 
markets
foreign 
competition in 
export markets
public education 
activities; alliance 
with alternatives
critical coal discourse 
but limited public 
concern about smoke
economic 
government 
protection (price 
control, cartel)
-- 0/+ + 0/+ + ++ -- 
post-war market 
expansion
growing interest in 
alternatives; dis-
satisfaction with 
coal
competition from oil; 
plans for nuclear; 
diffusion of coal gas 
and electricity
coal imports 
via NCB
Great London Fog 
boosts credibilty
public outrage over 
Great London Fog
government support 
(nationalization and 
modernisation plans)
++ ++ ++ ++ ++
declining 
markets; power 
generation is the 
industry’s life line
‘Modern’ 
consumers and 
industries switch to 
alternatives
Nuclear energy, oil 
and (natural) gas
coal is outdated'; coal 
industry seen as less 
attractive
CAA; frustration 
with coal and more 
scrutiny; enthusiasm 
for alternatives; 
1967 White Paper
1946-
1956
1956-
1967
1913-
1930
1930-
1946
 
 
Some pressures existed almost continuously (e.g. from smoke abatement movements). 
Other pressures gradually increased (e.g. public opinion). Yet other pressures alternated 
between positive and negative orientations (e.g. market size, policy support). In the 
1956-1967 period, most pressures increased, aligned, and created a ‘perfect storm’ that 
overwhelmed and destabilised the coal industry. This basic pattern only becomes visible, 
because I made a longitudinal analysis on multiple dimensions, which supports the 
general usefulness of the framework. 
                                                
26 This mean that the ‘scoring’ of pressure strength should only be read within columns, and cannot easily 
be compared across columns. 
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As a next step, I aim to draw conclusions about the relative significance of various 
pressures. In the economic environment, I suggest that new entrants only played a 
moderate role in the early periods. The most important pressures in causing full 
destabilisation were technological competition and changing user preferences, which 
translated into shrinking coal markets. In the institutional environment, I suggest that 
pressure from social movements had limited immediate effects on destabilisation. 
Despite decades of activities, smoke abatement organizations were moderately 
successful in influencing policies or public opinion (although they played some role in 
stimulating alternatives and articulating an anti-smoke discourse). More important 
pressure came from changes in societal beliefs/discourses and changing government 
policies. Especially the linkage of new cultural repertoires to households (modernity, 
cleanliness, smokelessness, convenience) undermined the cultural legitimacy of coal 
since the 1930s. Political pressure initially supported and protected the coal industry, 
but changed directionality in the last period, when policy makers became enthusiastic 
about alternatives, introduced strict anti-smoke regulations, and complained about the 
lack of coal’s self-sufficiency. 
But the analysis of individual pressures has limited explanatory power. I suggest that 
destabilisation is not just about the relative importance of single pressures, but also 
about their interactions between economic and socio-political environments. The next 
sub-section identifies the main interactions patterns. 
5.6.2 Interaction between pressures 
For this case, I draw the following conclusions about the relationship between economic 
and socio-political environment. I suggest that pressures in the economic environment 
were the direct causes of full destabilisation: changing user preferences, technological 
competition, and shrinking markets undermined the financial performance and 
economic viability of the coal industry. I further conclude that socio-political pressures 
were mediating factors that enhanced the vulnerability of the coal industry to economic 
pressures (when decreasing legitimacy eroded public acceptance and decreased political 
support in the late 1950s). 
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On a more specific level, I find many interaction mechanisms between pressures. For 
each period, except the first, I summarise these and graphically represent the 
interactions in a multi-dimensional characteristics space.27 
 
1914-1930. The main pressures came from declining export markets (due to foreign 
new entrants), strikes and domestic demand reduction (Figure 5.20). The first two 
pressures entered the political environment (leading to government inquiries and 
incidental subsidies). There was also some societal pressure from smoke activists, 
which interacted with proponents of the gas industry but achieved limited interactions 
to policy or public opinion. Direct pressure from coal-based alternatives (coal gas, 
electricity) was relatively small. 
Declining 
export 
markets
Coal-based 
alternatives
Domestic 
demand 
reduction
Early collaboration
Wage 
struggles
and strikes
Government 
committees
Anti-smoke 
movement
Positive 
public 
opinion
 
Figure 5.20: Multi-dimensional pressures interactions (1914-1930) 
 
1930-1946. The main pressures came from market problems, related to Great 
Depression and the loss of export markets (Figure 5.21). The economic problems 
entered the political environment, leading to government protection that propped up the 
                                                
27 The graphic representation of pressure interaction is based on the TEF (see 3.2), with the exception that 
the industry regime has been left out. The grey surface represents the industry (with a rough indication of 
its size, pressure fronts impinging on its shape, and protective measures as a thick line tangent to its 
boundaries). It is embedded in economic and socio-political environments in which pressures are exerted. 
Pressures are represented by arrows directed at the industry (thickness roughly indicating intensity), 
interactions are represented by arrows not directed at the industry, the alignment of pressures is indicated 
by their joint location on a single industry front. Broader secular trends (referred to as ‘landscape 
developments’ in the transitions literature) are represented outside the industry environments. 
  
135 
industry (e.g. cartel and price regulations). There was also some weakening of coal’s 
cultural legitimacy, because the anti-smoke movement, gas industry, and electricity 
industry collaborated in translating new cultural repertoires into a negative coal 
discourse and positive visions about gas and electricity. These visions were translated 
into user preferences in the economic environment. 
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Figure 5.21: Multi-dimensional pressures interactions (1930-1946) 
 
1946-1956. Expanding coal markets and government support for modernization 
programmes created positive pressure (Figure 5.22). The government also modulated 
pressures from gas and electricity industries (which were also nationalized). Substantial 
negative pressure came from the socio-cultural environment, where the Great London 
Smog caused public outrage that damaged the cultural legitimacy of coal and put 
pressure on to policy makers. The negative views on coal also affected user preferences, 
thus entering the market environment. 
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Figure 5.22: Multi-dimensional pressures interactions (1946-56) 
 
1956-1967. Strong and negative pressures came from multiple sides (Figure 5.23). 
Firstly, societal pressure led to the Clean Air Act, which put pressure on household coal 
markets. Secondly, the CAA was feasible because technical alternatives were 
sufficiently developed. Thirdly, macro-economic concerns affected policy makers who 
increased their scrutiny of the NCB and initiated a managed rundown by downscaling 
support. But, policy makers also provided some protection (e.g. oil tax, contracts for 
electricity industry). Fourthly, public discourses about outdated coal were translated 
into consumer preferences, which stimulated alternatives. 
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Figure 5.23: Multi-dimensional pressures interactions (1956-1967)  
 
The 1967 White Paper removed protective measures and unleashed market forces from 
alternative fuels, causing full destabilisation. Politically secured contracts for electricity 
generation formed the industry’s only lifeline (Figure 5.24). The 1967 policy, which 
changed the economic environment, was the outcome of several interacting 
developments: a) shifts in policy discourse (from ‘strategic fuel’ to ‘self-supporting 
industry’), b) accumulated frustration about slow modernisation and continued need for 
subsidies, c) political enthusiasm for alternatives, which undermined coal’s legitimacy, 
d) decreasing economic importance and political clout, e) eroded cultural legitimacy 
(‘outdated’ and ‘old-fashioned’ industry). The coal industry assumed a new form, which 
remained relatively stable for about a decade: a much smaller industry dedicated to a 
single market (power generation), which depended on institutionally supported 
contracts. 
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Figure 5.24: New state after destabilisation (post-1967) 
 
This case thus shows how interactions between the analytically differentiated pressures 
are important, because they can increase the rate and intensity of destabilisation. I offer 
two further observations with regard to landscape mechanisms involved in alignments 
and interactions in this specific case. 
Shocks and extreme events can reinforce and align existing pressures.  
The Great London Smog, for instance, was interpreted as public outrage and added a 
sense of urgency to political debates about anti-smoke policies, which stimulated the 
(further) diffusion of alternatives. The smog event (as it became framed) accelerated 
this alignment because it could build on decades of preceding ‘work’ by smoke activists, 
new cultural discourses, and technological alternatives that had gathered momentum. 
Extreme events can thus act as ‘catalyst’ for emergent pressure alignment. 
Secular ‘landscape’ developments reinforced certain trends in economic and socio-
political environments. 
The 1930s recession, for instance, reinforced market instability, which had already 
plagued the industry since the 1920s. Another example is that the emergence of new 
cultural repertoires (around modernity, cleanliness, smokelessness and convenience) 
reinforced the framing activities of the anti-smoke movement and the gas and electricity 
industries. The general professionalisation trend in the early 20th century also reinforced 
the rise of an anti-smoke movement as new professional groups aligned with smoke 
activists. 
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5.6.3 Endogenous enactment of regime destabilisation 
To develop the role of agency in destabilisation, the case study not only described 
external pressures, but also multi-dimensional response strategies by the coal industry. 
Table 5.6 plots the main strategies for different periods (except the first). 
 
Table 5.6: Development of strategic orientations and specific strategies in coal industry 
 
Socio-cultural framing 
strategies
Political strategies Economic positioning 
strategies
Innovation strategies
1913-
1930
Influencing the smoke debate 
(‘smoke means jobs’, ‘households 
are more polluting than industry’)
Coal interest groups lobby 
against nationalization and 
smoke regulations
Cost competition via labour 
costs
Fuel efficiency 
improvements by coal-
using industries
1930-
1946
Attempts to restore public image 
(‘coal is not old-fashioned’)
Organized resistance 
against restructuring 
policies but acceptance of 
protective measures
- Cartels and price controls
- Slow changes in marketing, 
processing, cleaning
- Early diversification into 
smokeless fuel (but no real 
commitment)
Slow and piecemeal 
mechanization of mines
1946-
1956
- Recognition of smoke problem, 
but not responsibility ('problem is 
use of coal in old appliances')
- Raising and maintaining 
strategic profile of coal industry
- Stable relationship with 
government, but frustration 
on pricing policies
- Lobbying to weaken the 
CAA
- Focus on increasing output
- Expansion in familiar markets
- Diversification into smokeless 
fuel, but capacity mis-
management
- Modernization plan (but 
delays and high cost)
- Some creation of research 
facilities and R&D
1956-
1967
- Public relations campaigns 
('modern coal industry')
- Arguing for the strategic 
importance of coal
- Political strategies to 
secure coal-fired power 
plants
- Lobby for ongoing 
government support
- Lobbying against (local) 
CAA implementation
- Increasing dependence on 
electricity generation market
- Explore new markets 
(heating, appliance 
manufacturing, etc.)
- Users and services (consumer 
education)
- Full modernization of 
mining systems
- Expansion in smokeless 
fuel supply capacity
- Creation of an innovation 
system (RD&D and user 
feedback)  
 
In chapter 3, I proposed that the commitment to industry regimes decreases along a five-
stage pattern. The case study matches this pattern quite well, but also shows some 
deviations. It suggests that the coal industry was unable to overcome the inertia of the 
industry regime in a timely fashion, despite pressure accumulation. In the different 
periods, the industry was not very pro-active in terms of foreseeing or preparing for 
possible future changes. 
1880-1914. The industry responded to pressure from smoke activists by denying and 
downplaying the problem, using framing strategies to focus attention on the positive 
aspects of coal. This strategy was relatively successful, because smoke activists had 
limited power and credibility. Economic problems hardly existed at the industry level. 
1914-1930. Major economic problems caused economic turbulence (bankruptcies, mine 
closures), but did not lead to substantial changes in the institutional logics or 
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governance system. The industry implemented some incremental changes (coal cutters) 
that stayed within the bounds of the existing regime. Recommendations from 
government committees about the need for coordinated amalgamation and 
modernization were not implemented. The industry downplayed smoke problems with 
political and framing strategies. 
1930-1946. Economic problems continued in the Depression years. But industry actors 
did not adopt comprehensive innovation strategies to close productivity gaps with 
foreign mines. Instead, they implemented piecemeal mechanisation (and diversified 
somewhat into new products such as smokeless fuels). Industry actors remained 
committed to the institutional logics of the existing regime: a) the industry’s mission 
and identity remained those of the Age of Coal (a supply-side oriented extraction 
industry); b) the core belief system was that Britain was built on coal in the past and 
would remain so in the future; c) technical operations remained relatively labour-
intensive and craft-based (mechanisation was piecemeal). Major changes did occur in 
the governance dimension of the industry regime:  the 1930 Coal Mines Act provided 
protection against economic pressures (and arguably allowed the other regime elements 
to remain relatively unchanged).  
1946-1956. Industry governance changed again with the 1946 nationalisation. Together 
with expanding markets this created new confidence in the industry. This reinforced the 
dominant belief that coal would remain the primary fuel and that alternatives would 
(temporarily) fill supply gaps in particular market segments. This belief led the industry 
to underestimate the threat from alternatives and ignore structural problems (slow 
mechanisation, low productivity, weak international competitiveness). The Plan for 
Coal (1950) signalled an ambition to change technical capabilities (mechanisation and 
modernisation of mines), but lacked urgency in its implementation. Commitment and 
investments in diversification (smokeless fuels) were also limited, leaving the industry 
unprepared for the CAA. Using Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985) distinction, the 
strategy was more ‘reorientation’ (some change in strategy and technology) than ‘re-
creation’, since core beliefs and mission/identity remained unchanged. 
1956-1967. The commitment to the regime’s institutional logics collapsed in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, when increasing and aligning pressures caused financial and 
legitimacy problems (which translated into downscaled support). Because the industry 
was relatively unprepared, these problems caused a sense of crisis, leading to various 
change programmes (the Revised Plan for Coal, advertising campaigns on progressive 
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industries, and a frantic struggle for markets). The 1967 White Paper destroyed the 
industry’s hope of restoring coal markets, leading the NCB to talk about loss of 
confidence and demoralisation. Subsequently, industry actors drastically recreated 
institutional logics of the industry regime: a) industry beliefs changed, recognising the 
threat from alternatives and accepting that coal was only one fuel amongst others, that it 
could not take customers for granted, and that the electricity industry increasingly 
formed its lifeline; b) mission and identity changed to encompass both supply and 
demand-side issues (as visible in increased attention for fuel consultancy, appliances, 
central heating, district heating and energy services); c) in terms of technology, the 
industry modernized the remaining mines, accelerated smokeless fuels processing, and 
created an integrated innovation system. These changes had characteristics of a crash 
program when the damage had already been done in terms of cultural legitimacy, 
competitiveness and political protection. Nevertheless, the changes improved 
productivity and restored some legitimacy, which halted further decline in the 1970s. 
5.6.4 Destabilisation pattern 
Some deviation from the predicted five-stage pattern occurred in the third stage. While 
the theoretical pattern predicts that increasing problems lead to early doubts in the 
regime’s viability, this did not happen in the case. Although there were some minor 
concerns in the 1950s, the coal industry was generally confident and made optimistic 
market forecasts. The reason for this mismatch is that the theoretical pattern assumes 
gradually increasing pressures, whereas real pressures may also decrease (see Table 6). 
A deviation in the fourth phase is that the industry implemented some reorientation in 
mining operations (1950 Plan for Coal), but only limitedly diversified in terms of 
products (limited coke production). A deviation in the fifth phase is that it contained 
both ‘reorientation’ (the 1959 Plan for Coal and enhanced coke production) and more 
drastic ‘re-creation’, which happened rapidly after the 1967 White Paper led to a sense 
of crisis and loss of faith. So, the boundaries between the five stages and underlying 
mechanisms are less clear-cut in the case than in the theoretical pattern. 
The coal industry was unable to overcome the inertia sustained by commitment to the 
industry regime in a timely fashion, despite the accumulation of pressures. The industry 
was not very pro-active in terms of foreseeing or preparing for possible future changes. 
In particular, the industry did not recognize that the post-war boom was an exceptional 
time, which did not signal ‘real’ revival (since many underlying weaknesses remained 
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unsolved). So, when multiple external pressures increased and aligned, the industry was 
relatively unprepared and destabilised within 8 years (1959-1967). The (more minor) 
countervailing attempt at ‘re-creation’ of the industry in the 1960s had characteristics of 
a crash program when the damage had already been done in terms of cultural legitimacy, 
competitiveness and political protection. Nevertheless, industry ‘re-creation’ improved 
efficiency and restored some legitimacy in its last remaining market, and halted further 
overall decline in the 1970s. 
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6 Case 2: The destabilisation and decline of British 
deep coal mining (1967-1997) 
In this second chapter of the destabilisation of the British deep mining coal industry 
(1967-1997), I focus specifically on the relationship between the British coal industry 
and the electricity supply industry (ESI). Indeed, the earlier major contraction phase 
(1913-1967) has brought the (reduced) British coal industry to a new state of relative 
stability (see Turnheim and Geels 2011). In the 1960s, the industry saw power 
generation as its main growth market, and pursued a specialisation strategy. A ‘coal-
electricity’ complex thus emerged from the first phase of contraction (1957-67). 
This second destabilisation period (1967-1997) is strongly related to a weakening of the 
relationship. Coal input to electricity grew from 30 mtoe in 1960, to 50 mtoe in 1980 
(see Figure 6.1). However, competition with international coal, alternative fuels, the 
acid rain controversy, ‘chronic inefficiency’, and polarised industrial relations put 
pressure on coal-fired power generation. While coal had represented over 80% of the 
fuel input to electricity generation in the early 1960s, this figure dropped below 60% 
from 1992, and plunged under 40% from 1997, a large proportion of which then came 
from abroad (see Figure 6.23). The case study traces how British coal lost its hegemony 
in its last growth market, and how it managed the consequences. The coal-power 
complex has given way to a liberalised electricity industry favouring low costs and fuel 
diversity. In the event, the British coal industry shrunk dramatically (see Figure 6.2).  
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Figure 6.1: Fuel input to power generation in the UK 1960-2000 (mtce) 
 
To divide the longitudinal case into several periods, I focused on changes in the external 
environments with lasting effects. I start in 1967, which marks a new era for energy 
policy in the UK, with a downgraded role for coal. The second period (1973-1981) 
starts with the oil crisis, which deeply affected the positioning of various fuels, and ends 
with the long-term instalment of the neo-liberal ideology. I chose 1981 rather than 
Thatcher’s election (1979), because it took a number of years for the new Conservative 
government to gain credibility and strengthen its line. The next period (1981-1990) is 
marked by strong political influence over the coal industry’s restructuring. The last 
period (1990-1997) begins with the liberalisation of the electricity industry with dire 
consequences for the British deep mining coal industry. 
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Figure 6.2: Employment in British mines (number of miners, black line), and annual growth 
(percentage, grey line) (Data: DECC 2008a)  
6.1 1967-1973: Coal-fired capacity expansion and mining erosion 
The British deep mining coal industry had become in the 1960s a much smaller industry 
– total inland consumption had fallen from 221 million tons in 1956 to 122 million tons 
in 1972. The 1967 White Paper on Fuel Policy (Ministry of Power 1967) signalled 
coal’s diminished role in society, as policy makers embraced the contribution of 
alternatives such as nuclear power and oil. In symbolic terms, “coal was widely 
regarded as the has-been fuel” (Smil 2003:229). However, the coal industry had also 
implemented a modernisation and innovation programme, which delivered a more 
productive industry with high mechanisation rates (see chapter 5). In terms of markets, 
the industry accepted that coal would be only one fuel amongst others, that it could not 
take customers for granted, and that the electricity industry increasingly formed its 
lifeline. So, it was believed that a smaller modernised coal industry could survive. 
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6.1.1 Pressures in economic environment 
6.1.1.1 Landscape 
Britain experienced a process of ‘deindustrialisation’ and relative industrial decline 
from the 1960s. This created an uncertain climate for energy industries. While 
traditional sectors were declining, depressing the general demand for coal, there was a 
great deal of political enthusiasm for new energy sources, large publicly funded civil 
technological projects, and research in general. 
6.1.1.2 Markets 
During the 1960s, the industrial and domestic markets accelerated their shift away from 
coal (see chapter 5). The power sector was the last sizeable expanding market for coal. 
The shift away from coal led to difficulties for the industry to mobilise resources for 
restructuring projects and capital investment, but also to cope with the social costs of 
closures. The industry, successfully implementing its rationalisation programme, had 
limited access to capital. This substantial financial pressure undermined the continuity 
of investments (Figure 6.3) – so crucial in an extractive industry. 
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Figure 6.3: Mining capital expenditure and productivity improvements in the British coal industry, 
Data: NCB Annual Reports28 
6.1.1.3 Customer relations 
The electricity supply industry was the principal customer of the British coal industry. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates how the power sector grew until the early 1970s (see Lehtonen and 
Nye 2009). The coal industry geared its efforts towards this particular market. With the 
assistance of Government, it benefited from mutual agreements, and recent long-lasting 
infrastructure investments,29 which provided a blanket of predictable long-term coal 
sales. In a way, the CEGB had become since the 1960s a tool of protection of the coal 
industry (Henney 1994). 
                                                
28 Average productivity improvements followed a noticeable increase throughout the period, which can be 
broken down into three main phases: rise (until 1972), stagnation (1973-1984), and rise (1985-1993). 
29 The standard lifetime of coal-fired power plant was then taken to be 30 to 40 years. 
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Electricity
20
Trends in electricity production and consumption
Introduction
Recent articles in Energy Trends have highlighted the trends over time in the production and
consumption of coal (September 2001 edition), gas (December 2001) and crude oil and oil
products (March 2002).  This article adds to the series by covering key information on the
generation, supply and consumption of electricity.
Historical background
Although Michael Faraday’s announced his discovery of electromagnetic induction in 1831, it was
not until the 1860s that generating equipment began to be produced opening the way for the
production of electricity on a commercial scale.  In 1881, Godalming in Surrey was the first town to
provide a true public electricity supply scheme combining public and private lighting in one
commercial undertaking.  Water power from the River Wey was used.  The first steam station was
at Holborn Viaduct in London in 1882, but like Godalming it could not compete on price with gas for
lighting and it closed in 1884.  The Electric Lighting Acts of 1882 and 1888 prompted both
municipal authorities and private companies to develop lighting undertakings.
After the First World War the government decided that some more centralised organisation had to
be imposed on the electricity supply industry given the 40 per cent increase in generating capacity
over the war period.  The Electricity Supply Act of 1919 established the Electricity Commissioners
with the duty of promoting, regulating and supervising the supply of electricity.  During the 1920s
there was pressure on the government to establish a transmission network so that electricity could
be generated in the most efficient stations and conveyed to wherever it was wanted.  The
Electricity (Supply) Act of 1926 set up a Central Electricity Board who devised a scheme for
connecting areas with primary transmission lines of 132,000 volts with secondary transmission at
66,000 and 33,000 volts.  Some 4,600 km of primary transmission lines and 1,900 km of secondary
transmission lines connected all of Britain except North East England by the end of 1935.
Standardisation of frequency at 50 Hz ac (some areas such as North East England used 40 Hz)
took longer and the full grid was not completed until 1947.  The Board also had to tackle the
question of standardising supply voltages since in 1935, among the 642 supply undertakings there
were 43 different voltages ranging from 100 to 480 volts, forcing domestic appliance manufacturers
to make and stock a range of models.  In 1945 240 volts ac became standard.
Chart 1: Growth in generating capacity 1891-2001
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Figure 6.4: Growth in UK generation capacity, GW (1891-2001), DTI (2002:20) 
 
Some early tensions within the coal-power complex grew out of CEGB frustration over 
the strong political intervention that characterised the sector. Political control of the 
electricity industry was particularly constraining, in three main ways: 1) price controls, 
2) pressure to purchase coal of British origin, and 3) a requirement to purchase 
equipment from British suppliers, as well as some unnecessary plant investments 
(MacKerron 2001:531-32). The forced marriage of coal with electricity had secured a 
future for the NCB, but the CEGB perceived itself as the “captive purchaser of a single 
or largely preponderant basic fuel” (CEGB annual Report 1970-71 cited by Henney 
1994:12), and was vulnerable to price increases, shortages and supply disruptions. 
These lasting inefficiencies, while insuring the NCB’s future, contributed to the erosion 
of customer relations, and the search for lasting alternatives by an unsatisfied customer. 
6.1.1.4 Competition with alternatives 
Coal’s virtual monopoly in the power generation sector was being challenged (Figure 
6.1). Coal’s share of the electricity market had gradually eroded with the penetration of 
oil-fired generation in the 1950s, and then nuclear power in the early 1960s. Its virtual 
monopoly of 95% fuel input to power generation in 1956 subsequently decreased to 
80% in 1960, and was as low as 56% in 1972.30 Oil was a serious competitor that had 
                                                
30 1972 and 1974 were exceptional years due to major strikes in the coal industry, reducing available 
output of coal for power generation, as is apparent from Figure 6.1. 
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already taken coal over for many industrial processes (iron and steel, gas, etc.), and had 
entered the power generation market. The post-war nuclear programme was delivering 
its increasing share as nuclear stations came on stream. The NCB noted a “considerable 
increase in the use of oil at power stations” (NCB 1970:18). Despite this trend, total 
coal sales to the power market grew from 53 Mtons in 1960 to 77 Mtons in 1969, and 
then stabilised (see Figure 6.1). So, the coal industry actually managed to keep a 
foothold in the power generation market (Posner 1993). 
6.1.2 Pressure in the socio-political environment 
6.1.2.1 Landscape 
Britain was, in the late 1960s, still enjoying a relatively stable socio-political landscape, 
inherited from shared political goals and societal requirements of the post-war era 
(Pearce and Stewart, 1992:507). This macro-political regime stability showed signs of 
erosion from the late 1960s. There were concerns about public spending, as illustrated 
by Figure 6.5.  
 
Figure 6.5: Front page of The Economist, 25 February 1967, illustrating the projected investment 
figures with public expenditure on the rise, here linked to Callaghan’s financial negligence. 
 
Rising inflation in the early 1970s led to macro-economic policy changes. Figure 6.6 
illustrates the emerging worries and their sequence: rising inflation, rising employment, 
and the possibility of Sterling devaluation. These macro-economic landscape pressures 
were translated into counter-inflationist policies (pay rise caps, price controls, etc.). The 
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resulting sentiment of injustice and austerity led to general workers’ discontent, which 
was particularly important in the coal industry. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Covers of The Economist, 28 November 1970, 29 January 1972, June 1972. 
6.1.2.2 Policy 
The White Paper (1967) marked a turning point from post-war reconstruction and 
relatively lax spending rules. Infused with growing anxieties in economic policy (over 
British economic decline, vulnerability, and the need to control spending), the new fuel 
policy showcased a novel approach to policy formulation (Chapman 1999:20), based on 
‘science-based’ principles, strict accounting procedures, guiding targets, and a general 
ambition to ‘roll back the state’ (see chapter 5). The White Paper set out the framework 
for a coordinated fuel policy, which provided official sanction for the view that the coal 
industry was entering a phase of contraction in light of the new status of oil. The NCB 
did not fully accept this view (see political strategies below). 
A new approach to public policy was emerging, geared towards less public spending 
and a gradual disengagement of Government from business and industry. In a context of 
increased scrutiny and tighter financial rules within nationalised industries, new 
accounting methods were imposed. They sought to bring what were seen as over-
protected, unhealthy, industries closer to the ‘rules of the market’ (see chapter 5). The 
direct consequence was reduced investment for the coal industry (Figure 6.3), and the 
acceleration of a major closure programme.  
Simultaneously, the enthusiasm of the 1960s for large civil technological programmes 
disproportionately encouraged developments in nuclear energy, which took up most of 
the available political and financial support from the new fuel policy, to the detriment of 
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investments in the coal industry. These dynamics relied heavily on competing 
expectations: 
“The early Magnox reactors seemed then to promise a future of increasingly cheap fuel, which (in 
the language of the time) would be based upon the developments of science rather than inhuman 
labour in the mines (…) drawing upon an increasingly optimistic view of economic change, 
technological development and social progress.” (Beynon et al. 1999:1) 
So, competing technological beliefs and expectations were translated into reduced 
commitments of financial and political support. This strain in the availability of 
essential support structures affected the long-term prospects of the coal industry. 
6.1.2.3 Labour relations  
Rapid industry rationalisation led to mergers and mine closures in a considerable 
adaptation effort by the coal industry (NCB 1969:x). Between 1965 and 1970, the 
number of NCB mines and employment figures fell dramatically (Figure 6.2). 
Employment opportunities in other industries and miner redeployment schemes 
smoothened the social consequences. Labour relations were mostly non-conflictual until 
the end of the 1960s. 
Rising inflation and unemployment in the early 1970s changed this picture. Industry 
decline and dramatic pit closures led to growing distance between management and 
workers (Turner 1989). The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) responded with 
discontent to pay-rise caps. Anti-capitalist forces grew within the union. The miners 
went on national strike for higher wages in January 1972 (Figure 6.7). Reduced coal 
supplies had a severe effect on the country and the Government’s perceived ability to 
run it, forcing it to call the ‘state of emergency’ in February. The Wilberforce 
Committee of Enquiry looked into the miners’ claims, making the case for a ‘special 
treatment’ of the miners, thus putting an end to the crisis. The 1972 strike had a 
substantial impact on the coal industry’s yearly results – estimated at around £150 
million (NCB 1972:4) – hence illustrating the potential of labour conflicts to influence 
the industry’s economic environment. 
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Figure 6.7: Photograph of miners’ rally in Trafalgar Square, 1972, Papers of Clive Jenkins, 
Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick; MSS.79/6/CJ/3/44. 
6.1.2.4 Environmental problems 
The coal industry had long been facing the coal smoke problem, which was 
substantially addressed (Thorsheim 2006; see chapter 5). In the 1970s, a new kind of 
environmental problem emerged: acid rain and long-range transboundary air pollution. 
Acid rain entered the British air pollution discursive space in 1972 with the UN 
Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm (Hajer 1995), where the 
problem of ground-level acidification from airborne pollutants was put on the agenda. 
Acidification was originally controversial and met scepticism from scientists and 
policy-makers. The problem entailed new scientific and political complexities. Indeed, 
acidifying air pollutants travel great distances before being deposited, which meant that 
the sulphur and nitrogen emitted in the UK could end up acidifying the lakes and forests 
of Nordic countries. Acid rain “challenged jurisdictional borders of the nation-state but 
also social and cultural boundaries, not least the one between science and policy” 
(Sundqvist et al. 2002). 
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6.1.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
6.1.3.1 Economic positioning strategy 
Under significant pressure in most market segments, the NCB sensed its virtual 
dependence on the growth of the electricity market, and its share in it. Figure 6.8 
illustrates its gradual market specialisation. However, as the CEGB was reducing its 
exclusive reliance on coal, maintaining its market share became a strategic priority of 
the NCB: 
“We [at the NCB] were relying absolutely upon an increase in requirements from the power stations 
to keep our pits open, or at least to prevent them from closing more quickly. We therefore had to 
fight oil and nuclear power – our rivals for this business – with every weapon that we could 
command.” (Robens 1972:66) 
The NCB developed two main strategies directed at power generation: 1) political 
bargaining for new power plant and contracts to secure long-term markets (NCB 1968), 
and 2) research and collaboration with power equipment suppliers to improve coal-fired 
plant and insure coal’s future position.  
Over 30 GW of additional installed coal-fired capacity had been built between 1960 and 
1975. However, power plant commissioning receded in the mid-1960s. The Drax power 
station was the only coal-fired power station to be approved between 1964 and 1971 
(Robens 1972:72). 
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Figure 6.8: Coal industry specialisation: power generation's share of the UK market for coal (%), 
(Data: DECC 2008a) 
6.1.3.2 Restructuring strategies 
The financial and market constraints of the coal industry led to dramatic contraction 
(Turner 1989:156), entailing 200 closures, and the loss of 149,000 jobs between 1965 
and 1969 (see Figure 6.2). The coal industry came out of this process in much better 
economic shape, believing that output and employment would stabilise (NCB 1970; 
NCB 1971). Productivity was improved year on year, especially in the late 1960s 
(Figure 6.3), thanks to the mechanisation of coal-winning, large projects coming on 
stream, and closures and mergers (increase in size, and concentration in best regions) 
(WOCOL 1980:401). By 1971, the NCB claimed that 88% of all its coalfaces were 
mechanised, that 92% of output came from mechanised coalfaces, and that overall 
productivity neared 2 tonnes per manshift (NCB 1971). Major longwall faces were 
equipped with shearers, trepanners, rapid ploughs, slicers, power roof support, etc. (see 
Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10). Much needed work concerned the improvement of the 
main power-loading equipment, as well as underground coal and miner transport (NCB 
1972:49).  
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The industry’s consolidation – under significant Government arm-twisting – provided a 
hopeful outlook:  
“Given the time for these policies [of industry consolidation] to fructify, the 1970’s will see a strong 
and virile coal industry playing a major part in the national economy.” (NCB 1969:6) 
“Despite the rapid contraction of past years, the industry is now in good shape and increasingly seen 
to offer a secure and promising future to recruits.” (NCB 1971:6) 
Lord Robens commented: 
“Both on price and security of supply [coal] is now well able to stand up to oil and nuclear power. 
(…) Coal has proved its staying power, and its value to the nation is now being tardily recognised. 
There’s no friend like an old friend.” (Robens 1972:87) 
Opencast mining also gained strength under Lord Robens (Beynon et al. 2000:14), 
reaching 10 Mt in 1973 (Figure 6.23). 
However, expansion strategies on the supply side and mining capacity were neglected. 
Mining expenditure was relatively low (see Figure 6.3), which jeopardised future 
production.31 The declining investment in mining from the mid-1960s, reaching a low 
point in the early 1970s, was a consequence of tighter financial constraints and the 
relative loss of enthusiasm and attention from policy makers and the ESI, more attuned 
to the promises of nuclear energy. Competing technological aspirations, visions, and 
expectations had thus influenced the availability of political and financial support, 
thereby hindering future industry performance. 
6.1.3.3 Innovation strategies 
The coal industry’s R&D budget remained relatively stable over the 1960s, around £4 
million annually (or £50 million at real 2009 prices) (NCB 1960-72). R&D was 
concentrated on productivity improvements and the diffusion of best-practice 
techniques (Surrey and Walker 1975:95), leading to high rates of coalface 
mechanisation. The Mining Research and Development Establishment (MRDE) was 
active in domains such as mining, tunnelling and underground transport. In the 1960s, 
the MRDE focussed on remote controlled operations and ROLF (remotely-operated 
longwall faces). These early experiments showcased an emerging vision of the 
“fundamentally more productive mining system” of the future. Research was looking 
                                                
31 Extractive industries are constrained by inevitable resource depletion, which means that a given mine 
has a tendency to decrease its yield as production increases. Capital injection must be sustained to 
maintain a stable production rate. Long lead times for pit sinking further complicate this problem. 
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into “the feasibility of extending systems for manless operation and remote control” 
(NCB 1972:47). ‘Retreat mining’ – which consists in tunnelling before face operation – 
was expected to reap further productivity improvements, along with heavy-duty 
machinery and mining systems. 
Early diversification strategies were devised. The Coal Research Establishment (CRE) 
concentrated on coal utilisation. In line with the growing importance of the Electricity 
Supply Industry (ESI) for the coal industry, major projects concerned improved 
innovative burning techniques such as Fluidised Bed Combustion (FBC). Developments 
around new fuels from coal (by gasification and hydrogenation) were mentioned as a 
promising area for future research – one that the US were “vigorously” pursuing (NCB 
1972:48). These innovation efforts were justified by exploratory motives with little 
strategic thinking about commercial exploitation or ‘market defence’ (interview 
Merrick). 
The NCB also delved into non-coal activities. Notably, it engaged in oil and gas 
exploration in the North Sea. NCB (Exploration) Ltd had interests in the Viking gas 
field and a number of oil fields. Its shares were transferred to BNOC in 1973. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Anderton Shearer (AB16) (available from http://coalmine.proboards.com, accessed 
May 12, 2010) 
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Figure 6.10: Powered roof support, 1960s (available from http://coalmine.proboards.com, accessed 
May 12, 2010) 
6.1.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
6.1.4.1 Political strategies 
Unwilling to accept a diminished role for the coal industry, the NCB repeatedly 
published statements that conflicted with the Government’s plans, advocated a smoother 
transition by underlining uncertainties concerning alternatives, and the need to maintain 
confidence in the coal industry: 
“The Board are confident of being able to produce large tonnages of coal at competitive prices in 
the 1970’s – much larger ones than envisaged in the White Paper.” (NCB 1968:xi) 
“A more gradual development from a two-fuel to a four-fuel economy than that proposed in the 
White Paper would provide freedom to take account of future developments without commitment at 
the present time to excessively high capital investment programmes in North Sea gas and nuclear 
energy (…) There must now be a slowing down in the number of colliery closures so that 
confidence within the industry can be restored.” (NCB 1969:5) 
The NCB mobilised political strategies to underline the Government’s responsibility for 
its difficulties, blamed the policy of cheap energy (NCB 1968; NCB 1970; Robens 
1972), and sought Government financial assistance. To ensure that the industry’s 
“continued decline would not be accompanied by undue hardships for the labour force” 
(Bailey 1974:153), the Coal Industry Act 1971 covered some of the social costs of 
colliery closure through social grants. Notwithstanding this concession, the 
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Government’s attitude to the rundown had sown the seeds for bitterness and the 
hardening of the line to come in the next decades. Miner discontent in 1971-2 forced the 
Government and NCB to concede temporary ‘special treatment’ and to commit to wage 
increases. 
6.1.4.2 Framing strategies 
The British coal industry engaged in public discourse framing strategies. Anxious to 
restore the symbolic importance of coal, and to counterbalance the enthusiasm for 
alternative energy sources, the NCB advertised productivity improvements and claimed 
the merits of coal. The two main advertising slogans used in the late 1960s and 1970s 
were ‘You can depend on Britain’s new coal industry’ and ‘Coal – Britain’s most 
important natural product’ (see Figure 6.11). 
 
Figure 6.11: NCB advertisement, The Times, 4 April, 1968, highlighting the competitiveness of coal 
for power generation under the new slogan ‘You can depend on Britain’s new coal industry’. 
 
The NCB also engaged in framing strategies in the face of the supply-side pressure 
resulting from reduced financial and political support. Government commitment to new 
fuels was a source of concern for the NCB, which wanted “to ensure that [competitively 
produced] coal is not excluded from its markets by excessive national commitments to 
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the development of natural gas and nuclear power, on which the Board’s reservations 
have been expressed” (NCB 1968:7-8) and sought to restore political legitimacy. The 
NCB needed the opportunity to continue substantially contributing to British energy 
supply. Nothing was less certain, however, as reminded by the then NCB chairman in 
his memoirs: 
“There was no scrap of evidence at any time that the CEGB wished to remain with coal: indeed, all 
the comparisons with nuclear power were weighted by them against the use of coal.” (Robens 
1972:72) 
As acid rain had barely entered the British environmental discursive space, it was not 
perceived as an important threat to the British coal industry. The CEGB mobilised 
political and ‘scientific’ framing strategies in the early 1970s: it “dealt with the early 
complaints by talking-down the problem and querying evidence” (Rose 1990:117). 
6.2 1973-1981: The climb back? 
6.2.1 Pressures in economic environment 
6.2.1.1 Landscape shock 
The 1973 oil crisis had a tremendous impact on economies around the globe, and 
particularly on the UK, which did not yet produce oil. The hidden assumption of stable 
oil prices was suddenly wiped away (Figure 6.12) and radically changed the basis of 
competition between fuels. Uncertainty crippled energy markets. Coal became a serious 
economic proposition again overnight. 
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Figure 6.12: Fuel prices, and retail price index in the UK (Fouquet and Pearson 1998:24) 
6.2.1.2 Technological alternatives 
The oil crisis had renewed interest in diverse energy options. The third nuclear 
programme promised a substantial expansion of nuclear capacity in 1974. However, 
controversy on cost, reactor choice, overestimated capacity requirements and societal 
contestation delayed the programme (Helm 2003:90-5). Nuclear power deteriorated its 
public reputation, but maintained a high degree of political support. Despite these 
hiccups, costly nuclear power generation steadily increased over the years and put 
pressure on the coal industry by diverting resources away from it. 
Natural gas started flowing from the North Sea in the late 1960s. It competed strongly 
with coal, gradually replacing coal-gas and coal in most markets. Electricity was 
exempt from this trend, as the use of gas was still considered a ‘premium’ fuel and was 
reserved for other applications (Parker 2000). 
Following the second oil shock, coal use at power stations reached an unprecedented 
level of 50 mtoe (nearly 90 million tons) in 1979 and 1980 to fill in for oil (Figure 6.1). 
6.2.1.3 New entrants 
The oil shock triggered the diversification of large oil companies in the coal business. 
These large new entrants in the international coal market had the power to impose new 
rules: 1) price competition, and 2) new modes of production (opencast strip mining – 
borrowing from civil engineering) that were inherently more large-scale, faster to set up 
and cheaper. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a revolution in coal mining, allowed by 
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the timely conjunction of technological advances (in mining and in shipping) and the 
investment climate created by the oil price hike (Koerner et al. 1995:662). A regime 
change was occurring in the international coal business. New attitudes emerged: large-
scale corporations acquiring mines in the USA, Australia, South Africa or Colombia 
were tailored for export, a successful strategy illustrated by a 50% increase in world 
hard coal exports between 1970 and 1980, and spectacular figures for South Africa and 
Australia (see Table 6.1). European coal markets were supplied through the ARA ports 
(Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp). In Britain, import restrictions restrained this pressure, 
but the “CEGB made frequent reference to ARA spot prices which contrasted sharply 
with those being offered by the NCB” (Beynon et al. 1999:5). It was recommended that 
the NCB include ‘international productivity comparisons’ in its annual reports (NCB 
1979:5). 
Opencast companies were becoming a growing sector. However, they were not 
perceived as a threat, but rather as a strategic means to meet short-term demand 
increases. 
 
Table 6.1: Hard coal exports 1970-1980, million tonnes, Source: Rutledge and Wright (1985:307) 
1970 1980 % increase 
South Africa 1.5 28.5 1800
Australia 17.9 42.8 139
USA 65.1 83.2 28
Poland 28.8 31.3 9
West Germany 15.9 12.7 -20
World 169.3 257.3 52  
6.2.1.4 Customer pressure 
The CEGB – the NCB’s main customer – saw itself as the captive of a monopolistic 
supplier. It had been in the early 1970s opposed to any new coal-fired power station 
being built, but faced strong pressure from the NCB and Government. Its chairman 
condemned coal’s likely expansion in power generation: 
“the board already has sufficient coal-fired capacity to burn all the indigenous coal likely to be 
available. New coal-fired capacity ordered now would increase the board’s already heavy 
dependence on one fuel and deny it the flexibility that new oil plant would give to meet what must 
remain an uncertain future.” (reported in The Times, 6 July 1973, front page) 
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The necessities of the oil crisis, and the successful search for support by the NCB had 
thus amplified CEGB discontent and frustration. Positive developments in the North 
Sea and related expectations nurtured CEGB emancipation prospects:  
“With discoveries being made almost weekly, the oil companies will have a very substantial amount 
of North Sea oil for the British market in the 1980’s. The Central Electricity Generating board is 
known to be thinking of North Sea oil as a power station fuel as part of its policy of increased 
flexibility by reducing its overall dependence on coal.” (The Times, 19 June 1974, p.17) 
6.2.2 Pressures in socio-political environment 
6.2.2.1 Landscape 
 
Figure 6.13: Cartoon illustrating consumer anxieties over the oil crisis as angry drivers fight over 
petrol (The Guardian, 5 December 1973, p.1) 
 
‘Energy shocks’ disrupted energy supply and revealed dependencies. Sudden resource 
scarcity provoked widespread anxieties (see Figure 6.13). The combination of the 
miners’ strikes and the oil crisis brought energy issues to the very top of public and 
political concerns. The 1970s became the years of energy, and 1973 the turning point of 
this shift in energy consciousness and mentalities. 
Along with new anxieties came an interest in solutions. The enhanced symbolic and 
strategic position of energy justified the creation of the Department of Energy in 
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January 1974. Energy self-sufficiency programmes were developed. Energy issues 
reached unprecedented levels of media attention, public awareness and engagement. 
Figure 6.14 illustrates the high ranking of energy in social and political considerations, 
and Britain’s confidence and pride in its energy ventures. The 1979 oil shock renewed 
the alarm around energy security. It confirmed the uncertainty of energy markets and 
strengthened the political case for self-sufficiency. 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Great Britain Energy Sources, stamp collection, Design: Peter Murdoch, 1978 
6.2.2.2 Labour relations 
Miners took advantage of the energy crisis to formulate wage claims in 1973. The 
inability to reach agreement with the NCB led to an overtime ban in November. The 
strategic position of the miners was inflated by the serious threat they posed to 
electricity supply. Regular blackouts were endured. Indeed, the CEGB no longer had the 
option to compensate by burning more oil, and was experiencing delays and technical 
difficulties with its nuclear programme. Heath’s Government, surrounded by multiple 
crises (Figure 6.15), called the state of emergency, petrol rationing, and a three-day 
work week to keep the lights on. The ensuing political crisis brought the Government 
down, and led to renewed commitment to coal and the miners (Hall 1981:222). 
These events 1) established the disruptive potential of labour relations, 2) led to miner 
wage increases, adding to NCB costs (Chapman 1999:148), 3) reinforced the miners’ 
position, and 4) revealed (and reinforced) pre-existing tensions. Older undertakings 
(characterised by traditional mining methods and the exhaustion of high-quality seams) 
experienced increased unemployment and harsh economic condition. Younger 
undertakings (having benefitted from recent investments and technological innovation) 
came out of the 1970s striking successfully for higher wages, and reassured about their 
strategic role in a climate of fuel anxiety (Beynon et al. 1999). These structural 
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divisions were supplemented of a political dimension, which articulated the tension into 
a resistive discourse (interview Parker). 
 
Figure 6.15: Cartoon depicting Heath and his Chancellor surrounded by (energy) crises (Daily 
Telegraph, 19 Nov 1973) 
6.2.2.3 Policy and politics 
In the new frame of energy policy, coal scored very high32 and was portrayed as a quasi-
unlimited indigenous fuel resource. The prospects for coal were seen with optimism, 
and “in 1974 both Westminster and Whitehall perceived a future for the coal industry” 
(Chapman 1999:154). This hopeful period has been labelled the “second coming of 
coal” (Hall 1981), the “renaissance for the industry” (Chesshire 1991:137). The energy 
crisis allowed the industry to negotiate a comfortable plan for the future, with limited 
involvement of the CEGB (Chapman 1999:161). The Plan for Coal (1974) provided 
strong support with the aim of stabilising and increasing output. 
However, in the late 1970s, the coal industry faced credibility problems and eroding 
political legitimacy. Plan for Coal experienced delays, which increasingly prompted 
                                                
32 The energy policy directions favoured by the UK in the 1970s is often referred to as ‘CoCoNuke’ 
(Coal, Conservation and Nuclear). 
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questioning and public inquiries, and added to long-lived dissatisfaction with national 
ownership and management practices. The extravagant spending of nationalised energy 
industries was seen as a cultural consequence of industries dominated by engineers 
trained to become managers, and thus more interested in technology than costs (Hannah 
1982, interview Parker). The 1978 White Paper on nationalised industries (Treasury 
1978) specified financial control rules and objectives, thus breaking with the earlier 
emphasis on economic efficiency, pricing and investment criteria (Heald 1980). The 
NCB was expected to break-even after interest and social grants by 1983-4 (Heald and 
Steel 1981). These changing rules put pressure on the coal industry that could no longer 
claim an exceptional status. 
The Conservatives in opposition gathered around the emerging promises and visions of 
economic liberalism. This broad political discourse coupled together a number of 
problems and solutions: 1) ideological (‘rolling back the state’ and expose nationalised 
industries to the rules of the market); 2) public finances (cut public spending); 3) 
political threat (lifting the power of the miners); 4) industrial policy (putting order in an 
industry considered as ‘sick’). The policy proposal consisted in replacing political 
relationships, interpreted as the cause of the problems (financial, social and managerial), 
with market structures (Chapman 1999:174). This emerging vision gained momentum, 
providing a counterpoint to the inflated optimism cultivated by the coal industry. The 
Ridley report on Nationalised Industries (1977), famously leaked in 1978 to The 
Economist, suggests muscular intervention to come:  
“we might try and provoke a battle in a non-vulnerable industry, where we can win” (Ridley 
1977:24);  
“these policies should enable us to hold the fort until the long term strategy of fragmentation can 
begin to work.” (Ridley 1977:26) 
6.2.2.4 Environmental problems 
The acid rain issue gathered pace in the international arena in the 1970s. The OECD 
(1977) pointed to Britain as the largest European sulphur dioxide emitter, and largest 
net exporter of pollution. Media coverage ensured public exposure to the issue. The 
Department of Environment startlingly admitted its responsibility in a report of the 
Central Unit on Environmental Pollution published in 1976 (Park 1987:17). However, 
this early step towards public recognition was exceptional, and the debate in Britain was 
rapidly re-centred around uncertainties and costs to justify inaction. 
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The timing of the acid rain controversy was unfortunate. Indeed, acid rain discredited 
coal’s legitimacy, but the energy crisis meant that coal had become essential. 
Additionally, the very way it was framed in Britain (in a climate of reduced ground-
level SO2 concentrations) “reinforced the official post-1956 story-line that suggested 
that air pollution was an issue on its way out” (Hajer 1995:106). The recently acquired 
strategic importance of energy meant that it became tightly coupled to economic 
objectives, and relatively immune to alternative framings (e.g. environment): 
“[For] the United Kingdom, energy crisis meant that the doors of the core of the state were locked 
still more firmly against environmentalism.” (Dryzek et al. 2003:60-1). 
6.2.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
The energy crisis radically shifted the industry’s market outlook, the underlying cost 
structures and balance of power. The coal industry utilised this new position to stabilise 
its future. 
6.2.3.1 Economic positioning strategies 
The Plan for Coal created a positive outlook for the coal industry. UK coal consumption 
was projected to be 130 Mt by 1985. The industry started a substantial investment 
programme. The pace of decline of the 1960s was halted (Beynon 1999:2). Reversing 
the industry’s fate proved very difficult in the short term. Plan for Coal was 
subsequently revised (after 3 years), to adjust for stagnant performance. The NCB faced 
delays and disparate performance levels. The readjusted strategy included long-term 
planning and short-term incentives. Later in the decade, the NCB called for an extension 
of the Plan, as justified by the Coal Review (Dec 1978): 
“unless investment in new capacity is kept up beyond the Plan for Coal programme (which goes up 
to 1985), output would fall progressively from the mid-1980s” (NCB 1979:5). 
6.2.3.2 Innovation strategies 
The NCB faced two major options for technological development: “pin its hopes on 
penetrating premium markets through coal conversion processes or give priority to 
improving the competitiveness of coal combustion in bulk heating markets, especially 
power generation.” (Surrey and Walker 1975:97). While the industry did increase its 
R&D expenditure (Grainger and Gibson 1981:475-6) and continued exploratory work 
on new products and new markets (gasification, hydrogenation, fluidised bed 
combustion, etc.), it focussed mainly on improved mining processes to deliver more and 
cheaper coal to established markets (bulk heating and power generation). So, instead of 
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engaging seriously with new product/market combinations – involving substantial 
changes in the industry’s technical base, strategy and markets –, the industry improved 
its production process.  
Accordingly, the NCB developed three main innovation strategies: 1) (mining) process 
innovation in existing capacity; 2) new capacity development exploring the latest 
mining technology; 3) R&D, diversification and exploration. 
Capital expenditure in mining was greatly increased (Figure 6.3). Modernisation was 
geared towards reduced labour costs, standardisation, and economies of scale. Initial 
enthusiasm stalled upon major problems: 
 “Simply to keep output at existing level was quite a task, because the pits were on average eighty 
years old and many were therefore nearing exhaustion. The industry was suffering, and would 
continue to suffer, from the lack of investment in the sixties.” (Hall 1981:223) 
A systems’ engineering approach was introduced to mining. Besides routine mine 
maintenance and the diffusion of machinery, improvements at existing pits were 
directed to industry structure and the organisation of work (Burns et al. 1985:96). Such 
new attitudes to mining emphasised labour productivity, capital productivity, and 
control. Controversial productivity incentives and voluntary early requirement were 
introduced in 1977/78. The incentives helped raise productivity levels locally, relieving 
“the sluggish levels of performance in the industry” (NCB 1978:2). The industry 
increased automation in mining (Figure 6.16), “facilitated by the development of micro-
electronics” (Burns et al. 1985:94). The MINOS (Mine Operating System) project 
introduced remote control and systematic monitoring of mining operations. The new 
perspective on mining skills and practice was highly centralised, and based on new 
information and communication technologies. It has been criticised as de-skilling 
workers, introducing unnecessary amounts of control and hierarchy, and leading to 
dramatic reductions in employment (Winterton 1994). 
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The development of radically new mines spurred a lot of enthusiasm. The industry 
invested in ‘superpits’ – enormous mining complexes, combined with large power 
stations to be supplied directly – as a way to follow the upward shift in scale imposed 
by developments on the international coal market (see illustration in Figure 6.17). The 
Selby project was approved in 1976. It was to become the world’s largest deep-mining 
project: 5 collieries to be joined together underground, remotely operated from a central 
drift mine, to produce 10 million tons annually for the power station market. Such 
mines were designed to host the latest technology, promising the highest output rates 
and lowest labour intensity achievable in deep mines. They became the symbol of the 
‘new’ coal industry. However, they ran into technical problems, such as irregularities in 
the seams. The Selby complex started marginal production in 1983, and only produced 
at full capacity in 1991. At its peak (1993-4), it produced 12 million tons of coal. 
Retrospectively, ‘superpits’ proved to be costly investments (interview Merrick, 
interview Parker). 
Opencast output was scaled up in the 1970s (Figure 6.23). The Opencast Executive 
(OE) gained in confidence with Plan for Coal (1974) (Beynon et al. 2000:15). The NCB 
had a monopoly over the resource. It contracted specialised firms to extract coal from 
surface or low-depth seams, but also sold licenses to smaller independent mining 
companies. Opencast mining was “the most profitable part of the Board’s activities” 
Figure 6.16: Front cover of the NCB Annual 
report 1979/80, illustrating the ongoing 
revolution in mining automation. 
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(NCB 1972:11). Opencast production was seen as useful to meet the projected demand 
growth underlying Plan for Coal. 
Thirdly, renewed interest for coal led to enthusiasm for diversification strategies. 
Research in coal utilisation, mainly done at the Coal Research Establishment (CRE), 
was “aimed at strengthening existing markets and developing new uses for coal” 
(WOCOL 1980:417), with a budget of £7.3 million in 1977-78 and £8.9 million in 
1978-79. Two main axes were to 1) develop advanced coal combustion equipment in 
the medium term, and 2) investigate coal conversion processes (gasification and 
liquefaction) in the longer term. The intensified development of fluidised bed 
combustion (FBC) was a direct response to the 1973 oil shock in what has been labelled 
a “policy reversal” (Watson 1997:192).  
The UK was a pioneer of FBC development. It took responsibility for the International 
Energy Agency (IEA)’s Coal Research and Development Group, developed prototypes, 
and the construction of a 80MW pilot plant at Grimethorpe (Ashworth 1986:423-4). A 
license for the basic technology was held by NCB Combustion Systems Limited, and 
FCCL (a company set up for FBC project contracting and engineering) owned by 
Babcock and Wilcox (WOCOL 1980:418-421). The budget for coal utilisation R&D 
was increased from £1 million to £10 million throughout the 1970s (Grainger and 
Gibson 1981:470-6), which remained a limited commitment. According to former CRE 
scientist David Merrick (interview), the NCB’s inability to develop commercial 
applications and capitalise on excellent research resulted from 1) the absence of 
capacity expansion in the ESI, and 2) the inability to develop full-scale advanced 
combustion projects. 
6.2.3.3 Markets 
The oil crisis justified an “all-party support for a substantial programme of coal 
investment as a strategic route to reduce the UK’s energy import dependence” 
(Chesshire 1991:137). This positive climate provided the context for the Plan for Coal 
in 1974. The Plan’s output scenarios were based on optimistic demand forecasts resting 
on 2 basic assumptions: 1) continuous growth in energy demand, and 2) increased share 
of coal in UK energy (Beynon et al. 1999:3). These assumptions were swept away by 
the slowing down of the economy, the absence of new electrification plans, and further 
expansion of nuclear investment. 1978-9 was the post-oil crisis peak of coal 
consumption in the UK, at around 130 Mtons of coal, and 1980 was the all-time highest 
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coal consumption by the ESI (Figure 6.1). MacGregor later added 2 critical reasons for 
these market problems: 3) assumed sustained demand by the steel industry (which was 
allowed imports of coal, and declined drastically); and 4) very little overall productivity 
improvements despite substantial investment (MacGregor and Tyler 1986:124-5).  
The NCB had to ensure lasting demand for British coal in power stations through the 
expansion of coal-fired capacity, increased levels of coal burn and preference for British 
coal despite growing international competition. It addressed these pressures with 
lobbying and commercial strategies. 
Applying constant lobbying pressure for new coal-fired plant and refurbishments was an 
important aspect of the NCB’s market strategy (Ashworth 1986:398-399). Despite a 
stagnating ESI, this strategy led to a new major 2,000 MW coal-fired power station, 
Drax B,33 after eleven years without coal-fired capacity increase, and the lifetime 
extension of large coal-fired plants following the second oil shock. This success was 
welcomed by the NCB: 
“The decision to build Drax is consistent with the Board’s long term strategy for expanding the coal 
industry. It is a major step towards ensuring that the electricity industry has enough coal-fired 
capacity available in the longer term to burn the quantities of coal which the Board are planning to 
produce and which they believe will be economic.” (NCB 1979:9) 
Commercial strategies were aimed at increasing coal’s share in the power sector. 
Record coal sales to power stations were reached in every year from 1976 to 1979 
(Figure 6.1). By 1980, the NCB had accomplished its market specialisation strategy, as 
the power sector reached over 70% of its sales (see Figure 6.8) – other markets being 
disappointingly weak. In an effort to stabilise the sales pattern, the commercial 
relationship with the CEGB was strengthened through the negotiation of a Joint 
Understanding (JU) on sales, with Government oversight, in 1979, which “gave the 
NCB a better basis for the planning of operations and sales” (Ashworth 1986:400). The 
NCB recognised it as a crucial achievement: 
“A five year programme to sell a minimum of 75 million tonnes a year to the [CEGB] (…) will play 
an important role in securing the short-term future for coal.” (NCB 1980:2) 
                                                
33 Approved in 1977, Drax power station – the largest in Western Europe – was directly linked to the 
Selby mining complex. Their combination can be seen as a paradigmatic case of the British coal-power 
complex as envisioned in the mid-1970s. 
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In return for ensuring this sales volume, the CEGB exerted a downward pressure on 
price (interview Parker), with reference to the international coal price and the possibility 
of imports. 
6.2.3.4 Customer relations 
With improved prospects from the energy crisis, the NCB gained confidence, and 
overlooked relationships with customers. In the policy process leading to the Plan for 
Coal, little attention had been given to CEGB anxieties. The CEGB was only consulted, 
leading to oversimplifications, namely concerning fuel competition:  
“The CEGB suggested that it would be able to burn about 90 million tons in 1985 to which the 
SSEB added a further 10 million tons. However, the amount it actually would burn would depend 
on coal’s relative price vis-à-vis oil and other alternatives (…) The NCB, the NUM and the 
Government assumed, in 1974 and beyond, that the amount of coal the ESI would burn equalled to 
the amount they could burn and the ESI’s ‘competitive’ caveat faded into the background” 
(Chapman 1999:163-4, original emphasis). 
This exacerbated pre-existing tension, marking a turning point in the deterioration of 
customer relationship. 
6.2.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
6.2.4.1 Political strategy 
According to Chapman (1999:154-5), Plan for Coal “was essentially the product of the 
NCB”. The proposal pre-dated the energy and political crises. The Coal Industry 
Examination (DoE 1974), quickly officialised Plan for Coal, and accepted the principles 
to maximise production to reverse the industry’s decline. The decision-making process 
has been criticised for being opaque: 
“In short, the Government needed a plan, the Board had a plan and it was one that was acceptable to 
the NUM, who could no longer be ignored.” (Chapman 1999:165) 
The coal industry now had access to finance – and hope – for urgently needed renewal 
activities. Forecasts were devised for total UK coal demand of 130 mt in 1985, and as 
much as 200mt by 2000 (MMC 1983). 
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6.2.4.2 Framing strategies 
The energy crisis “heightened the political urgency of consideration of the coal 
industry’s future” (Parker 2000:4). Discursive framing strategies made sure that such 
commitment would last:34 
“The investment programme has now [1980] built up to over 0.5 billion pounds per year and it is 
essential that this momentum is maintained (…) This requires continuity of government policy and 
the avoidance of planning delays.” (WOCOL 1980:369-370) 
The continuity of public and political support depended on the industry’s perceived 
strategic role and good management. It was crucial to maintain the strategic importance 
of energy security, and to emphasise the advantageous coal/oil price ratio in public 
documents:  
“there is little doubt that a healthy expanding coal industry will be a valuable asset in the difficult 
years ahead as the world adjusts to limited availability of oil and gas” (WOCOL 1980:376)  
“The importance of coal, which became evident once again after the massive oil price increases of 
1973/4, has been further underlined by the disturbance in the oil market occasioned by the troubles 
in Iran (…) The case for a long term policy for developing our own energy resources seems now 
generally accepted.” (NCB 1979:3) 
The new competitive advantage of coal and the resulting coal demand boost was 
interpreted as long-lasting structural change (Chapman 1999; Parker 2000).  
Building on a recently recovered symbolic position, the NCB constructed an image of a 
glorious re-born industry, and capitalised on new understandings of energy security. In 
1978, an advertisement campaign was run under the theme ‘Coal: a source of energy 
that will last for 300 years’. Other campaigns focussed on the industry’s technological 
advances, energy security, and the lasting nature of commitment (see Figure 6.17). 
                                                
34 The World Coal Study (WOCOL) had been instrumental to disseminating a positive framing of coal 
interests worldwide. 
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Figure 6.17: NCB advertisement, showcasing the latest technology developments and associating 
the industry with the future (The Times, 19 November 1981, p.9) 
 
The new hopeful vision for coal reached the mentalities and expectations of decision-
makers within the industry, who planned its future with confidence. Highly optimistic 
forecasts (‘guestimates’) were regularly issued as the basis for planning (Chapman 
1999:169). Bad news (e.g. demand reductions, efficiency improvements, etc.) was 
(publicly) framed as temporary, while good news (renewed support, price advantage, 
etc.) were framed as lasting trends.  
The NCB celebrated improvements. The NCB chairman, pleased with recent 
achievements, interpreted them as hopeful signs of industry recovery: 
“1979/80 was a year of achievement for the industry. After a difficult year in 1978/9, the industry 
recovered strongly.” 
“financial objectives were achieved.” 
“These results are a welcome sign that the industry is turning the corner after the long decline that 
started in the Sixties, and that the benefits of Plan for Coal are now beginning to appear.” (NCB 
1980:2) 
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6.2.4.3 Environmental lobbying 
Acute concerns over energy, and coal’s prime circumstantial role in addressing them, 
reduced relative attention for other issues. Official framing strategies associated coal 
with jobs and security of supply to deflate environmental criticism: 
“coal production and utilisation have a considerable impact on the environment and society [which] 
should, however, be seen in the context of the benefits which the coal industry contributes to the 
economy” (World Coal Study 1980:409) 
The NCB included a chapter ‘Environment’ in its annual reports from 1979 onwards, 
suggesting rising concerns. However, the NCB language remained fuzzy, mentioning 
the need for “close co-operation between all concerned”, “proper evaluation of what 
should be done”, “appropriate environmental measures”, “detailed examination of 
environmental questions”, “reassurance”, and underlining that the current proceedings 
are “more environmentally acceptable than those which were characteristic of the past” 
(NCB 1980:31). The main environmental concerns identified were “tipping colliery dirt, 
mining subsidence, opencast mining restoration and air pollution” (NCB 1980:31). 
6.3 1981-1990: Working out the privatisation machine 
6.3.1 Pressures in economic environment 
6.3.1.1 Landscape 
The 1980s were difficult times for Britain. Inflation skyrocketed again in 1980. The 
recession led to catastrophic increases in unemployment, especially in heavy industries 
(Figure 6.18). 
 
Figure 6.18: UK unemployment rate (%) (Source: Hicks and Allen 1999:24) 
6.3.1.2 Markets 
The British coal industry had come out of the 1970s with renewed hope: 
“coal is once more king, and the miners need no longer worry about their future” (Hall 1981:251) 
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However, the very particular economic environment created by the oil crises was halted, 
wiping out the assumptions of the 1970s. Demand continued to fall from the local peak 
reached in 1979, putting significant pressure on the coal industry: 
“There can be no doubt that the plans to expand the coal industry in the aftermath of the energy 
price shocks of the 1970s (…) are now totally outdated.” (Robinson 1988:203) 
The NCB seemed to recognise the end of good times: 
“The NCB told [the Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC)] that by early 1980 it no longer 
regarded the production targets contained in Plan for Coal as valid, because the specific numerical 
targets had progressively been overtaken by events.” (MMC 1983:80) 
An imbalance between improved supply and depressed demand, and an imbalance 
between prices and costs triggered industry anxiety (NCB 1983:1): 
“the belief was gaining ground that the consensus of support for the industry was coming to an end. 
By the end of 1980 many in the coalfields were predicting that the possibility of closures could lead 
to conflict.” (Hall 1981:251) 
Market problems increasingly exposed disparities in the industry’s unprofitability.  
6.3.1.3 Supply-side stress 
The industry had entered the 1980s with a substantially improved mining outlook, 
thanks to recent investment, technical innovation, and productivity schemes: 
“The year 1980/1 showed further positive improvements in the efficiency of mining. Output of the 
long-life collieries continued to rise, and coal-face productivity reached record levels. These 
represent the progressive benefits of a policy of high investment under ‘Plan for Coal’, and of 
technical innovation.” (NCB 1981:3) 
However, reduced mining investment (Figure 6.3) combined with inherent exhaustion 
dynamics led to declining returns by the mid-1980s. 
6.3.1.4 New entrants 
Developments of the international coal trade had led to “the creation of the world ‘coal 
chain’ as envisaged by the World Coal Study” (Koerner et al. 1995:665). The number 
of players increased with investments that would come on stream in the late 1980s. 
Transnational coal corporations pursued a price strategy to crush smaller companies. 
After nearly a decade of adjustments (shipping and handling technology and 
infrastructure), international steam coal trade rapidly increased. The ARA price of 
steam coal denominated in Sterling fell by 59% in ‘real’ terms between 1982 and 1990 
(Parker 2000:67), amplifying the price pressure on the British coal industry. 
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While the price mechanisms in the JUs provided a protective buffer (Parker 2000:68), 
international exporters became a problem: 
“like other British producers, the Board faced competition from imports in certain markets because 
of the strength of sterling.” (NCB 1980:2) 
“the future of the British coal industry in 1980 was tied to that of the electricity generating industry. 
However, this industry was increasingly looking toward the international coal market.” (Beynon et 
al. 1999:5) 
Developments on the international coal scene had triggered a re-think of commercial 
and technical rules in domestic coal industries. International price benchmarks were 
increasingly used as performance comparator to determine the future of the British coal 
industry (Koerner et al. 1995:666). By focussing attention towards low-cost mining, the 
international price pressure contributed to driving deep mines out of business, and 
opencast mines to gain in relative importance (Beynon et al. 1999:9). 
The Government was keen on opening up coal production to new entrants from the 
private sector (Prior 1989:213). The expansion of opencast mining was one way of 
encouraging this (Sadler 2001:7). The greater productivity levels of opencast mining 
added to the price and productivity pressures on deep mining. 
6.3.1.5 Customer and import pressure 
The strengthening of Sterling challenged the competitiveness of NCB prices (MMC 
1983:75) internationally. The CEGB signalled its dissatisfaction: 
“the CEGB expected that in the long term United Kingdom coal prices would reflect the value of 
NCB coal in international trade.” (MMC 1983:72) 
and lobbied to maintain the possibility to import coal open: 
“All the coal consumers who gave evidence to [the MMC] were keen that importing coal should 
remain an option open to them, as they regarded it as a way of ensuring that NCB prices were 
competitive.” (MMC 1983:75) 
The threat of imports came to be seen as a welcome instrument of discipline against 
NCB’s monopoly power: 
“imports serve to safeguard fuel supplies and provide some discipline on NCB prices” (Tombs, 
1983:100)  
“[the NCB] must, like any other business, avoid offending its (in the short term) captive customers 
[the CEGB], who otherwise will make the investment necessary to switch to alternative sources of 
power.” (Robinson 1988:207-8) 
The CEGB repeatedly stated its frustration with the NCB: 
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“Every major increase in coal prices brought a letter of protest from the chairman of the CEGB.” 
(Ashworth 1986:397) 
In 1985, in a move closer to its own privatisation, the electricity supply industry entered 
the international spot market and purchased a large amount of Colombian coal (Beynon 
et al. 1999:9). While the Government had until then supported the protection of the 
British coal industry through pricing mechanisms, it now sought to apply the 
international price pressure through targets and objectives. So, the boundary between 
domestic markets, international trade, and politics became increasingly blurred. The 
Government and the CEGB had a strengthened argument against the NCB’s established 
way of doing things (monopolistic coal trade at above-world prices). The NCB’s ability 
to resist competitive price pressure was clearly waning. 
6.3.1.6 Competition from alternatives 
Within the power generation market, the main competition came from nuclear power 
and oil. Gas was not yet a threat in the electricity market. The collapse of the oil price in 
1986, given a politically unstable coal industry, led to serious difficulties for the NCB to 
hold on to its influence over the power market (see Figure 6.19): 
“[The oil price changes] have not escaped the [CEGB], which is currently negotiating a reduction in 
the price of coal. The CEGB’s position is strengthened by its experience in using oil-fired 
generating stations during the coal strike (…) The CEGB can thus, unusually, threaten an immediate 
and massive switch from coal to oil unless prices come down.” (Robinson 1988:218) 
This radical commodity price shock had a tremendous influence on the prospects of the 
British deep-mined coal industry, and can arguably be seen as a main trigger of change 
in energy markets, business and policy (Parker 2000, interview Parker). The oil price 
collapse wiped away any perceived need to retain a UK coal industry of a strategic size. 
It was interpreted as the beginning of a new era of cheap and abundant energy – oil, gas, 
and imported coal – wiping away energy security arguments for the retention of 
indigenous coal capacity. 
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Figure 6.19: An explicit representation of the effect of the oil price collapse on the coal industry, 
Today, 29 April 1986. 
6.3.2 Pressures in socio-political environment 
6.3.2.1 Landscape 
This period saw the election of Margaret Thatcher and the instalment of the market 
doctrine and ‘authoritarian liberalism’ (Dryzek et al. 2003). In energy policy, there was 
a “broader political enthusiasm for private ownership and the promotion of 
competition.” (MacKerron 2009:77). This new frame had been gradually built-up since 
the 1960s, and culminated in the 1980s-1990s. 
High-level political and strategic interest in energy was sustained into the mid-1980s. 
However, the focus shifted from energy security concerns to the search for economic 
efficiency and market competition (MacKerron 2009:76-9), as the liberalisation agenda 
pervaded every strategic aspect of Government. The new ideological frame and 
methods (private ownership and the promotion of competition) were applied to the 
energy sector with conviction. In the 1980s, there was a move from a state that was 
mediating the effect of market forces, to a deliberate choice to “roll back the influence 
of the state and to give a freer range to market forces” (Chesshire and Skea 1989:60). 
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This new ideological frame and the resulting discourse became a major determinant of 
change in the coal industry. 
6.3.2.2 Policy and politics 
The Government intended to put in order the house of nationalised industries, which 
were seen as unprofitable and costly. This meant tighter financial control and closer 
managerial control. The Coal Industry Act of 1980 required the NCB “to become 
profitable by the end of the financial year 1983/4” (Burns et al. 1985:105). The 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was set up to 
“investigate and report on the question whether the Board could improve its efficiency and therefore 
reduce its costs [in the development, production and supply of coal]” (MMC 1983:1). 
It noted a problem of over-capacity, recommended to reduce operation costs, and to 
increase the capital intensity of the industry. The official solution involved: 
“a maximisation of output from low-cost capacity with relatively low marginal costs and reduction 
of the high cost capacity” (MMC 1983:54) 
The industry was thus to get rid of its low-performance tail: 141 out of 198 pits were 
defined as ‘unprofitable’. The industry’s heavy dependence on various financial sources 
and grants was also emphasised, arguing that the industry’s funding should be “closer to 
those of a commercial organisation” (MMC 1983:54). 
The industry’s reform began with the framing of problems and the search for 
appropriate policy solutions. These framing activities, infused by the new repertoire of 
the market ideology, focused on defining what was an ‘uneconomic’ pit, whether it 
should be closed, and how, and how capital and labour should be reallocated (Turner 
1989:160). The policy debate thus no longer appreciated the industry’s social role. Free 
market advocates argued that closures would lead to ‘natural’ healthy re-allocation of 
labour and economic activities. Opposition believed that there was an alternative to 
mass unemployment, and that the coal industry should not be governed strictly by 
market logics. The NUM, especially, argued that special attributes and costs of coal had 
to be taken into account (irreversibility of closures, coal as basic commodity, future 
costs, pricing policies, etc.). As market reformists gained power over the miners, the 
monolithic yardstick of costs per ton prevailed. 
After 1981, the debate on the future of the British coal industry became increasingly 
polarised. For market reformists, the British coal industry symbolised the country’s 
industrial past, a paradigmatic case in market reform, a drain of public money, and the 
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miners represented the radical socialists – the ‘Enemy Within’ – that threatened to bring 
the economy to a standstill. Since the success of the miners in 1974, and Plan for Coal, 
it had become “almost impossible to establish a bipartisan approach to the nationalised 
coal industry’s affairs” (Parker 2000:7-8). On the other side of the political spectrum, 
the coal industry was portrayed as the proud contributor to Britain’s economy, the 
symbol of the mobilisation against capitalism, the right of workers. Solidarity with the 
miners initially provided substantial public support. 
Discursive polarisation turned into an ideological and political struggle over the coal 
industry, escalating into the 1984-5 miners’ strike (the Great Strike), which is so deeply 
imprinted in the British collective memory.35 
Turner (1989:165-6) argues that the whole decade had been dedicated to preparing the 
industry for privatisation. Important hurdles included: 1) breaking Scargill’s power, 2) 
the introduction of flexible working (more profitable, longer worked pits, and flexible 
use of machines), and 3) the move to profitability (closing down ‘uneconomic pits’ and 
concentrating production in ‘superpits’). 
6.3.2.3 Labour relations 
Radicalisation. The National Union of Miners (NUM) actively resisted mine closures 
(Turner 1989:152). Its position was radicalised with the election of Scargill as president: 
no mine should be closed other than on the grounds of exhaustion. It won a symbolic 
battle in 1981 when the threat of a national strike led to Government capitulation and 
withdrawal of its closure programme (Figure 6.20). Thatcher’s defeat was received as a 
humiliation (Turner 1989:159). As long as the miners held strong, there was little 
chance for the Government to implement its restructuring programme. Government 
improved its tactics and strategy to break the power of the unions (stockpiling, 
conversion to oil at power stations, etc.). New laws reduced the power of unions, 
making secondary striking and flying pickets illegal, and increasing the legal 
responsibilities. 
                                                
35 Reasons for this particularly important trauma include the paradigmatic nature of the political divisions, 
the dramatic tension provided by the caricature characters of Thatcher and Scargill, the profound cultural 
and world-view clashes they represented, and the particularly painful process of the 1984-5 strike. 
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Figure 6.20: Margaret Thatcher pictured as forced to withdraw as she gets burnt from upsetting 
the coal industry (The Observer, 22 February 1981) 
 
Managerial shake-up: new appointments. Re-elected with a large majority in 1983, the 
Government replaced the people in charge to fit its agenda. Lawson replaced Howell as 
Secretary of State for Energy. Ezra was replaced by MacGregor as chairman of the 
NCB (see Figure 6.21),36 “he was put in place specifically to challenge Scargill”, while 
England was replaced by Marshall as chairman of the CEGB, with the main task to 
“prepare the ESI to withstand a coal strike and promote the nuclear power industry” 
(Chapman 1999:188). So, there had been a deliberate Government intervention to shake 
up the organisation and reduce internal political pressures. The Secretary of State for 
Energy defined new rules and objectives for the NCB: 
“the justification for coal production, like that for any other business, lies in the ability of those 
engaged in it to earn a satisfactory return on capital while competing in the market place. The basic 
objective for the National Coal Board therefore must be to earn a satisfactory return on its assets in 
real terms after payment of social grants (…) the Board should not plan on any continuing tranche 
of sales which will not be profitable.” (NCB 1983:3) 
                                                
36 MacGregor had a record for turning organisations upside down. He confessed that the main motive for 
his appointment, as far as he understood it, was to break the bureaucratic culture of loyalty, resistance, 
and risk-aversion inherent to the coal industry (MacGregor and Tyler, 1986). 
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Figure 6.21: MacGregor portrayed as lone dictator of the NCB, after having dismissed nearly the 
entire Board of Directors, Evening Standard, November 5, 1984  
 
The Great Strike 
The Great Miners’ Strike (1984-5) is an important episode of British industrial history. I 
here outline events relevant to destabilisation. In late 1983, the NUM submitted a wage 
increase claim, which was rejected by the NCB. An overtime ban followed from 31 
October 1983. On 6 March 1984, MacGregor announced a 4 Mton production cut, 
which corresponded to around 20,000 job losses. Local strikes ensued from Yorkshire 
to Scotland, spreading around the country. Confrontations in the streets, outside 
collieries, power stations, coke ovens, and strategic coal transportation points involved 
miners and police forces. The battle also occurred in courts, as various NUM procedures 
were deemed unlawful. Growing division between striking and non-striking miners 
(pointed out as ‘scabs’ by their counterparts) was fully exploited. The winter was 
difficult for striking miners and their families. The strike faded as the balance of power 
became overwhelming and the striking fraction’s internal drive gradually eroded (due to 
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nearly undisturbed power supplies, NUM’s low budget, and miners’ extreme poverty 
after a year of strike). On 3 March 1985, the strike ended without a new agreement. The 
defeat of the NUM was crucial to the reform of the British coal industry. The newly 
acquired degree of freedom allowed the implementation of restructuring in line with the 
market ideology (Chapman 1999, interview Parker). 
6.3.2.4 Customer pressure 
Crucially for the achievement of the Government’s goal, the managerial and diplomatic 
skills at the CEGB had allowed the lights to be kept on. After the miners’ strike, as the 
ESI liberalisation proposal gathered momentum, one of the objectives of Government 
and the CEGB was to reduce dependence on the British coal industry. There were social 
limits as to how quickly this could be done. With the NCB’s power greatly reduced, the 
general strategy for power generation became detrimental to British coal: 1) nuclear 
power as base load, 2) opencast coal, and 3) imported coal became the priorities 
(Beynon et al. 1999:9). 
6.3.2.5 Environmental problems 
The acid rain controversy created substantial political pressure specifically on the 
CEGB and the coal industry. Indeed, coal-fired power stations were identified as the 
prime source of acid emissions, and the target of environmental campaigns. Two major 
solutions were commonly viewed as effective to curb acid emissions from power plants: 
Flue Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) and low-sulphur coal (e.g. non-British and more 
expensive). 
The acid rain crisis gathered momentum on the international scene and at the level of 
European institutions. The UNECE Convention on LRTAP in 1979 led to international 
political pressure on large emitting countries for a commitment to reduce emissions. 
Major European emission exporters, led by the UK, at first rejected the conclusions of 
the CLRTAP. Germany’s reversal in 1982 with the ‘Waldsterben’37 controversy left the 
UK virtually alone (Dickson and Clark 1995:4-5). The UK became known as the ‘dirty 
man of Europe’ (Rose 1990).  
In British media, and on the public scene, there were signs of activity: 
“In May 1983, acid rain gained a dominant position in the discursive space of environmental 
politics. It kept a prominent position until at least 1987.” (Hajer 1995:109) 
                                                
37 Relates to a controversy particularly salient in Germany, about the dieback of forests due to 
acidification. 
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The public was regularly stimulated, educative material was written by environmental 
groups, scientists, and widely diffused. The discourse focussed on clarifying the 
chemical process (Figure 6.22), illustrating the environmental damage, and framing 
Government inaction as irresponsible: 
“A Government which allows such an ecological catastrophe to continue has thrown up all pretence 
at a real environmental policy.” (Interview with Chris Rose, FoE spokesman, The Guardian, 15 
April 1985, p.4)  
 
 
Figure 6.22: Schematic representation of the processes causing acid rain, The Times, 17 December 
1984, p.2 
 
Environmental pressure groups actively mobilised in advocacy, education and research 
campaigns (e.g. FoE, RSNC (with e.g. the Watch Acid Rain campaign), Greenpeace, 
etc.). Environmental activists regularly demonstrated to contest and challenge 
Government policies and the CEGB’s position (interview Kerr). At the peak of official 
denial, in 1984, when no proposal existed besides more research, Parliamentary 
pressure grew, and the Government’s position was portrayed as ‘lamentable’. 
Despite growing support, the influence of environmental pressure groups on the British 
political position was limited in the early 1980s (Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea 1991; 
Hajer 1995; Dryzek et al. 2003).38 The ‘official’ discursive coalition attracted attention 
                                                
38 Dryzek et al. (2003:43-50) contextualise the limited influence of non-producer interests and pressure 
groups in the 1980s to the very ‘special’ conditions characterising Thatcher’s ‘authoritarian liberalism’, 
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away from the environmental crisis towards costs, scientific uncertainty, and the 
economic risk of unjustified action. 
International pressure increased with the suggestion, in 1983, of an EC Large 
Combustion Plant Directive, and later with the Helsinki Protocol in 1985 (where 
signatories, UK excluded, agreed on 30% SO2 reduction of 1980 levels by 1993) 
(Longhurst et al. 1995:2632). Political pressure also increased domestically in 
disagreement with the official stance. In 1984, two Select Committees recommended 
serious action.39 Both sets of recommendations were rejected by Government on terms 
of high costs (Ling et al. 2000:257). In 1988, the EC LCPD (88/609/EEC) was finally 
signed, requiring member states to set out national plans to meet agreed SO2 and NOx 
limits. 
6.3.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
6.3.3.1 Re-creation strategy 
Optimism receded, and proponents of radical managerial change were increasingly 
supported.40 In 1983, ahead of the publication of the MMC report, an editorial of The 
Times called for an abandonment of the logic of Plan for Coal, interpreted as poorly 
managed waste of public funds: 
“[The PfC] envisaged a high level of demand which was unrealistic then and is merely fantasy 
today. The Government has met its side of the bargain in its rates of investment in the industry, 
though much investment which might have gone to developing pits with long lives has been 
devoted less usefully to the rescue of pits with poor prospects.” (The Times, 11 March 1983, p.11) 
According to this increasingly acceptable view, the British coal industry was ‘sick’. In a 
cognitive shift, the new management had identified the main problem in its capital 
                                                                                                                                          
which entailed “the imposition of a free market agenda, a corresponding suppression of dissent in civil 
society, and an ‘individuation’ of social and economic life”. 
39 The Select Committee on the European Communities recommended that at least two power 
stations be retrofitted with FGD (HoL 1984), while the Environmental Select Committee 
recommended 60% SO2 reduction by 1995 (HoC 1984). 
40 The pressure for change was supported by a number of discourses: a) Britain’s manufacturing and 
economic decline storyline (the ‘British Problem’) justified the kind of radical reform that Thatcher 
promised to implement, b) the competitive problems of the NCB justified radical restructuring, and c) the 
notion of ‘flexible’ working eroded miner solidarity and encouraged competition in work practices. 
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structure, which would guide a major re-creation strategy along overriding competitive 
criteria. Specifically, the tail of ‘unprofitable pits’ became the focus of attention:  
“The Board’s intention is to tackle this burden [of unprofitable pits] with determination, for the 
future of the industry demands that we should.” (NCB 1983:1) 
Industry managers recognised the new types of competitive threats that had emerged 
worldwide from the increasing availability of cheap foreign coal (NCB 1984:5). The 
NCB explained its recently acquired objectives and strategy, signalling the aspirations 
of regime re-creation: 
“building a secure, high-volume, low-cost industry which will pay substantial wages to the people 
who work in it, at the same time enabling us to become a regular, reliable sources of high-quality 
low-cost energy to all our customers.” (NCB 1984:1) 
According to MacGregor, an important problem stood within the British coal industry: 
loyalty and resistance to change, from management to miner. The prevailing 
management style was depicted as procedural and complacent – a hindrance to business 
(MacGregor and Tyler 1986). The miners’ bargaining power was considered artificially 
inflated and problematic. There were also inner tensions across and between mining 
areas (performance, social mobilisation, and positioning vis-à-vis industry reform). 
NCB management crucially identified that these tensions could be harnessed. It 
developed ‘divide-and-rule’ strategies in areas with anti-Scargill pre-dispositions in 
order to gain worker support (MacGregor and Tyler, 1986). 
As the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM) came to represent the cooperative 
workers and the NUM the old structure of industrial relations, NCB management 
emphasised their differing attitudes: 
“whilst the attitudes and conduct of the UDM leadership has been generally constructive and 
reasonable, some of the leaders of the NUM have been much less willing to recognise the very 
difficult market position which we all now face.” (NCB 1987:1) 
MacGregor’s managerial style in handling the situation was bold. He identified his 
allies within the Board, and crushed the resistance (Figure 6.21). The miners’ strike was 
treated as any other form of internal resistance to change: it was interpreted as 
problematic, isolated and crushed. With the NUM’s defeat, the British coal industry had 
acquired freedom to implement radical change. 
6.3.3.2 Economic positioning strategy 
The economic diagnosis of the MMC (1983) and the defeat of the miners (Chapman 
1999:222, Beynon et al. 1999:7) were crucial steps that allowed the implementation of a 
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radically new strategy. The NCB unveiled its ‘New Strategy for Coal’ in 1985. The plan 
had 2 main goals: 1) to phase out the industry’s dependence on subsidies, and 2) to get 
it to sell at competitive prices. This new strategy led to an increased number of mine 
closures, and the “Wheeler Plan” (heavy duty faces and retreat longwall mining) in 
1986.  
A “fundamental change in the management approach” was operated in response to the 
mounting market pressures (Chesshire and Skea 1989:41-5). It promised an internal 
‘cultural revolution’ (Parker 2000:70). The new guiding principle for the industry was 
profit, with little attention to social constraints. This change reflected the recognition of 
coal as an internationally traded commodity, and the ambition to remove protective 
measures. Demand-following output targets (tons) were replaced by objectives in terms 
of cost per GJ (heat content). The new cost objectives provided the base for investment 
appraisal (Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.2: Production cost objectives set out in New Strategy for Coal (1985) 
£/GJ £/tonne
All collieries 1.65 41
New pit investment to maintain output 1.50 38
New investment project to increase output 1.00 25
Operating costs
 
 
The stated objective was to achieve 80% of mines below 1.65 £/GJ by 1986-7, to break 
even by 1987-8, and to finance investments from profits by 1990-1. The heuristic 
determining the industry’s future aimed alignment with markets: 
“We will never forget that the size of the industry will be determined by the size of our market with 
our customers telling us what they are prepared to buy and at what price.” (NCB 1985:1) 
The new management was determined to change the spirit, culture and identity of the 
industry, and implement a symbolic break with the misfortunes of the past. The industry 
was re-named ‘British Coal’ (BC) to further symbolise this new era: 
“In recognition of the transformation in the industry’s performance which has taken place, and the 
opportunity this presents for a new start, in which we can put our problems of the past behind us, 
the Board have decided to trade under the name of British Coal.” (NCB 1986:1) 
The new corporation was infused with a new business culture that looked to the future 
and contrasted with the ‘bureaucratic and administrative’ managerial style of the NCB: 
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“We have established at the very top and at area level a ‘management’ approach to the enterprise. 
There is a restlessness and enthusiasm in the management now, a continuing desire to improve 
results and to find new ways of doing things. Of this I am proud.” (MacGregor and Tyler 1986:369) 
The achievements of the ‘new coal industry’ were celebrated. A sense of pride and unity 
was emulated by showing gratitude to miners and emphasising improvements: 
“In large measure [the all-time productivity record] was due not only to the efforts of managements 
but also to the new spirit of realism and co-operation shown by our workforce, who enjoyed the 
highest earnings ever paid in the industry, reflecting the benefits of our productivity incentive 
scheme.” (NCB 1986:1) 
6.3.3.3 Commercial strategies 
The Joint Understanding regime was revised in 1986, with the introduction of a third 
negotiated price tranche to reflect the price of oil and imported coal. This protection – 
although decreasing – was priceless to weather the substantial market pressures from 
international coal and CEGB dissatisfaction. It provided temporary market continuity, 
securing 80% of BC sales, at predetermined prices well above international market 
levels (Parker 2000:59-60). The revision was however a sign of BC’s reduced 
negotiating power with the CEGB and signalled the gradual opening of the market for 
power station coal. 
As BC’s bargaining position further deteriorated in the late 1980s in the face of 
increasing economic pressures, it engaged in deals with the ESI. The Government, eager 
to make the industry attractive to investors and to avoid its collapse, facilitated these 
negotiations. In 1990, BC signed three-year supply contracts with National Power (NP) 
and PowerGen (PG), the privatised successors of the CEGB. It secured a market for at 
least 70 million tons a year for two years, up to 65 million tons for the third year, and a 
price agreement (decreasing over the period from £1.70/GJ) (Sadler 2001). 
6.3.3.4 Production strategies 
Under the new strategy, production forecasts were greatly reduced (from 170 million 
tons to around 100). A new productivity target of 6 tonnes per manshift was often 
referred to (O’Donnell 1988:2). In order to achieve these objectives, a consolidation 
programme and a productivity-enhancing plan (the ‘Wheeler Plan’) were set up. The 
main features of this plan included six-day weeks, new incentive schemes, fewer 
collieries, more productive coalfaces, and the generalisation of heavy-duty technology 
and automation (Gibbon and Bromley 1990, Moses 1986, O’Donnell 1988, Wheeler 
1986). The consolidation of British coal mining involved: 1) the introduction of new 
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capacity, 2) the introduction of new technology in existing capacity, and 3) the closure 
of pits with high operating costs (Leman and Winterton 1991:55). 
The introduction of new capacity was derived from investments in highly mechanised 
and automated capacity (e.g. Selby) and the reorganisation of existing pits. Brand new 
hopes were invested in superpits. They would showcase the latest machinery, high 
productivity rates and ‘flexible’ working. These projects took time to come on stream, 
and were delayed well into the 1990s.  
Opencast mining, still performed by contractors, increased in scale and productivity 
during the 1980s. Opencast contracting was BC’s most profitable business. BC actively 
influenced the sector’s technical strategies (Beynon et al. 2000:16-22). Notable 
technical change concerned the capacity of onsite dump trucks, the size and 
manoeuvrability of shovels, and the intensification of draglines. All of this was made 
possible by the involvement of 1) equipment manufacturers who “rapidly extended and 
developed their machinery” and 2) BC, which had a flexible approach to encouragement 
and financial subsidies (Beynon et al. 2000:18-21). Opencast production increased to 
nearly 20mt (Figure 6.23), with average output per manshift of 14.6 tonnes in 1988. 
Technical innovation was introduced in existing mines at a sustained pace to improve 
productivity and to enter the age of Advanced Technology Mining (ATM) (Winterton 
1994). New technologies included “microelectronic control and monitoring technology” 
and Heavy Duty Face Equipment (HDFE). The percentage of longwall faces using 
retreat-mining techniques grew from 8% in 1972 to 52% in 1989 (NCB 1973-1990). 
While technical achievements over this period were impressive, it is noteworthy that 
mining expenditure peaked in 1981 (Figure 6.3). The industry was living off past 
investments without sustaining them, thus inevitably fomenting the exhaustion of 
economic reserves. 
The main restructuring element consisted in the closure of higher-cost pits. The 
performance threshold was a moving target. In times of decreasing markets, it had a 
tendency to lead to more closures (Leman and Winterton 1991:55). According to 
Robinson (1988:210), the NCB wished to close pits making a substantial loss. It had, ‘in 
strict accounting terms’, an ‘overwhelming’ case for it. However, it was “by no means 
obvious that a wider public interest [would be] served by closure”. The closures of the 
1980s were concentrated in the peripheral coalfields, in sharp contrast with the central 
coalfields, where most capital injections were targeted. The geography of restructuring 
thus confirmed established tensions between coalmining regions (Leman and Winterton 
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1991, Hudson and Sadler 1990, Sadler 2001). Figure 6.2 illustrates the very dramatic 
closure rate. The restructuring programme attracted attention from the media and 
subsequently the public. The NCB/BC insisted on the voluntary nature of redundancies. 
Politics played an important role in mediating the possibility and rate of closures. The 
implementation of the closure programme had to be carefully weighed against local 
community discontent, and its potential to affect public opinion, which would 
eventually play out in the urns: 
“political expediency plays a large part in closure. With a general election looming in the next two 
years, it can be expected that more pit closures may be put on ice, particularly where collieries are 
the mainstay of local employment.” (The Guardian, 21 February 1986, p.2) 
Industry consolidation led to a near doubling of average productivity between 1981 and 
1990 (Figure 6.3). 
6.3.3.5 Innovation strategies 
The general attitude to R&D changed in the 1980s. Gradually, Margaret Thatcher began 
asking questions about the usefulness and purpose of nationalised industrial 
organisations. When it came to R&D facilities: What is this research for? Who is the 
beneficiary of this research? (interview Merrick). In the absence of a coal-fired 
generation capacity expansion programme, most of the research on coal utilisation had 
unclear development potential. There was also a lack of full-scale commercial 
demonstration of advanced coal-fired technologies (PFBC, IGCC, etc.). The potential 
beneficiaries of technologies developed at the CRE (power plant manufacturer and 
power producers mainly) were also judged too remote from the coal industry for the 
research to be viable in a privatised future. Under such short-term and narrow criteria, it 
was difficult to defend the sustained existence of substantial research structures, which 
were progressively abandoned. 
Similar considerations applied to research at the MRDE. Given the scale of industry 
contraction, there were no clear incentives for substantial in-house research capabilities. 
The beneficiaries of mining research were the mining equipment manufacturers, so 
MRDE was closed down. Some of its functions were retained within the new structure 
of the Headquarters Technical Department (HQTD) in 1989, then Technical Services 
and Research Executive (TSRE) in 1990 (Durucan et al. 2010). 
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6.3.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
6.3.4.1 Framing strategies 
During this period, state involvement in industry restructuring meant that BC now stood 
on the Government’s side, and so no longer resisted its influence. The politically 
controversial nature of the reform of the British coal industry required astute 
justification. The NCB mobilised framing strategies to legitimise restructuring, and 
emphasised great achievements. Productivity improvements were celebrated yearly, and 
contextualised as outstanding given extreme circumstances: 
“further productivity records” (NCB 1982:3) 
“1985/6 has been a year of great achievement for the British coal industry” (NCB 1986:1) 
“During the past year the coal industry has faced the toughest competitive pressures in its history. It 
is therefore particularly gratifying that we have been able to make such substantial advances in our 
performance. Productivity increased by 21%, and records were achieved by each of our deepmine 
areas and by the Corporation as a whole.” (NCB 1987:1) 
During the strike, the industry’s public relations strategy was targeted at deflating 
criticism, and putting forward the thesis of ‘uneconomic pits’ and ‘business sense’: 
“It was necessary to run a fairly sustained campaign to put the record straight about Scargill’s 
outrageous claims, and to point out that the industry had a future if only we could get it down to size 
and get our costs right.” (MacGregor and Tyler, 1986:304) 
6.3.4.2 Political strategies 
The rationalisation of the coal industry also implied huge costs. Securing the support of 
financial and political actors was difficult, as a history of broken promises had 
weakened BC’s legitimacy. The Government was reluctant to give away grants to the 
coal industry. But the eagerness to see BC privatised justified punctual assistance. It 
became increasingly clear that BC’s case for Government support for new and 
replacement activity was greatly weakened (Chesshire and Skea 1989). The 
Government was inclined to cover the social costs of rundown and closures (Parker 
2000:78-82), and neglected more structural capital injection. The two main components 
of financial assistance to the industry concerned social grants (including pensions and 
redundancy payments), and punctual deficit grants (Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.3: Grants to the coal industry, £million (real at 2009 prices, using GDP Deflator), Data: 
NCB/BC Annual reports 
Social grants Deficit grants Total grants
1981/82 337 1201 1612
1982/83 350 977 1358
1983/84 669 2166 2835
1984/85 447 5267 5714
1985/86 1147 112 1259
1986/87 1284 623 1907
1987/88 979 410 1389
1988/89 574 - 574
1989/90 1114 11072 13034  
 
Crucially in 1989, the NCB chairman engaged in talks with the Government over the 
financial reconstruction of the coal industry. Parliament approved to intervene to reduce 
BC’s accumulated debt and interest charges. The Coal Industry Act 1990 provided for 
an impressive £11bn deficit grant (Table 6.3) to cover the write-down of fixed assets, 
potential liability for miners claims (health and concessionary coal), and accumulated 
losses from high interest and restructuring (DTI 1993:95). The NCB was grateful for the 
opportunity provided by a clean accounting sheet (NCB 1990:5). 
6.3.4.3 Environmental strategies 
Ten years after the Swedish Government’s call for action on acid rain, the British 
position remained reluctant until the late 1980s. Resistance to change was embedded in 
industrial practices and the established environmental discourse (Hajer 1995), as well as 
the incompatibility of controls on industry with the broader liberalisation discourse. 
Fear of increased costs (especially concerning FGD retrofitting) and the expectation of 
technical fixes (FBC, nuclear, gas, etc.) were more motives to delay action (McCormick 
1997, Dudley et al. 1985, Hajer 1995).  
As pressure mounted, the Government and the targeted industries engaged in active 
counter-information. In 1983, the CEGB and the NCB jointly funded a £5 million 
research programme into the problem of acid rain: the Surface Waters Acidification 
Programme (SWAP). Results were mobilised to reinforce the main discursive emphasis 
on uncertainties in science and the cost-benefits of abatement technology (Ling et al. 
2000:254), and “to build a body of information that could be used to deflect criticism.” 
(McCormick 1997:85). The CEGB-NCB coalition’s discursive strategy had a selective 
approach to scientific evidence. It capitalised on a major credibility advantage as the 
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CEGB had been involved in air pollution research since the late 1960s (Hajer 1995:112) 
and pursued active links with the Royal Society for further legitimation. The CEGB 
produced a £200,000 ‘educational’ video on acid rain for dissemination purposes (Rose 
1990:127-8). 
This discourse on acid rain was “reinforced by the external influence of the political 
ideological commitments of Thatcherism” (Hajer 1995:170). Investing in (costly) 
abatement solutions (FGD or low-sulphur coal) contradicted with commitments to 
decrease public spending and Government intervention. Achieving significant sulphur 
cuts with FGD was estimated at around £1.5 billion, while buying time with ‘research’ 
cost only £1 million/year (Rose 1990:126). This argument also suited the taxpayer. 
As political pressure mounted in 1984, lobbying strategies revealed their strength. The 
rejection of the Select Committee’s Report marked “a remarkable victory for the 
[CEGB] in the face of growing evidence and political pressure both at home and 
abroad” (The Observer, 2 December 1984, p.3).  
The first major political change on the acid rain problem occurred in 1986, when 
Waldergrave (Secretary of State for the Environment) stated that the UK would revise 
its position on acid rain (Ling et al. 2000:249-50). The CEGB planned the retrofit of 6 
GW of coal-fired capacity with FGD between 1993 and 1997, and the likely building of 
up to 8 GW of new capacity equipped with FGD by 2000 (Longhurst 1988). 
The Thatcher administration “had finally run out of negotiating space, finding itself 
painted into a corner by a combination of domestic policy aspirations and the 
requirements of its membership of the [European] Community” (McCormick 1997:91). 
The programme succeeded in shifting attention away from the problem, as suggested by 
Hajer (1995:110): 
“The 1986 decision had taken the sting out of the tail and NGOs had put their campaigning money 
and manpower elsewhere. Acid rain now had to share discursive space with new issues like the 
greenhouse effect and the diminishing ozone layer.”  
Britain subsequently agreed to the terms of the EC LCPD. In June 1988, after rounds of 
negotiations and hefty industrial lobbying to impact “the shape of future UK 
legislation” (NCB 1987:14), a compromise was reached. Britain would reduce 
emissions of SO2 by 20% and NOx by 15% by 1993 on 1980 levels. These very low 
targets were partly negotiated over the earlier promise to install FGD, but British 
officials later preferred gas-fired plants and low-sulphur coal (Rose 1990:133). By 1994, 
only 6 GW of coal-fired generation had been fitted with FGD (Parker 1994:61). After 3 
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years of apparent concessions to the pressures on acid rain, the British solution was 
determined by the privatisation agenda, and the avoidance of investments: 
“despite seeming to lose every argument, the CEGB probably came close to achieving its original 
goal. In the end, the environmentalists had almost no impact on real action.” (Rose 1990:132) 
With respect to the Greenhouse Effect, BC was eager to lobby against an issue that 
questioned coal utilisation, instead emphasising progress on new generation of coal 
combustion:  
“British Coal welcomed the Committee’s conclusion that, with reference to coal, ‘the country 
cannot afford to turn its back on its largest indigenous source of fuel resources’ and the 
recommendation that, ‘in view of its clear economic advantages’, the Government ‘should ensure 
that the next stage of work at Grimethorpe is completed.’” (NCB 1990:18) 
BC refuted the understanding according to which coal combustion was the most 
important single source of greenhouse gas emission:  
“British Coal believe that the contribution of coal combustion to the Greenhouse Effect has been 
overstated.” (NCB 1990:18)  
6.4 1990-1997: The alignment of pressures 
6.4.1 Pressures in economic environment 
6.4.1.1 Landscape 
The energy landscape was fundamentally altered in the 1990s by the liberalisation of 
energy markets (discussed below). 
6.4.1.2 Market shock 
The liberalisation of the electricity sector was key to the destabilisation of British Coal. 
BC’s survival had become literally dependent on ESI demand, and loyalty in the face of 
increasing international competition. Protective agreements had stabilised this market 
and tempered the rundown of the coal industry. Breaking up the electricity industry 
dramatically changed the balance of powers, and triggered the chain of events that led 
to the near-terminal decline of the coal industry. 
The privatisation of the ESI, implemented from 1990, represented the “most radical 
reorganisation of any comparable industry (…), long-established and apparently highly 
stable organizational forms and their technological affiliations were broken down and 
replaced” (Winskel 2002:564). The generation activities of the CEGB were split up, and 
passed on to Powergen and National Power. The National Grid Company took over 
transmission activities. Generation and distribution were opened up to new entrants, and 
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market competition.41 A market was set up to trade electricity – the ‘Pool’ – with 
bidding on a half-hourly basis. The liberalisation of the ESI radically changed the 
environment of the British coal industry, leading to 1) new determinants of fuel choice 
and capital investments, 2) a re-evaluation of the necessity to buy British coal, and 3) 
the emergence of new technical and organisational opportunities.  
6.4.1.3 Customer pressure 
ESI liberalisation “broke the vertical link with the coal industry” (Helm 2003:176), and 
created a system geared towards profitability and competitive decision-making, rather 
than long-term strategic goals. This increased market uncertainties: 
“The coal industry certainly has a future in Britain [in the late 1980s], but it is an uncertain one. 
Once the British electricity, generation and distribution, is privatised, that future will become less 
certain still as British Coal’s main customer looks around the world for the cheapest source of coal.” 
(Turner 1989:166) 
Fuel choice and capital investment decisions for power generation became determined 
by short-term economic prospects, with limited support:  
“Since the technical constraints of coal mining (geological, engineering, managerial) really take 
several years and much investment to circumvent or change, it is no surprise that the still publicly 
owned British Coal is inclined to abandon hope for nearly half its existing business. In the old days, 
it might have hoped for continued and increased subsidies, but those days have passed.” (Posner 
1993:82) 
The margin for political mediation was reduced. Inevitably, this weakened BC’s 
‘commercial’ bargaining power, and ability to negotiate favourable contracts. The 
electricity spot market and new investment practices led to the downgrading of coal in 
the merit order of power generation, implying new constraints for the planning and 
operation of coal-fired power stations (Whittington and Bellhouse 2000).  
6.4.1.4 New entrants 
Between 1990 and 1994, the CEGB manifested an eagerness to import more coal. From 
1994, while the demand for coal plunged, the relative share of imports skyrocketed. 
Imports were above 10mt since the 1984-5 events, and around 20 mt from 1991. In 
relative terms, imports contributed 4%, 10%, 21%, 34%, 53% and 71% of British coal 
use in 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008 respectively (Figure 6.23). 
                                                
41 This led in the 1990s to the internationalisation of the British energy market, with the entrance of 
multinational corporations (MacKerron 2001). 
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“The ’sequencing of events’ (…) has been bad luck for British coal, and very bad news indeed for 
20,000 miners, their families, and the districts in which they have been working. No doubt, by 
contrast, this has been good luck for some new mining ventures in the Americas or Australia, using 
new technologies, new sites, mobile labour forces.” (Posner 1993:82) 
Figure 6.23: Provenance of coal in the UK (mtons) 
 
The Coal Industry Act 1990 raised the maximum size for private mines, thereby 
widening the door for new entrants in the domestic coal market (Beynon et al. 2000). In 
this context, opencast mining and imports remained very stable while deep-mining 
collapsed. 
6.4.1.5 Technological alternatives 
The introduction of competition and private ownership transformed the way 
investments were planned, and in turn technological choice. According to Chesshire and 
Skea (1989:62), new generating options were becoming more attractive, including 
“plant life extension; high efficiency combined-cycle gas plant; and, potentially in the 
future, advanced coal combustion technologies”.  
New gas-fired generation technology broke through in the ‘dash for gas’ of the 1990s, 
when regulations limiting the use of gas for power generation were lifted. Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) became the prime choice for investment in the early years 
of market competition, uncertainty in energy markets, the quest for rapid returns on 
investment, and increasing environmental commitments. New entrants in the generation 
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market invested in this cheaper option and were quickly followed by NationalPower and 
Powergen, who “built CCGTs to defend their market share” (Parker 1994:14). 
The conjunction of the new criteria of a liberalised electricity market, a renewed interest 
in capital stock replacement and expansion (Figure 6.4), and the availability of plentiful 
gas supplies42 and innovative low-risk technology led to the ‘dash for gas’. By 1997, 13 
GW of gas-fired capacity had been built, 5-6 GW were under construction. Gas 
accounted for 30% of electricity generated in England and Wales (Sadler 2001:9, see 
also Figure 6.1) – or, roughly the displacement of the equivalent of 50 million tonnes of 
coal.  
The dash for gas had a game-changing influence on fuel choice within the given 
infrastructure (Winskel 2002). The ‘take or pay’ gas contracts tailored for CCGTs 
ensured long-term commitment to gas (Posner 1993:80-1), to the detriment of coal. 
While the dash for gas had started almost by accident, and largely unexpected, it soon 
became the strongest pressure facing the coal industry: 
“The real threat to the British coal industry now lay not so much from imported coal as from 
displacement in its main market by an alternative fuel source.” (Sadler 2001:9). 
Gas came to represent everything that coal was not: cheap, exciting, low-sulphur, high 
thermal efficiency, low lead times, responsive to market changes, etc. It was both made 
possible by, and came as a further justification of, the liberalisation agenda. 
The Thatcher administration also had a clear interest in nuclear energy. On the way to 
ESI liberalisation, the high cost of nuclear energy was revealed to the public. No one 
was willing to take the financial risks involved on board. The Government provided 
protective measures. Past investments were written off (Helm 2003:191), and a number 
of mechanisms ensured that nuclear costs would be met. 
6.4.2 Pressures in socio-political environment 
6.4.2.1 Landscape 
Since the early 1980s, British policy and regulatory processes have been dominated by 
the search for efficiency, with market competition as the preferred solution (MacKerron 
2001:553). In the 1990s, the liberalisation of the ESI and later of British Coal marked 
                                                
42 While almost ¼ of the gas used in the 1980s was imported, this proportion fell below 
10% from the 1990s. 
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an irreversible shift in the public administration of energy industries. The two industries 
were radically re-organised in a highly politicised (and ideologically loaded) process. 
6.4.2.2 Political crisis 
BC had emitted warnings about likely consequences of ESI privatisation. Continued 
closures were foreseeable as market and productivity gains slowed down. In autumn 
1991, the first Rothschild Report to the Government suggested a dark picture of the 
demand prospects for coal, such that only 14 pits would survive,43 whether privatisation 
plans went ahead or not. On October 13, 1992, Neil Clarke (Chairman of BC) and later 
Michael Heseltine (Board of Trade) announced the closure of 31 out of the 50 existing 
pits within 5 months, and 30,000 direct job losses (Parker and Surrey 1993). This was 
justified by a background of record expected reduction in power station demand: from 
70 million tons in 1991, to 40 million tons in 1993, and 30 million tons subsequently. It 
was no longer possible to simultaneously encourage competition and diversity in the 
electricity sector and maintain outlets for the coal industry (Chapman 1999:197). 
The issue was debated widely in the papers, and spurred a popular movement as it 
entered the public sphere: 
“The bungled announcement of the closure of 31 pits and 30,000 sacked miners triggered a 
spontaneous outburst of popular revulsion against the Government unprecedented in the Tories’ 14 
years in office (…) up to a quarter of a million people demonstrated in London twice one week (…) 
opinion polls continued to show more than 90 per cent majorities against pit closures and a 
campaign of protests and demonstrations carried on throughout the winter in the Midlands and the 
North.”  (The Guardian, 7 June 1993, p.22) 
The issue entered the political arena. The pronouncement sparked a “backbench revolt” 
(The Independent, 18 October 1992), and “provoked a furious political reaction”:  
“Tory MPs were besieged by angry constituents and the Government was forced to retreat in the 
face of a backbench rebellion” (The Guardian, 7 June 1993, p.22) 
There was a generalised sense that the scale and speed of the announced rundown was 
not necessary. In a nation-wide controversy, fingers were pointed at Government 
mishandling of the situation, leading to a political crisis. The president of the 
Confederation of British Industries (CBI), while lauding Government’s attempts to 
revert the recession with growth measures and incentives for new industries, heavily 
                                                
43 It reached these conclusions by focussing on the market for coal, rather than the supply capacity for a 
given ‘competitive’ price (Chapman 1999:196-7). 
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criticised the “‘irresponsible, insensitive and maladroit’ handling of the pit closures”, 
which he qualified as a ‘monumental cock-up’ (monthly CBI meeting reported in The 
Independent, 22 October 1992, p.28). 
The non-valuation of the social consequences and the lack of consultation provoked 
indignation. With such strong opposition, a re-evaluation was necessary. Heseltine 
announced a moratorium on 21 of the 31 proposed closures (DTI 1993), and a number 
of reviews were set up. 
In practice, the implementation followed pretty much the October 1992 programme, the 
planned closures were spread over two years, and the closed pits became available for 
private investors. A small proportion of the £500 million subsidy was delivered. So, the 
whole review process had a purely symbolic function in practice: 
“British Coal managers believe that the Government’s review of the coal industry, including its 
white paper, changed absolutely nothing. The situation is as it was at the end of 1992 – except that 
projected markets for coal are now even smaller.” (The Observer, 14 August 1993) 
the review was met by very little public or political reaction, which reveals the shifting 
attention of public opinion and mobilisation: 
“All this has been executed with scarcely a murmur from either government or opposition, media or 
trade unions.” (The Guardian, 7 June 1993, p.22) 
6.4.2.3 Policy reform 
Although it had been an objective of the market reform programme, the privatisation of 
BC was long held back. Steps had been taken towards reducing BC’s monopoly 
position, allowing for new entrants in British coal production, especially in opencast 
mining. After ESI liberalisation, “John Major’s government began in 1991 seriously to 
prepare for coal privatisation” (Parker 2000:210). Output had to be reduced to envisage 
the sale. The ‘dash for gas’ became the trigger and imperative justification for rapid 
industry contraction. From there on, the Government demonstrated eagerness to get on 
with the privatisation agenda: 
“The Government intends to bring forward the necessary legislation as rapidly as possible.” (DTI 
1993:9) 
In 1993, preliminary regulation allowed the Government to get rid of excess capacity 
and to ‘test the water’ by putting unwanted pits on the market (Parker 2000:140). In 
December 1994, the coal industry was privatised. Administrative functions were 
transferred to the Coal Authority. Assets were sold in 5 regional packages. RJB Mining 
(a substantial player in opencast mining, under license form BC) acquired the 3 English 
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coal regions, Scottish Coal acquired the Scottish assets, Celtic Energy acquired South 
Wales mining, and smaller players acquired individual collieries. RJB dominated the 
scene with 80% of UK output. 
The once glorious policy objective of coal privatisation (the ‘ultimate privatisation’ in 
the words of Cecil Parkinson, Secretary of State for Energy), was implemented hastily, 
following the ‘coal crisis’: 
“There is no doubt that the privatisation of the British coal industry failed to live up to the 
Conservative Party’s expectations (...) The rumours and doubts over the process of the sale invited 
images of second-hand car dealers rather than something in which the nation might glory (…) It had 
been a market transaction; nothing more.” (Beynon et al. 1999:19) 
The Government had in theory had gotten rid of the ‘economic burden’ of the coal 
industry, but it “failed to depoliticize the industry, or indeed to secure its longer-term 
future.” (Helm 2003: 176). It would continue to provide strong assistance in the form of 
grants, environmental liabilities, and oversight for contract negotiations. 
6.4.2.4 Environmental problems 
According to Dryzek et al. (2003), environmental questions in the UK had been largely 
determined by collaboration between industry and government regulators, with little 
space for the influence of environmental groups. Environmental pressures increased in 
intensity as the energy liberalisation project was implemented. A number of converging 
dynamics were favoured by the context of energy market reform: 1) international 
(especially EC-level) environmental policy pressure (Newbery 1993), 2) the dash for 
gas and the increasing availability of cleaner energy sources more compatible with 
environmental demands, 3) receding political influences in favour of coal use (Parker 
1994:72), 4) the mobilisation of positive framings and narratives to “present the new 
electricity industry as something more than a private monopoly replacing a public one” 
(Beynon et al. 1999:10), and 5) the competitive and political strategies of the electricity 
industry willing to reduce its dependence on BC. Environmental pressures on the coal 
industry not only increased in the 1990s, but they were also coupled and aligned with a 
series of highly adverse pressures. The alignment of environmental problems and the 
economic dynamics of privatisation were merely coincidental, but enhanced each other 
(Collier 1998:100-2).  
Policy commitments to curb SO2 and NOx emissions required a solution. Neither 
Government nor CEGB were keen on implementing the costly FGD programme. The 
import of low-sulphur coal imports was not politically sensible given the problems of 
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the British coal industry. The replacement of coal-fired capacity by gas provided an 
ideal, non-controversial means to fulfil SO2 and NOx targets. As the acid rain pressure 
became more acute, abatement options abounded. The strategy to buy time had proven 
successful for industrial interests. The UK signed the second Sulphur Protocol in 1994, 
committing to Sulphur reductions of 50%, 70% and 80% on 1980 levels by 2000, 2005 
and 2010 respectively (Churchill et al. 1995:184), which were relatively easy targets to 
achieve with the CCGT technology (MacKerron 1999). 
6.4.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
The conjunction of ESI liberalisation, the coal import threat, the dash for gas, and 
growing environmental pressure led to the alignment of forces for change highly 
unfavourable to the coal industry. This rapidly changing context, managed by a 
maladroit Government, suddenly wiped out the foundational support structures and 
regime supporting the British coal industry. The bulk of BC’s strategy in this context of 
rapid change was mobilised in an effort to make sense of and cope with market changes, 
securing ongoing protection, and rapid contraction in view of privatisation. 
6.4.3.1 Market collapse 
The coal crisis revealed the full extent of the consequences of recent energy policy 
choices. It was now clear that the market for coal would collapse (which it did between 
1991 and 1997), and that the industry would have to close mines at a dramatic pace. 
British Coal headquarters were nicknamed ‘Chateau Despair’ during the coal crisis, 
illustrating the loss of hope in the future. BC was forced to accept now inevitable 
contraction: its new chairman (Neil Clarke) confessed the need to cope with “the bear 
squeeze on demand” (New York Times, 14 October 1992). 
Since the coal crisis, BC’s objectives were re-evaluated: 
“the Corporation had to address the fundamental shifts in the market for power station fuels while 
positioning itself to take maximum advantage of the altered market opportunities which remained 
(…) [and] pressing on with the immensely complex task of preparing the industry for its return to 
the private sector.”  (NCB 1994:5) 
6.4.3.2 New ownership 
When handing the industry over to private investors, BC was confident that the few 
remaining mines would be profitable, and given the four remaining years of contracts, 
would provide the foundations to “secure the longer term future of the industry” (BC 
1994:7). Indeed, dramatic contraction and restructuring since the coal crisis had brought 
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the industry back in line with its reduced market, and this ahead of privatisation. The 
Government had left a clean financial sheet for the new owners (Parker 1994:49, Table 
6.3). 
Richard Budge, CEO of RJB Mining, brought a new managerial style to British Coal. 
He provided incentive structures for miners (bonuses, free shares) and expanded the 
industry’s involvement in opencast development and production. Productivity increases 
were achieved in the first few months, substantial profits were recorded in the first 
semester (Beynon et al. 1999:19). But this initial success was short-lived. RJB shares 
peaked in 1996. Between 1996 and 1997, sales dropped from 42mt to 26mt, and profits 
from £171m to £40m. (Sadler 2001:25), putting it in a difficult situation: 
“The company faced a difficult choice between three options: managed decline, vertical integration 
into power generation, and overseas expansion” (Sadler 2001:25). 
According to Beynon et al. (2000:213), “RJB stuck to what it knew best – persistent 
lobbying for Government support in the face of an impending disaster” (see political 
strategies). 
6.4.3.3 Commercial strategies 
The only way to retain some of the dramatically reduced market was to negotiate 
contracts with the power generators, ensuring a threshold of minimum purchases. 
Ahead of ESI privatisation, contracts were signed up to 1993, securing minimum sales 
of 205 million tonnes for the new generating companies over 3 years: at least 70 million 
tonnes for 1990/1 and 1991/2, and at least 65 million tonnes for 1992/3. Government 
oversight of the process was crucial (Parker and Surrey 1993:403). However, BC’s 
reduced bargaining power meant that it had to concede significant price reductions in 
real terms (NCB 1990:4-11). A second wave of contracts with the privatised ESI was 
negotiated in the midst of the coal crisis, to cover the years 1993-98. These contracts 
reflected BC’s weakened bargaining position: they covered 40 mt in the first year, 
declining to 30 mt. Unable to persuade NP and PG to buy more coal, BC was forced to 
continue contraction. The relief provided by contracts was highly valuable but not 
sustainable, as they were each time negotiated in worse conditions, and “by 1998 the 
threat of import competition would inevitably re-emerge” (Helm 2003: 178). 
Towards 1998, RJB Mining was only able to reach some – if short-lived – contractual 
commitment from generators (PowerGen, Eastern and National Power) and delay the 
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‘rush from coal’ thanks to the moratorium on new gas power stations introduced in 
1998 (Sadler 2001:10-11).    
6.4.3.4 Productivity increases 
Substantial closures were implemented. Between 1990 and 1994, the number of deep 
mines owned by BC fell from 65 to 16, while total employment was cut from 49,000 to 
7,000 (Figure 6.2). The rate of contraction reached unprecedented levels, leading to 
impressive productivity improvements (Figure 6.3), as only the best performing pits 
survived (Glyn and Machin 1997). BC, “by 1992, had achieved dramatic increases in 
productivity and a capability of competing with imports – unlike the remaining coal 
industries of other EC countries which have survived by virtue of subsidy.” (Koerner et 
al. 1995:666). 
The involvement of the privatised industry in opencast mining changed substantially. 
The large coal companies (RJB Mining, Scottish Coal and Celtic Energy) started to 
develop opencast sites, instead of contracting them to smaller companies (Beynon et al. 
2000:31-33). 
6.4.3.5 Investment strategy 
The level of capital expenditure in deep mining had fallen consistently since 1980 
(Figure 6.3). This jeopardised industry long-term survival, given the looming pressure 
of resource exhaustion. With a bleak market situation, BC was “very short of finance” 
in the 1990s (Posner 1993:81). RJB Mining continued investing in deep mines, but at a 
highly reduced level (HoC 1998:83). The deep-mining industry rapidly exhausted its 
best quality reserves. Inevitably, productivity and output levels declined dramatically 
from 1995. The Review of energy sources for power generation (DTI 1998) drew a dark 
picture of British coal reserves, predicting a collapse to 10 mtonnes of deep-mined coal 
by 2010 if no new mine was opened. This was the legacy of past contraction and lack of 
investment. Even the glorious superpits were to be closed (Beynon et al. 1999). 
RJB did diversify in overseas ventures, investing £12 million in an Australian coal 
company (CIM). This strategic move was justified by weakening assets: 
“In the UK our business is at best a dwindling asset base, because we will be unlikely to see coal 
production increasing. My duty as the Chief Executive is not just to manage the reducing asset, it is 
to look for potential expansion” (Richard Budge answering to Trade and Industry Committee, HoC 
1998:79) 
This diversification attempt was however not highly significant in financial terms. 
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6.4.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
6.4.4.1 Lobbying strategies 
BC warned the Government of the devastating effects of new gas power stations 
resulting from the ESI liberalisation project (Chapman 1999:196), but lobbying for 
protection against the dash for gas was not highly effective: 
“British Coal's chairman, Neil Clarke, met Heseltine and Eggar at the DTI on 3 June in a last-ditch 
attempt to press the case for coal, but made no progress. Although the Government was beginning 
to see the impact of the dash for gas, it would not mitigate its effect on the coal industry. Further, it 
would not cease to approve new gas power stations: in August, two new licences were granted.” 
(The Independent, 18 October 1992) 
With the political change of 1997, new opportunities arose  
“understandably there was a major coal industry campaign to slow the ‘dash for gas’, directed at the 
new Labour Government and led by the major coal producers, in particular by RJB Mining (UK) 
Ltd” (Glasson and Chadwick 2000:230) 
The coalfield communities campaign (CCC), regrouping local authorities from mining 
districts, lobbied for more protection. In the late 1990s the coal community lobbied 
against tighter environmental policies, for restriction on the ‘dash for gas’ and against 
the ‘unfair competition’ of European subsidies to coal exporters. 
An Energy Review (DTI 1998) reaffirmed the Government’s commitment to market 
competition in power generation, but recognised the possibility of market distortions. 
Indeed, if unabated, gas-fired generation could grow to represent between 50% and 80% 
of electricity supply, thus threatening diversity of fuel supply. There was also some 
evidence that FGD retrofitting was cheaper than new CCGT.  
A moratorium on new CCGT was issued in 1998, justified by energy security concerns. 
The fuel policies of the late 1990s stabilised coal use in power generation around 50 
mtonnes (Figure 6.4). This only provided short-term relief for RJB Mining. Overall, the 
Energy Review (DTI 1998) “envisaged a very clear medium to long-term future for the 
coal-mining industry in Britain: near-terminal contraction” (Sadler 2001:11). 
The conditions reached in the early 1990s (more environmental policies expected on top 
of the liberalisation agenda and LCPD) not only have weakened coal’s position, but 
virtually removed all reasonable hope for investment in coal-fired generation in the 
medium term. The moratorium on CCGT halted the decommissioning of coal-fired 
capacity and the incentives for FGD fitting provided incentives for pollution abatement 
in coal-fired generation. 
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6.5 Analysis 
This period stands out as one of unprecedented contraction of the coal industry (see 
Figure 6.2), in a process that was highly politicised and confrontational. The main 
pressures for contraction of the coal industry have been exerted within the market 
domain. These pressures have however been strongly mediated by an emerging political 
agenda guided by normative and ideological prescriptions. The new institutional frame 
for energy markets introduced in the 1980s, centred around liberalisation (‘efficient’ 
market competition, capital injection and ‘diversity’ of energy sources), provided 
solutions to what had been identified as recurrent problems (monopoly power, energy 
security, inefficiency and market protection, environmental problems). In this process, 
however, a number of voiced concerns have been actively suppressed or left unattended 
(the power of trade unions, the vitality of mining communities, the maintenance of 
long-term indigenous energy supply, environmental modernisation, consumer benefits, 
etc.). The resulting re-configuration led to the extreme alignment of pressures against 
coal. Throughout the destabilisation process, the erosion of slack and essential resources 
further reduced the industry’s ability to re-create itself (see 6.5.4).  
The destabilisation process was also characterised by a strong embedding in landscape 
and niche-level changes. The decline of the coal industry has occurred at the confluence 
of these profound transformations, which accelerated and provided direction to the 
contraction process. 
6.5.1 External pressures 
The case study shows that the British coal industry experienced multiple pressures in its 
economic and socio-political environments. These pressures are summarised in Table 
6.4, and analysed below. 
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Table 6.4: External pressures for change exerted on the British coal industry, as located in 
economic and socio-political environments (the sign (+/-) indicates whether pressures are 
challenging/enhancing industry stability, the value (+, ++, +++) provides an indication of the 
importance of the pressure, [*] indicates a shock, [L] indicates a landscape dynamic) 
  
The period studied stands out as the theatre of a substantial pressure, especially during 
the 1980s and 1990s. This was however expected in a mature industry with a history of 
decline and survival prospects based on compromise. The case displayed extreme 
variations (ups and downs) of external pressure. There was indeed a striking balance 
difference between the relatively positive context of the 1970s, and the gloomy 1980s. 
Both instances can be related to major swings in commodity prices (1973 oil shock, 
1986 oil price collapse), and are thus illustrations of the re-defining nature of shocks 
and transformations in the landscape of industries (here economic).  
As a next step, I aim to draw conclusions about the relative significance of various 
pressures. The most important pressures leading to the industry’s destabilisation arose 
from constraints on 1) essential industry resources on the supply side and 2) 
technological competition, in a context of 3) weaning market growth and 4) political 
pressure for market reform and industry contraction.  
1) The very low level of capital injection in basic infrastructure, reduced financial and 
political legitimacy, and inherent resource exhaustion, led to the erosion of the 
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industry’s essential resources (coal reserves, financial support), and jeopardised its 
medium- and long-term prospects. 
2) The industry faced a sequence of technological challenges: a) within coal production, 
a new competence-destroying international coal regime – relying on a new set of 
opencast mining technologies and capabilities – redefined the nature of competition 
exerted on British coal when protective barriers faded from the mid-1980s, and b) 
within power generation, technological alternatives competed with coal-fired 
generation (first oil and nuclear since the 1960s), and then gas-fired CCGTs substituted 
for coal in the 1990s.  
3) While the British coal industry had captured a substantial share of the power 
generation sector, expected growth did not materialise in the 1980s, and led to market 
collapse when alternatives kicked in. 
4) The particular importance of the political pressures is related to a) strong political 
embeddedness due to the industry’s inherited nationalised status, b) the raised strategic 
importance of energy from the 1970s, c) the political project of liberalisation (joining 
together political ideology and market pressure), and d) the resulting social/political 
problems. Political intervention in the industry amplified existing market uncertainties 
by removing protective barriers, but also provided coherent signals as to future direction. 
 
Contrastingly, normative contestation, public opinion and discourse played only a 
marginal role. While activists and pressure groups did intervene in the socio-political 
environment of the coal industry (on environmental questions, worker claims and 
conditions, opposition to market reform), their ultimate influence over the course of 
events remained limited and highly dependent upon compatibilities identified with the 
prevailing political discourse. 
However, normative and ideological concerns originating in the landscape did influence 
the industry’s destabilisation trajectory significantly. The deep market reforms 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s radically redefined the environment of energy 
industries, providing an ideal opportunity for the alignment of destabilisation pressures. 
In this inherently political process, an emerging normative discourse positioning on the 
role of the state in the regulation of markets and industries provided an ideological basis 
for policy reform and a policy paradigm shift (Mitchell 2008). The industry’s 
environment and its basic principles have been intentionally reshaped from the outset, in 
the rigorous and cautious implementation of the market reform agenda, and provided 
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the basis for a transition from the socio-political considerations of a nationalised 
industry to the competitive imperatives of a ‘free’ market. This case thus lends some 
support to the argument that normative aspirations and ideological change can actively 
shape transitions.44 It is important to note that these changes emerged in the political 
landscape but penetrated the industry’s direct environment. 
The case also stands out for the importance of landscape pressures and shocks. In the 
1970s, the energy landscape was dramatically altered by the oil crisis, which redefined 
the role of energy in society, but also the competitive structure within the overarching 
fuel and power regimes. An international coal regime emerged in this context, 
harnessing landscape transformations in civil engineering technology and international 
trade rules (globalisation), to compete with the existing coal regime. Macro-political 
and ideological concerns about British nationalised industries (and coal in particular) 
emerged long before leading to the imposition of deep structural changes of the 1980s. 
The implementation of market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s marked the 
institutionalisation of a solution to what had been identified as problems in industry 
structure and performance – and thus a direct interference of landscape with industry 
6.5.2 Interaction between pressures 
The immediate cause of industry destabilisation was the radical market change brought 
about by the ESI liberalisation, which put a definitive end to the historical commitments 
of the industry’s principal customer, and opened a window of opportunity for competing 
industries and technological options to break through. So this case stands out as one in 
which the regulation of the economic framework has led to the re-configuration of the 
economic environment, leading to the rapid contraction of the industry, and thus reveals 
a mechanism by which socio-political transformative forces can lead to the alignment of 
destabilisation pressures across multiple environments.45 Most of the pressures 
unleashed in the 1990s had been gradually building up (reduced competitiveness, 
                                                
44 It should be clear from the above that societal and political forces of change did not play out alone, but 
rather were articulated around existing market pressures. Additionally, the paradigm shift in economic 
policy had major implications for numerous industries. 
45 Strong cautions however apply to this statement, as the market reforms orchestrated by the Thatcher 
Government were of a radical nature (i.e. a rare occurrence in practice), and have been implemented in 
stages with remarkable determination, rigour, caution and coherence (see for instance Parker 2000 and 
Helm 2003). 
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customer dissatisfaction, international coal regime emergence, more opencast, erosion 
of political and financial support) and were subsequently legitimised and strengthened, 
while others emerged from the newly created opportunity structures (dash for gas, 
environmental concerns). The forces of change intensified in the 1980s. They 
accelerated in the 1990s with the removal of protective barriers (direct support, import 
restrictions and contracts).  
On a more specific level, I find many interaction mechanisms between pressures. For 
each period, I summarise these and graphically represent interactions in a multi-
dimensional space.46 In this case, the length and number of steps involved in the 
interaction chains are striking. 
 
1967-1973. The collapse of the non-power market and the negative framings of coal 
provided the background to the expansion of coal-fired generation. The White Paper on 
Fuel Policy in 1967 institutionalised the 4-fuel economy and the collapse of the non-
power market for coal. This policy framework provided a stable policy landscape for 
the alignment of pressures in the economic environment, leading to clear negative 
signals: 1) reduced financial support, thus degrading the industry’s capital structure, 2) 
the encouragement of the nuclear and oil industries, thus intensifying market 
competition within power generation. In the context of depressed markets for coal aside 
from power generation, lasting commitments to coal were however secured by the 
accumulation of substantial coal-fired generation capacity. Degrading labour relations 
led to important miner strikes. 
                                                
46 The keys to these figures have been provided in footnote 24 in chapter 5. 
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Figure 6.24: Pressure interactions 1967-73 
 
1973-1981. An extreme event (oil crisis) fundamentally redefined the destabilisation 
context, and the assumptions regarding coal’s positioning. It influenced a) the industry’s 
economic environment by damaging the competitive position of the main alternative, b) 
its socio-political environment as it reconfigured the conditions of political (and 
financial) support and expectations in favour of coal, and c) the public through cultural 
anxieties leading to demand reductions. Coal rapidly regained strategic and symbolic 
relevance. Medium-term stabilising commitments were secured (Plan for Coal). The 
coal regime was strengthened by a seemingly hopeful outlook, which masked long-lived 
dissatisfactions and liberalisation ambitions. Meanwhile, a new international coal 
regime had emerged from new technological and market opportunities worldwide, but 
proved no direct threat as import restrictions were applied. Tension with the industry’s 
main customer arose from a feeling of captivity. 
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Figure 6.25: Pressure interactions 1973-81 
 
1981-90. The macro-economic and political contexts changed again in the 1980s, with 
the consolidation of political aspirations for liberalisation and market reform. These 
landscape developments penetrated the industry’s environments, via a new pervasive 
policy discourse and practice. Political and financial support became limited and 
conditional on the industry’s deep restructuring: the ‘sick’ industry had to acquire a 
culture of profitability and get rid of its resistive attitude. Internal resistance to change 
was crushed in a heavily politicised context, which accelerated the implementation of 
radical market and organisational reforms towards its privatisation. The robustness and 
coherence of the ideological framework, and the determination in its implementation 
provided an ideal frame for the alignment of market pressures. The active dismantling 
of slack and support structures prevented the industry from pursuing promising 
innovation and diversification pathways. The oil price collapse reinforced and 
accelerated this destabilisation context, decisively damaging British Coal’s 
competitiveness and perceived strategic importance. The tardy penetration of new 
environmental problems in British political and public spheres added pressure in the 
landscape. 
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Figure 6.26: Pressure interactions 1981-90 
 
1990-97. The ESI liberalisation was decisive. Based on the market ideology, it radically 
changed the market for British coal, intensified existing pressures, and created a frame 
with a clear direction for the alignment of existing pressures. It destabilised existing 
norms and beliefs in the energy domain, and provided new ground for the development 
of technological competition. A novel technology (CCGT), put forward by new entrants 
in the power sector, quickly became the most attractive proposition in the newly 
transformed environment, and recursively changed the rules of the electricity regime. 
The ‘dash for gas’ was interpreted as a demonstration that liberalisation ‘works’, a 
discourse that was opportunistically coupled with a newly adopted interest in 
environmental issues. The new framework also opened up the market for imported coal. 
So, new technologies and new entrants could exert their (nearly) full pressure upon the 
British coal industry, leading its market to collapse. Without political support, and 
awaiting its own privatisation, the British coal industry underwent extreme contraction. 
The ‘rush from coal’ (Sadler 2001) left behind a radically reduced industry in private 
hands. Deep-mining gave way to an increasing proportion of opencast and imports. 
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Figure 6.27: Pressure interactions 1990-97 
 
So, the destabilisation process has been characterised by the co-evolution of multiple 
pressure streams, which were aligned at different points in time. The destabilisation 
process intensified during the 1980s, and accelerated in the 1990s, leading up to major 
market reform, the dash for gas and the rapid decline of the British deep-mining 
industry. Pressures initially increased on multiple fronts, but were then articulated and 
aligned via a coherent environment-changing policy framework operating at the level of 
socio-technical configurations (interlinkages across industry environment and 
landscape). Lasting problems and dissatisfactions with coal were coupled with a new 
‘solution’ and vision for the future of energy, thereby creating the opportunity for its 
own actualisation. The articulation and enactment of the radical reform fundamentally 
changed the rules of the energy system, leading to its re-configuration, dismantling the 
coal industry’s support structures, and opening up opportunities for new entrants. 
 
Furthermore, this case stands out for the salience of two processes: 
- radical policy intervention and heated politics; 
- multi-level dynamics involving shocks and landscape trends. 
Political mediation 
The destabilisation context has been significantly articulated by political ambition to see 
the industry become competitive or else decline. The policy reform process joined long-
lived problems (mostly economic) and articulated them via a coherent transition 
discourse – based on neo-liberal ideology – that became the crux of the destabilisation 
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process. Three features of this articulation and coupling process stand out as crucial: 1) 
the narrowing down of the scope of issues involved, 2) the alignment of previously 
disjoined problems with the elaboration of a legitimated narrative for change, and 3) 
system-wide re-configuration. 
1. The formulation and enactment of the neo-liberal view of the world provided 
directionality for alignment in a turbulent industry environment. The primacy of 
(short-term) competitiveness criteria and the abandonment of the industry’s 
social and strategic functions formulated the governing principles of the coming 
transition: without protective support, only economic selection criteria would 
matter. Price signals and economic issues became the prime determinants of the 
industry’s future. The political agenda and its implementation provided a new 
frame for the interpretation of external signals (both for incumbents and for new 
actors). Newcomers were thus encouraged to invest in build-up activities. The 
now overtly dispensable industry faced the quasi-unrestricted pressure of 
customers, new entrants, technological alternatives, and activists against acid 
rain, for which the coming downfall of British deep-mined coal brought new 
opportunities.47 
2. Beyond narrowing down the selection criteria at play in the industry’s 
environment, the politics of coal’s end also crucially coupled newly reframed 
problems with a clearly identified solution. The neo-liberal discourse capitalised 
on long-lived dissatisfaction with the industry’s economic performance, its 
privileged nationalised status and the disruptive political power of unions to 
make a case for structural reform. Coal was to ascribe to this new logic and 
become a competitive business. In practice, this meant that it should have 
positive balance sheets and that its size should be radically reduced, along with 
all excessive costs. Lasting taboos and untouchable privileges were thus broken. 
The dismantling of coal’s economic and political monopoly was a highly 
political process that implied the imposition of new managerial methods and 
objectives. 
                                                
47 However, long-term policy programs are also vulnerable to sudden environmental change when 
fundamental assumptions are questioned. This has been the case with the oil shock that reverted the 
institutionalised move away from coal. 
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3. Economic policy reform is an important source of interaction that may involve 
the translation of societal ideals into profound changes to framework conditions 
in the economic environment. In this case, the scope of the policy initiative led 
to radical environmental change that cut across established logics and opened up 
opportunities for system-wide re-configuration. The energy market reform 
process, starting with the power sector, provided a timely and coherent frame for 
the removal of protection against existing pressures, and the alignment of 
pressures previously diverging or unattended (customer fuel choice, new 
technologies, environmental problems, etc.). For instance, the ESI reform 
process led to the ‘dash for gas’, with largely unanticipated consequences for the 
coal industry. Niches had developed (international coal, CCGT), but had until 
then been kept at bay by various protection mechanisms. With ESI liberalisation, 
they provided matching solutions to existing problems, and benefited from the 
re-configuration of the energy system as a window of opportunity for 
breakthrough. Subsequently, the availability of better performing technology 
also allowed the inclusion of other concerns, such as acid rain. 
Shocks and landscape trends 
The period of study has also been marked by important landscape changes, and specific 
environmental shocks. These bear an important role in destabilisation processes. Indeed, 
their deep structural level means that they have great influence not only on industries, 
but on the entire socio-technical system to which they are associated. Three main 
findings emerge: 
1. Shocks and extreme events can fundamentally re-define industry selection 
environments and the articulation of pressures within them. For instance, the oil 
crisis (1973) was such a profound commodity price shock that it radically 
altered coal’s economic and strategic positioning amongst energy alternatives, 
thus effectively providing lasting support structures and halting its 
destabilisation trajectory. By stimulating enthusiasm for alternatives to oil 
internationally, it also led to the emergence and growth of an international price-
cutting coal regime that later generated substantial destabilisation pressure.  
2. Shocks can trigger the acceleration of destabilisation sequences through the 
activation of ‘latent’ interaction mechanisms. For instance, the oil price collapse 
of 1986 triggered change in energy markets, business and policy as it reinforced 
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existing customer dissatisfaction with British coal, justified fuel substitution in 
power generation, wiped away the energy security argument of maintaining 
domestic coal supply capacity, and thus accelerated the restructuring process. 
This pressure interaction sequence spread like ripples across industry 
environments, providing greater coherence to the overall destabilisation pressure 
front. 
3. Landscape changes, when appropriated locally, can provide the external frame 
of reference for the funnelling and coherent articulation of previously unaligned 
pressures. During the period of study, important landscape trends fundamentally 
altered the interpretive schemes of relevant actors in the industry’s environment. 
The instalment of the liberal doctrine and modern global trade (globalisation) at 
roughly the same time (early 1980s) together altered the socio-economic order. 
Actors in the organisational field appropriated these trends in their local domain: 
a) the Thatcher administration embraced the opportunity to modernise British 
industrial policy, developed new problem framings based on the cultural 
repertoire of ‘international competitiveness’, and proposed the ‘market solution’ 
to put order in ‘sick industries’, b) new entrants in coal mining were better 
adapted to the changing regime rules that they co-produced, c) the ESI expected 
clear benefits from the opening of markets and the primacy of price-based 
competition, while d) the unions resisted the change, engaged in counter-
framing, and in ultimately unsuccessful strike action. Through an actively 
constructed modernising discourse, these landscape changes thus penetrated the 
industry environment, providing a shared orientation for most actors within it 
and thereby contributing to the alignment of pressures for change. 
 
Pressure interactions are thus important in destabilisation processes. In this case, 
specific events and processes have been important in accelerating and directing the 
destabilisation process.  
While the external destabilisation context is punctuated by extreme events and radical 
transformations, these build on and allow making sense of the gradual accumulation of 
problems, thus accelerating their development and the resulting pressure for change. 
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6.5.3 Endogenous enactment of regime destabilisation 
The destabilisation of industries results from external pressures and internal enactment 
processes. I now turn to regime changes and strategy developments from an industry 
perspective. These are summarised in Table 6.5 and analysed below. 
 
Table 6.5: The development of industry strategies 
 
Socio-cultural framing 
strategies
Political strategies Economic positioning 
strategies
Innovation strategies
1967-
1973
Marketing the ‘new’ coal 
industry
Political bargaining for 
continued support
Specialisation, ‘battle for 
fuel’ in power generation, 
Closures and restructuring
Productivity improvements, 
coal-face mechanisation, 
lower grade coal, world-
class R&D
1973-
1981
Framing coal as the fuel 
of the future, raising 
customer confidence, re-
affirming coal’s social role
Lobbying for long-term 
commitments 
Stronghold in power 
generation, some early 
diversification, Stabilisation 
(PfC)
Beginnings of opencast and 
superpits, R&D 
diversification in coal use
1981-
1990
Discursive focus on 
improvements, limited 
ability to resist 
Bargaining for contracts, 
protection against imports, 
and worker compensations
New competitive objectives, 
consolidation: pit closures, 
cost cutting, flexibility
productivity improvements, 
automation, end of R&D
1990-
1997
Lobby for a moratorium 
on CCGT
Cost cutting, further closures
 
 
1967-1973. In response to declining markets, the coal industry positioned itself on the 
only growing market. Industry actors responded to pressure accumulation through the 
abandonment of shrinking markets (decline) and specialisation in a secure market 
pocket (re-orientation). This strategy maintained a reduced, yet relatively stable 
economic environment. Political bargaining and market defence strategies succeeded in 
securing lasting commitments in the power generation market. Technological strategies 
focussed on improved productivity (contraction, mechanisation) for a lower grade 
product with very limited investment. 
1973-1981. The opportunity window brought by the oil crisis was seized. Political 
lobbying strategies reversed the industry’s position with Plan for Coal. Socio-cultural 
framing strategies centred on coal’s strategic importance and its ability to renew itself 
fostered new hopes about Britain’s coal industry for the future. Revived expectations 
and the availability of support led to a strategic reversal: innovation strategies were 
directed at productivity improvements, new pit designs, the beginnings of automation, 
and early diversification attempts in numerous directions opened up by the oil crisis. 
1981-1990. As new policy imperatives called for deep restructuring, the industry tried 
to re-create itself, implementing drastic changes in its mission, identity, values, and 
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strategies. These changes were only possible by crushing miners’ resistance and getting 
rid of the industry’s ‘social’ mission. New competitive objectives and culture guided 
technological strategies (productivity improvements and automation), commercial 
strategies (contract negotiation and protection from imports). As financial and political 
support structures were dismantled, innovation and diversification strategies were 
abandoned in favour of domain defence along familiar lines: improving competitiveness 
through greater mechanisation, automation, de-manning and flexibility. Tremendous 
productivity improvements from consolidation provided hope that British Coal would 
be competitive in relation to international coal price cutters. 
1990-1997. Market collapse and the end of support led the industry to negotiate 
worsening contracts. With its agency limited to implementing the Government’s market 
reform towards privatisation, the deep-mining coal industry continued its contraction 
and reached an insignificant size. 
6.5.4 Destabilisation pattern 
In this case, full destabilisation was accelerated with the rapid and dramatic penetration 
of landscape dynamics into the industry’s environment. However, these transformations 
had been gradually building up, largely unforeseen by an industry preoccupied with 
coping with imminent threats to its survival – which it did successfully (deep 
restructuring, productivity improvements, etc.). In directing its response strategies to 
short-term adjustment and compliance to local pressures (living a permanent crisis), the 
British coal industry failed to attend to the long-term influence of landscape changes to 
which local pressures were linked.48 BC’s technical and managerial re-orientation 
strategy was not in tune with the scale of the radical external changes it was facing. 
Increasing match at the local level concealed a growing gap with landscape changes. 
When strong turbulence (shake up) was introduced at regime level (liberalisation), 
landscape pressures and competing technologies were joined together and destabilised 
the coal industry, which could only delay its terminal decline. 
The more gradual decline path (characterised by the foreseeable accumulation of 
pressures) of the late 1960s was thus rapidly shifted in the early 1970s to a stabilisation 
path with pressures ignored and deflected by the raising of protective barriers. This 
                                                
48 However, it should be noted that the autonomous agency of the coal industry was limited, as it was 
operating under state ownership and within Government control. 
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exceptional outcome was triggered by a profound shock. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction 
with features of the regime accumulated but remained loosely aligned and articulated. In 
the 1980s, the industry trajectory shifted in an attempt of re-creation, in which the 
industry adopted new goals, mission and identity compatible with the altered newly 
institutionalised policy framework (paradigm shift). However, the erosion of slack 
reduced its scope for resource mobilisation and thus increased its vulnerability to 
economic pressures and prevented the success of the industry’s re-creation. In the 
1990s, the industry entered the dissolution stage as socio-political and market pressures 
achieved extreme alignment and radical environment change. 
So, the British coal industry has made important advances in adapting to external 
pressures, but could not cope with the dramatic increase and alignment of pressures in 
multiple domains spanning multiple levels. As destabilisation progressed, the coal 
industry increased its dependence on external support (financial and political), and on 
the loyalty of a single customer/market – both of which turned their back in the 1990s. 
 
A number of explanations for industry failure can now be proposed: 
- The industry pursued myopic adaptation to singular and localised pressures in 
the first two periods, which led to short-sighted crisis management rather than 
long-term renewal strategies. Regime rules were modified incrementally to 
include new competitiveness (price/performance) criteria, flexible working, and 
technological improvements. However, more forward-looking diversification 
strategies and re-creation trajectories (e.g. advanced coal combustion technology 
development, investments abroad, etc.) were abandoned in the 1980s when the 
big ‘resource squeeze’, the loss of political legitimacy, and the withdrawal of 
support took effect. So, in this case, the adverse context became an inhibitor of 
industry re-creation, because the industry did not enjoy the degree of freedom 
necessary to develop creative response in the mid-1980s. The implementation of 
market reform suppressed choice in the strategic options available to the coal 
industry, as it was paralleled by the forced abandonment of diversification 
attempts. With respect to its market and commercial strategies, the industry 
followed a specialisation strategy in a threatened market, but accorded little 
attention to maintaining good customer relationships. With respect to innovation 
strategies, the industry persistently followed an obsolete technological trajectory, 
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resulting in incremental performance improvement, at a time when technological 
alternatives offered much higher performance. 
- the industry neglected the long-term implications of profound landscape 
changes. The threat of international competition and the consequences of the 
coming liberalisations was perceived in the 1980s, but interpreted as the need to 
improve performance and drive prices down, not as a stimulus to search for 
viable long-term strategies. This means that both hope and ability for re-creation 
had vanished by this point. 
- As external conditions worsened, the industry increasingly depended on 
commercial and political protection in a crowded market. Prolonged reliance on 
artificial protection from external pressures increases their destabilising potential 
once they are removed. Indeed, the intensity of the industry destabilisation in the 
1980s-90s can be partly attributed to the incoherence of maintaining 
‘uneconomic’ production capacity requiring protective barriers and subsidies for 
survival. This is however, a consequence of the inflated enthusiasm of the 1970s 
that was based on exceptional commodity price fluctuation. Industry strategy, 
relying on this temporary economic climate, was no more than a house of cards, 
with in-built instability based on external dependence. The associated inflated 
expectations increased the dramatic nature of the subsequent collapse. 
- the industry’s degraded resource base led it to live off past achievements, 
increasingly eroding its slack. Starved of investment (in R&D, in mining), the 
industry concentrated on reaping the benefits of past investments without 
complementing them with sustained investment and creative strategies. The 
resulting improved performance concealed a degraded industry capital structure, 
and inhibited substantial re-creation strategies.  
- Ultimately, the consequences of radical environmental change (dash for gas, 
coal crisis, acid rain constraints, etc.) were unanticipated, surprised the industry, 
and left it no choice but to rapidly contract. 
These sub-processes all participated in the enactment of industry destabilisation, which 
can be synthesised as a downward spiral resulting from a) worsening conditions, b) 
erosion of slack and c) narrowing down of options. The final decline phase was engaged 
when the coal industry lost any future market prospect and engaged in extreme 
downsizing. This process led to the milking of cheap assets (material, and commercial) 
before and after the industry privatisation. 
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7 Case 3: Climate change and the destabilisation of 
coal-fired generation in the UK (1990-2011). 
Possible revival? 
This case study focuses on coal-fired generation as a proposition in the British energy 
mix between 1990 and the present. It particularly investigates the role of the climate 
change issue, which gained momentum in the 1990s. It also investigates the role of a 
technological promise – carbon capture and storage (CCS) – to address this challenge 
within the hypothetical frame of a high coal future. This chapter is thus an application 
of the framework to an open question: How does climate change relate to the 
destabilisation or recreation of coal-fired generation in the UK? 
The case is temporally inscribed within a possible underlying transition ‘in-the-making’ 
(to low-carbon energy systems). This transition is a prospective one, as it is not yet 
accomplished, and (the form of) its materialisation remains uncertain.49 This condition 
complicates the assessment of a destabilisation trajectory. 
Following an overall declining trend, coal-fired generation in the UK today finds itself 
at a crossroads between further decline and renewal in relation to new challenges (in 
particular climate change). Figure 7.1 provides an overview of fuel sources for power 
generation in the UK over the period. The case has been partitioned in three sub-periods, 
corresponding to major events or direction shifts: ESI liberalisation in 1990, the halt of 
the dash for gas and political change in 1997, the step up of climate policies and energy 
security concerns from 2005. 
 
                                                
49 The possibility that this transition will never materialise cannot be excluded. 
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Figure 7.1: Fuel input50 to power generation in the UK, mtce (Data: DECC Historical electricity 
data) 
7.1 1990-1997: Adjustments to liberalised energy markets 
7.1.1 Pressures in economic environment 
7.1.1.1 Landscape 
The 1990s were marked by structural transformations encouraged by neo-liberal 
reforms (see chapter 6). The British economy accelerated its shift from manufacturing 
to a service economy and the growth of its financial sector, while markets became 
increasingly open to international investment and trade. 
Oil prices remained relatively low since 1986. Based on beliefs related to a new age of 
plenty (Smil 2003), energy decision-making relied on optimistic assumptions for oil and 
gas prospects and thus disfavoured coal. 
 
                                                
50 By looking at fuel input, this graph understates the relative importance of electricity generated from 
fuels with higher conversion efficiencies, such as natural gas. 
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Figure 7.2: The price of primary fuels (Data: Fouquet 2011) 
7.1.1.2 Markets 
The electricity market adopted a new form when it was liberalised in 1990. The 
emphasis was set on making way to competition in the energy sector. The privatisation 
of the ESI split the supply part of the business into two main private companies. 
National Power (NP) and PowerGen (PG) were less constrained by political obligations, 
and adopted a different style of decision-making and investment planning. This mainly 
translated into increased freedom of fuel choice. The liberalisation of the ESI also 
opened the industry to new entrants. A wholesale spot market for electricity price-
setting (the ‘Pool’) was introduced, promising the injection of competition and new 
strategies. However, the industry initially remained dominated by PG and NP, which 
raised the concerns of the regulator (OFFER) (Thomas 2006). 
The decade started with an expected upcoming shortage in electricity supply, and 
related new opportunities for investment in power generation. However, as a result of 
the new market arrangements, the market for coal-fired generation plunged in the 1990s 
(Figure 7.1), and looked as though is was going to continue to fall (interview Brewer). 
7.1.1.3 New entrants and technological competition 
The energy gap was initially to be filled by nuclear and coal-fired plant, in accordance 
with previous commitments and practices: 
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“In February 1988, the Board applied for planning consent for two 1800MW coal-fired power 
stations, based on 900MW steam turbine units newly developed by the CEGB in collaboration with 
GEC, one of the British plant manufacturers.” (Winskel 2002:572). 
So, there was still some confidence that coal would continue to play a dominant role in 
power generation. This hope was short-lived, as the CEGB later announced the deferral 
of the construction of these new coal-fired stations (CEGB Annual Report 1988-
1989:15). When NP and PG took over the CEGB’s activities, the programme to build 
coal-fired plants was abandoned in favour of the new enthusiasm for CCGT projects. 
The emerging ‘dash for gas’ was taking shape. New entrants in power generation 
invested in CCGTs, followed by incumbents who now preferred gas: 
“dominant generation technologies were cast aside in favour of a previously unused form: in a 
sudden ‘dash for gas’, all proposals for new coal-fired steam turbine and nuclear power plants were 
abandoned in favour of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) schemes” (Winskel 2002:564). 
The combination of new opportunities in power generation, the availability of cheap 
natural gas, and a liberalised market favouring quick returns on investment led to the 
rapid expansion of CCGTs (Patterson and Grubb 1996). By the end of 1994, the CCGT 
capacity under construction or in service amounted to 13146 MWe, of which 6944 
MWe owned by new generators, 3160 MWe owned by NP and 3042 MWe owned by 
PG (Thomas 1997:66). The resulting rapid decline in the demand for coal was largely 
unforeseen by the government, industry, or commentators (Winskel 2002). 
Gas- systematically replaced coal-fired generation: 
“the advantages of using gas has meant that gas-fired generation has moved from its original 
peaking position in the merit- order to base-load generation, displacing coal-fired plant” 
(Whittington and Bellhouse 2000:206) 
The shorter payback times of CCGT investments meant that investing in coal-fired 
generation became less favoured. Furthermore, gas had environmental benefits over 
coal. 
Nuclear power continued to supply an increasing share of electricity output in the 1990s 
(Figure 7.1), as it benefitted from political support and corresponding investment 
schemes (Thomas 1997). However, nuclear power was not an easy proposition to 
maintain in a privatised setting. Policy support was necessary to sustain the costly 
technology, effectively creating an (embarrassing) special case of technological 
regulation (MacKerron 1999). A moratorium on new nuclear was followed in 1994 by 
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an announcement not to go forward with the construction of new nuclear, thus halting 
the long-term expansion of nuclear power (Verhees 2012). 
7.1.1.4 Price pressure and imports 
The Secretary of State for Energy (Cecil Parkinson) responded to concerns in 
opposition about the expected consequence of ESI privatisation on coal imports and the 
related public interest of supply security: 
“The generators do not want to be over-dependent on a single United Kingdom supplier – they have 
been bitten by that bug four times in the past 20 years. They also know that there is an enormous 
advantage in having a secure, reliable, home-based supplier, and that being over-dependent, or 
dependent to any major extent, on imports can be dangerous.” (HC Deb 26 June 1989 vol 155 
cc763) 
The phase-out of contracts between the major generators and British Coal led to the 
penetration of coal imports. Within five years, “coal prices delivered to power stations 
fell by 20% in real terms and purchases of British coal fell from 74 million tonnes to 30 
million tonnes” (Newbery and Pollitt 1997:270). 
The British coal mining industry collapsed (Figure 7.3): 
“The British mining industry, which had no other credible markets for its coal [besides power 
generation], was effectively destroyed. The implausibility of long-term contracts for British coal 
beyond 1998 meant that investment in new mining capacity could not be justified and needs from 
1990 to 98 were largely met by depleting already developed seams.” (Thomas 2006:590) 
From the perspective of coal-fired generation, however, the decline of the coal industry 
was not too much of a problem, as imported coal was cheaper. 
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Figure 7.3: The provenance of coal used in the UK (mtons) 
7.1.2 Pressure in the socio-political environment 
7.1.2.1 Landscape 
This period saw the instalment of market liberalism beyond political divides in the UK, 
and more generally at the European and global levels. Global environmental problems 
and their governance also became dominant policy concerns.  
7.1.2.2 Policy 
The 1990s were marked by the implementation of the liberalisation agenda, and the 
instalment of a generalised understanding that efficient market allocation will solve 
energy problems. Furthermore, environmental problems (acid rain and climate change) 
became increasingly recognised and led to new policy objectives.  
Decision-making in the electricity industry, traditionally performed by engineers 
(Hannah 1982), was now replaced by market allocation mechanisms and short-term 
financial considerations. The “Pool” system was a wholesale price-setting mechanism in 
which suppliers made bids for generation options (price and capacity) and traders 
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purchased the required amount determined by demand, thus setting the Pool price.51 The 
new system, in the name of the market, replaced engineers by traders, and led to 
changes in the merit order of fuels. 
However, this new system also attracted criticism, namely concerning the manipulation 
of the rules of the game by the two main suppliers: 
“The generation structure was clearly not competitive and by 1993, the Regulator had become 
impatient with what he saw as manipulation of the wholesale (Pool) price by the duopoly” (Thomas 
2006:586) 
The liberalisation of the ESI was accompanied by strong rhetoric about the success of 
market reform and associated long-term benefits (Newbery and Pollitt 1997). These 
included a doubling of labour productivity, dramatic cost reductions in the short-term, 
as well as reduced emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide. 
This apparent success can however be largely attributed to contextual variables such as 
1) favourable fossil fuel markets, 2) improvements in nuclear generation, and 3) a 
resource transfer from taxpayers to consumers (Thomas 2006).  
The Thatcher government, after having obstructed debate on the environment for nearly 
a decade, operated a U-turn and embraced the need to reduce polluting emissions and 
GHG emissions. Thatcher’s speech at the Royal Society in 1988 is commonly seen as 
the landmark of the reversal of the British position to recognise the challenge of climate 
change. This reversal was opportunistically tied to fuel switches in power generation, 
which now promised easily achievable targets for acid rain: 
“Coal’s contraction could now be justified on both economic and environmental grounds.” (Helm 
2003: 347) 
The acid rain problem gathered political clout in the late 1980s, leading to commitments 
and regulations. In 1986, the CEGB announced the retrofit of 6GW of coal-fired plant 
between 1988 and 1997 (The Guardian, September 12, 1986). Planning permission for 
the Drax retrofit was given in 1988 (HoC 1990). Following Britain’s reversed position 
on acid rain, the EU LCPD (88/609/EEC) was finally agreed in 1988, requiring an 
additional 6GW of FGD retrofits. 
However, the LCPD was not immediately transposed into UK law, and emission targets 
were preferred over technological mandates, as it became clear that gas provided a 
                                                
51 The highest accepted bid thus became the Pool price, which all selected generators would receive for 
the electricity sold. 
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cheaper way to reduce emissions and fulfil targets than fitting expensive FGD to coal-
fired power stations. Acid rain regulation thus provided a further argument in favour of 
the replacement of coal by gas. In the remaining coal-fired plants, another effect of 
sulphur regulation was to shift away from British coal in favour of sulphur-leaner coal 
suppliers. 
The policy position towards climate change followed a similar progression to that about 
acid rain: it was inscribed in a move away from the British reputation as the ‘dirty man 
of Europe’. Because of the dash for gas, the British government saw itself in a position 
to actively support GHG emission reductions, the UNFCCC, and be actively engaged in 
the issue internationally (Lovell et al. 2009). In 1992, the UK supported the UNFCCC 
(signed in Rio). 
A number of national policies were formulated in the 1990s. The Non Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO), established in 1990, was presented as a means to encourage the 
development of renewable energy. In practice, however, it was designed merely as a 
way to support the nuclear option (Helm 2010).  
This Common Inheritance, the White Paper on the Environment (DoE 1990), raised 
climate change as an environmental policy priority, underlining the need for educating 
the public, for global cooperation, and for reversing the energy growth trends. In 1994, 
the first UK Climate Change Programme included emission reductions objectives by 
2000. It led to the set up of a value added tax on fuel, and the Energy Saving Trust to 
encourage climate-friendlier behaviour (Lovell et al. 2009, Collier 1997, Pearson and 
Watson 2012). 
7.1.2.3 Societal concerns 
In the 1990s, climate change emerged as a new environmental concern for the British 
public. The geographical and time horizons involved were truly global. It required the 
ability to integrate damage made to future generation in current decision-making. 
Furthermore, climate change is a fairly complex phenomenon that required the 
establishment of a robust scientific consensus for its legitimation (Doyle 2007). Indeed, 
scientists have had a prominent role in raising the issue of climate change, and were, 
together with environmental groups, the early advocates of change. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in 1988. It 
established itself as the most authoritative scientific organisation in the area of climate 
change (Doyle 2007, Turnheim and Tezcan 2010), assuming a leading international role 
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in collecting and assessing the latest scientific findings on climate change. Its first 
assessment report, issued in 1990, was a landmark in building global consensus on 
anthropogenic climate change. 
Environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the Climate 
Action Network, were instrumental in establishing climate change as a major societal 
concern (Doyle 2007, Gough and Shackley 2001). Their activities included lobbying for 
policies, public campaigns, and the production of scientific reports. They involved the 
public through communication campaigns, notably by mobilising graphic images that 
illustrated the early effects of climate change and conveyed symbolic meaning to the 
issue (Doyle 2007). They provided a more popular form of communication as 
alternatives to the scientific consensus-building apparatus of organisations such as the 
IPCC (Forsyth 2003). However, Carvalho and Burgess (2005) suggest that while media 
attention to climate change was high in the early 1990s, it subsequently receded until 
1997 (Figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.4: Distribution of newspaper articles on climate change (1985–2003), number of articles, 
Carvalho and Burgess (2005:1462) 
7.1.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
7.1.3.1 Economic positioning strategy 
New entrants brought new economic positioning strategies to the market, such as 
investment in capacity with shorter payback times like CCGTs. NP and PG swiftly 
followed this practice. 
The liberalisation of energy markets, in conjunction with the rise of global corporations, 
led to the entrance of international energy companies (Patterson 2000), the assets of 
which became internationally traded and regularly changed ownership: 
“In country after country, assets previously assumed without question to be essential for national 
security became the property of foreign owners, changing hands internationally and repeatedly. 
Electricity became an international activity.” (Patterson 2000:1) 
The new electricity market structure, the dash for gas, and the major costs involved in 
the retrofitting of FGD led to the (sometimes premature) closure of coal-fired plants: 
“Between 1990 and 1995 National Power and PowerGen together closed a total of 18,960 MWth of 
coal-fired generating capacity.” (Eames 2000:41) 
, resulting in lower levels of coal-burn (Figure 7.1). 
The drive to reduce costs in the electricity sector led to strategies for improved labour 
productivity. The new owners implemented drastic cuts in employment: 
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“Labour shedding became a sustained feature of the UK electricity industry long before American 
investors arrived. A pre-privatization workforce of around 150,000 was halved during the 1990s and 
cuts of more than a third were made in the first 5 years following privatization.” (Colling and Clark 
2006:1637) 
, leading to substantial productivity improvements: 
“Employment in PowerGen fell from over 9,000 in 1990 to 3,700 in 1995, as productivity more 
than doubled.” (Arrowsmith 2003:154) 
7.1.3.2 Innovation strategies 
R&D budgets had been an early liability of the introduction of the market solution in 
the energy sector from the 1980s (Margolis and Kammen 1999, interview Merrick, 
Jamasb et al. 2008). Table 7.1 shows a clear downward trend in R&D investments by 
electricity utilities following liberalisation. 
 
Table 7.1: R&D investments in the electricity sector (£million), Source: Thomas (1997:79) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
CEGB 135 162 199 201
NP 22 26 17 20 24
PG 5 14 12 10 9
NE 116 95 71 64 51
NGC 7 7 8 8 8
Total 135 162 199 201 150 142 108 102 92
 
Recognising the need to develop more environmentally acceptable ways of burning coal, 
the Department of Trade and Industry created the Clean Coal Technologies Programme 
in 1994. It identified several market opportunities for the development and export of 
technologies, such as advanced combustion equipment. The increased budget remained 
relatively insignificant. 
British Coal, seeing its last remaining market crumbling under the threat of imports and 
shift away from coal, was willing to engage collaboratively in innovation strategies to 
demonstrate the possibility of clean coal-fired generation. However, BC was unable to 
secure capital funding or a market for a 150MW ‘clean coal’ demonstration plan 
(Winskel 2002). 
In the 1990s, the IEA was already suggesting the capture and storage of CO2 (CCS) as a 
promising future solution to reduce carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuel 
in large stationary sources. This solution, it was argued, would “allow continued use of 
the fossil fuel infrastructure, built up over many decades, and avoid the disruption of 
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changing to alternative sources of energy” (Riemer 1996:665). Furthermore, IEA 
scientists did not point to major feasibility problems, besides the significantly increased 
costs, which “still remain favourable compared to many renewable energy options” 
(Riemer 1996:669). This position was thus compatible with the protection of interests in 
fossil fuel generation. 
7.1.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
7.1.4.1 Political and lobbying strategies 
Faced with substantial pressure, actors with interests in coal-fired generation (coal 
mining and power generation companies) developed political and lobbying strategies to 
minimise the effects of liberalisation and to gain protective support. The coal industry 
lobbied for the introduction of changes to the electricity wholesale market (‘the Pool’), 
which was seen as discriminating against coal (Green 1999). The negative effects of the 
dash for gas on energy diversity were repeatedly highlighted as an argument for 
maintaining substantial coal-fired capacity. This strategy led to commitments in the late 
1990s (see next period). 
The coal mining industry also lobbied for continuous support (and subsidies) in 
historical coal constituencies, namely via the Coalfields Community Parliamentary 
group. Resulting measures only tempered the rate of contraction in the industry: 
“In the new order after 1990, the cross-subsidy in favour of coal continued, though at a declining 
rate, especially after 1993.” (MacKerron 2001:564) 
Energy-related industries opposed proposals of an EC carbon tax: 
“The business sector response to the [EC proposal of a carbon] tax has been hostile. The intensity of 
the anti-tax campaign has surprised some national governments and parts of the Commission.” 
(Ikwue and Skea 1994:6). 
, arguing instead for technology and innovation policies 
“This Commission proposal to raise a carbon tax caused concern to the coal industry. CEPCEO 
clearly condemned the discriminatory character of such a tax. The Ad Hoc Committee prepared the 
document “Advanced Clean Coal Technologies”, forwarded to the European Commission and again 
arguing that a clean technology was more constructive with respect to the environment than any 
carbon tax. This document was received favourably both by the European Commission and the 
European Parliament.” (Euracoal 2010:17) 
The abandonment of the carbon tax proposal in the UK suggests the success of these 
lobbying activities. 
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7.1.4.2 Framing strategies 
Climate change and air pollution emerged as significant concerns for power generators 
in the 1990s. The new momentum on climate change led fossil fuels interests worldwide 
to develop counter-framing strategies: 
“Fossil fuels interests disputed the science, economics and policy proposals put forward by the 
IPCC. They were also prominent in negotiations at the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, the world’s largest-ever environmental conference, in Rio de Janeiro 1992.” 
(Patterson 1999:71) 
The Global Climate Coalition (GCC) was formed in 1989, in the wake of the IPCC’s 
first meeting. It was formed of major international companies with interests in fossil 
fuels (oil, coal, car, etc.). It engaged in continued counter-framing activities against 
climate science until the late 1990s, influencing, among other things, the US official 
position on climate negotiations (Kolk and Pinkse 2007). It engaged in a denial of 
climate science, and targeted lobbying on policy proposals. A central part of this 
strategy consisted in the involvement of ‘experts’ to highlight the uncertainties of 
climate change science (Dunlap and McCright 2010). According to Ikwue and Skea 
(1994:6) the coal industry in Europe has tended to “argue that conclusive evidence for 
climate change does not exist and that any action is unwarranted” in the debate around a 
EU carbon tax proposal. 
7.2 1997-2005: Climate change and maintaining coal-fired capacity 
7.2.1 Pressures in economic environment 
7.2.1.1 Landscape 
The period was marked by shifts in the international dimension of energy trades. The 
growth of emerging countries in the global economy led to rising global energy use 
(Smil 2003). Oil prices became less stable and started rising (Figure 7.2). The UK 
became a net energy importer in 2004 in relation to the erosion of North Sea reserves. 
7.2.1.2 Markets 
With no major plans to invest in coal-fired generation, the market for coal depended on 
the amount of coal-burn in the existing capital stock, declining with plant 
decommissioning. The dash for gas had put coal-fired generation under a substantial 
amount of pressure to maintain its share of the market. However, declining demand for 
coal in power generation stabilised around 45 million tonnes towards the end of the 
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1990s (Figure 7.1). This stabilisation was related to changes in markets and prices, but 
also to the role of policy intervention in mediating the competition from alternatives 
(gas and nuclear). Crucially, the ‘Pool’ was reviewed in the late 1990s and was replaced 
by the introduction of bi-lateral contracting, which allowed fuel suppliers to negotiate 
their selling price and thus levelled the playing field between different alternatives 
(interview Brewer). From 2000, the market for coal in power generation experienced 
fluctuations, largely related to changes in gas/coal price ratios, but on average tended to 
rise again. In the context of rising fuel prices, coal’s relative low cost (Figure 7.5) 
contributed to the stability of coal-fired generation, thus levelling-off its decline. 
 
Figure 7.5: Average fuel prices paid by UK power producers at delivery point (DECC 2010:28) 
 
Furthermore, the generalisation of coal contracts allowed some form of stability for 
domestic coal producers, who were able to plan their investments over 3-4 years. This 
tended to favour investment in surface mining over the more capital-intensive deep 
mining (interview Brewer). 
7.2.1.3 Technological competition 
The intense technological pressure on coal-fired generation resulting from the dash for 
gas was relaxed in the late 1990s. In 1998 a moratorium on new gas-fired plants was 
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imposed to slow down further development. This was justified by concerns about fuel 
diversity in power generation, but was also inscribed in a political move by the newly-
elected Labour Party to show its support to coal communities (Beynon et al. 1999). 
Coal-fired generation was temporarily relieved, and the dramatic contraction rate of the 
coal industry was stabilised. The coal industry welcomed this sign of support (Coal 
Authority Annual report and accounts 1998-99:2). This relief was only temporary, as 
the moratorium was lifted in November 2000 (Simmonds 2002), thus increasing the 
technological pressure again. 
The decommissioning of nuclear plants without replacement (Verhees 2012) led to the 
continuous decline in nuclear power until 2007 (Figure 7.1). 
Meanwhile, despite some early policies to stimulate the deployment of renewable 
energy technology, very little progress has been observed (Mitchell and Connor 2004), 
so that in practice renewable technologies did not represent a substantial threat for coal-
fired generation. 
7.2.1.4 New entrants 
The liberalisation of British power generation had attracted foreign investors, namely 
American companies such as Edison and AES (Colling and Clark 2006). However, 
American investors were quick to sell back these activities, unlike other investors such 
as the German E.On and the French EdF. 
7.2.2 Pressure in the socio-political environment 
7.2.2.1 Landscape 
The British model of privatised and liberalised energy markets became widely adopted 
worldwide (Thomas 2006). An EU directive (96/92/EC) generalised the gradual 
introduction of competition in electricity markets across the European Union, followed 
by moves towards a single European electricity market (2003/54/EC).  
In the UK, the apparent benefits of the free market were embraced beyond political 
boundaries. The incoming Labour government continued to support and reproduce the 
institutional dimension of the market ideology (Scrase and MacKerron 2009:96, Fudge 
et al. 2008:41). The uncontested instalment of the market logic in energy regimes 
manifested itself in 
“the view that efficiency is best pursued through competition wherever competition is possible.” 
(MacKerron 2001:553) 
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However, beyond this rhetorical veil, the market design was far from perfect, and a 
number of problems called for regulations. Notably, the short-termism dominating 
investment decisions hindered investment in capital-intensive projects, and created great 
difficulties for raising funds to build new plants (Roques et al. 2005). Furthermore, 
growing concerns about energy security and climate change led to calls to reconcile 
privatised energy markets with public interests. 
7.2.2.2 Policy 
Given the acquired nature of market competition goals, energy policy revolved around 
two major (new) concerns: climate change and energy security (especially from 2003). 
These new issues were framed as externalities, which markets do not take into account 
but relate to public goods, and may require financial assistance or policy signals. So, in 
a sense, ‘free’ markets started to expose their limits. 
Climate change concerns increased their political salience in the 1990s. The Kyoto 
Protocol was agreed in 1997, paving the way for GHG reduction targets. Britain was 
willing to assume a leading role in this global challenge early in the process:  
“The Labour party made climate change a central component of its 1997 election campaign. In July, 
Labour declared that, if elected, it would reduce British CO2 emissions by 20 percent [on 1990 
levels] by 2010.” (Cass 2007:45) 
Beyond such political announcements, which have been criticised for being mere 
‘targets’ rather than actual commitments (MacKerron 1999), interest in climate policy 
seriously picked up in 2000: 
“an influential report by the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 2000) 
catalysed reinvigoration of the climate change debate, and brought this issue squarely onto the 
agenda of energy policy. The RCEP proposed that the UK adopt an ambitious, long-term, target of a 
60% reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions from 1998 levels by 2050. It was also important in 
focusing attention on the need for the state to reengage with the energy sector, after the `hands- off’ 
approach of the 1990s.” (Lovell et al. 2009:95) 
Greater policy interest in addressing climate change led to proposals and debates on the 
best course of action in the energy sector. Early policy instruments included the Climate 
Change Levy (CCL), launched in March 2000. In practice, it was a rather complicated 
arrangement, on taxing energy output regardless of carbon content, concerned only 
industrial sources, and included a lot of exemptions. The CCL thus illustrated the 
influence of energy-intensive industries on climate policy: 
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“The negotiated agreements were complex, involved much bureaucracy, and needed to be 
monitored and enforced. From an environmental perspective, they represented a retrograde step, 
helping to support the very industries which are most energy intensive.” (Helm 2003: 356) 
Initiating a true shift in energy policy from the imperatives of economic efficiency to 
those of long-term carbon reduction strategy seemed to require “greater public and 
stakeholder involvement in policymaking” (MacKerron 2009:80). The White Paper on 
energy policy (DTI 2003) institutionalised a central role for climate change in energy 
policy.  
There was an emerging agreement at national and EU levels that emissions should be 
reduced, but positions varied as to the means to meet such objectives (e.g. a mixture of 
market instruments (such as a tax or cap-and-trade system), regulations, and innovation 
policy to support the development of low-carbon alternatives). In the UK, the emission 
reduction policy revolved around 
“a climate-change strategy to achieve [its emissions] target through renewables (the Renewables 
Obligation and the Renewables Obligation Certificates) and energy efficiency, with some support 
from emissions trading (the UK ETS and then the EU ETS).” (Helm 2008:226) 
So, it mainly focussed on (relatively weak) incentives for cleaner energy rather then the 
regulation of the most carbon-intensive sources such as coal. The emphasis was put on 
more readily ‘acceptable’ market mechanisms to curb emissions. 
The idea of an emissions trading scheme, although initially unfavoured, gained 
momentum in Europe and in the UK at the turn of the century (Voss 2007). The UK 
wanted to take a head start to gain early experience with trading, and so developed an 
emissions trading experiment. An EU Directive was adopted in 2003 for a first trading 
period starting in 2005: 
“From 2005 onwards, the EU ETS established a European market of allowances for 2.2 billion tons 
of carbon emissions from 11,500 installations. In 2006 the daily transaction volume in emission 
allowances reached 60 million Euro.” (Voss 2007:113) 
The EU ETS reframed climate goals by establishing a strong link with the liberalisation 
framework, thereby giving “a stronger role for economic expertise as well as a 
reframing of the pollution problem from moral condemnation to efficient allocation” 
(Voss 2007:114).  
Observers suggested that the EU ETS would dramatically affect the level of coal-burn: 
“The 2001 energy plan expected coal's share of power generation to fall from 35% to 20% as the 
European Union cap on carbon emissions bites.” (The Business, 29 August 2004, p.10) 
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The emerging consensus on the need to address climate change with stringent policies 
could potentially translate into serious challenges for coal-fired generation, namely in 
the form of economic disincentives for coal via carbon pricing, the eventual translation 
of domestic emissions targets through regulatory limits, and technological pressures 
resulting from incentives to low-carbon technologies. These developments negatively 
affected perceptions of the future of coal and coal investments. 
Energy policy debates were also affected by fluctuations in energy prices. These market 
changes led to the re-emergence of energy security on the horizon. While these 
concerns would truly materialise in the next period, they already provided hints that 
coal could play a greater role in the near future, if it could position itself positively in 
relation to such debates. 
7.2.2.3 Societal problems 
Public concerns around energy related to climate change. By 2000, there was “a new 
sense of urgency attached to risks from climate change” (Carvalho and Burgess 
2005:1466),  
“By 2000, there was a wide, if not unanimous, consensus that global warming was a fact, and that 
the greenhouse gas emissions projections on the basis of business-as-usual over the first half of the 
twenty-first century would not be remotely sustainable” (Helm 2003: 369-70) 
The IPCC’s third assessment report (2001) marked a turning point in the recognition of 
the science of climate change, and so contributed to raise the issue’s international 
profile. By this time, the general public had become convinced that something had to be 
done about climate change (interview Brewer). 
Major environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace and WWF, became increasingly 
involved in developing ‘grey’ literature, which bridged the gap between academic 
research and the public (Gough and Shackley 2001), and disseminated this information 
to the public. Furthermore, they developed powerful imagery to engage the public about 
the manifestations of the effect of climate change (Doyle 2007, Gough and Shackley 
2001). News reports on climate change focused on the more dramatic events such as 
floods and abrupt weather, which were good news selling items (Carvalho and Burgess 
2005). 
In this context, the long-term prospects for coal-fired generation were bleak. Indeed: 
“nobody [saw] any coal revival in the EU, only further decline” (Smil 2003:236) 
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Because of the rise of climate change concerns, the legitimacy of coal-fired generation 
was further downgraded. 
7.2.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
7.2.3.1 Economic positioning strategy 
While the early years of liberal electricity markets had led to the vertical disintegration 
of the business, and the influx of new entrants, the emerging trend shifted towards 
greater concentration and the re-integration of generation and retail activities. Full 
competition was applied in 1998. Through mergers and takeovers of exiting firms 
(Collier 1998:100), the industry’s structure evolved towards an oligopoly in which six 
companies of similar size (the ‘Big Six’) share the virtual totality of the market. 
“Leading energy companies, whatever their historical origins, are racing to stay at the cutting edge, 
pursuing mergers and takeovers, invading new markets, redefining the ways they do business and 
even the business they are in.” (Patterson 2000:2) 
Financial power and economies of scale have become important success factors in 
liberalised electricity industries. 
Coal-fired generation was relieved temporarily by the moratorium on gas and in the 
medium term by the reform of the Pool, which allowed bi-lateral contracts of typically 
2-4 years to be negotiated between coal suppliers and generators (interview Brewer): 
“The successful conclusion to the contractual negotiations for the supply of British coal to the 
electricity industry [provided a more level “playing field” for British coal].” (Coal Authority Annual 
report and accounts 1998-99:2) 
However, barriers to the development of new coal-fired projects remained high. One 
exception was the American AES’ new coal-fired station at Uksmouth, coming on 
stream in August 2000.  
7.2.3.2 Innovation strategies 
While the UK had led a number of world-class coal generation research programmes up 
to the 1980s, most of its capacity had been abandoned. This was particularly true of coal 
utilisation research, which was an early liability of the industry’s restructuring in the 
1980s (interview Merrick). 
However, pressing environmental constraints required the development and deployment 
of ‘cleaner’ technologies, and thus raised the question of raised concerted efforts and 
state involvement with coal research once more.  
Improving the environmental performance of coal-fired generation focused on: 
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- cleaning up flue-gases in response to acid rain and other forms of pollution, 
- improving efficiency through advanced combustion technologies, and 
- investigating the possibility of capturing and storing CO2 emissions 
Firstly, most British coal-fired plant had been fitted with low-NOx burners. FGD had 
been fitted at a small number of plants (Watson 2005), and further adoption would be 
required for continued operation under the LCPD and related sulphur limits. The 
adoption of these ‘cleaner’ coal technologies were acclaimed and publicised as the 
future of coal: 
“Coal, one of the world's dirtiest forms of fuel, is set to make an unlikely comeback as power 
companies invest millions of pounds in technology to clean it up (…) “[FGD technology] is the 
future for coal-fired power stations. Using this technology ensures that coal can still hold a key 
place within a balanced portfolio of energy assets,” [the chief executive of EDF Energy] said.” (The 
Times, November 1, 2004, p.50) 
Secondly, besides these relatively well-known technologies, progress in coal 
combustion had focussed on improved thermal efficiency (Oliver 2008). Supercritical 
pulverised coal technologies, developed in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s, diffused 
worldwide from the late 1990s (Watson 2005). They could reach thermal efficiencies of 
40-45%. Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle technology (IGCC) relies on the 
gasification of coal for use in CCGTs, allowing thermal efficiencies of 40-45%. 
However, this technology remained very costly (Watson 2005), and experienced 
difficulties competing with supercritical technologies (Lockwood 2008). 
These research efforts were supported by a strong rhetoric about future prospects for 
exports to India and China, where coal-fired generation experienced high growth rates, 
justifying state involvement in supporting clean coal development: 
“[The Chinese] market represents one of the biggest export opportunities for UK plant and 
equipment companies worth up to £300 billion over the next decade or so - with much more beyond. 
The UK’s share of this market, if it can retain its current proportion of the world power equipment 
market, could be some £30 billion over the next ten years or so.” (DTI 1999:6)  
Thirdly, early exploration of CCS technological options was seen as a more distant 
technological trajectory to be pursued. 
7.2.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
As climate change established itself as an important issue, the space for industry to 
openly contest it was reduced. Consequently, industry socio-political strategies focussed 
on the details of policy implementation, the search to delay and direct responses, and 
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the establishment of a role for coal within the new constraints, rather than denying the 
scientific basis. 
7.2.4.1 Political and lobbying strategies 
British and European coal industries sought to firmly re-establish a role for coal, and 
thus engaged in political and lobbying strategies to build support. In response to 
perceptions that coal would be the ideal target for CO2 reductions, organisations 
representing coal interests suggested that coal will necessarily play a role in tomorrow’s 
energy systems, and that efforts should focus on developing appropriate solutions: 
“[The European Committee on Solid Fuels] drew attention to the fact that climate protection and 
security of energy supply were much better responses than eliminating coal from the energy mix 
thanks to modern technology and Clean Coal Technology.” (EURACOAL 2010:22) 
The British Government recognised the potential of clean coal to deliver on climate 
challenges: 
“The Government Energy White Paper “Our energy future – creating a low carbon economy” 
(published in February 2003) leaves open a number of important options for the future for coal and 
some critical clean coal technology initiatives were supported, together with a package of 
indigenous coal support through investment aid.” (Coal Authority Annual report and accounts 2002-
2003:2) 
With respect to specific policies, coal-related interests lobbied policy arenas to 
influence decision-making. The EU ETS was seen as problematic, and efforts were 
mobilised to reduce its influence: 
“Emissions trading was the topic causing concern for the coal industry, especially for coal-fired 
power plants (…) EURACOAL obviously monitored the development of this directive very 
carefully.” (EURACOAL 2010:24) 
Because of their sheer weight, carbon-intensive industries had a significant influence 
over policy formulation: 
 “Policymakers have mainly responded to corporate lobbying of Europe’s largest emitters to ensure 
their participation (…) because they provide the necessary trading volume and liquidity for the EU 
scheme to succeed” (Kolk and Pinkse 2007:204) 
Lobbying efforts led to the allocation of free allowances to emitters in the EU ETS on 
the basis of 1990 emissions. 
Another area for lobbying consisted in limiting external support to alternatives. Indeed, 
as renewable energy became increasingly discussed as one way to reduce carbon 
emissions, carbon-intensive industries systematically tried to play down the role of 
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alternatives such as renewables. Support to renewables was portrayed as a costly option. 
Niche-protection was interpreted as the introduction of market distortion. 
The industry also needed long-term support to develop an R&D programme that would 
be able to make the vision of ‘clean coal’ and low-carbon coal-fired generation possible. 
The DTI Cleaner Coal Technology Programme was driven by the will to support 
activities that industry would otherwise not develop for lack of short-term incentives: 
“Government involvement by initiating a new Cleaner Coal Technology Programme should, by 
contributing some financial support to projects and encouraging collaboration, accelerate 
development work on cleaner coal technology which would otherwise be on a smaller scale and 
much slower in being progressed” (DTI 1999:10)  
At the same time, CCS gained momentum as a possible low-carbon energy option for 
the future. The IPCC assessed the status of the technology and steps that could favour 
its development (IPCC 2005). 
7.2.4.2 Framing strategies 
In a time of raised environmental concerns and awareness, coal had become a 
problematic fuel and was pointed as both the main source of CO2 and the priority target 
for abatement: 
“According to the informal and official opinions of the European Commission, climate problems 
linked to the amount of CO2 were due to coal. The simplest solution, to respect the Kyoto 
commitments, would be to close down coal plants.” (EURACOAL 2010:22) 
Indeed, 
“coal plants will become less economical to run as the carbon emissions trading, which will be 
introduced in the country from January, is introduced. Britain's dirtiest coal plants will begin to 
close down from 2008, when much tighter restrictions on emissions of sulphur dioxide will come 
into force.” (The Times, 11 November 2004, p.50) 
At the European level, it was recognised that coal’s strategic significance had been 
seriously downgraded: 
“Nuclear energy and solid fuels are the undesirables among energy products” (EC 2000:31) 
“coal's future depends largely on the development of techniques which make it easier to use (…) 
and lessen its environmental impact in terms of pollutant emissions through clean combustion 
technologies and CO2 sequestration.” (EC 2000:38) 
Acknowledging coal’s importance to future energy supply needs thus meant that other 
challenges would have to be addressed. The 2003 White Paper thus still recognised a 
role for coal with conditions: 
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“Coal fired generation will also have an important part to play in widening the diversity of the 
energy mix provided ways can be found materially to reduce its carbon emissions. We will continue 
to support relevant research projects, including internationally, to develop options for cleaner coal 
technologies and for carbon capture and storage.” (DTI 2003:12) 
7.3 2005-2011: the energy gap, carbon constraints, and the CCS 
promise  
7.3.1 Pressures in economic environment 
7.3.1.1 Landscape 
Energy prices continued their ascension since the late 1990s (Figure 7.2, IEA 2011), 
with oil experiencing the sharpest rise in relation to the troubled geo-political situation 
in the Middle East, and concerns about fuel availability. These market developments 
raised anxieties concerning the ability to continue pursuing energy-intensive 
development patterns.  
The financial crisis of 2008 has triggered economic difficulties and plunged the world in 
global recession and uncertain prospects. The downgrading of banks and financial 
institutions, as well as the implementation of national austerity measures, has further 
degraded the investment context. As a result, the investment climate for the energy 
sector has become highly uncertain (IEA 2011). 
While the climate change issue had made it on the discursive space of energy policy 
(long-term trend), the economic crisis coincided with a notable downward shift in 
attention (Figure 7.7) and political ability to find acceptable compromises. 
7.3.1.2 Markets 
In this gloomy context, global markets for coal are thriving. Anxieties about rising oil 
and gas prices are leading economies worldwide to fall back on cheap and domestically 
abundant fuel sources. While coal prices have been seriously affected by global energy 
price rises (although to a lesser degree than oil and gas), coal markets have continued to 
expand globally, especially in large rapidly-growing countries such as China (IEA 
2011): 
“For all the talk about natural gas and renewables, coal unquestionably won the energy race in the 
first decade of the 21st century” (IEA 2011:355). 
It is noteworthy that most of this capacity expansion did not involve most efficient plant 
designs. Furthermore, this trend is expected to continue under current energy policies 
(IEA 2011).  
  
244 
The British market for coal did not experience this expansion. Coal-fired generation was 
the main option affected by the decrease in total demand for electricity between 2006 
and 2009 (Figure 7.1). As of 2006, the international coal price rose in response to the 
global appetite for coal. As a result, domestic coal supply was becoming increasingly 
competitive again in the UK (interview Brewer). Figure 7.6 illustrates the rise and 
subsequent fall in imports of steam coal into the UK as of 2006, which can be explained 
by reliance on stockpiling, rising international coal price, and a temporal decrease in 
coal-burn. Furthermore, it displays the growing importance of Russian imports, and 
more recently Colombian coal, as well as the decreasing importance of imports from 
South Africa. 
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Figure 7.6: Steam coal imports to the UK (Data: DECC, available online at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/statistics/source/coal/et2_4.xls, accessed October 23, 2011) 
 
Britain’s ageing power plant capital stock called for new investment decisions to fill the 
‘generation gap’. The decommissioning of older (nuclear and coal) capacity, requiring 
replacement ahead of 2015-6, re-opened the debate on fuel and technology choice. The 
upcoming capacity renewal created a window of opportunity for the re-positioning of 
various fuel options. Because of very long investment cycles characterising the power 
sector (IEA 2010:6), and additional delays for planning permissions, this issue became 
pressing by 2005. While the general tendency was towards the decommissioning of 
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coal-fired capacity, there was a renewed interest in the coal option, provided it would 
be clean. 
7.3.1.3 Technological alternatives 
Coal-fired generation faced competition in current and future markets. Coal absorbed 
most of the slump in electricity demand (Figure 7.1). In terms of future fuel choice for 
generation, coal had to compete with plans for nuclear power, oil- and gas-fired 
generation and renewable energy. 
From 2005, with the rise of energy security and climate change concerns, a hidden 
agenda emerged about re-opening the nuclear option, which was framed as the main 
solution to the climate issue in power generation (Carvalho and Burgess 2005). This 
official positioning was made public in Tony Blair’s speech to the CBI in 2005, where 
he assert the need to re-evaluate the nuclear option. This comeback was highly 
controversial, as witnessed by Greenpeace’s successful application for a judicial review 
on the lack of consultation (MacKerron 2009). However, commitment to future nuclear 
expansion was confirmed in the 2008 White Paper on nuclear power (DBERR 2008). 
The government progressively developed serious plans to build an additional 16GW of 
nuclear capacity to come on stream by 2025 (www.decc.gov.uk, accessed October 20, 
2011). The Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011 has led to additional ‘safety and 
emergency preparedness’ requirements, but hasn’t yet altered these plans substantially 
(ONR 2011).  
Comparatively, the contribution of renewable energy to power generation by 2010 
remained relatively low in Britain, with a total of 9GW of installed capacity 
(predominantly onshore wind), contributing to around 7% of net annual power 
generation. Renewable energy development has been admittedly slow in the UK, 
especially given the substantial rhetoric efforts invested at governmental levels. This 
situation is arguably due to change with planned investments for nearly 30GW 
additional capacity, notably in onshore wind power (DECC 2011e). 
So, there is, and can be expected to be substantial technological competition within 
power generation. ‘Clean coal’ is increasingly assumed to have its part to play: 
“It has become accepted that there are limitations to the amount of renewables that can be 
incorporated on the grid, that it is becoming too late for new nuclear to make a significant 
contribution before 2016 and that the generation gap, which is now widely recognised as being 20–
29 GW, will need to be filled by a combination of renewables, gas and clean coal.” (Farley 2007:16) 
  
246 
7.3.2 Pressure in the socio-political environment 
7.3.2.1 Landscape 
A number of developments led to increasing concerns about a looming energy crisis in 
Britain, due to dependence on gas imports from troubled regions, the ageing of power 
plant capacity, and the slow development of new capacity. 
Another source of concern was related to climate change. The unprecedented degree of 
public attention contrasted with the slow progress of international climate negotiations, 
and the relative dilution of international concerns from 2009 (see Figure 7.7). Indeed, 
while Europe and the UK seemed to have made theoretical and political positioning 
advances on the subject, global disagreement on the means to tackle carbon emissions 
resulted in the inability to achieve binding international agreements (most recently at 
the climate talks in Copenhagen 2009 and in Durban 2011). 
Furthermore, the financial crisis, which hit America and Europe most violently from 
2008, refocused policy interest and political action towards economic imperatives, thus 
shifting attention away from public good concerns such as climate change. Political 
discourse became embroiled around the themes of jobs and spending cuts. In Britain, 
long-term structural investment plans were weakened. 
So, while energy security and climate change established themselves as policy priorities, 
energy decision-making and markets were also fraught with uncertainties. 
7.3.2.2 Societal pressure against climate change 
A number of authoritative publications contributed to increase the traction of the 
climate change problem internationally and domestically. The Stern Review (Stern 
2007) increased the momentum of the climate change issue in the UK and worldwide. 
By making explicit links between climate imperatives and the costs and benefits of 
abatement, it has contributed to increase the sense of urgency and introduced a new 
form of pragmatism for energy-related policymaking. 
Furthermore, the Stern Review drew substantial media and public attention to the issue 
of climate change, as witnessed by rising media coverage of the issue from 2005, 
peaking in 2009 (Figure 7.7): 
“In October 2006, climate change succeeded in making headlines across the UK, even in media 
outlets that are not normally inclined to give environmental stories much airtime. The trigger for 
this sudden and much more heightened interest was the publication of a wide-ranging study of the 
economic costs and benefits of climate change, pulled together by Sir Nicholas Stern, the UK 
Treasury's chief adviser on climate change issues.” (Jordan and Lorenzoni 2007:310) 
  
247 
absolute # articles
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
*
The Guardian
The Times
The Independent
Daily Express
 
Figure 7.7: References to 'climate change' in major British newspapers, wordcount, Data courtesy 
of Bram Verhees (originally compiled for Verhees (2012: 230)) 
 
The IPCC’s fourth report (2007) also made headlines when it was released, and added a 
sense of certainty to the claims of climate scientists (Jordan and Lorenzoni 2007:317). 
Al Gore’s ‘An inconvenient truth’ released in the UK mid-September 2006 (Boykoff 
2008), contributed to raise awareness and understanding of the climate change problem 
and related challenges. The attribution of the Nobel Peace Prize jointly to the IPCC and 
Al Gore in 2007 signalled the important efforts towards making the scientific and policy 
case against climate change. 
These high-level landmarks resonated with a wider audience and contributed to raise 
the issue’s public profile: 
“public perceptions – and with them concerns – that the climate is changing have strengthened 
appreciably in the past few years.” (Jordan and Lorenzoni 2007:313) 
, leading to a raised level of urgency 
“While concerns about environmental degradation have a long history, the past five or so years have 
seen the emergence of an environmental politics that makes new claims about the urgency of 
climate change as a problem to be addressed if a catastrophic future for human society and the 
wider ecosystems it depends on are to be avoided.” (North 2011:1581) 
  
248 
However, despite the involvement of high-level scientists, activists, environmental 
groups and members of the public, it remains unclear whether they will be enough to 
address the immensity of the challenge faced: 
“the extent to which activism is generating a large enough social change movement that will enable 
humanity to avoid serious problems associated with future climate change is challengeable.” (North 
2011:1581-2) 
Furthermore, there is a notable downward trend in media attention to the climate issue 
since 2009 (Figure 7.7), which is likely to be related to the shadow cast by the financial 
crisis and related economic considerations. 
Climate change framings also faced the opposing claims of climate denial. Climate 
scepticism received disproportionate media coverage (North 2011, Pearce 2010), and 
seized opportunities to construct scandals. The “Climategate”, for instance, involving 
the hacking of a climate research centre in 2009, was mobilised to dismiss climate 
science as fraudulent, and attracted substantial media coverage.  
7.3.2.3 Policy 
The issues of 1) energy security and 2) climate change firmly established themselves as 
central determinants of energy policymaking. 
Firstly, energy security came to the fore with anxiety about energy dependence. 
According to MacKerron (2009:79), the energy debate changed substantially in the UK, 
owing to the gradual return of energy security concerns with rising oil and gas prices. 
Indeed, “oil and gas prices became much less stable and on occasion very high” 
(MacKerron 2009:79). These fluctuations opened the debate on the import-dependence 
of the British energy system, and were framed as a major policy challenge. The new 
framing relied on: 
“official scare mongering about an alleged (but implausible) major dependence on Russian gas 
supply in the future, and assertions that Russia would inevitably prove an unreliable supplier. By 
2006 the rhetoric of vulnerability to malign foreigners had become strident, and government was 
advancing the twin ideas of advancing energy insecurity and pursuit of carbon emission reductions 
as the heart of energy policy objectives.” (MacKerron 2009:80) 
Secondly, Britain was committed to reducing its carbon emissions within the Kyoto 
Protocol, and increasingly sought to become a leading figure on climate change in the 
international arena. Policies translated implicit choices in the means to tackle climate 
change. The preferred solution would require international cooperation, a stable 
economic framework for investment and support to promising large-scale technological 
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options. The White Paper 2007 (DTI 2007), “laid primary stress on international 
strategy, and the need to tackle climate change and energy security jointly” (MacKerron 
2009:87, my emphasis), asserted the importance of the EU ETS mechanism, supported 
technological options such as nuclear power and CCS, and favoured “streamlined (more 
centralised and authoritarian) processes for planning approvals”. 
The results of the Stern Review (Stern 2007) were very influential. They not only 
suggested that tackling climate change was urgent and necessary, but also made an 
economic case for emissions reductions. Soaring energy prices also meant that energy 
security became a strategic domestic policy issue once more. Both policy objectives 
became interlinked in energy policy discourse: 
“We need therefore, to establish a strategy which delivers both energy and climate security. It is not 
sustainable to achieve one without the other. The investment decisions taken over the next two 
decades, will be critical in determining the world’s energy and climate security and, therefore, its 
economic future.” (DTI 2007:28).  
These commitments were confirmed in the following years, when policy emphasis 
shifted to implementation: 
“In the years since 2007, there has been an increasing emphasis on detailed policy implementation” 
(Pearson and Watson 2012:27) 
Indeed, in 2007, EU leaders agreed to 20% emissions reductions on 1990 levels by 2020 
(the so-called ‘20-20-20’). In response to domestic political debate about the lack of 
serious commitments to emissions reductions, the Climate Change Act (2008) 
introduced a legal framework for the implementation of an 80% emissions reduction by 
2050. In 2009, the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan set out a range of measures and 
strategies to reach these new ambitious targets, confirming the central role of the three 
prioritised technological options for power generation. The Renewable Energy Strategy 
(RES) announced a target of 15% renewable sources in the energy mix by 2020.  
In relation to these new priorities, the main policy emphasis concerned 1) markets for 
carbon, and 2) the role of low-carbon energy technologies.  
Firstly, UK energy policy remained highly committed to the role of markets for the 
efficient allocation of choice in the energy domain. This market however had to be 
regulated to take into account externalities such as climate change. The UK was one of 
the early countries to experiment with carbon trading. In 2005, the EU ETS was created 
as a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions from large industrial combustion. 
However, this system has been criticised for its low level of ambition due to 
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implementation details such as the free allocation of allowances,52 and numerous 
exemptions and loopholes bare the imprint of powerful interests in high-emissions 
sectors such as power generation: 
“ ‘Internalizing’ market failure such as CO2 emissions has proved to be highly contentious however 
and governments have been so far unwilling to set a price on carbon that can be agreed upon.” 
(Fudge et al. 2008:43) 
Ideally, the EU ETS should be unfavourable to coal as compared to other sources of 
power. Implementation details reduced this threat in practice: 
“In theory, carbon pricing should deter investment in new coal plants. However, so far the EU ETS 
has not been effective in driving down emissions, let alone influencing investment decisions. This is 
mainly because allowances have been too generous, and the time frame of each phase of the scheme 
has been too short.” (Lockwood 2008:30) 
Secondly, in terms of technological choice, the joint challenge of energy security and 
climate change was framed as calling for secure, diverse and low-carbon energy sources. 
In terms of technology policy, this meant that future energy systems would rely on a 
portfolio of technological options, and that support should be given for the development 
and deployment of a range of low-carbon alternatives. The 2007 White Paper on energy 
policy (DTI 2007) emphasised Government support to three main technological options 
in the electricity sector: renewables, CCS for fossil fuels, and nuclear power. Support to 
CCS was further signalled through a number of provisions in the 2008 Energy Act. 
In the context of technology strategies to deliver the UK low-carbon energy transition, 
coal-fired generation has received a mixture of pressure and support. Indeed, as coal-
fired generation is the most energy-intensive source of electricity and a substantial 
source of acidification, stricter targets tend to discourage coal, and encourage its 
decommissioning. For instance, the implementation of the EU LCPD required coal-fired 
generators to install abatement equipment or opt out of the scheme and plan to shut 
down by 2015: 
“The [EU LCP] Directive is expected to result in the closure of about half of the UK’s remaining 
coal powered electricity generating capacity by 2015.” (Shackley and Green 2007:230) 
However, 2005-6 can also be seen as a turning point in the recognition that coal will 
play a substantial role in energy supply in the future, not least because of disruptions in 
                                                
52 Criticism about free allocation of allowances has led to a reform that should enable the auctioning of 
over half of the allowances from 2013 (http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm, accessed 
September 15, 2011). 
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gas supplies, the recognition of an emerging capacity gap, and increasing momentum in 
the support for CCS technology (Farley 2007). So, coal-fired generation found itself at 
a crossroads between decline and renewal. A coal future in the UK became 
increasingly likely, but dependent on the materialisation of the CCS technological 
trajectory. 
The official position on the future of coal has emerged as a form of conditional support 
to coal-fired generation. Jointly addressing concerns about the environmental 
consequences of coal-fired generation, and the energy security challenge, regulators in 
Europe moved towards the inclusion of CCS as a pre-requisite for new coal-fired power 
plants. The Office of Carbon Capture and Storage (OCCS) was created to facilitate the 
development and deployment of CCS technology. 
Financial support was provided for technology demonstration. The 2007 White Paper 
confirmed Government support to CCS through a demonstration programme, to be 
implemented in stages of increasing capacity. A national competition for project 
proposals was launched. The pre-qualification for Demo 1 retained the applications of 
four consortia led by Peel Energy, BP, E.On and Scottish Power in June 2008. The 2010 
Spending Review included a £1bn commitment by the Treasury for a post-combustion 
capture plant to be completed by 2014-15, seemingly confirming the UK’s commitment 
to a specific technological design choice. 
In parallel, the European Commission launched the NER 300 programme, to fund 
projects for innovative renewable energy technology and CCS. It committed to make 
the proceeds of the auctioning of 300 million EU ETS allowances (roughly £2-3bn, 
depending on the price of carbon) available for such projects. A first call for proposals 
was launched in 2010, to be considered by the European Investment Bank by 2012. 
7.3.2.4 Anti-coal mobilisation 
The political support for coal also attracted protest groups. At a time when the Stern 
Review was being publicly celebrated, campaigns led by environmental activists 
targeted coal-fired generation as the symbol of Government and industry inaction on 
climate change. Arguments against new coal investments were produced and 
disseminated by environmental NGOs (Greenpeace 2008a, Greenpeace 2008b, WWF 
2008). Such groups saw the alarming possibility of a coal renewal in the UK, and 
argued that such long-lasting investments must be ruled out for the sake of climate 
mitigation: 
  
252 
“The decision over whether to approve the Kingsnorth plant is likely to be the most important 
climate decision of Brown’s premiership. Opening the flood gates to new coal stations now would 
lock Britain into high levels of emissions for decades to come and signal Brown’s surrender on 
meeting his own climate targets.” (Greenpeace 2008a:2, original emphasis) 
New coal investments were seen as perpetuating long-standing logics in power 
generation, and a major obstacle to the development of renewable energy: 
“The government’s system [policy framework for energy] is designed to accommodate for large, 
inefficient and remote power stations owned by large companies like the coal and nuclear utilities 
such as E.ON. In other words, nuclear and coal power stand like two bouncers at the door blocking 
the way for renewables and efficiency - and perpetuating our outdated, inefficient and centralised 
energy system.” (Greenpeace 2008a:12) 
Renown scientists joined the ranks, publicly calling for the caution of policymakers 
against irreversible decision on new coal investment. In a public letter to the then Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown, James Hansen, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies argued against new coal investment without carbon capture: 
“A firm choice to halt building of coal-fired power plants that do not capture the CO2 would be a 
major step toward solution of the global warming problem” (Hansen, 2007:2) 
These discursive and political strategies were supplemented by direct action. The Drax 
climate camp was set up in an attempt to temporarily shut down Britain’s largest source 
of carbon dioxide, emblematic of the country’s reliance on coal for power generation 
(The Times, September 1, 2006). The occupation of the Didcot power station by 
Greenpeace protesters a month later was more successful, as it achieved a halt to 
generation (The Guardian, November 3, 2006). Between 2008 and 2010, a number of 
targeted actions were set up to protest against E.On’s plans to replace and expand its 
Kingsnorth coal-fired power plant. Subsequently, the company announced its 
withdrawal from the CCS competition,53 effectively shelving the replacement of 
Kingsnorth power station. These developments paved the way to Government pledges 
not to allow new coal-fired generation projects to go forwards without CCS plans. 
                                                
53 http://pressreleases.eon-uk.com/blogs/eonukpressreleases/archive/2010/10/20/1628.aspx, accessed 
March, 7, 2011. 
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7.3.3 Industry strategies – economic environment 
7.3.3.1 Economic positioning strategy 
Energy companies, facing high present and future market uncertainties, privileged 
diversification strategies into multiple fuels and generation technology. In this context, 
coal raised its profile from a position of gradual phase-out to a guarantor of diversity in 
the domestic energy mix. 
Coal-fired generation’s market position has benefitted from changes in energy prices: 
“since 2000, oil and gas prices have increased significantly (…) which has led to a resurgence of the 
use of coal for power generation” (Lockwood 2008:13) 
So, economic prospects for coal were stabilising again. The fluctuations in the shares of 
gas-fired and nuclear power were interpreted as a long-term pattern improving the 
relative attractiveness of the coal industry. The expected stabilisation of coal-burn, in a 
climate of growing energy security anxieties, channelled hope and renewed 
expectations about the possibility to maintain a stronghold on future energy choices. 
Such expectations indeed materialised (interview Brewer). 
In 2011, five of the Big Six power generators in the UK operated a similar capacity of 
coal-fired generation, around 4,000 MW (Figure 7.8). The contribution of coal to power 
generation is expected to change with the planned decommissioning of ageing plants, 
and plants opting out of the LCPD. E.On and RWE are the most affected by these 
changes, and should see their coal-fired capacities shrink by 60% and 80 % respectively 
(based on data in Jess 2006), which are thus likely to push for new coal capacity in 
order to maintain a diverse portfolio: 
“In the next fifteen years, companies like E.On, EDF, and British Energy would like to build large 
new coal or nuclear stations. Other companies suggest marine renewables (wind, wave, tidal) and 
gas fired CHP as alternatives. In 2006, E.On applied to build the first UK coal plant in 20 years.” 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, postnote February 2007 Number 280, UK 
Electricity Infrastructure, p.2) 
In the context of replacing a substantial proportion of the ageing British power 
generation stock, and because of the new economic and strategic arguments to retain a 
substantial capacity of coal-fired generation, we can expect to see new investments in 
the coming years:   
“Interest in new coal plants has been sparked by relatively low coal prices over the last five years, 
making them more profitable than gas plants. However, the strongest driver for new coal is the 
desire by companies to maintain a portfolio of generating capacity that includes a range of fuels, to 
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hedge against market, security of supply or policy risk. As some companies are losing a significant 
amount of coal capacity from 2015 onwards, they are very keen to replace it.” (Lockwood 2008:6) 
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Figure 7.8: Portfolio of major energy company capacity, MW, Source: DECC 2011c) 
7.3.3.2 Innovation strategies 
The industry recognised the need to adapt to increased concerns about climate change, 
and engaged in substantial innovation efforts: 
“focus is increasingly being placed on the introduction of clean coal technologies to mitigate carbon 
emissions associated with coal fired power generation.” (Coal Authority Annual report and accounts 
2007-2008:4) 
In the medium-term, efficiency improvements (advanced and supercritical coal 
combustion) became the main innovation objectives. Projects abounded: 
 “During 2006, six major clean coal power station projects were announced (2 GW of IGCC and 3.6 
GW of advanced supercritical)” (Farley 2007:16) 
“Powergen, the energy supplier owned by E.ON of Germany, unveiled plans yesterday to invest 
£1bn in the UK's first "super" coal-fired power station to try to curb carbon emissions. The 
company expects to apply for formal consent next month to build two new 800 megawatt units at its 
Kingsnorth station in Kent using "super-critical" technology. They would replace the station's four 
existing units from 2015, enabling Kingsnorth to operate at much higher levels of efficiency while 
producing fewer carbon emissions.” (The Independent, 12 October 2006, p.44) 
However, by 2011, progress was still relatively slow. 
In the long-term, the industry was seeking the development and commercial use of CCS 
for coal generation in order to comply with increasing environmental constraints: 
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“The UK power industry is keen to invest in coal fired generation and understands that CCS will be 
necessary if this is to have a future in countries with commitments to cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions.” (Sussex Energy Group 2009:4) 
Indeed, the CCS technological promise offers an attractive development trajectory to 
fossil fuel interests. It can be seen as: 
“a technology that allows companies to build on existing technologies by providing an add-on 
element to existing practices (…), popular amongst oil, coal and electricity companies. CCS gives 
carbon-intensive companies the opportunity to show proactivity on climate change, while 
concurrently continuing their core business activities – this has also been a source of criticism.” 
(Kolk and Pinkse 2010:48) 
From a destabilisation perspective, CCS, the main technological proposition put 
forward by industry actors involved with coal-fired generation, is a technological option 
that would allow established actors to maintain their core activities unchanged. In this 
respect, it can be seen as a ‘sustaining’ technology (Bowen 2011), which explains why 
it is being pushed by actors with vested interests in maintaining the importance of fossil 
fuels in the energy system. 
As the Government became interested in this technological promise, and decided to 
further investigate its potential, increasing support became available. The Department of 
Trade and Industry (2005) issued a strategy for CCS development and thereby 
contributed to legitimise this future technological option. Public funding was made 
available for CCS research: 
“Ministers pledged £25m yesterday to develop technology that captures greenhouse gas pollution 
from power stations and dumps it under the North Sea. The funds for carbon capture and storage are 
part of a £40m package to help tackle climate change announced by the energy minister, Malcolm 
Wicks. Experts think the technique, known as carbon sequestration, could dispose of decades worth 
of pollution in depleted oil and gas fields while allowing us still to burn fossil fuels - emissions 
from which contribute to global warming.” (Guardian, 15 June 2005, p.7) 
However, this was deemed insufficient by industry to support technology 
demonstration: 
“Iain Miller, chief operating officer of Mitsui Babcock, an engineering company that makes 
technology that can be fitted to existing power stations, believes research funds of £100 million to 
£120 million are needed to convert a power station producing 500 megawatts of electricity.” (The 
Times, May 16, 2005:36) 
Subsequently, £1bn was made available to assist the funding of a full scale 
demonstration plant in the UK. The competition first retained two projects (at 
Kingsnorth and at Longannet) as likely candidates, but they were dropped for technical 
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and financial reasons. The £1bn public funding still remains to be attributed to a 
credible candidate. 
While a number of projects of gradually increasing scale have been developed 
worldwide, the largest carbon capture pilot plant in the UK was opened in November 
2011 at Ferrybridge, with a capacity equivalent to a 5MW plant. It was developed by a 
consortium bringing together Doosan Babcock, SSE and Vattenfall, and benefitted from 
a £6.3m contribution from DECC. 
Within CCS innovation, three main technological design options co-exist for capture: 
pre-combustion technology, oxyfuel firing and post-combustion technology. 
Additionally, CCS could be fitted to thermal plants firing any kind of fuel, and may also 
be coupled to downstream processes such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) to enhance 
its economic viability (interview Paxman). The British Government initially favoured 
post-combustion technologies, for reasons such as its claimed flexibility and retrofitting 
potential in emerging markets such as China and India. This position has recently been 
challenged. Following the decision not to go ahead with the Longannet project, UK 
demonstration has become more flexible as to the design option it is likely to support, 
which is seen as a satisfying development from industry actors pushing for alternative 
designs (interview Paxman). 
While coal combustion with greatly improved thermal efficiencies is already feasible 
today, the development of CCS technology is much less certain. The technical 
feasibility of CCS technologies has already been proven, but it is not clear whether and 
when such technologies will be commercially viable. This will depend on a number of 
conditions, among which the price of carbon (Mills 2010) and the emergence of a 
dominant design that would allow economies of scale required for a breakthrough 
(Shackley and Green 2007). There is also substantial concern that CCS is a 
technological promise that will never materialise and is used as as an argument to 
further delay carbon abatement. There is currently no agreement on a possible date for 
the first full scale CCS project to come on stream in the UK. 
At any rate, most of the options in a low-carbon energy portfolio require substantial 
capital investments in plant and infrastructure, which the current liberalised energy 
markets do little to support. Because of the major investments involved, the 
technological uncertainties, and the substantial uncertainties as to the policy framework 
for low-carbon energies that will materialise in the coming years, it remains uncertain 
whether CCS technology will develop as it may be wished by advocates of coal-fired 
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generation. So far, most of the corporate activity on CCS “has been focused on basic 
scientific research and lobbying governments for subsidies and support rather than 
investments needed to deploy the technology on a commercial scale” (Bowen 
2011:2256). Such strategies are however unlikely to lead to the kind of technological 
breakthrough that is currently being held as the main assumption of CCS enthusiasts: 
“even an accelerated timetable could not see large-scale deployment of CCS in the UK much before 
2020. This is consistent with other projections at the EU level” (Lockwood 2008:47) 
The route currently being put forward by industry actors relies heavily on the 
involvement of public funders for demonstration programmes. While there is substantial 
enthusiasm for developing CCS in the UK and become a leader on future global 
markets, its advocates are concerned about the climate for investment, e.g. the absence 
of stable carbon prices and the obstruction by climate activists. Indeed, current (low) 
carbon prices are seen as discouraging CCS or other low-carbon alternatives 
“The main [policy] question is, though, is how soon carbon prices will be high enough to support 
CCS projects, and whether – given the high volatility seen on carbon markets so far – project 
developers will have enough confidence to go ahead with costly, long-lived and inflexible 
investments. Research and development is also promoted by stable prices.” (Mills 2010:231) 
Accordingly, CCS advocates are pushing for tax incentives, loan guarantees for 
demonstration and deployment projects (CIAB 2008). 
However, pursuing the CCS option would require the rapid scaling up of incentives for 
technological development (Bowen 2011). Additionally, because of “public hostility to 
new coal plants, demonstrations, regulatory challenges, lawsuits” in the UK, it might 
“be better for the power industry to sidestep such opposition, by having clear legal 
mandates for CCS that at least put all the companies on a level playing field” (Mills 
2010:231). 
Industry actors have enthusiastically engaged in debates and negotiations to put forward 
CCS in the UK between 2006 and 2009. Lobbying efforts were rewarded by the 
announcement of Government support, and a flurry of company projects entered the 
race for demonstration (CPS 2007). However, from 2009, with lack of a stable 
investment framework in perspective, individual companies have started pulling out of 
the technological race for the deployment of CCS in the UK. Today, a few projects 
remain in the race for the UK and European demonstration programmes. At any rate, 
the difficulties to maintain a stable framework for long-term investment in CCS seems 
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to suggest that the UK is less likely to take the lead on large-scale deployment than 
other parts of the world such as the USA (interview Brewer). 
7.3.4 Industry strategies – socio-political environment 
7.3.4.1 Political strategies 
Companies and interest groups related to coal engaged in lobbying strategies to secure 
support for energy policies compatible with the continued burning of fossil fuels. Given 
the increasing momentum of climate change considerations in energy policies, efforts 
had to be made to legitimise coal’s role as an energy source for the future. So, lobbying 
efforts shifted from obstructing climate change policies to influencing their direction. 
Two main political strategies prevailed: 1) ensuring that the energy gap can be seized 
for new coal-fired investments, and 2) building support for innovation in CCS 
technology. 
It was crucial for some energy companies to get new coal-fired generation on stream by 
2015. By 2008, various coal-fired projects totalling just over 11GW were being planned 
or pending approval (Lockwood 2008:13). However, planning permissions were 
complicated and delayed by environmental activism.  
At the EU level, groups such as EURACOAL, which represent coal interests, argued for 
new investment in coal-fired generation, and the establishment of a protected 
framework for CCS: 
“Since the beginning of 2010, EURACOAL continues to repeat that new coal-fired power plants are 
necessary in addition to replacing old power plants, in order to greatly reduce emissions thanks to 
modern technology improving power plant efficiency (…) Carbon Capture and Storage also remains 
a very important option for the period after 2020, particularly if industrialised countries must reduce 
their emissions of greenhouse gases by 80 % or more by 2050. In order to reach the objectives 
related to CCS, EU Member States together with industry, must overcome obstacles of legal, 
financial, infrastructural nature and also, probably more difficultly, public acceptance. An initial 
case will be the construction of 10 to 12 pilot plants throughout the EU by 2015.” (EURACOAL 
2010:29)  
British coal-related interests pursued similar strategies, arguing for the necessity of 
strong Government involvement: 
“The success of carbon capture and storage demonstration plant fitted to coal fired power stations 
being sponsored by Government is fundamental to the long term future success of the industry.” 
(Coal Authority Annual report and accounts 2009-2010:8) 
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The UK Coal Forum, set up by Government in 2006 and attended by representatives of 
Government and industry, regularly argued in favour of strong support for coal, in the 
name of meeting climate targets, maintaining energy security through diversity, and 
contributing to employment in coalfields communities. 
Companies with intentions to develop new coal-fired projects sought to obtain 
Government approval and planning permission. External expressions of support, such as 
that of environmental NGOs, were seen as greatly improving the chances of successful 
applications. The Hatfield IGCC project, initially led by Powerfuel, for instance, 
crucially acquired the support of Friends of the Earth (Lodge 2007:13). 
This seemingly ‘pro-active’ position on future technological promises allowed 
companies with interests in coal-fired generation to argue for new coal-fired 
investments on the basis of a future retrofit when CCS technology would become 
available. This influenced the official position requirements for new coal-fired 
generation, enshrined in the national policy statements, according to which new-built 
should be constructed according to the criterion of ‘capture-readiness’: 
“All commercial scale fossil fuelled generating stations have to be carbon capture ready […]. In 
addition […] new coal-fired generating stations, or significant extensions to existing stations, in 
England or Wales must have CCS on at least 300 MW net of the proposed generating capacity and 
secure arrangements for the transport and permanent storage of carbon dioxide.” (DECC 2011a:54) 
7.3.4.2 Framing strategies 
After the 1990s, coal interests in the UK in general admitted that they were no longer in 
a position to contest climate change publicly, given the high degree of public and policy 
support that it had attracted in recent years (interview Brewer). This situation was 
significantly different in the US, where climate scepticism was much deeper rooted in 
the political, media and industrial domains (Antonio and Brulle 2011). 
However, companies and interest groups sought to influence the core rationales of 
energy policy to be favourable to the continued burning of coal and to discredit 
alternative goals and technologies. The emphasis was set on three main aspects: 1) the 
pressing importance of energy security, 2) the ability of free market institutions to 
address the climate problem as opposed to picking technological winners, and 3) 
constructing enthusiasm for clean coal technologies. Via these strategies, interests 
pushing for the continued development of coal-fired generation in the UK sought to 
position coal as a viable option and to obstruct the development of alternatives such as 
renewable technologies. 
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Firstly, rising energy prices and the threat of supply disruptions were mobilised as 
arguments to re-state and insist on coal’s relevance for the future of energy mixes and 
regain a respective degree of legitimacy. The main argument consisted in framing coal’s 
potential contribution to a diverse fuel portfolio, and insisting on the domestic 
availability of resources. This framing allowed the continuation of coal-fired generation 
as a strategic imperative: 
“The Coal Authority (Authority) believes that coal will continue to make an important contribution 
to the medium term energy requirements of the nation as part of a diverse energy mix, underpinning 
security of supply, with indigenous coal being particularly significant in reducing the dependence 
on imports (…) Coal can have a major role in ensuring security and diversity of supply to enable the 
nation to determine and develop alternative long term energy solutions that meet 21st century 
requirements.” (Coal Authority Annual report and accounts 2004-2005:1) 
Coal was thus increasingly framed as one key to energy security, in the face of the risks 
presented by overreliance on gas. Additionally, coal enthusiasts regularly emphasised 
the problems of renewable energy. The intermittent nature of renewable energy was 
mobilised to emphasise the need for load-following energy sources such as coal-fired 
generation. Coal-fired generation with CCS was also argued to be cheaper than 
renewables (interview Paxman):54 
“Fitting clean coal technology to the UK’s 16 power plant would cost an estimated £6 bn. In 
comparison, 2,000 wind turbines are being put up in the UK over the next six years at a cost of 
£9bn.” (CPS 2007:10, mobilising claims by Doosan Babcock Energy) 
Secondly, framing strategies consisted in insisting on a central role for market 
allocation, thereby preventing the debate on energy policy to engage with questions of 
strategic technological choice. Given that market mechanisms had been developed to 
include carbon constrains – be them largely captured by powerful industries’ ability to 
dilute them – a marked preference for the status quo prevailed. In this context, and in 
order to avoid future requirements for mandatory CCS for coal-fired generation, the 
Confederation of British Industries (CBI) argued that the EU ETS was enough to ensure 
low-carbon energy systems: 
“Introducing alternative measures, such as emissions performance standards or mandating for CCS, 
which limit or ban new coal-fired power stations will send out the signal that government does not 
have confidence in the EU ETS” (CBI 2008:6) 
                                                
54 Such favourable price estimates relied on strong assumptions such as the 
technological feasibility of CCS. 
  
261 
Furthermore, it was argued by coal interests that the offsetting mechanisms inscribed in 
the EU ETS made the debate on the relative rise of UK emissions irrelevant (WWF 
2008), which meant that the UK could continue burning coal as long as it was offsetting 
its emissions elsewhere. Coal-related industries also tried to discredit renewable 
energies and policy instruments supporting their diffusion, such as the Renewable 
Obligation, and called for similar schemes to support clean coal technologies: 
“Doosan Babcock has lobbied the Government to introduce a form of incentive, similar to the 
Renewable Obligation Certificate, for power generators to invest in clean-coal technology.” (CPS 
2007:11) 
According to this strategy, caps and emission limits were seen as incompatible with 
liberalised markets (including carbon trading), since emitters should be allowed to 
choose fuel and technology. ‘Enabling’ incentives structures were thus preferred over 
‘limiting’ regulation. 
Thirdly, industry actors sought to construct positive framings of coal-fired generation 
technologies. ‘Clean coal’ is an oxymoron that has been constructed by the coal lobby 
in order to suggest that coal can be reconciled with environmental objectives. It has 
been used to signify various technological options and promises throughout the years, 
and remains ambiguous. Today, the emphasis is set on CCS. 
With respect to the acceptability of CCS, industry actors believe that more needs to be 
done to improve the public’s perception of the technology: 
“Much more needs to be done to raise public awareness. Policy makers and opinion leaders must be 
more forthcoming in explaining to their constituencies the significance of CCS technology and its 
potential ability to contain the much-feared affects of global climate change.” (CIAB 2008:36) 
However, they also recognize that in constituencies dependent on coal mining and coal-
fired generation, the technology is much more accepted – as would any option that 
could ensure future survival of existing industries (interview Paxman).  
Another element of coal advocates’ technological framing strategies has consisted in 
constructing promises that new-built coal can be designed to be ‘capture-ready’. This 
relatively vague rhetorical device (Markusson and Haszeldine 2009) is meant to 
safeguard and reassure as to the industry’s willingness to abate carbon emissions in the 
future. In practice, the commitment doesn’t imply much besides more uncertainty: 
“When building power plants, the space to extend them must be foreseen so that they are “capture-
ready” as soon as this technology is perfectly mastered.” (EURACOAL 2010:29) 
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Crucially, the ‘clean coal’ promise tied together emerging energy security concerns with 
a promise to tackle climate change within the coal regime. New coal investment plans 
re-surfaced in 2005-6, signaling the possibility of a serious re-birth of coal-fired 
generation in the UK. This renewed enthusiasm, backed by policy support, was related 
to framings of a new generation of ‘clean coal’ technologies that could jointly 
contribute to address climate change and reduce energy security: 
“The government yesterday gave its clearest signal yet that King Coal is ready for a comeback as it 
emphasised that clean technology could help the fuel play a new role in future energy needs. Alan 
Johnson, the trade and industry secretary, said the UK should make sure its “eggs aren't in one 
basket,” both in terms of power sources and their countries of origin. “If a new, cleaner coal 
generation is viable, then I think it could have an important part to play in making sure we have 
diverse generation in the future. Coal is easy to store and it comes from a variety of well-established 
sources around the world,” ” (The Guardian, 21 February 2006) 
In 2006, E.On and RWE announced their intentions to build ‘clean coal’ power plants in 
order to compensate the closure of capacity under the LCPD (E.On Annual Report 2006, 
RWE Annual Report 2006). 
So, thanks to successful framing strategies, it increasingly looked like coal would make 
a comeback in British electricity production: 
“Old King Coal is back (...) Coal was supposed to be the forgotten fuel, the dirty man of Europe, 
fit only for meeting the electricity needs of the developing world, where the stuff is plentiful and 
economic self-improvement still takes precedence over the trashing of the environment. (…) Coal is 
cheap and in abundant supply compared with gas (…) So, in the short- term at least, making 
maximum use of coal-fired capacity is a no-brainer.” (The Independent, 23 December 2005, p.49, 
my emphasis) 
Coal-fired generation achieved to create a discursive space for itself by emphasising the 
joint imperatives of energy security and climate goals.  
“It can be stated with confidence that the UK’s dependence on fossil fuels will continue far into the 
future (…) It is true that CO2 emissions from coal are higher than alternative fuels. However, this 
presents an opportunity to capture the greatest amount of CO2 captured per unit of electricity.” 
(Foreword by Richard Budge, CPS 2007:1) 
“New clean coal technologies can allow the UK, the US and other coal rich countries to develop 
new technologies which harness Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). They can thereby demonstrate 
to the developing world the practical importance of embracing the cleaner and more efficient use of 
coal.” (CPS 2007:4) 
Coal was once more considered as a serious contender in a future energy mix, which 
testifies of the success of framing strategies. 
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7.4 The future? 
With grand challenges ahead, and only limited recent change, the urgency of 
accelerating a shift to low-carbon and secure energy sources is become increasingly 
urgent: 
“In the UK, environmental restrictions on coal-fired power, the need to decommission most of the 
existing nuclear reactor stock and the probable need to cater for even modest demand growth means 
that investment in new capacity of at least 20,000 megawatts (MW) will be needed by 2020 (…) 
The choice of fuel for these new power stations will heavily condition electricity sector carbon 
emissions until mid-century – the time by which the UK aims for an absolute carbon emission cut of 
60 per cent. To have any hope of getting near such an aspiration, new electricity generating capacity 
must be very low carbon.” (Scrase and MacKerron 2009:96) 
The UK Government is showing signs of stepping up its commitments to a low-carbon 
transition. Most recently, the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) was introduced by a 
White Paper in 2011 (DECC 2011b). It aimed at clarifying and stabilising the market 
framework to encourage investment in low-carbon power capacity. It confirmed the 
Government’s commitment to the ‘trinity’ of low-carbon power technologies, and 
suggested the implementation a set of policy instruments, notably, 1) a feed-in tariff 
enabling long-term contracts for low-carbon energy, 2) the introduction of a carbon 
price floor, 3) an emission performance standard of 450gCO2/kWh to prevent new 
high-carbon investments, 4) a mechanism to ensure the adequacy of future capacity. 
So, this new policy framework might improve the context for investment in low-carbon 
technologies. However, it tends to confirm commitment to a neo-liberal approach to 
energy markets. It seeks to correct market failures by the introduction of mostly market-
based instruments (Newbery 2011). While such incremental ‘corrections’ are welcome, 
it remains to be seen whether they will be enough to enable the radical changes that are 
necessary for a transition to low-carbon energy systems. 
With respect to coal’s position, the new framework has confirmed its support to coal 
with CCS. The WP could mark the beginning of the acceleration of a shift from 
‘traditional’ coal-fired generation to a new generation of ambitious low-carbon options. 
In that sense, incentives for CCS are greater than ever in the UK. However, a number of 
policy implementation concerns remain.  
Coal-related industries are worried about the carbon price support that would ensure a 
floor carbon price to prevent investment in coal without CCS (interview Brewer). The 
fact that coal generators are opposing the application of such measures is quite revealing 
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of the double discourse that is currently being held: 1) CCS should be encouraged, but 
2) measures to discourage coal new-built without CCS should be opposed. The outcome 
of such lobbying activity on detailed policy implementation remains to be seen.  
Furthermore, the Government has recently considered the delivery of up to 10GW CCS 
capacity by 2020 in its Carbon Plan (DECC 2011d). CCS lobby groups still judge this 
target as being too low. Indeed, CCSA continues to argue for the need to reach a CCS 
capacity of 20 to 30 GW by 2030 if emission reduction targets are to be met (CCSA 
2011). 
On a global level, coal is continuing to expand, and CCS technology is attracting major 
interests, notably from the oil and coal industries. A number of pilot plants are already 
in operation.55 Large-scale CCS projects are multiplying throughout the world, mostly 
to come on stream from 2015. The main countries involved are the US, Canada and 
Northern European countries. The American context is seen as comparatively more 
favourable to CCS for two main reasons: 1) a long history of R&D funding, and 2) the 
positive association of CCS with Enhanced Oil Recovery, which makes the technology 
commercially viable in the absence of a carbon constraint (interview Paxman). 
Critically, major international institutions have recently endorsed the future role of CCS 
in tackling climate change. Indeed, the IEA attributed a major role to CCS technology 
in its most world energy outlook (IEA 2011). Following intense lobbying from the 
World Coal Association (WCA), CCS has been included as an option in the Clean 
Development Mechanism at the Durban climate negotiations in Durban (Dec. 2011), 
further reflecting its raised international acceptability. 
The ‘capture-readiness’ requirements potentially open the door for at least fifty more 
years of commitment to coal-fired generation by delaying the necessity of assessing 
CCS viability and societal acceptability. Furthermore, there are serious concerns that 
‘capture ready’ plants will never retrofit CCS because of the high costs involved (WWF 
2008). As such, it can be seen as an empty promise that allows going ahead with 
capacity replacement and avoiding mandatory CCS retrofits, which are not favoured by 
industry: 
“We may expect resistance to regulation making capture retrofitting mandatory” (WWF 2008:5) 
                                                
55 The status of CCS projects worldwide can be consulted at http://sequestration.mit.edu 
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There is an evident risk that this form of strategy will further delay drastic cutbacks in 
carbon emissions and contribute to make future efforts more costly. A consultation on 
CCS and what was meant by ‘capture ready’ was set up in 2008, confirming concerns: 
“[Some stakeholders] saw the concept as at best a distraction and at worst a smokescreen to get 
unabated coal capacity built in advance of CCS being available” (Scrase and Watson 2009:179) 
Semantic considerations were amplified, given the low degree of technical 
specifications of the term, and the low prospects of seeing CCS materialise anytime 
before 2020. In light of this controversy, the UK demonstration programme can be seen 
as disappointing, slow, as its terms “legitimised a ‘build now, capture later’ mindset in 
the UK power industry” (WWF 2008:7).56 “There are real risks that a policy intended to 
accelerate development and learning of CCS technology is being used to legitimise 
much larger, investments in unabated (if ‘capture ready’) coal capacity” (WWF 2008:7). 
7.5 Analysis 
This case study is incomplete in nature, and ends at a crossroads with regards to the 
industry’s future. Coal-fired generation’s future prospects have been greatly improved 
in recent years, which suggests that the industry is unlikely to fully contract as could 
have been predicted a decade ago. Notably, the industry has proved resourceful in 
positioning itself positively in relation to the great challenges facing current energy 
systems: energy security and climate change.  
The industry was initially weakened and deprived of long-term survival prospects in a 
context that favoured other energy sources. Especially, the issue of climate change, 
which gained prominence from 2000, contributed to de-legitimise coal-fired generation 
in the UK, which was deemed to decline as its production units were put off stream. 
However, the industry managed to contest this highly negative industry outlook. The re-
emergence of energy security concerns from 2005 provided an opportunity to position 
coal as an attractive fuel option for the future. ‘Clean coal’ technologies (and notably 
CCS) promised to jointly address the problems of climate change and energy security. 
While investments projects have not yet fully materialised, the enthusiasm around CCS 
suggests that industry actors with an interest in coal-fired generation have succeeded in 
constructing support and regaining some degree of political legitimacy. While coal-fired 
                                                
56 This perception is further justified by the choice of funding post-combustion technology, over other 
technological alternatives. 
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generation remains controversial, it has regained a part to play in the energy picture of 
tomorrow. 
7.5.1 External pressures 
The case study shows that coal-fired generation in Britain experienced multiple 
pressures in its economic and socio-political environments. Table 7.2 summarises the 
main pressures, and indicates how they have evolved in the various periods. 
 
Table 7.2: External pressures for change exerted on the British coal industry, as located in 
economic and socio-political environments (the sign (+/-) indicates whether pressures are 
challenging/enhancing industry stability, the value (+, ++) provides an indication of the importance 
of the pressure) 
Essential supply-
side resources
Shrinking 
markets
Changing markets 
and preferences
Technological 
competition
New 
entrants
Normative 
contestation
Public opinion 
and discourse
Political 
pressure
(++) (++) (+) (++) (+) (+) (0/+) (+)
Removal of 
support; negative 
investment 
climate; very low 
R&D
Market 
collapse
Liberalised ESI; 
less capital-
intensive options 
favoured
Dash for gas Low 
barriers 
to entry
Climate change 
science and 
activism
Growing climate 
awareness
Interest in acid 
rain and 
climate change 
policies
(0/-) (0/-) (0/+) (--) (+/-) (++) (++) (+)
Negative 
investment 
climate & ageing 
capital stock, but 
coal cheap
stable market environmental 
constraints as 
investment criteria
Dash for gas 
weans but 
interest in low-
carbon 
technology
Foreign 
investors
Climate change 
gathers 
momentum
Climate change 
established; 
negative framing 
of coal
Moratorium on 
gas, but climate 
change enters 
energy policy
(+/-) (-) (+/-) (+) (+) (+/-) (-)
Worsening 
investment 
climate, but coal 
abundant & 
cheap
Opportunities 
as energy gap 
to be filled
Rising energy 
prices & fuel 
diversity 
requirements
Renewables, 
nuclear but 
also ‘clean 
coal’ to fill the 
gap
Climate change 
urgency but 
energy security 
concerns
Climate change 
highly mediatised 
but 'clean coal' 
future becomes 
accepted
Climate change 
policies (20-20-
20, CCA 2008, 
etc.), but also 
CCS support
1990-
1997
1997-
2005
2005-
2011
 
 
Some pressures existed almost continuously throughout the case (e.g. growing 
environmental concerns about climate change). Other pressures were less ongoing, e.g. 
energy security concerns that only surfaced in the last period. Coal-fired generation was 
under major pressure (economic and socio-political), and faced declining prospects. 
However, the rise of energy concerns and changing fuel prices in the last period 
provided an opportunity to re-frame coal as a potential future option – thus restoring a 
degree of political legitimacy, and a case for future investment. 
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The most important pressures on the industry were related to 1) technological 
competition, 2) societal pressure, and 3) political pressure for the inclusion of 
environmental issues. 
1) substantial competition from alternatives better aligned with the changing context led 
to the rapid replacement of coal-fired generation by gas in the 1990s. In the longer-term, 
coal-fired generation has had to compete with the enthusiasm generated for cleaner and 
low-carbon technologies (gas, nuclear and renewables). Rising oil and gas prices 
attenuated this challenge in the last period. 
2) The energy sector was characterised by substantial societal concerns. Environmental 
concerns have been relatively high since the late twentieth century, first focussing on 
acid rain and then on climate change. Both problems saw coal-fired generation as the 
main offender, which led to substantial pressure in the form of environmental policies. 
In the medium-term, acid rain policies required coal-fired generators to invest in 
expensive abatement technologies or decommission. In the longer-term, increasing 
carbon abatement policies threatened the future viability of coal and thus prevented new 
investments. With rising energy prices, energy-related issues made their way to the 
public debate. Energy security concerns, however, played in favour of coal-fired 
generation, as an opportunity to halt its decline. 
3) Growing environmental concerns have led to the implementation of more stringent 
policies, first related to acid rain, and then related to climate change. Raised climate 
targets, the introduction of carbon pricing, and incentives for low-carbon technologies 
put substantial pressure on traditional coal-fired generation. Since the future of coal-
fired generation depended on the industry’s ability to secure long-term investments in 
an adverse climate, energy policy and support to technological development became 
crucial to secure long-term prospects for coal. 
 
Contrastingly, resource problems were less salient. Indeed, while the rush from coal of 
the 1990s led to the removal support structures and funding sources for capital-intensive 
projects, the abundance of coal reserves worldwide at relatively cheap prices has rather 
played in favour of coal-fired generation, especially in recent years. 
 
The case also displays the important influence of landscape trends and shocks:  
- the climate problem was linked to the emergence of an international pressure 
coalition driven by scientists and environmental NGOs, but British policy advances 
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also reflected a willingness to take the lead internationally. Indeed, domestic 
measures to mitigate climate change are highly dependent on international efforts. 
- Global upward trends in coal consumption have influenced the framing of coal, and 
the perception of future opportunities 
- The global nature of fossil fuel trades has increased fluctuations, and has notably 
led to increasing energy security concerns from 2003. 
- The 2008 financial crisis was an extreme event with lasting consequences that has 
been driving policy, business and media attention since its eruption, to the 
detriment of issues that had recently acquired a high status, such as climate change. 
It has led to the slowdown of economic activity, the re-ordering of economies 
worldwide, the introduction of austerity measures, and considerably increased the 
uncertainty of long-term investments in energy ventures. 
7.5.2 Interaction between pressures 
The industry faced a highly adverse environment at the beginning of the period, 
characterised by radical market change and the vanishing of political support. The 
industry was set on a trajectory to “hollow out”, declining gradually in the absence of 
support structures and the inevitabilities of old age. Environmental pressures added to 
this adverse context, in which pressures became aligned towards the decline of coal-
fired generation – although the technological pressure was temporarily relieved. In the 
last period, however, the emergence of energy security concerns provided a window of 
opportunity for coal-fired generation to position itself as both secure and low-carbon, 
via the technological promise of CCS. 
So, the case started with a high degree of pressure interaction pointing clearly towards 
the long-term decline of coal-fired generation, but ended with disjoined pressures, 
namely as a result of deliberate industry strategies to create space for itself on the basis 
of new energy policy priorities. 
 
1990-1997. The liberalisation and privatisation of the electricity sector led to a re-
configuration of the rules governing investments and decision-making in the industry. 
Coal-fired generation was hard hit by these changes. The inflow of new entrants, 
opportunities for investment, and new rules favoured technological alternatives to coal 
that were comparatively less capital-intensive and entailed lower acid emissions. The 
dash for gas marked the rush from coal, the instalment of a consensus about the benefits 
  
269 
from economic liberalism and its coupling with greater interest in environmental issues 
(acid rain and climate change). The problem of climate change made its way on the 
public and political agenda. So, strong pressures were aligned against coal-fired 
generation. 
ESI liberalisation
acid rain 
constraints
market ideology
‘dash for gas’ 
new
entrants emerging CC discourse
coal-fired 
closures
new rules
 
Figure 7.9: Pressure interactions 1990-97 
 
1997-2005. The negative effects of privatisation were assessed and led to adjustments. 
Coal-fired generation was temporarily relieved and protected from the intense market 
pressures: the penetration of technological alternatives (gas) was halted, market rules 
were adjusted and reinstated coal’s position in the merit order. Public concerns about 
climate change gained significant momentum, catalysed by the advancement of 
international scientific consensus and mobilisation. Climate change advocates called for 
the definitive end of coal, while (less salient) energy security arguments emerging 
towards the end of the period suggested that low-risk fuel sources (such as coal) should 
be preferred. The decommissioning of coal-fired capacity was due to accelerate to 
comply with acid rain policies. 
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Figure 7.10: Pressure interactions 1997-2005 
 
2005-2011. Fluctuations on international fuel markets were taken up in the policy 
environment, casting doubts over the reliance on gas. Energy security and climate 
change confirmed their raised status. Aspirations to a transition to low-carbon energy 
justified more stringent policy action to enable this change: low-carbon targets and 
commitments were raised, carbon markets were introduced, and greater attention to 
issues of strategic technological choice was sought. Technological alternatives 
(renewables, nuclear power) were increasingly considered, coupling climate change 
concerns with increasing anxieties about an upcoming energy gap. This context 
favoured a mix of technological options that could address both issues. Power 
generators renewed their interest in (relatively cheaper) coal as an option to hedge 
against fuel price fluctuations. The ‘trinity’ of low-carbon energy supply options 
(renewables, nuclear, CCS) emerged in this context. So, while societal opposition to 
coal persisted (and was alarmed about the international growth of coal-burn), it became 
increasingly accepted that coal was to play a role in future energy systems. These 
expectations were bundled around the technological promise of CCS, which received 
innovation support and shaped future opportunities for coal-fired generation. 
Meanwhile, the financial crisis and the deadlock of international climate negotiations 
reduced confidence about transitions to low-carbon energy systems, and investment in 
general. 
  
271 
CCS 
technological 
promise
new enthusiam 
for coal-fired 
generation
new energy 
policy priorities
public 
concerns 
about CC
energy price 
fluctuations
energy security 
concerns
renewables
nuclear
energy 
security
carbon 
constraints
CCS future 
energy option
 
Figure 7.11: Pressure interactions 2005-11 
 
So, the industry environments was initially characterised by pressures on multiple fronts 
(markets, technological competition, policies, environmental problems), pointing 
towards the long-term decline of coal. This coherent front was swept away by the 
instalment of divergent demands on energy systems: energy security and carbon 
constraints. The pressures, exerted in parallel, provided diverging signals to energy 
industries, which faced an increasingly uncertain future. An attempt to constructively 
reconcile these concerns was then operated via the build-up of technological 
expectations around a possible coal future. Presently, coal-fired generation in the UK 
finds itself at crossroads between its gloomy past and potential future opportunities. 
 
The most important issues have been climate change and energy security concerns. 
They thus provide an opportunity for the analysis of issue build-up and interaction: 
The climate change issue was initially raised by scientists and activists and attracted 
public attention. It first entered policy circles in international arenas. British politicians 
were eager to take the lead internationally, and contributed to raise the issue’s public 
profile. Early policies sought to establish emission reduction targets and a price for 
carbon. Although too weak to be effective, such measures ensured that the issue 
penetrated the economic environment of energy industries, attracting the interest, 
concern and involvement of industry actors. The recognition of the ineffectiveness of 
current policies, combined with a raised urgency about the climate problem, led to more 
ambitious policies, resulting in greater stress on industry actors. Currently, it remains to 
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be seen how effectively such energy and climate policies will be implemented, but 
carbon abatement seems to have remained stuck at the discursive and prospective level, 
and lacks strong economic drivers and motivations. This gives me reasons to doubt a 
further decline of coal-fired generation in the UK.  
Energy security concerns have repeatedly made their way on the energy policy agenda. 
They have been related to swings in commodity prices, or disruptions to the continuous 
supply of fuels. In this case, the combination of past technological choices (dash for 
gas), rising oil and gas prices, and concerns about over-dependence on imports from 
unstable countries, have led such resource problems to enter the political agenda as 
energy security concerns, influenced by industry framing strategies to strengthen the 
position of coal in relation to this emerging issue. These concerns led to the questioning 
of the market model for energy industries, greater pressure for regulations and state 
intervention in strategic technological choice. The rise of energy security concerns in 
decision-making in the electricity sector provided opportunities for the voicing of 
specific fuel-related interests. 
Likely future pressure evolution 
While the future evolution of the UK’s energy system, and coal-fired generation in 
particular, is difficult to predict, a number of trends, upcoming contradictions and 
crucial opportunities can be outlined. 
Overall, it seems that environmental and energy security concerns have firmly 
established themselves as important criteria shaping the future of energy systems, 
although mobilisation around climate change may be declining.  Because they relate to 
market failures, these concerns are inherently conflicting with the operation of free 
markets and the instalment of the neo-liberal doctrine since the 1980s; their influence on 
energy systems will be mediated by the introduction of new rules and regulations. 
However, efficient market allocation is likely to remain the underlying principle driving 
policy formulation in this sector. So far, it is not clear that the conflict between these 
societal goals framed as market failures and the underlying commitment to market 
allocation will be overcome by the gradual introduction of piecemeal regulation, such as 
the EMR package (DECC 2011b). Addressing the major challenges related to 
environmental problems, anxieties about economic prosperity, and the strategic need for 
reliable energy sources is unlikely to go forward with incremental changes alone. 
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Increasing technological competition can be expected as alternative technologies jockey 
for position to gain market shares in the energy system of tomorrow. Such options, if 
coupled with strong societal demands (e.g. around climate change, energy security, or 
both), ambitious policies, and stable investment conditions could in turn contribute to 
shape the (upcoming?) transition and its underlying framework. However, in the 
absence of a clear technological leader, and given the established assumption that no 
single technological option can solve the climate problem, the upcoming transition path 
is likely to be more complex than it has been in past substitution patterns. It will 
continue to be prone to the strong influence of heterogeneous actors, of which coal-
related interests will be part. Difficulties of managing this technological diversity is a 
strong obstacle to the destabilisation of established industries and the breakthrough of 
new ones. 
The elaboration of a new governance framework addressing these problems jointly 
could be crucial to the establishment of long-term commitments that have the ability to 
send out clear signals to industry actors to profoundly alter their strategies. Such signals 
will only have a structuring effect if they shift from the discursive level to strong 
constraints. In this perspective, we are likely to see the role of the state and industrial 
policy make a comeback, enabling interactions from societal concerns to economic 
frame conditions. Furthermore, a stable high carbon price is seen by many as the key to 
the acceleration of commitments and the internationalisation of the climate problem. 
The recent policy makes shy steps in this direction. 
7.5.3 Endogenous enactment 
I now turn to regime changes and strategy developments from an industry perspective. 
These are summarised in Table 7.3 and analysed below. 
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Table 7.3: The development of industry strategies 
Socio-cultural framing 
strategies Political strategies
Economic positioning 
strategies Innovation strategies
1990-
1997
Contest climate change 
claims; Focus on uncertainties
Seek support against dash for 
gas; Lobbying against the 
‘Pool’
International companies and 
supply chains; Cost reductions; 
Closure of coal-fired plants
Underfunded ‘clean 
coal’ research
1997-
2005
Worries about climate 
developments; ‘Clean coal’ 
framing
Delaying acid rain policies; 
Lobbying to create support 
for ‘clean coal’ R&D
Concentration; Renewed 
confidence in maintaining 
coal; Diverse fuel portfolios
3 'clean coal' promises:    
- short-term: flue gases     
- mid-term: efficiency   
- long-term: CCS
2005-
2011
Inflate energy security worries 
& insistence on coal’s role; 
‘Clean coal’; ‘Capture-ready’
Secure commitments:              
- new coal for energy security    
- CCS for climate change
Maintain fuel diversity with 
coal; Seek new coal 
replacement
Plans for supercritical 
plants; CCS projects
 
 
1990-1997. In response to the liberalisation of the ESI, coal-fired generators developed 
lobbying strategies to acquire support to weather the dash for gas and contest the market 
mechanisms in place. Firms adapted to the new economic framework with restructuring 
strategies and international positioning. Counter-framing strategies sought to limit the 
influence of the climate problem by focussing on uncertainties. 
1997-2005. In the face of increasing concerns about climate change, the industry 
worried about its ability to further halt its decline. The development of the ‘clean coal’ 
framing sought to conciliate energy security and climate change, in order to create 
market opportunities for a renewed coal-fired generation industry. This technological 
promise thus constructed the image of an industry embracing a new mission, identity, 
values and strategy. This new prospective technological strategy gathered interest and 
funding for innovation. 
2005-2011. The industry sought further commitment to the deployment of CCS in order 
to materialise its promised re-orientation. Future developments will depend on the 
success of this innovation strategy, without which coal-fired generation is likely to 
decline in the UK. Positive price signals and investments in R&D are pointing towards 
a new sense of optimism for a coal renewal. 
7.5.4 Destabilisation pattern 
In this case, the diagnosis of destabilisation is less straightforward, for two main 
reasons: 1) the transition in which it is inscribed has not fully materialised, and 2) coal-
fired generation’s positioning has tended to improve over the period. 
Coal-fired generation was hard hit by the liberalisation of the ESI and growing 
environmental concerns. It engaged in the last stages of industry decline and dissolution 
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in the face of highly adverse conditions. However, it managed to subsequently halt its 
decline, through the successful lobbying for support, and the opportune rise of energy 
security concerns and price signals favouring coal. This context allowed the industry to 
frame itself as a necessary part of current and future energy systems. Furthermore, it 
actively participated in the conciliation of energy security and climate change concerns 
via a technological proposition and its accompanying framing, thereby ensuring itself a 
central role in official low-carbon discourse and consolidating the commitment of 
Government support. 
Coal managed to inflate its position to become an integral part of discourses (and 
commitments) about future energy mixes (especially for power generation) 
internationally, and in Britain in particular. This development is particularly interesting 
when considering that coal-fired generation’s attractiveness had been declining from the 
mid-1980s in most Western countries. 
However, this technological trajectory, although likely to materialise because of 
economic and political support, still has the characteristics of a technological promise, 
with its flurry of uncertainties and likelihood of failure. Industry actors, although highly 
interested in this technological trajectory, are still in the phase of constructing its future 
commercial viability and socio-political legitimacy. Furthermore, it is remarkable that 
the technological option that promises to sustain a market for coal-fired generation does 
not require a fundamental departure from current industry activities, but rather the 
incorporation of additional technologies and skills downstream. In this way, it 
represents a deeper entrenchment in historical lock-in, rather than radical technological 
regime change. 
 
In terms of pattern matching, the industry seems to have found a way to halt its 
historical decline. It has engaged in a partial re-orientation in a future niche that it has 
carved for itself at the junction of energy security and climate concerns. If this scenario 
materialises, we might be able to see this development as active environmental shaping. 
Given the length of investment times in power generation, the industry’s influence on 
the shape and direction of a ‘low-carbon’ transition will bear consequences for many 
decades. 
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Coal was practically buried dead in the UK in the early 1990s. There was an 
insignificant domestic mining industry, and no planned replacement of the ageing coal-
fired capacity to come off stream by the turn of the century.  
This situation was a result of the previous destabilisation phases, which had made coal a 
relic of the industrial past, largely replaced by other fuels in power generation. The 
increased societal momentum of environmental concerns such as acid rain and climate 
change further downgraded the enfeebled position of coal in British power generation. 
Indeed, coal symbolically represented the dirtiest of fuels, and coal-fired power 
generation rapidly became the focal point for dramatic emission reductions. 
Building on concerns about security of fuel supply and changing relative prices of fuels 
in the present energy configuration, the industry managed to turn this context into an 
opportunity, generating enthusiasm for CCS, and a gradual integration of the notion that 
coal will play a part in a future energy mix. 
If Vaclav Smil was writing in 2003 that 
“Coal’s future is not (…) fundamentally a matter of resource availability or production cost but one 
of environmental acceptability” (Smill 2003:232) 
British coal-fired generators have geared efforts towards legitimising coal’s ability to 
play a central role in low-carbon transitions. 
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8 Conclusions 
This thesis aimed at answering the following main research question: 
 
How can we understand the unfolding industry destabilisation processes? 
 
Because I adopt a process epistemology (see chapter 4), I seek to answer this question 
by searching for relevant patterns and causal mechanisms involved in the unfolding of 
real world industry destabilisation processes. 
 
In chapter 3, I have developed an integrative understanding of industry destabilisation, 
building on five existing theoretical views, and addressing three main research 
challenges. Taking stock of empirical insights, I here elaborate conclusions that 
generalise on fundamental aspects of destabilisation processes uncovered by this 
research. 
8.1 Destabilisation: three explanatory processes 
In chapter 3, I suggested that industry destabilisation is a process leading up to 
substantial changes in established ways of being, thinking, and doing things (industry 
regime rules). Furthermore, the explanation is organised around three interacting 
explanatory processes: 
1) the accumulation of external pressures,  
2) industry responses to low performance (economic and legitimacy challenges), 
3) weakening commitment to established regime rules.  
While these explanatory processes can be analytically isolated (as has been done at the 
end of each empirical chapter), they are typically mutually complementary and 
interactive. Furthermore, the cases suggest that the processes follow an ordered 
sequence: a) pressures tend to build up before industry actors experience challenging 
performance levels, b) themselves preceding the serious questioning of regime rules 
characterising destabilisation. This sequence relates to two time lags, which can be 
explained as follows: 
a) Initially, external problems tend to be overlooked and downplayed by incumbent 
actors, who have a strong tendency to resist change. If pressures increase, 
industry actors may face decreasing performance (in economic and/or legitimacy 
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terms), as a result of which they may no longer be able to leave pressures 
unattended. Low performance levels translate into an increasing mismatch 
between industry actors and their environments that may be curbed with 
appropriate response strategies to identified problems. Industry destabilisation 
thus involves related processes of external pressure build-up and strategic 
responses to weakening industry performance. 
b) However, initial response strategies to performance challenges tend to remain 
within the frame of existing industry trajectories. Indeed, industry actors 
routinely draw on established regime rules, which reproduce industry 
trajectories. Early response strategies thus seek to re-establish a degree of fit 
between industry actors and their environments, and tend to be incremental 
corrective action. When faced with disruptive challenges or overwhelming 
environmental change, drawing on existing regime rules may only lead to 
limited results. When this point is reached, the erosion of regime commitment is 
manifested by a loss of faith in the ability to adapt. Destabilisation thus results 
from demands for changes in established regime rules. But regime rules are 
deeply engrained habits that are difficult to change. Destabilisation is thus a 
process whereby external pressures and problems become such challenges for 
established industry actors that industry regimes can no longer be re-produced. 
 
My cases provide credit to this generic explanation, although there are some differences 
in the particular ways in which these three processes lead to industry destabilisation. 
These differences point to time lags concerning a) the interpretation of pressures as 
industry challenges and b) the enactment of regime changes. 
 
In case 1: 
Overall, the industry faced mounting pressures on a number of dimensions throughout the period 
(shrinking markets, stagnant productivity, policy dissatisfaction, alternative technologies, smoke 
problem, etc.), as shown in Table 5.5, although government interventions interrupted the gradual 
increase of pressures. 
Economic problems (related to shrinking markets and new entrants) and legitimacy pressures (about 
coal smoke and miner conditions) were downplayed in the first period (1914-1930), and led to 
minor regime-reinforcing adjustments (wage cuts, piecemeal mechanisation).  
Only when economic pressures became more serious (in the 1930s), with visible consequences on 
economic performance (bankruptcies) and political legitimacy (early policy concerns about 
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industry’s viability), did the industry recognise its problems. However, these problems led to 
incremental response strategies (piecemeal mechanisation) and market protection (cartelisation and 
import restrictions) that ensured short-term survival within the bounds of the existing regime.  
WWII and the post-war reconstruction period temporarily halted (and concealed) the further 
progression of economic and legitimacy problems, and brought incentives for the industry to 
modernise and innovate. Commitment to core regime rules (beliefs, mission, and identity) was 
reinforced, diversification strategies were pursued, but the industry’s economic performance 
stagnated (slow productivity improvements, dependence on government funding). Furthermore, the 
Great London Smog (1952) led to regulations that favoured alternatives. 
When strong economic and socio-political pressures re-surfaced from the mid-1950s (shrinking 
markets, penetration of alternatives, etc.), the industry’s economic performance (finance and profits) 
and legitimacy (political frustration, negative cultural discourse) were heavily eroded. Response 
strategies were not in tune with the extent of pressures: markets were shrinking as alternatives 
diffused, policy enthusiasm waned and shifted to alternatives, the industry adapted only sparsely to 
the smoke pressure. However, industry hopes lived on despite increasing doubts. It is only from 
1959 that the industry really lost faith in its ability to survive unchanged. The industry declined in 
most markets, but also successfully re-oriented itself by concentrating on its only remaining growth 
market (steam coal for power generation) for which it had acquired commercial and policy 
protection. 
In case 2: 
Pressure evolution followed an ‘up-and-down’ pattern. The case started with a moderate amount of 
pressure: market growth levelled off in the late 1960s, while legitimacy levels were relatively low 
(dissatisfaction, concerns about financial viability and nationalised status, etc.). However, the 
industry was pursuing new strategies: specialisation in the power segment and restructuring.  
With the oil crisis, pressures were reversed: coal regained economic prospects, legitimacy and 
acquired substantial power (over its main customer). Industry hope and commitment to regime rules 
were higher than ever, despite the continuity of background frustration and dissatisfaction (of main 
customer and policymakers), which became more pressing towards the late 1970s.  
Political change (Thatcher’s election) brought a new ideological frame for economic and industrial 
policy. The breakthrough of neo-liberal ideology led to the discursive coupling of many 
accumulated problems, and greater industry exposure to these as protective barriers were 
dismantled. In practice, central Government imposed new values and beliefs to nationalised 
industries (imposed regime change). The British coal industry was to become competitive, 
restructure drastically ahead of its own privatisation. Initial resistance to such new imperatives (e.g. 
Great Strike) was crushed; the industry was forcefully downscaled, modernised and restructured 
(re-creation). However, cutbacks on financial slack and diversification attempts, as well as the 
industry’s inherited overspecialisation limited its long-term economic prospects.  
The liberalisation of the ESI in 1990 provoked a radical environmental change, opened the market 
for alternative power generation technologies (CCGT) and coal imports that led to a rapid collapse 
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of the market for British deep-mined coal and overwhelmed the industry. The industry regime 
change did not prevent its near-terminal contraction. 
In case 3: 
Pressure on coal-fired generation has been relatively high throughout the case, although the industry 
seems to have found a way of diverting these pressures, by positioning itself as indispensable to the 
emerging energy agenda in a context of rising energy security concerns – and thus halting 
destabilisation to some extent. 
In the first period (1990-97), the industry faced substantial pressures (radical market change led to 
technological competition, exerted by new entrants and emerging environmental constraints) that 
threatened its economic viability and legitimacy. The industry was hard hit by economic challenges 
and was restructured, but contested socio-political pressures (climate counter-framing). 
In the second period (1997-2005), the industry tried to respond to the climate problem, which was 
gaining momentum, by developing the ‘clean coal’ framing. It thus recognised socio-political 
challenges and sought to face the new constraints through diversification strategies, whilst slowing 
down the further decline of coal-fired generation. 
In the third period (2005-2011), the rise of energy security concerns provided less adverse economic 
conditions for coal-fired generation, which compared much better on cost with alternatives. By 
framing itself as indispensable, the industry regained some degree of political legitimacy and 
created positive expectations about the role of CCS in the transition to low-carbon and secure 
energy systems. The projected re-orientation, based on a technological promise, provided financial 
resources for innovation strategies. The future of these projects (and thus the materialisation of the 
projected re-orientation) is yet uncertain, but the prospect for the survival of coal-fired capacity in 
the UK is improved. If materialised, this re-orientation strategy, although based on the integration 
of the climate challenge, is unlikely to disrupt core regime rules (mission, beliefs, identity). 
The cases thus confirm the usefulness of conceptualising industry destabilisation 
according to three basic complementary processes. However, in each case, time lags 
have been observed 1) between mounting external pressures and the recognition of 
serious challenges, and 2) between early responses to problems and the serious 
questioning of regime rules. I illustrate the second form of time lag below: 
In the first case, the second time lag was relatively long (1930-1959), because the industry was 
deeply embedded in society (basic energy needs, multiple markets, employment, etc.) and benefitted 
from state intervention (market protection and financial assistance), which ensured the continuity of 
operations and reinforced commitment to core industry regime rules, thereby enhancing industry 
inertia. The erosion of political legitimacy and the penetration of alternatives in a context of 
worsening performance problems overwhelmed the (over)confident industry, which lost faith in 
most markets but was able to re-orient in the power generation market. 
In the second case, the second time lag was shorter, because the industry’s restructuring was 
performed under strong political impulse: industry resistance to change (management and miners) 
  
281 
was forcefully broken over a short period (1983-1990), involving the imposition of new managers, 
new regime rules (revision of social role, competitiveness criteria, automated operations, etc.), and 
drastic cuts preventing diversification attempts. 
In the third case, while problems have been increasingly recognised until 2005, we have not yet 
seen a loss of faith, because energy security questions and technological expectations have provided 
the basis for current renewed hope in the industry’s future. 
So, the three processes played out differently in each case. Considering destabilisation 
as a multi-level unfolding process, as suggested in chapter 3 (3.3.2), provides further 
explanations for the materialisation of the observed time lags and differences across 
cases. Furthermore, the resulting understanding of industry destabilisation reaches out 
to a number of essential mechanisms influencing the overall process. 
The conclusions are structured in relation to categories developed in chapter 3. I first 
discuss the unfolding of destabilisation at different levels, then multi-dimensional co-
evolution, before turning to the role of environmental challenges in destabilisation 
processes. The conclusion ends with insights on sustainability transitions and a 
discussion of the scope of findings and suggestions for further research. 
8.2 Unfolding at different levels 
In chapter 3 (3.3.2), I suggested that destabilisation is a multi-level unfolding process. I 
here conclude on each of the following levels of unfolding: 1) industries, 2) industry 
environments, and 3) broader landscapes. 
8.2.1 Endogenous enactment of destabilsaition 
In chapter 3 (3.3.2.1), I elaborated an ideal-typical model of industry destabilisation 
enactment. I have suggested that at industry level, the enactment of destabilisation by 
industry actors can be conceptualised as following five phases, from denial to 
dissolution: 
1) Blindness and denial 
2) Early small changes 
3) Doubts and diversification 
4) Destabilisation and decline 
a. Re-orientation, or 
b. Re-creation 
5) Dissolution 
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I first assess the overall match of each case with the phase-model. Deviations are then 
explained in relation to the different levels of unfolding and related conceptual 
categories. 
 
Case 1: The destabilisation of the British coal industry (1914-1967) 
The first two periods (1914-1946) fit well with the model, with the industry first downplaying 
structural problems and then introducing piecemeal and incremental innovations. The third period 
(1946-1956) deviates from the model, because expanding post-war markets created optimism 
instead of increasing doubts and some blindness regarding structural problems. The industry 
innovated and modernised to meet the new opportunities, not because of despair. It also diversified 
(somewhat) into smokeless fuels to address the smoke problem, which caused some concern for the 
industry. The fourth period (1956-1967) deviates from the model, because it encompasses both the 
fourth and fifth phase. The reason was that the industry followed two tracks. There was decline 
(fifth model phase) in many market segments, which caused major performance problems (financial 
problems, loss of cultural legitimacy and political support). But there was also strategic re-creation 
(fourth phase) towards the growing electricity market, which sets the stage for the second case. 
So, the coal industry, while dissolving many of its activities, did not fully destabilise, because new 
market opportunities revitalised hopes and a certain degree of legitimacy, and thereby prevented a 
complete loss of faith. 
Furthermore, the industry followed a shock-wise destabilisation pattern, clinging on to hopes until it 
was too late and multiple markets had to be abandoned. 
Blindness
and denial
Doubts and
diversification
Early small 
changes
Destabilsiation
and decline
Dissolution
Re-orientation
Re-creation
time
Ideal-typical pattern Actual pattern, case 1
1913-1930 1930-1946 1946-1956 1956-1967
 
Figure 8.1: Destabilisation enactment pattern, case 1 
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Case 2: The destabilisation and decline of the British deep coal mining (1967-1997) 
The first period (1967-1973) fits well with the model, with the industry clinging on to an expanding 
market (following its re-orientation in power generation) and restructuring to match the new 
situation. The second period (1973-1981) deviates from the model because the oil crisis created new 
enthusiasm and positive expectations despite structural problems, but also made resources available 
for diversification strategies. The third period (1981-1990) followed two tracks. Increasing 
pressures (negative government attitude and policies, competition from nuclear and gas, price 
threats from foreign coal) led to the early recognition of problems regarding the industry’s future 
viability and the implementation of small changes enhancing productivity locally. However, under 
strong political influence, the industry was abruptly restructured, seeking to re-create itself on the 
basis of newly imposed competitiveness criteria. More forward-looking innovation attempts were 
halted because the government imposed tighter managerial rules and cut innovation programs. 
Overall, industry strategy was increasingly reduced to ‘fire-fighting’ and short-term responses to 
imminent threats (‘living in a permanent crisis’). The fourth period (1990-1997) deviates from the 
model in the sense that the destabilisation process skipped the fourth phase (re-orientation) and 
immediately moved to the fifth phase (dissolution). Smooth re-orientation was difficult because 
government policies had eroded slack and (financial and technical) capabilities. The industry 
therefore had limited possibility to respond to the unleashed competition that followed ESI 
privatisation. Collapsing markets forced the rapid shrinking of the industry. 
So, the deep mining industry experienced full destabilisation, because declining markets, in the 
absence of material slack and political legitimacy, led to a complete loss of faith regarding future 
opportunities.57 The industry destabilised rapidly in a shock-wise pattern. 
 
                                                
57 While the deep mining of coal reached near-terminal contraction, coal-fired generation capacity based 
on imported coal retained a place in Britain, which justifies the third case. 
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Figure 8.2: Destabilisation enactment pattern, case 2 
 
Case 3: The destabilisation of coal use in the British power industry 1997-today. 
Possible revival? 
For the contemporary case, the overall diagnosis of destabilisation is complicated by two main 
features: 1) the case is not fully realised, and 2) the case begins with the electricity industry’s 
commitment to coal in serious jeopardy. 
The first period (1990-1997) partly matches the model. It doesn’t fit it, because the industry was 
under acute pressure and was collapsing. However, the small remaining industry downplayed and 
contested problems such as climate change. The second period (1997-2005) fits relatively well, 
because the industry started to worry about its ability to cope with incoming challenges. But it also 
started to engage with longer-term diversification strategies. The third period (2005-2011) also fits 
partly, as diversification attempts became more concrete. Furthermore, the industry was clinging on 
to its only chance of survival: embarking on a technological re-orientation trajectory for which it 
could make itself indispensable. The future remains open, and the industry may manage to gather 
lasting commitment to its renewal, or else will face inevitable decline.  
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Figure 8.3: Destabilisation enactment pattern, case 3 
 
So, while it is too early to conclude with regards to the third case, both historical cases 
broadly match the five-phase model of destabilisation, thus confirming its overall 
plausibility. This allows me to reach the following conclusion:  
 
Conclusion 1: The five-phase model provides a useful framework to understand the 
endogenous enactment of destabilisation: early destabilisation is about emerging 
doubts, while full destabilisation is about losing faith in the ability of the existing 
regime to cope with changes in the external environments. 
 
However, destabilisation is more complicated, as shown from the deviations from the 
ideal model. The deviations confirm the usefulness of mobilising an ideal-type as a 
heuristic that allows the identification of more subtle patterns. This underlines that the 
phase-model should be used flexibly, and not as a mould into which historical data are 
to be forced. Furthermore, the identification of deviations allows further conceptual 
refinements on particular aspects of destabilisation unfolding. 
Four types of deviations can be explained in relation to multi-level aspects of unfolding: 
1. Full industry dissolution (fifth phase) can be avoided by industry renewal 
activities (e.g. move to power generation market in the first case). The ability for 
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industry renewal requires the availability of material and institutional slack (see 
8.2.1) and opportunities in industry environments (see 8.2.2) 
2. The build-up of pressures is not as gradual as assumed in the model. Deviations 
(accelerations, reversal, etc.) can be explained in relation to external aspects of 
destabilisation: the multi-dimensionality of industry environments (see 8.2.2), 
the role of landscape developments (see 8.2.3), and interactions between the 
different levels of unfolding (see 8.2.4) 
3. The abrupt nature of destabilisation patterns observed (rapid loss of faith in later 
stages instead of the more gradual questioning of regime rules predicted by the 
model) can be explained in relation to industry inertia (see 8.2.1), but also to the 
intervention of external actors (see 8.2.2) 
4. Differences in the timing of destabilisation enactment (skipping through phases, 
overlaps, varying length of phases) can be explained in relation to different 
forms of inertia and the endogenous enactment of transformational regime 
change (see 8.2.1), and the multiplicity of simultaneous pressures (see 8.2.2). 
 
Conclusion 2: Industry destabilisation is a process by which industry actors abandon 
prevailing forms of inertia (institutional and material commitments) in an effort to 
address disruptive changes in the external environment. 
 
In the two historical cases, destabilisation has involved a discernable rupture with 
established trajectories as industry actors recognised the outdated nature of the 
associated frames of reference. 
In the first case, destabilisation involved the industry’s ‘last minute’ adaptation to the breakthrough 
of technological alternatives (the ‘four fuel economy’) that questioned the legitimacy of coal’s 
inherited monopoly over fuel industries. In the second case, destabilisation involved the industry’s 
powerless conformation to the pervasive ‘market logic’ that swept away long-standing assumptions 
about the legitimacy of maintaining a strategic domestic coal industry and its associated social 
contribution. 
Furthermore, the cases show that the ‘moment’ in which the abandonment of 
institutional logics is enacted is relatively short in relation to the more long-term 
resistance to ongoing problems, denoting the acceleration of destabilisation dynamics in 
the later phases and more shock-wise patterns of enactment. In the first case, over forty 
years of relative regime commitment (1880-1946) were followed by over a decade of 
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increasing doubts (1946-1959), and a rapid loss of faith (1959-1967). In the second case, 
destabilisation also accelerated as new logics were swiftly imposed to the industry from 
the mid-1980s, following twenty years of growing dissatisfactions. Conclusion 3 
generalises from this observation: 
 
Conclusion 3: Full industry destabilisation, arising from and overcoming a structural 
tension between industry inertia and changing external realities, may involve abrupt 
patterns of enactment. 
 
This conclusion diverges from the initial assumption according to which destabilisation 
is a gradual phased process (see 3.3.2.1). This divergence can be further explained in 
relation to specific mechanisms at play that tend to delay the enactment of regime 
change: a) different sources of industry inertia, b) associated difficulties of enacting 
transformational change, c) the attractiveness of short-term opportunities, and d) the 
availability of various forms of slack. 
 
Conclusion 3a: Industry destabilisation is delayed by the persistence of industry 
commitment to different kinds of regime rules. 
 
Indeed, industry actors will hang on to established regime rules as long as it is possible 
for them to do so. The cases show that industry responses to pressing external problems 
have appeared to be systematically slowed down by regime commitment, with industry 
actors finding it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances. This observation is in line 
with theoretical predictions, that established industry actors have an inherent tendency 
to resist change. Furthermore, the industry regime construct (see 3.2.3) has provided a 
valuable conceptualisation of the sources of inertia that explain the time lag between 
external pressures and endogenous responses. The cases suggest that industry actors 
were unable to overcome the inertia of industry regimes in a timely fashion, despite 
substantial pressure accumulation. Lasting commitment to established ways of being, 
interpreting, and doing things has prevented industry actors from foreseeing or engaging 
with the kind of structural transformations required from disruptive destabilisation 
contexts. Furthermore, building on the cases, I can provide further depth to this 
conclusion by suggesting a hierarchy between regime elements: 
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Conclusion 3b: Core beliefs are more difficult to abandon than technical and 
regulatory regime elements. 
 
Cultural-cognitive and normative regime rules are more fundamental because they are 
constitutive rules that shape ‘ways of being’. Beliefs about how to see and interpret the 
world (cultural-cognitive regime elements) have led industry actors to underestimate (or 
fail to perceive) new threats to their activities. Beliefs about who you are and what is the 
right thing to do (normative regime elements) prevented industry actors from adapting 
their normative view of the world to changing external values and expectations. 
In the first case, the British coal industry failed to interpret the threats posed by the emergence of 
alternative energy industries and the collapse of markets, because of their taken-for-granted, but 
outdated, beliefs that the coal industry was the cornerstone of the British economy, thus making its 
decline inconceivable. In the 1930s, market problems and successive warnings by Government for 
the need to change its structure were downplayed and a cartel structure where business could 
continue as usual was preferred. Even in the 1950s, amidst multiple market and legitimacy problems, 
the coal industry clung on to images of a glorious past and created visions of a glorious future, 
which prevented it from engaging with more structural problems. Only when the battle was already 
‘lost’ did industry beliefs change, recognising the threat from alternatives and accepting that coal 
was only one fuel amongst others, that it could not take customers for granted, and that the 
electricity industry increasingly formed its lifeline. 
In the second case, prevailing beliefs were about the everlasting relationship with the electricity 
industry, the nature and types of competition, but also the industry’s inherited social and strategic 
function in society. The coal industry failed to perceive and adapt to the upcoming structural market 
reforms (liberalised markets) that challenged these assumptions and led to the penetration of new 
entrants (international coal) and new technologies (the dash for gas). Even when these problems 
became more imminent and foreseeable (in the late 1980s), it focussed its adaptive response on 
productivity improvements and commercial deals, rather than taking stock of structural changes in 
energy markets and the delegitimisation of its social and strategic mission. 
In the third case, there are some signals that coal-fired generators in the UK have started to integrate 
the notion that new values about environmental concerns (namely about climate change) will 
become a necessary condition of future success. This apparent change in beliefs seems to provide a 
strong opportunity to be perceived as a legitimate industry. Long-term stability will depend, among 
other things, on the materialisation of this (for now mainly rhetorical) promise. 
Technological and regulatory regime rules relate to ways of doing things (the world of 
action), and are comparatively easier to change. Indeed, introducing new technologies, 
production practices, forms of knowledge, and regulations need not entail changing 
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commitments to existing beliefs and values. They may even contribute to the 
reinforcement of existing industry beliefs and values. 
In the first case, the industry responded to market problems by introducing important changes in 
mining techniques and technologies in successive waves (piecemeal technology diffusion in the 
interwar period and more integrated technology in the 1950s) without fundamentally questioning 
the legitimacy of the industry’s belief systems. Similarly, technological responses to the smoke 
problem were sought within the bounds of established value commitments to coal: first concerning 
the downstream uses of coal (through improvements in combustion technology and techniques in 
the interwar period), and later concerning innovation in smokeless coals in the 1950s. The 
introduction of new far-reaching industry regulations (Coal Mines Act in 1930 and nationalisation 
in 1946) tended to confirm established values and beliefs rather than displace them. The industry’s 
re-orientation and specialisation in the power generation market in the 1950s entailed technological 
and regulatory changes, but not a fundamental change in values and beliefs (to the industry’s 
strategic and social importance, and hopes of long-lived renewal). 
In the second case, the pattern is slightly different, because both forms of regime rules were 
changed in the 1980s. This can however be explained by the strong and precipitating influence of 
political power in the enactment of industry destabilisation (see 8.2.2). 
So, except under exceptional circumstances, cultural-cognitive and normative rules tend 
to be more fundamental and more difficult to question than technological and regulatory 
forms of commitment. Furthermore, the more deeply entrenched cultural-cognitive 
limitations of incumbent industry actors prevent them from seeing and interpreting 
long-term changes that are out-of-tune with routinised industry activities and 
preoccupations.  
 
Conclusion 3c: Under adverse circumstances, industry actors have a tendency to seek 
short-term protection and external support. 
 
In both historical cases, amidst adverse external conditions, industry actors have 
preferred to seek external support and protection against problems (see also 8.2.2) rather 
than implement transformational change.  
In the 1930s, efforts to regulate the industry’s structure in order to improve its economic 
performance were rapidly turned down in favour of a protective cartel that encouraged the status 
quo. From the 1960s and onwards, the coal industry based its commercial strategy on politically 
negotiated contracts with the electricity industry and import restrictions.  
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Such strategies, while providing important relief in the short term, tend to artificially 
inflate morale and hope, reinforce commitment to outdated regime rules, and thus 
reduce long-term adaptability to external changes.  
In the 1950s and 1970s, coal industry actors seized the new opportunities and articulated new 
promises about a bright future, which temporarily led to greater external support. This new 
enthusiasm may, however, have led industry actors to pay insufficient attention to deeper structural 
problems, which came back with a vengeance when macro-economic pressures changed again 
(inflation and budgetary problems in late 1950s, and oil price collapse after 1986). 
So, the temporary availability of external support despite ongoing structural problems 
tends to further delay industry preparation and response to disruptive change, and 
contributes to explain why industry destabilisation has a tendency to be ‘too little, too 
late’. This is particularly the case with capital-intensive industries, for which the 
restructuring of operations may take decades. 
However, the availability of various forms of slack also mediates the influence of 
negative external conditions, and thereby influences the unfolding of destabilisation 
processes. 
 
Conclusion 3d: The availability of various forms of slack influences the timing and 
scope of destabilisation processes. 
 
Industry slack can be related to material resources (e.g. access to finance and capital) 
and external sources of legitimacy (e.g. political support). The cases show that both 
forms of slack can crucially influence the destabilisation process: 
- industry actors may mobilise accumulated slack to halt the progression or prevent 
the need to face destabilising conditions  
- low levels of slack hinders industry ability to exploit new (technological, market, 
etc.) opportunities  
- the availability of slack is necessary for industry re-orientation and re-creation 
efforts that may avoid full destabilisation (dissolution) 
- full industry destabilisation is more likely when sustained weak performance has 
eroded material slack and political capital 
So, while the availability of slack can slow down destabilisation processes and may 
allow the mitigation of adverse conditions by enabling the development of new 
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activities, the loss of slack can accelerate industry destabilisation and lead to greater 
vulnerability to external challenges. 
Overdependence on accumulated slack may contribute to more shock-wise and cliff-
edge patterns when rapidly lost. 
The protective barriers raised in the interwar period reinforced the industry’s tendency for minimal 
structural improvements, and thereby contributed to the scope of the supply-side challenges facing 
the nationalised industry in the post-war years. In the early 1960s, the availability of residual 
material resources and some degree of political support provided the possibility for industry renewal. 
In the second case, the rapid degradation of financial slack and the loss of political support in the 
1980s – which had been so crucial to maintain the industry alive – contributed to a more violent 
destabilisation pattern with greater despair and virtually absent prospects. 
 
So, industry destabilisation is influenced by a number of mechanisms that mediate the 
degree of fit between industry actors and their environments. However, the ‘relatively 
independent development’ of change in various dimensions of industry environments 
(Freeman and Louça 2001) justifies a closer look at dynamics at play within them. 
8.2.2 Multi-dimensional pressures from industry environments 
In chapter 3, I have suggested that unfolding at the level of industry environments is 
crucial to understanding industry destabilisation processes. I here mobilise insights from 
cases to explain how the multi-dimensional nature of industry environments influences 
industry destabilisation. 
Destabilisation processes involve changes in economic and socio-political environments, 
for which a number of sources of change can be identified (see Figure 3.2). In chapters 
5 to 7, I have assessed the evolution of different kinds of pressures (see Table 5.5, Table 
6.4, Table 7.2), as well as their role in explaining destabilisation. It results from this 
analysis that all forms of change are not equal when it comes to industry destabilisation, 
which allows the following conclusion: 
 
Conclusion 4: Economic pressures tend to be the direct drivers of destabilisation, while 
socio-political pressures have a mediating influence 
In the first case, crucial destabilising pressures came from: new entrants in export markets (1920s-
1930s), changing user preferences (1950s-1960s), technological competition (1950s-1960s), and 
shrinking markets (1950s-1960s). These pressures undermined the financial performance of the coal 
industry. Policy makers propped up the industry in the 1930s and 1950s. Decreasing legitimacy 
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eroded this support in the late 1950s, and enhanced the vulnerability of the coal industry to 
economic pressures after the 1965 White Paper. 
In the second case, core economic pressures came from cheap international coal, nuclear power and 
gas. These pressures were mediated and unleashed by neo-liberal Conservative policies in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. 
These illustrations however allow to further clarify what is meant by ‘direct driver’ and 
‘mediating’, as well as to qualify the importance of economic and legitimacy criteria in 
destabilisation processes (see Figure 8.4). Indeed, in both historical cases, economic 
problems initiated the destabilisation sequence by creating challenges for industry. 
Relatively high levels of political legitimacy allowed the development of protection 
measures to moderate the influence of economic problems through the creation of 
protective buffers. However, when political legitimacy was eroded along with the 
narrowing scope of economic opportunities, the industry was faced with overwhelming 
economic challenges and experienced full destabilisation. 
economic
pressures
full destabilisation
protection
industry
challenges
relative
stabilisation
eroded
political
legitimacy
abrupt removal
of support
overwhelming
environment
stable
political
legitimacy
 
Figure 8.4: Schematic representation of the respective roles of economic pressures and political 
legitimacy in industry destabilisation processes (direct drivers above, mediating factors below, 
dotted line signifies impermeability to pressure). 
 
This schematic representation is also relevant for less visible or obvious socio-political 
processes, such as the evolution of societal issues that involves challenges of cultural 
legitimacy (see also 8.4). 
Indeed, in the first case, the smoke problem has had a mediating influence over changes on 
economic dimensions, rather than a direct effect on industry destabilisation: the anti-smoke pressure 
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had no substantial direct effect on the industry’s trajectory until the passing of tough regulations in 
1956. However, it contributed to the long-term erosion of cultural and political legitimacy, and 
provided directionality to changes in markets, customer preferences and technological alternatives, 
which eventually overwhelmed the industry. 
This latter illustration further justifies the need to focus on the role of interaction 
between and co-evolution of pressures, which I address in 8.3. 
Industry actors face ongoing, and sometimes conflicting, changes on multiple 
dimensions in their environments (see 3.2.1 and 3.3.3), which may vary independently 
as well as in conjunction. As a result, industry actors are constantly engaged in multiple 
games that may stretch their ability to navigate coherently through troubled contexts, 
and further complicates destabilisation dynamics.  
 
Conclusion 5: Industry destabilisation becomes more likely when the number, intensity 
and alignment of multiple pressures in industry environments increase.  
 
The historical cases show that industry destabilisation has involved situations in which 
industry actors became overwhelmed by the sheer number and intensity of the pressures 
they were facing, but also their degree of alignment. I thus suggest consolidating these 
categories in order to characterise destabilisation contexts.58 The intensity of a given 
pressure can be defined in terms of the mismatch between external change and industry 
performance (e.g. mismatch between supply and demand, or external expectations and 
industry goals, etc.) and thus allows identifying ‘ups-and-downs’ for individual 
problems. The number of pressures simply accounts for the multiplicity of sources of 
change exerting significant pressure on industry. Pressure alignment accounts for the 
coherence and compatibility between pressures and thus influences the overall direction 
of change adverse to established trajectories.59 
A typology of destabilisation contexts can be suggested on the basis of these 
dimensions (Figure 8.5): 
 
                                                
58 This approach bears resemblance to that of Suarez and Oliva (2005), further elaborated by Geels and 
Schot (2007). See also the related discussion in 2.2.1.3. 
59 The notion of alignment will be further elaborated when discussing pressure interaction in 8.3. 
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Number Intensity Alignment Destabilisation context
Ongoing noise
Minor pressure front
Major pressure front
Strong turbulence
Strong directed pressure
Low
High
Low
N/A
High
High
High
High
Low
High
Low
Low
High
High
High
 
Figure 8.5: A Typology of destabilisation contexts 
 
On the basis of this typology, I will discuss which kind of context is more challenging, 
and more likely to lead to industry destabilisation. 
The first two contexts (ongoing noise and minor pressure front) are unlikely to lead to 
destabilisation, because the overall amount of pressure is not significant enough to 
create major challenges that cannot be addressed within existing regimes. The three last 
contexts are worth discussing in more detail. A strong directed pressure and a major 
pressure front are likely to lead to industry destabilisation, because overall pressure is 
high (and thus challenging to the established regime), and because the degree of 
alignment is high, which means that there is a clear direction of change away from 
established trajectories. In both historical cases, industry destabilisation has occurred in 
the context of a major pressure front, in which many substantial pressures were aligned 
and rapidly overwhelmed the industry (see pressure interaction figures in chapters 5 to 
7):  
In the first case, a ‘perfect storm’ of strong pressures overwhelmed the industry, including declining 
markets, changing customer preferences, the breakthrough of alternatives, increasing policy 
enthusiasm for alternatives and scrutiny of financial performance, negative cultural framings of coal, 
and anti-smoke regulations. 
In the second case, multiple pressures became increasingly aligned as the market reform agenda 
went forward, leading to market collapse. These pressures included: cheaper imports, customer 
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dissatisfaction, new entrants and new investment criteria, favoured technological alternative 
(CCGTs), and a newly embraced environmental agenda around acid rain. 
So, the alignment of pressures appears as crucial to the formation of destabilisation 
contexts, and will be further discussed in 8.2.4 and 8.3. 
The third type of context (strong turbulence) remains ambiguous. Since my cases do not 
provide much compelling evidence about it, I can only provide a qualified theoretical 
discussion of its possible consequences. My hypothesis is that strong turbulence leads 
to major industry challenges, but is not likely to lead to destabilisation. Indeed, I 
suggest that in such cases environmental signals are too conflicting for tensions and 
uncertainties to be resolved, and are more likely to lead to ‘wait-and-see’ patterns in the 
absence of clear directed choices – thus delaying the unfolding of destabilisation. 
However, I also recognise that ongoing tensions and crises may bring major 
opportunities. Strong turbulence may rapidly turn into a major pressure front if 
powerful or daring actors are able to seize the opportunities generated by the climate of 
uncertainty and set re-configurations in motion. This discussion suggests that pressure 
interaction and alignment are important determinants of industry destabilisation. 
Patterns and mechanisms of pressure alignment will be further discussed in 8.3. 
8.2.3 Landscape developments 
In chapter 3, I suggested that the long-term unfolding of industry destabilisation is also 
influenced by deep structural trends and events playing out at the level of landscape 
dynamics (see 3.3.2.3). The cases confirm the influence of such higher-order change on 
industry destabilisation. 
 
Conclusion 6: Destabilisation is influenced by secular landscape developments, 
particularly a) gradual landscape trends and b) extreme events, because they influence 
the alignment and precipitation of pressures. 
 
a) The role of gradual landscape trends 
Destabilisation conditions can worsen in relation to higher order change in landscapes. 
Deep-structural and slow-paced landscape trends bear distal forms of causation on 
industry trajectories. Because they affect entire societies, they are powerful sources of 
pressure alignment, carving ‘avenues of environmental change’, and thus increasing the 
likelihood of concurring societal dynamics by deep structural alignment. 
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Significant changes in mentalities and broad cultural repertoires engaged in the 1930s (about 
modernity, cleanliness, etc.) had a structural influence on consumer behaviours that led to changed 
kinds of demand that contributed to framings of coal as outdated and emerging enthusiasm about 
alternatives. These dynamics, in the long run, led to the penetration of the conceptualisation and 
materialisation of the ‘four-fuel economy’. 
The emergence of the neo-liberal view of the world in the late 1970s, building on accumulated 
dissatisfaction with state intervention, gained momentum and installed itself from the 1980s and 
onwards, providing the ideological background for profound economic reforms. This paradigm shift 
fundamentally re-configured the environment of the coal industry, thereby accelerating and 
intensifying its destabilisation. Indeed, coal-fired generation was no longer perceived as an 
attractive proposition in the context of de-industrialisation and ‘free’ markets, favouring less 
capital-intensive investments with shorter payback time, and disregarding of long-term strategic 
planning. 
It has been suggested that aspirations for greener societies, economies and lifestyles may provide 
the background for the next economic paradigm shift. While the materialisation of this change 
remains questionable to this date, if it were to be confirmed, we should be prepared to experience a 
major transition in energy systems with the potential to fundamentally re-configure established 
energy regimes and industries. 
The cases thus suggest that broad macro-economic, socio-cultural and socio-political 
changes are more than the background in which destabilisation in played out: they can 
provide the macro-tensions according to which the break between the old and the new is 
formulated (by actors at different levels). 
 
b) The role of shocks and extreme events 
Destabilisation can be accelerated or halted by shocks and extreme events. The effect of 
extreme events is however mediated by contexts and preceding articulation processes. 
Punctual crises can raise the sense of urgency regarding problems, and increase public 
and political pressure. 
The London Smog (1952), for example, caused public outrage and led to the CAA (1956). But 
smog events with many casualties had happened in previous decades without similar effects. So, 
public outrage in the 1950s was not only due to the smog event, but also to the delegitimisation of 
coal in preceding decades (through smoke activism, a cultural discourse of cleanliness and health, 
and new visions of the household), and the legitimisation of alternative technologies. 
Macro-economic events affect industry destabilisation by influencing market demand, 
competitive positions and/or future expectations. This influence may enhance existing 
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destabilisation pressures, or instead contribute to the alleviation of pressures, and thus 
contribute to explain observed delays 
The Great Depression weakened markets for coal, causing economic problems for the industry. 
The 1973 oil crisis was a disruptive event in the macro-political landscape that created new 
enthusiasm for coal, because it positively influenced the competitive position of coal compared to 
oil. It led to increased availability of financial resources and political legitimacy that created the 
lasting illusion of a possible industry renewal. It was actively mobilised by the coal industry. 
The recent financial crisis has slowed down previous enthusiasm for low-carbon transitions, major 
capital investments, and energy research. This situation is likely to benefit established systems and 
favour the status quo, as it diverts attention away from societal problems. 
8.2.4 Multi-level interactions 
In chapter 3 (3.3.2), I have suggested that destabilisation results from the interaction of 
mechanisms at play in and between these different levels. I have so far discussed the 
unfolding of industry destabilisation in relation to different levels independently, with 
passing references to how these different levels are linked together. 
The cases confirm that the progression of destabilisation processes is associated with 
self-reinforcing interactions between changes at multiple levels. 
The emergence of new cultural repertoires at landscape level from the 1930s contributed to changes 
at environmental level: the consolidation of markets for technological alternatives to coal, via the 
expression of new forms of demand, and the articulation of framings according to which coal 
became seen as outdated and alternatives attracted enthusiasm. The new framings gained 
momentum and a wider public as markets developed, allowing greater customer and public 
exposure to these technologies. New entrants also actively mobilised these linkages to market their 
products in contradistinction to coal, thereby contributing to widen the gap between the old and the 
new, and creating important challenges at industry level. 
The restructuring and liberalisation of the coal industry in the 1980s-1990s materialised at the 
conjunction of accumulated problems at industry level (financial problems, lagging productivity, 
etc.), at environmental level (customer frustration, political dissatisfaction, etc.) and landscape level 
(difficult economic times, de-industrialisation, neo-liberal ideology). Although the implemented 
solution resulted from a highly politicised process, it was crucially framed in relation to these 
accumulated tensions. 
These empirical illustrations suggest that the observed acceleration of destabilisation 
processes towards the later phases can be explained by the multiplication and 
strengthening of multi-level linkages: 
- Incumbent industry actors become increasingly dissociated from their environments 
and broader landscapes (increasing mismatch) 
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- New actors in industry environments actively mobilise landscape changes as new 
frames that amplify their distinction from established regimes 
- Conversely, actors in industry environments participate in the construction of 
landscape changes through the elaboration of visions and expectations about the 
future 
- As landscape changes gain momentum, new actors, interests, values and ideas 
become increasingly interlinked and contribute to the elaboration and actualisation 
of new regimes, in contradistinction to established regimes 
- Industry actors lose their ability to shape and adapt to environmental changes as 
environmental change becomes highly embedded in landscape dynamics 
 
These observations can be further elaborated into more generalisable conclusions about 
destabilisation dynamics: 
 
Conclusion 7a: Linkages between change at environmental and landscape levels may 
build up marginally over extended periods of time without creating insurmountable 
challenges to established industries. 
 
Conclusion 7b: While industry actors can resist isolated forms of change, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for them to do so when multiple levels of change become 
interlinked. 
 
Conclusion 7c: Critical destabilisation moments arise from the synchronisation of 
multiple forces of change playing out on different levels and temporal dimensions. 
 
Conclusion 7d: The confluence of multi-level pressures on established industries 
becomes critical to destabilisation when environmental actors are able to seize the 
resulting opportunities to articulate the shift away established patterns of inertia. 
8.3 Co-evolution 
In Chapters 2 and 3 (2.2.2 and 3.3.3), I have suggested that a co-evolutionary 
perspective can enhance the understanding of industry destabilisation by reaching out to 
the mechanisms and processes participating in the articulation and acceleration of 
destabilisation contexts leading up to regime transformation. 
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The discussion so far has confirmed the importance of multi-dimensional interactions 
and pressure alignment in destabilisation processes. Indeed, industry destabilisation 
does not proceed from individual or conflicting pressures, but from the co-evolution of 
multiple forces of change that jointly challenge the viability of established regimes and 
create opportunities for more constructive dynamics to be put forward. Furthermore, the 
mutual reinforcement of environmental pressures through processes of interaction 
accelerates and amplifies destabilisation dynamics (see figures at the end of empirical 
chapters for illustrations). 
 
Conclusion 8: The destabilisation of existing industries becomes more likely when 
multiple external pressures become aligned in a clear direction. 
 
In both historical cases, full destabilisation involved the simultaneous articulation and 
alignment of multiple pressures: 
In the first case, destabilisation followed a ‘perfect storm’ pattern, in which multiple pressures 
increased and overwhelmed the coal industry between 1956 and 1965: competition from technical 
alternatives, negative cultural discourse about coal, the Clean Air Act, and the downscaling of 
government support. 
In the second case, the crucial alignment was between competitive pressures (cheap foreign coal, 
gas, nuclear power) and a macro-level (‘landscape’) political ideology (neo-liberalism), which was 
translated into radical policy reforms, causing a coal market collapse. 
Leading up to these relatively dramatic points of rupture, more pressure interactions 
build up over extended periods of time, and can be analytically isolated. Linking back to 
Figure 3.2, Figure 8.6 maps six specific forms of interaction between pressures with a 
strong potential for mutual reinforcement in destabilisation processes, for which I 
provide illustrations. I first focus on selected examples of interaction before reflecting 
on longer pressure interaction chains and their contribution to industry destabilisation. 
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Figure 8.6: Selected local pressure interactions in industry environments 
 
1. Alternative technologies and kinds of demand 
The early development of gas and electricity in niches before the 1930s, although not perceived as a 
direct challenge by the coal industry, contributed to altering consumer preferences, in turn 
stimulating the diffusion of these more ‘convenient’ alternatives in contradistinction to coal. 
In the second case, changes in the determinants of demand for power generation options (towards 
more competitive and short-term paybacks) contributed to the breakthrough of CCGT technologies, 
the success of which was associated with the benefits of liberalised energy markets.  
2. Changing kinds of demand and shrinking markets 
The diffusion of new modes of energy consumption from the 1930s gradually eroded the 
attractiveness of solid fuels and led to a decline in coal use in multiple sectors throughout the first 
case, with the exception of power generation, and thereby confirmed qualitative market changes. 
3. Societal beliefs and new kinds of demand 
The long-term progression of new collective framings and discourses about energy (smokelessness, 
convenience, etc.) shaped emerging customer demands for new energy services in the 1930s that 
provided additional momentum to these new discourses, and thereby contributed to outdate coal and 
favour alternatives. 
4. Environmental pressure groups and policies 
In all cases, pressure groups and activists have sought to influence policymakers towards the 
regulation of industry activities. Furthermore, they have been crucial in introducing new issues 
previously unattended to by industry or considered beyond the state’s core functions, such as 
environmental issues. From the 1880s to the 1950s, normative activists have repeatedly challenged 
policymakers and pressed for stringent coal smoke policies. Similarly, acid rain and climate change 
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have been brought to the attention of policymakers by engaged scientists and environmental 
activists. 
So, not only is civil society important to policies on new issues, the cases seem to 
suggest that a buoyant civil society is necessary for the emergence of such issue to the 
attention of the public and policymakers. 
5. Government support and the availability of external resources 
Because economic and industrial policy is one of the core functions of modern states 
(Dryzek et al. 2003), governments are routinely engaged in the design and regulation of 
markets and resource distribution patterns. With respect to destabilisation, this form of 
interaction can 1) stimulate industry re-orientation (via public support and funding of 
development programmes), and 2) buffering/amplification effects (by altering the rules 
of the economic game in favour of or against established regimes). 
Major industry development programmes have provided resources to support re-orientation 
attempts: in the early years of nationalisation (Plan for Coal in 1950), during the oil crisis (Plan for 
Coal 1973), but also the Wheeler plan (1986).  
The economic framework has been significantly altered during a) both world wars (through state 
control), b) with the 1930 Coal Mines Act (introducing restrictions on competition and pricing 
mechanisms), c) with nationalisation (creating a vertically integrated industry), d) with the 
institutionalisation of the four-fuel economy (WP 1967), and e) with liberalisations in the 1990s 
(fundamentally overturning long-term stable demand patterns). While a), b), and c) have been 
crucial to provide breathing space in troubled times, d) and e) have disrupted to established market 
relationships and thereby accelerated destabilisation. 
6. New entrants and technological competition 
This relationship is relatively trivial. What is more interesting is how this relationship 
has been mediated. 
In the first case, technological threats (from modern mining techniques mastered by foreign 
industries) were long kept at bay by the protection of domestic markets from these new entrants. 
In the second case, because markets were long protected from new entrants, the opening up of 
markets following liberalisation led to the rapid diffusion of new technologies (CCGT) that 
outcompeted coal-fired generation. 
 
While the above selection of illustrations from cases is not exhaustive, it provides a 
substantial amount of evidence to substantiate the following conclusion: 
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Conclusion 8a: Interactions between forces of change in industry environments can 
lead to mutually reinforcing dynamics that contribute to pressure alignment and 
generate momentum for change. 
 
However, such analytically isolated interactions, while crucial to long-term pressure 
alignment, fail to fully explain industry destabilisation processes and their timing if 
considered in isolation. Indeed, the cases show that destabilisation has proceeded from 
the cascading dynamics resulting from the articulation of multiple such forms of 
interaction in long sequences (see respective figures in empirical chapters). So, multiple 
forms of pressure interactions provide the hinge points for longer interaction chains that 
provide storylines for destabilisation processes. 
 
Conclusion 8b: The multiplication of interactions (between different types of change) 
can lead to the emergence of longer interaction chains and coherent pressure fronts 
through cascading dynamics. 
 
Furthermore, in each historical case, a specific ‘master’ alignment process can be 
identified as having significantly shaped the articulation of destabilisation pressures, 
harnessing these emergent forces in a coherent direction away from the established 
regime: 
In the first case, the breakthrough of alternatives to coal has greatly enhanced the coherence and 
coupling of multiple accumulated problems, thereby providing the definitive overwhelming 
challenge to the coal industry that led to the collapse of multiple markets. The breakthrough of 
alternatives provided a credible gradient for change, which allowed the articulation of multiple 
pressures (political dissatisfaction with economic performance, changing customer preferences and 
markets, cultural discourse on energy, changing cultural repertoires, the smoke problem, etc.) in a 
clear direction in contradistinction to coal. 
In the second case, the neo-liberal ideology and the implementation of radical economic policy 
reforms reshaped the industry’s environment through the coherent articulation of multiple problems 
(poor financial performance and related subsidies, customer captivity, outdatedness, ‘better’ 
alternatives, obstruction to imports, emerging environmental concerns, etc.) in discourse and 
practice, leading to industry collapse. 
Building on the notion of ‘gradients for action’ as higher-order constraints on the 
articulation of change (Geels 2004, see 3.3.2.3), these illustrations allow me to 
formulate the following conclusion: 
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Conclusion 8c: Far-ranging landscape dynamics, when articulating the break between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ (across different levels), can provide emergent gradients for 
multi-dimensional pressure alignment. 
 
Furthermore, this conclusion allows me to look back and reflect on a starting motivation 
of this thesis, which consisted in counterbalancing a common assumption according to 
which industry destabilisation is the result of technological challenges. I suggested that 
industry destabilisation fulfils a productive role in transitions as it may open up 
opportunities for novelty to emerge. 
The empirical cases show that the relationship between established systems and novelty 
is less unidirectional than expected: 
- industry destabilisation opens up opportunities for alternatives to break through 
- as (technological or aspirational) alternatives gain momentum, they crucially 
contribute to the destabilisation of existing industries. 
This leads me to formulate the following conclusion: 
 
Conclusion 9: The causal relationship between industry destabilisation and the 
breakthrough of novelty in transitions is bi-directional.  
 
Both processes are not only causally linked; they exist (in theoretical and material form) 
only with reference to each other in the frame of transitions. 
8.4 Societal problems 
In chapter 3, I suggested ways in which societal challenges may influence industry 
trajectories in destabilisation processes (see 3.3.4). The empirical evidence, based on 
environmental problems, confirms that the direct influence of such problems may be 
limited. 
 
Conclusion 10: Societal problems alone are unlikely to lead to industry destabilisation 
 
While societal problems can play an important role in destabilisation processes, the 
empirical evidence suggests that they are unlikely to be the main cause of 
destabilisation. 
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In the historical cases, social movements exerted pressures relating to environmental problems 
(smoke, acid rain). The direct effects on destabilisation long remained limited, because policy 
makers shielded the industry, because public opinion was limitedly concerned (in the first case), and 
because industries used political and framing strategies to defend themselves. 
In the second case, the problem of acid rain had virtually no influence on the destabilisation process, 
because it was kept off the political agenda until the late 1980s, at which time it was 
opportunistically tied to the liberalisation agenda as an ex-post justification of alternative 
technological preferences.  
Societal concerns about climate change are thus unlikely to destabilise existing 
industries on their own. However, the cases also show that environmental issues can 
gain traction when they are expressed in conjunction with economic factors (e.g. 
alternative technologies, changing customer demands, accumulated dissatisfaction, 
shrinking markets), or broader cultural trends (e.g. cleanliness). 
Furthermore, the cases show that the evolution of societal issues is a slow process, as 
suggested by the issue life cycle literature (see 2.2.3.1). The early stages are likely to be 
characterised by strong industry resistance and avoidance who tend to ‘wait and see’ 
before major regulation or policy is developed. 
The coal smoke problem took many decades, from early framings in the late nineteenth century to 
serious legislation in the 1950s. Crucial steps bringing the issue forward included the education of 
the public, the professionalisation of the anti-smoke movement and the refinement of its claims, 
trial-and-error with poorly enforced regulatory attempts, the development of credible technological 
alternatives, the opportunistic mobilisation of a major crisis. 
In the second and third cases, while the issue of acid rain progressed in relation to the evolution of 
scientific framings and political and public mobilisation, industry actors first responded with denial 
and counter-framing, re-directing attention on the natural occurrence of the environmental damage, 
the natural resilience/tolerance of natural systems, and uncertainties in monitoring proxies. Later on, 
as consensus began to emerge, they adopted ‘wait and see’ strategies, delaying responses and 
obstructing action before major regulation or policy is implemented. 
The cases thus confirm that industry actors are unlikely to address normative problems 
spontaneously, as long as they are not perceived as challenges to established trajectories. 
The existence of a vibrant and politically determined civil society is crucial for societal 
problems to be considered by industry actors. 
8.5 Lessons for sustainability transitions 
This thesis has also sought to address a second research question related to 
contemporary challenges: 
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What lessons for current sustainability transition challenges can be derived from an 
understanding of destabilisation and the insights from the historical cases? 
 
This research has suggested that the destabilisation of established industries is crucial to 
socio-technical transitions. Furthermore, my cases have shown that industry 
destabilisation is a long-term process, unfolding over decades and involving many 
concomitant forms of change. In light of my historical examples and findings, I aim to 
formulate qualified lessons for current sustainability transitions. 
Transitions to low-carbon energy systems cannot be assumed to materialise in the near 
future, and are likely to take many decades. Indeed, the climate problem, although it has 
achieved major steps in building scientific consensus, mobilising the attention of the 
public and policymakers, and has aligned aspirations towards visions of low-carbon 
societies, faces numerous challenges:  
a) the alternative technologies put forward are still judged unviable by many, 
b) it faces considerable resistance from fossil-fuel industries and fossil-fuel rich 
countries, 
c) policy implementation is still at its early steps and is filled with loopholes, 
exemptions and fragile half-hearted commitments, 
d) public awareness has not yet materialised in serious behaviour change towards 
low-carbon lifestyles or mainstream consumer preference changes 
e) macro-economic and energy consumption patterns point in the wrong direction 
(economic crisis drives attention away, and globally more energy-intensive 
lifestyles complicate the challenge) 
f) macro-political trends seem to disengage with the trend towards greater global 
cooperation. 
Difficult as they may be, transitions to environmentally cleaner energy systems have 
however occurred in the past (Fouquet 2010). My cases have confirmed that the 
destabilisation of established energy industries is inherent to such transitions. 
Contestation and challenges (cultural, political, economic) are as important as the 
development and breakthrough of alternatives in transitions. Destabilisation is thus a 
relevant focus for advocates of low-carbon transitions. Low-carbon transitions can be 
accelerated if both the build-up of alternative systems and the destabilisation of 
established regimes are tackled simultaneously. 
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Furthermore, the following more detailed points can be derived from historical cases in 
order to inform current challenges: 
1. Established industries are likely to resist change and long remain committed to 
regime rules 
This means that substantial pressure over the climate problem or against centralised 
energy systems will not be enough to destabilise fossil fuel based industries. Instead, we 
can expect these industries to resist such pressures and fight back in order to keep a 
stronghold in their core businesses. As seen from the third case, it can be suggested that 
many energy-related industries have moved beyond the initial phase of problem denial, 
and may be between the second and third phase of the enactment model. Indeed, coal-
fired generation in the UK is still committed to its inherited regime, but has 
acknowledged serious problems and is demonstrating efforts to devise technological 
solutions (e.g. CCS). However, it remains to be seen whether and how these will be 
developed. Furthermore, the proposed solutions do not entail a fundamental change in 
core beliefs and are not expected to displace existing competences. On the contrary, the 
development and up-scaling of CCS technology as a low-carbon option is likely to 
stabilise the existing (fossil fuel based) regime through the introduction of new forms of 
commitment. 
2. Societal pressure around climate change is not assured to remain at the top of 
public and political concerns 
Indeed, the historical cases show that the salience of societal problems may follow more 
irregular patterns (‘ups-and-downs’, interruptions, etc.), as other problems come to the 
fore of public and political attention, or industry actors mobilise successful counter-
framing strategies. More specifically, I suggest that scientific and political consensus 
about the causes of climate change has been reached in the international arena, despite 
remaining pockets of resistance. However, societal demand for low-carbon economies 
is still in its infancy, as a better-informed public is finding it hard to engage with and 
commit to low-carbon lifestyles (and abandon high-carbon habits). Similarly, but 
perhaps more critically, economic growth – a major obsession of governments and 
societies for decades – is showing no signs of decoupling from carbon emissions. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis and the following recession have reshuffled political 
and private priorities towards the more traditional functions of the state to provide 
protection and the conditions for prosperity, and comparatively lower degrees of 
priority for such grand societal challenges as climate change. However, as shown in the 
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third case, industry actors seem to have taken up the issue on a rhetorical level, which is 
already a hopeful step away from its denial. 
3. Climate change aspirations alone are unlikely to destabilise existing high-carbon 
industries. 
The historical cases show that economic pressures tend to prevail over socio-political 
pressures in destabilisation processes. However, societal problems can gain traction if 
formulated in conjunction with economic forces. So, it is likely that the destabilisation 
of fossil fuel industries will involve pressures in the economic environment (e.g. 
resource exhaustion, new kinds of demand, alternative technologies, customer 
dissatisfaction, weakened profitability, etc.). The influence of climate change over the 
destabilisation of high-carbon industries will thus depend on the development of 
positive interactions with such economic problems. 
This means that proponents of low-carbon transitions have to find creative ways of 
linking societal aspirations to economic processes such as the creation of new markets, 
improved services, new customer demands, etc. Some of the economic attributes of 
renewable energy options have so far failed to gain mainstream traction (e.g. self-
sufficiency, price/performance, long-term savings, etc.). Public support for societal 
transitions is not only related to public awareness about the issue, but also to the 
perceived attractiveness of the proposed alternatives. Indeed, while public opinion was 
long aware of the smoke problem, the issue only gathered significant momentum when 
it was associated with hopeful aspirations and visions of the future. This means that for 
low-carbon transitions to materialise, the associated visions needs to become culturally 
integrated and socially desirable (e.g. linked to improved status). So the attractiveness 
of low-carbon lifestyles should be attended to and actively constructed. 
4. The role of government support is a double-edged sword in destabilisation 
processes.  
While a certain amount of protection might be desirable to weather difficult economic 
circumstances, the cases show that industry actors tend to take advantage and remain 
dependent on external sources of support, even when these have lost their initial 
relevance (e.g. necessity or desirability). In both cases, governments have found it 
difficult to step away from commitments to support established industries. Increasing 
policy frustration with industry attitudes have however led to decreased legitimacy and 
political capital. The resulting removal of government protection has been found to 
accelerate destabilisation and contribute to shock-wise destabilisation patterns in which 
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industry actors are precipitously confronted with adverse environments. Lifting 
subsidies for the consumption and production of fossil fuels – estimated to an annual 
US$ 650bn worldwide (UNEP 2011) would therefore greatly contribute to their 
destabilisation, but also pose difficult social challenges (related to industry collapse and 
resulting unemployment). However, because fossil-based business is currently 
profitable, it is not sure how much of a destabilising effect such a removal of subsidies 
would have. Designing more conditional and temporally limited forms of support in 
difficult times may prevent this form of political lock-in in the future, provided new 
industries can curtail the associated negative socio-economic effects of industry decline 
by allowing the conversion and re-deployment of workers and competences. 
Furthermore, while policymakers have a responsibility for the pervasiveness of 
established industries and vested interests, they may also have the power to abolish such 
privileges provided a legitimate mandate, determination, and coherence in 
implementation. 
5. Political determination can lead to major normatively guided structural reforms, 
even in the presence of strong industry resistance. 
The implementation of ideologically motivated market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s 
shows that industries can be deliberately destabilised. This provides credit to the 
possibility for economic conditions to be radically altered in relation to specific 
aspirations, effectively shifting the balance between incumbents and contenders. 
Working on the articulation of ongoing problems and prospective solutions (proposals), 
(political) entrepreneurs can thus become central actors for the introduction of radical 
changes in framework conditions that may precipitate destabilisation processes and lead 
to the alignment of existing pressures. 
In the second case, determinant aspects of the introduction of substantial change in frame conditions 
included: 
a) The pre-existence of problems and dissatisfaction with the established industry 
b) The mobilisation of latent disappointment for the critique of the established regimes 
c) A discursive framing that contributes to making the proposed reform more acceptable to public 
perception 
d) The articulation of visions of change and hopeful expectations for large-scale industrial 
transition 
e) The build-up of authority and legitimacy for the implementation of difficult transition reforms 
f) The availability of alternatives and new entrants to introduce them. 
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The simultaneous existence of these or parts of these conditions provided substantial 
windows of opportunity for the introduction of change. Such windows are however 
short-lived (Kingdon 1984). 
In the case of low-carbon transitions, it is doubtful whether changes in economic frame 
conditions – however radical – would be enough to lead to systemic change in low-
carbon directions. Furthermore, efforts at setting a high price for carbon have so far 
stalled upon the resistance and lobbying power of energy-intensive industries. This 
problem is further complicated by the globalised nature of energy industries. 
6. A related point concerns the changing pattern of state-economy relationships 
over the long-term. 
Indeed, the acceptability of state intervention has varied through the cases: state 
intervention is by definition difficult to argue for in a country attached to liberal values 
such as Britain, but has nevertheless been found acceptable in exceptional times and 
beyond (e.g. WWI, Great Depression, WWII, post-war reconstruction), and can be 
considered to have been relatively high for British standards between 1920 and 1970. It 
is thus not unthinkable that stronger government intervention, and the resulting greater 
coordination of strategic industrial policy choices could make a comeback in Britain 
some day. In this case, providing clear normative direction (such as low-carbon 
imperatives) for the development of energy markets, infrastructures and industries 
would be less difficult. 
7. The elaboration of credible alternatives and the destabilisation of established 
industries mutually reinforce each other in transition processes. 
The cases show that cultural criticisms, political contestations and technical challenges 
to existing systems are equally important as the elaboration of desirable alternatives. 
Without the accumulation of problems with existing industries, and the positioning of 
alternatives in contradistinction to these, neither destabilisation nor breakthrough would 
have occurred. This suggests that advocates to low-carbon transitions, already involved 
with the development of alternative technological options (e.g. renewables, energy 
efficiency, etc.), should equally attend to means and strategies to destabilise established 
industries. Weakening the cultural, political, economic and technological dimensions of 
fossil fuel related industries is just as important as stimulating green options. 
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8.6 Discussion: Research goals, contributions, limitations and areas for 
future research 
8.6.1 Nature of the theoretical goals 
In this thesis, I have sought to make an original theoretical contribution to the 
transitions literature. I have considered ‘big’ questions, related to socio-technical 
transitions, destabilisation processes and the role of societal problems in transitions. 
Such ‘big’ questions can be defined as follows: 
“questions about large-scale outcomes that are regarded as substantively and normatively important 
by both specialists and nonspecialists.” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:7) 
I recognise that this is an ambitious and hazardous undertaking, with serious 
implications and limitations for theoretical claims. 
This research has explorative and conceptual aims. Because of the limited 
comprehensive body of work on destabilisation within the transitions literature, 
substantial conceptual elaboration was required, and represents a substantial original 
contribution of this thesis. Various literatures have provided valuable insights on 
economic decline and de-institutionalisation processes, providing represent substantial 
bodies of work for theoretical elaboration. 
Furthermore, I have aimed to address three major aspects of destabilisation jointly 
(long-term unfolding, multi-dimensional co-evolution, and the role of environmental 
problems). These crosscutting research challenges relate to classic problems and 
common struggles in the social sciences. I have mobilised them as three ‘transverse’ 
scopes for contribution. Because, to my knowledge, no existing perspective on 
destabilisation addresses these challenges jointly, I developed a new perspective, which 
enabled me to address new questions of relevance to current societal and academic 
concerns.  
However, theory-building was not done from scratch, as a number of aspects relevant to 
destabilisation processes can be found in a wide array of literatures. For this reason, I 
mobilised insights from a number of different approaches, using them as ‘building 
blocks’ for theoretical elaboration. Chapter 2 thus served the purpose of identifying and 
collecting such ‘building blocks’. I then combined them to formulate an integrative 
conceptual perspective on destabilisation processes (in chapter 3). 
I am aware that such an integrative and multi-disciplinary approach to theory-building 
also potentially raises a number of criticisms: 
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1. A first criticism relates to addressing fundamental problems in social science, 
which tend to be seen as endless debates between and within disciplines.  
My strategy was not to search for a definitive answer to the three ‘transverse’ issues 
taken up, but rather to develop a perspective that puts these fundamental problems at the 
core of theoretical elaboration. I thus mobilised such theoretical tensions as the ‘glue’ to 
assemble different theoretical building blocks together. 
2. A second criticism relates to disciplinary stretching: by mobilising too many forms 
of explanation one takes the risk of sacrificing depth for breadth.  
Theory-building always involves trade-offs between depth and breadth. In this respect, 
my approach leans towards greater breadth, which is justified by the kind of question I 
ask. I developed a more ‘transverse’ approach that identifies linkages (common research 
problems and analytical shortcomings) between existing views. In practice, I took a 
combinatorial approach to theory-building, based on (fragmentary) building blocks 
from various literatures and suggested their combination in a synthetic perspective. In 
order to do this, I have identified potential linkages and anchoring points between 
different perspectives that allowed me to put the emphasis on connections between 
various disciplines, rather than disagreement. 
8.6.2 My contributions 
In this thesis, I have made a number of contributions: 
- I have elaborated an original perspective on industry destabilisation that is attentive 
to unfolding at multiple levels, co-evolutionary processes, and the role of 
environmental problems. I have done so by building on extant literature and 
combining ‘building blocks’ from different existing views. 
- I have undertaken three case studies of destabilisation in coal-related industries in 
Britain, constructing analytical narratives on the basis of theoretical categories. 
- I have generated a number of conclusions that reach out to core mechanisms of 
industry destabilisation. 
- I have generated insightful lessons for current societal challenges on the basis of 
historical cases. 
8.6.3 Qualifying the scope of the conclusions 
I have generalised from a small number of cases that present geographical, historical 
and sectorial specificities. The findings thus have to be qualified, so that they can be 
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mobilised in further research in full knowledge of their limitations. How do the 
specificities of my cases affect the scope of my conclusions? 
Firstly, the cases are limited to the specific geographical scope of the United Kingdom. 
Although international developments have been considered as they affected the British 
industry (e.g. international competition, foreign capital injection, global policy 
considerations, etc.), the findings are mostly relevant to national systems. Furthermore, 
the British geographical context may display unique particularities that may have 
affected the unfolding of destabilisation. 
a) The British coal industry has been characterised by strong embeddedness 
(especially in the first case with multiple markets), owing to Britain’s early 
involvement in historical industrialisation phases (based on coal) and its long-
lived commitment to coal. This means that the resulting patterns of inertia 
observed are likely to be particularly strong. Other, less extreme, destabilisation 
cases may thus display less resistance to change and be comparatively more 
rapid. 
b) The British context is also one in which specific notions of political economy 
have prevailed throughout history. Indeed, the first case has revealed the 
importance of laissez faire in determining government’s ability to interfere with 
industrial activities, reminiscent of ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs) (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). This might be very different in contexts like France, which has a 
longer tradition of strong state involvement in economic affairs. Furthermore, 
the UK has been central to the long-term instalment of the neo-liberal doctrine 
from the 1970s, which had such a strong influence on industry development in 
the second case. Countries more temperate in the introduction of market reforms 
may have allowed the smoother decline of their coal industries in the 1980s. 
Comparing destabilisation cases across varieties of capitalism may lead to 
different conclusions. 
c) Britain has long been among the most developed and powerful economies in the 
world. The conclusions drawn from British cases are thus more directly relevant 
to countries with similar development patterns. I have made only passing 
comments on the rapid development of coal-fired generation in other countries 
(e.g. India and China). Major recent investments in coal in these countries may 
result in long-term stability rather than upcoming destabilisation. 
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Secondly, the empirical material has been restricted to three historical periods, although 
spanning over a century. The historical context has had a strong influence on the 
mechanisms at play. This has been evidenced through variations in the relative 
influence of societal mechanisms across cases. To give but a few important examples: 
a) The role of civil society has changed significantly across cases. Mostly local and 
constituted of influential individuals until the early 1900s, civil society became 
better organised (first as ‘societies’ and later as ‘organisations’), consequently 
more resourceful, growing in influence on national decision-making, and leading 
to greater involvement of the general public. These changes have allowed the 
success of the anti-smoke mobilisation in the 1950s, but are also crucial for the 
advancement of environmental problems in more contemporary settings. The 
relative infancy of civil society mobilisation around problems related to the 
natural environment at the beginning of the twentieth century may explain the 
difficulties of putting the smoke issue on the political agenda. Furthermore, the 
role of civil society is likely to be more important in determining current 
industry development patterns, which may explain the comparatively rapid rise 
of public and political attention to the climate change issue in the third case. 
b) However, industry actors have become more powerful and organised with the 
rise of multinational corporations, which means that the inertia of established 
industries may also be comparatively stronger. Large firms today are highly 
resourceful, heavily engaged in lobby politics and influencing public debates. 
The resulting power and informational asymmetries (between firms and civil 
society, between firms and governments) may contribute to stall the progression 
of societal contestation of industry activities and thus make industry 
destabilisation comparatively more challenging. 
c) The relationship between the state and the economy, and the resulting influence 
of market forces has also differed between cases. During world wars, and during 
the nationalisation period, the influence of market forces on industry 
development was tempered by strategic imperatives and the search for the 
greater good. Comparatively, market forces can be seen as being relatively 
influential today, and especially acute in economic recession, which suggests 
that the internationalisation of common goods in current economies may be 
comparatively more difficult. 
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A more general point raised by these illustrations is that the relative strength of 
environmental pressures (and their role in industry destabilisation) is bound to change 
over time (as well as between specific cases): the environmental dimensions put 
forward in the conceptual framework and their interactions are not a-historical. 
However, mobilising cases from different historical periods and engaging with 
historical embeddedness has allowed me to reach a deeper level of generalisation about 
industry destabilisation that balances the time-bound nature of the dynamics unveiled in 
each case. 
 
Thirdly, the empirical material covered in this thesis concerned a specific type of 
industry. Indeed, the cases are related to energy industries, and more specifically coal. 
The coal-mining and coal-using industries covered have important characteristics. 
a) They are large, capital-intensive industries. This means that they require 
substantial investments, with relatively long payback periods (10-20 years), and 
capital renewal periods (30-50 years). A major consequence is that long-term 
planning is an inherent part of activities in such industries, and that 
responsiveness to short-term market changes is very difficult. This condition 
might lead to above-average degrees of industry inertia. Furthermore, we can 
expect an important role for government intervention to correct or protect from 
more volatile market conditions for such industries. So, other types of industries 
may destabilise more rapidly (because of lower inertia) and experience less 
governmental mediation. 
b) They are related to a bulky natural resource. Fossil fuels are natural resources 
that are limited, and have to be extracted. Such industries are exposed to 
structural constraints: reserves are bound to diminish and become increasingly 
difficult and costly to extract. This has been a fundamental problem of coal 
mining in the UK. Production problems (resource-related, process competition, 
etc.) are likely to be more prominent in extractive industries more generally. 
c) They relate to the strategic societal function of energy provision. Indeed, energy 
is an essential human need, and is thus relatively inelastic. This means that 
demand for energy can be expected to be relatively stable over time, and major 
changes to be related to the introduction of substitutes. Furthermore, because 
energy is an essential need, ensuring the continuity of energy supply over time 
appears to be a highly strategic issue, one that governments have been willing to 
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take on. It results that this kind of industry is likely to receive substantial support 
in times of crisis. Industries with similar features include agri-food businesses, 
water supply, housing, and banking (under current socio-economic 
circumstances). 
 
The above limitations thus qualify the generalisability of findings, and suggest 
additional criteria for case selection in future industry destabilisation research.  
8.6.4 Qualifying the kinds of conclusions 
Taking a process approach to explanation has allowed me to explain how industries 
change over time in destabilisation dynamics. I have gained access to developmental 
patterns, provided insights on a number of basic mechanisms, and have suggested 
crucial processes that allow retrospectively explaining how destabilisation has unfolded. 
I have done so by elaborating a basic understanding of the sources of industry stability, 
and an ideal model of industry destabilisation as a heuristic against which to evaluate 
real-world cases. The longitudinal case narratives have provided empirical evidence that 
broadly matched this model, but also pointed to significant deviations. The analysis and 
cross-comparison of these deviations has allowed theoretical refinements and reaching 
out to core mechanisms. 
Rather than searching for specific factors and causes, I have privileged another kind of 
explanation that is attentive to processes of unfolding. My purpose was not to establish 
the superiority of this approach over others, but rather to enhance the understanding of 
destabilisation from this particular perspective. It has allowed me to gain privileged 
access to the hows of change, but also to a specific kind of whys of change by looking 
into the motivations, beliefs and interests of actors. Furthermore, this research has 
sought to explore the phenomenon rather than test specific hypotheses.  
While the conclusions do not allow me to forecast the specific timing of destabilisation 
processes, uncovering the interaction dynamics at play in historical destabilisation 
processes across societal domains, levels of process, and temporality has allowed me to 
generate a number of lessons of theoretical relevance for transition studies and of more 
practical relevance for current and future transition efforts. 
 
Destabilisation appears as both the point of rupture when regime commitment is 
abandoned (related to significant events that can be identified within a relatively short 
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timeframe) and the long-term process leading up to this breaking point. Critical 
destabilisation turning points arise amidst the long-term accumulation of tensions 
between industries and their environments, thereby producing historical breaking points 
between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’. The research has confirmed that such critical ruptures 
can be understood by looking back in time to unveil the proximate and more distant 
causes of industry destabilisation, as well as understanding significant events as the 
time-critical outcomes of co-evolutionary processes. Adopting long time horizons for 
the study of change allows reaching out to important processes of cumulative change 
and causal chains (Pierson 2004, Burke 2005, Sewell 2005) – and thus transcending the 
search for ‘immediate causes’. By attending to the co-evolution of processes unfolding 
at multiple levels, I have thus reached conclusions that other approaches would have 
overlooked. While the destabilisation of carbon-intensive industries might eventually 
materialise as an immediate consequence of radical policy initiatives (or the 
breakthrough of a technological solution) the exact form of which we cannot predict, 
the possibility for such a rupture to materialise will necessarily be the result of longer-
term processes of change in multiple dimensions (markets, policy, technology, culture, 
etc.) and their articulation – possibly in the form of a crisis. 
In terms of societal relevance, I have argued that advocates of low-carbon transitions 
can enhance the effectiveness of their efforts by adopting an interest in the 
destabilisation of specific industries. Indeed, the inertia of established high-carbon 
industries may be the single most powerful barrier to transitions to a low-carbon 
economy today, stalling innovative efforts, the momentum of socio-cultural change and 
political determination. 
8.6.5 Underexposed themes and areas for future research 
In this thesis, I have only begun to address what I have identified as a research neglect. 
A new research agenda could emerge in transition studies from this initial exploration. 
A number of important aspects of destabilisation processes have emerged from this 
research. While they go beyond the scope of this thesis, they are worthwhile mentioning, 
as they could provide fruitful ground for future research. 
A first requirement to consolidate the claims put forward in this thesis concerns the 
increase of the evidence base and the exploration of different kinds of cases. Indeed, the 
conclusions of this thesis could be further exposed, refined and modulated on the basis 
of a greater number of cases and their comparison. This could potentially lead to the 
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elaboration of more detailed patterns, destabilisation typologies and generally finer 
grained analyses. 
Another point for future improvement concerns the refinement of concepts put forward 
in this thesis. Indeed, the exploratory nature of the research has led me to make use of 
loosely defined notions. I have mobilised the notion of commitment to refer to the 
coherence of industry actions with prevailing institutional logics, and have assumed that 
changes in industry commitment (to a set of rules) can be traced over time. The notion 
of alignment has been mobilised to refer to the degree to which particular pressures 
evolve in a similar direction (away from established regimes), and has been applied 
across environmental dimensions as well as across levels of unfolding. I have suggested 
that alignment is crucial in destabilisation processes but have not systematically 
elaborated on different forms of alignment, which can be a) coincidental, b) the result of 
collaborative interaction (e.g. coalition), c) via expectations and visions, d) because of 
shocks and crises, e) through constraining landscape changes, etc. How can the multi-
level aspect of these two central notions (commitment and alignment) be more 
investigated more systematically? 
The mutual influence of destabilisation and the breakthrough of novelty has appeared to 
be crucial in transition processes. Transitions research should thus attend to the co-
evolutionary nature of this relationship, so as to improve the intelligibility of both 
processes in relation to each other. Research questions that could be pursued include: 
How can the long-term unfolding of destabilisation and novelty creation be analysed 
jointly over transitions processes? How does the co-evolution of destabilisation and 
novelty play out in different transitions pathways? 
I have repeatedly referred to the importance of political intervention in mediating the 
influence of destabilisation pressures and industry responses. Furthermore, the 
introduction of new economic policy frameworks is crucial in the context of purposive 
transitions, when normative ideals are at the root of transformative activities. My 
findings concerning the role of policy in destabilisation processes remain anecdotal and 
could benefit from more systematic research. Research questions that could be pursued 
include: How can destabilisation processes be fostered, or accelerated, and under which 
conditions? How can policy actively facilitate destabilisation processes? Are some 
forms of support more useful than others in specific destabilisation contexts? A more 
practice-oriented set of questions relates to the rationales and justification of policy 
support in destabilisation contexts: How can policymakers know when to support, and 
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when to drop support? What forms of conditional support can best contribute to long-
term industry stability? 
In this thesis, I have shed some light on relationships between multiple levels of 
unfolding in destabilisation processes. Multi-level embedding has appeared as an 
important determinant of destabilisation dynamics, especially as it influences the 
acceleration and alignment of pressures. However, the integration and consideration of 
multi-level embeddedness by industry actors has been barely touched upon, and 
provides a fruitful area for future research. Indeed, industry actors experience 
difficulties to conciliate long-term outlooks with short-term imperatives. This inability 
is however crucial for adaptation to adverse contexts. Research questions that could be 
pursued include: How effective have foresight activities and long-term strategies in 
industry for industry re-creation (a side observation from the case is that industry actors 
are relatively bad at this, and tend to be overoptimistic)? What types of organisational 
structures and activities may increase the ability of industry actors of coping with long-
term change? 
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